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Israel’s Invasion Seeks To Keep Syria Divided

By Alexander Langlois, a Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities and analyst focused on the Middle East. Follow him on X @langloisajl and BluSky @langloisajl.bsky.social.

The collapse of former President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 ushered in a generational political transition in Syria. Yet, as the country works to rebuild and heal after nearly 14 years of brutal conflict, Israel appears dead set on malignly stymieing Syria’s transition, territorial integrity and continuity, and basic sovereignty.

Indeed, Israel is pressuring Syria today under the guise of protecting minority groups in the country. The effort constitutes an extension of Israel’s “periphery doctrine” and “alliance of minorities” strategies – long central components of Israel’s broader regional effort to bolster its security through alliances with potential shared enemies of Sunni majority states. As such, Tel Aviv aims to operationalize real or perceived minority concerns in Syria to justify clear violations of its northern neighbor’s sovereignty, advancing its overarching security interests. Such efforts risk reigniting Syria’s civil conflict and should be rejected by the international community.

Israeli Violations of Syrian Sovereignty

Less than one day after the Assad regime collapsed on December 8, Israel quickly moved to secure its interests inside Syria. IDF soldiers captured the Syrian side of the disengagement zone along the disputed Israel-Syria border separating the illegally occupied Golan Heights from the rest of Syria. It has since captured and illegally occupied numerous towns in southwest Syria’s Quneitra Governorate – the country’s second-smallest province, which contains the Golan Heights.

Israel’s decision to invade Syria coincided with a sweeping bombing campaign across the country. In an estimated 480 strikes, Israel targeted the former Syrian Arab Army’s military infrastructure and assets, including bases, weapons stockpiles, aircraft and military airports, and supposed chemical weapons sites. The goal of the operation, according to Israeli officials, was to eliminate any Assad regime weapons that could fall into the wrong hands. These strikes continue today.

Yet Israeli officials originally stressed that these operations would be temporary, mindful of both the illegality of their actions and global public opinion against its broader regional operations over the last 16 months. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu then claimed on December 17, 2024, that Israeli forces would remain until an arrangement that “ensures Israel’s security” would be put in place. This announcement reflects a substantially deeper and more nefarious goal, as Tel Aviv couples national security rhetoric with expanding operations over time.

In this regard, Israeli leaders view Syria’s new rulers – senior leaders from the former Al-Qaeda-affiliated Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – as an immediate threat along their occupied northern border in the Golan. For Israel, the thought of another Islamist militia or armed entity on their border reflected the ongoing threat from Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Lebanon – a threat they largely eradicated in 2024.

That military operation in Lebanon highlights a drastic shift in Israel’s military strategy since the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023. Given the brutal success of Hamas’s operation in breaking through Israel’s security systems that have long blockaded Gaza, the military establishment in Israel adopted a strategy of enhanced border security on a national scale – namely by rejecting the most remote threats along those borders through the use of military force.

As such, Israel continues to expand its illegal occupation of southern Syria. Israeli Defense Minister Katz announced an indefinite occupation of the newly captured Syrian territory on January 28. Then, on February 23, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded that the southern Syrian governorates of Quneitra, Dara’a, and Suwayda remain demilitarized, threatening the use of force should Damascus deploy in these areas.

The threat effectively nullifies any sense of Syrian sovereignty while extending the Israeli exception to international law further into Syria and just miles from the capital of Damascus. Israeli officials have amplified ethno-sectarian tensions across the country to bolster those threats, claiming Israel’s self-proclaimed role in protecting Syria’s minority groups – including Alawites, Kurds, Druze, and Christians.

In one particularly telling instance, Israel repeatedly insisted it would use military force to protect the Druze, a major minority group in southern Syria – particularly in Suwayda Governorate. Tel Aviv cited so-called violations against the Druze in Jaramana, a densely populated and ethnically diverse suburb of Damascus with a sizable Druze population.

Working with small and disparate Druze groups, the Israelis argued that Druze spiritual and political leaders supported an alliance – something that Druze leaders immediately and publicly rejected. Unfortunately, this did not prevent days of violence between Damascus’s new security forces and some of these minor Druze factions, resulting in many deaths.

Understanding the risks, Syrian leaders have criticized Israel’s actions without escalating the situation. This position reflects Damascus’s weakened state. Indeed, it is in no position to challenge Israel or the broader West as it hopes to garner sanctions relief necessary for a successful transitional period. With its military and economy in shambles, it can ill afford a conflict with a rogue Israeli state that will simultaneously eradicate any hope to rebuild the country and provide for its people.

Israel’s Intentions in Syria

Ultimately, Israel’s efforts post-Assad are designed to create facts on the ground that advance their interests now and in the future. Tel Aviv expects some form of negotiations with Damascus that will dictate state-to-state relations for generations should the transition succeed. Thus, the Israeli government is collecting as many bargaining chips as possible ahead of potential talks.

To put it lightly, this approach is dangerous. Israel appears willing to induce ethno-sectarian infighting within Syria to ensure the transition fails to produce a territorially contiguous Syrian state. It is doing so by co-opting minority fears in a country where the previous regime used sectarianism to sow distrust throughout the population in a classic autocratic divide-and-rule strategy that left Syria’s social fabric destroyed.

Israel likely hopes to use this pressure to induce a series of concessions from Damascus under the threat of collapsing the state, resulting in the balkanization of Syria. In this context, the goal is to prevent any serious threat to Israeli interests or territory from inside Syria. As such, Tel Aviv could hope to dangle full recognition as an alternative – an item Assad was previously negotiating alongside a break from Iran in exchange for sanctions relief and a general Western acceptance of his victory in the war.

Given that this so-called victory was anything but real, Israel is hoping to get the same or a similar outcome from Syria’s new rulers at gunpoint. At minimum, they likely hope for Syria’s recognition of Israel’s claim to the Golan Heights. Both goals are non-starters for Damascus, which would not dare risk its limited legitimacy during a highly unstable transition period by recognizing Israel or its illegal occupation and annexation of its territory.

To be sure, Washington previously made offers their counterparts could not reject under US President Donald Trump’s first term in office – an effort that led to the infamous Abraham Accords. Morocco received US recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara; Sudan was removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list; and the UAE received numerous preferential deals. It is not unrealistic to assume Washington could bolster Israeli efforts to induce a false “peace” between Syria and Israel, especially given the former’s listing on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list since 1979.

Still, Syria could turn to other countries for support – namely Russia and Turkey. The latter is particularly important as it represents Israel’s other major concern in Syria. Ankara directly and strongly backed the opposition during Syria’s civil war, aggressively demanding Assad’s ouster and positioning itself well in today’s post-Assad Syria as a result. Given the total collapse of Israel-Turkey relations today, both view Syria as a battleground in their growing competition for regional power and influence.

Israel is working to ensure Turkey cannot realize its military goals in Syria. Ankara hopes to build multiple military bases in the country – something Tel Aviv worries could re-ignite Syria’s long-running role as a resistance front to its illegal occupation of Palestine and neighboring lands.

In line with the Israeli goal to not allow real or perceived threats on its borders, it is working to prevent this potential future. Yet, just as its military operations could inadvertently produce a new rival state in Syria, Israel’s efforts to weaken the country will likely force Damascus to rely more heavily on Ankara. Thus, the short-sighted nature of Israel’s strategy comes into full focus.

Preventing a Disaster

The international community cannot allow any regional actor to thwart or distort Syria’s transition in ways that could either upend the country or permanently tear it apart. Indeed, efforts should be focused on ensuring Syrians can lead their transition with minimal to no impediments – especially those that would harm Syria for another entity’s political gain. Washington can play a central role in this regard while retaining a light-touch approach to any post-Assad transition.

The Trump administration should temper Israeli actions in Syria, overtly and covertly pressing them to forego illegal military operations within and illegal occupation of Syria’s sovereign territory. This can be framed as supporting Israeli security – namely that occupying a neighboring country’s land creates long-term strife that could produce a Hezbollah-equivalent entity in Syria. Stressing that Syria is not interested in competition or conflict with Israel, and that Washington and Israel can work with regional partners to ensure that reality is sustained, should be central to this approach.

Washington should also coordinate with regional actors – particularly Turkey – to further ensure Syria does not remain a playground for regional and international actors to compete. Guaranteeing and supporting positive role for Ankara that does not use Syria to raise tensions with Israel is crucial in this regard as Israel views Turkish influence in the country with suspicion, if not hostility. Such efforts can bolster the parallel goal of reigning in Israel.

Finally, Washington should work with the new Syrian government to disincentivize any potential response that could escalate the situation and produce further Israeli encroachment on their territory. The United States still holds economic and diplomatic tools that can lightly steer the Caretaker Government in the best direction for Syria’s transition to succeed. Of course, this approach must reject micromanaged nation-building or any heavy-handed approach to Syria’s transition. Officials can openly back the Damascus government and gradually provide terror designation relief to reinforce this effort.

Ultimately, all states should support Syria’s political transition given the country’s geographic positioning as the “Heart of the Middle East” and out of respect for its people’s resilience and democratic aspirations after 14 years of war. Preventing unhelpful and short-sighted policies that harm that transition should be central to any actor with a stake in Syria today. Bargaining Syrian security for one of its neighbors will only produce more of the same instability that has plagued the Middle East for decades – a scenario no administration in Washington should promote or accept as pre-determined.

Trump Resurrects Old Nuclear Nightmares, Destroying Agreements that Protect America

Joe Cirincione is the vice-chair of the Center for International Policy’s board of directors and the author of Nuclear Nightmares: Securing the World Before It Is Too Late.

Donald Trump is tearing down the barriers that for decades have blocked the global spread of nuclear weapons. In pursuit of an alliance with Russia, he is recreating the nightmare nuclear scenarios that haunted America in the 1950s and 1960s, and that decades of bipartisan American policy prevented from coming to life.

In the 21st century American Presidents have largely viewed the problem of new nuclear weapons as a “rogue state” problem. During the War on Terror, US policy worked to prevent terrorists or countries seen by the US as sympathetic to terror groups, specifically Iraq, Libya, Iran, and North Korea, from getting the Bomb.

Now, Trump’s efforts to please Putin by betraying Ukraine and undercutting America’s commitment to defend Europe threaten to drag the world back to the dangerous nuclear anarchy of the 1950s and 1960s when dozens of countries considered getting the most powerful weapons humankind has ever invented.

Keeping Americans in, Russians out, Proliferation managed

The NATO treaty signed in Washington 76 years ago this April 4th, was, in part, a treaty to stop the spread of these weapons. The United States was then the only country in the world with atomic bombs. President Harry Truman assured the European allies that he would use all of America’s military might to protect them from any attack from the Soviet Union. They did not have to get their own atomic bombs.

This extended deterrence was not, by itself, convincing enough for all NATO members. The United Kingdom got its own nuclear arsenal in 1952 as did France in 1960 despite the security assurances. Another framework was needed: the arms control and disarmament commitments embodied in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), negotiated in 1968 and ratified by the Senate under Richard Nixon in 1970.

That treaty and the associated mechanisms provided the diplomatic and legal framework that assured countries that if they choose not to get nuclear weapons, they would be part of the international norm. The nuclear-armed states promised to negotiate their reduction and elimination; the non-nuclear states promised never to get them. This gave countries the assurance that if they did not get nuclear weapons, their neighbors would not either. This was enough to convince Sweden, the last European country with a weapons program, to end its efforts in 1968.

Those two basic frameworks are now at risk. NATO allies believe that they can no longer depend on the United States to honor its treaty commitments to come to their aid if Russia attacks. Emergency meetings throughout Europe now focus on developing new, independent security arrangements. Leaders in Germany and Poland openly speak of acquiring nuclear arsenals. If they leave the NPT to develop their own weapons, the non-proliferation regime will collapse. There will no longer be the global political, diplomatic and legal restraints that we have taken for granted. There could be a dozen new nuclear-armed states, not just the “rogues” but our closest allies.

Germany’s likely next Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, said that “My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA.” The European Union’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, says “the Free World needs a new leader.” French President Emmanuel Macron has offered to discuss having his nation’s arsenal of 290 nuclear weapons serve as a Euro deterrent force — and Poland, Germany and Denmark say they are open to the idea.

But could a French or British nuclear umbrella open to replace the one Trump is closing?

Collapsing the Nuclear Umbrella

Consider Europe’s new dilemma. If Putin prevails in Ukraine — and Trump is doing his best to help him win his war — he will certainly pursue his territorial ambitions with Moldova, Romania, the Baltic States and Poland. He will certainly make new demands on all of Europe, backed by veiled or direct nuclear threats. Yale historian Tim Snyder writes that should Russia prevail, should Ukraine be defeated, then “nuclear weapons will spread around the world, both to those who wish to bluff with them” – the way Putin has done in his war on Ukraine – “and those who will need them to resist these bluffs.”

These nations might be able to rely on a French nuclear umbrella with Macron in power, but what if far-right leader Marine Le Pen becomes president? She has already said that “French defense must remain French defense.”

Could Germany step into the breach? It certainly has the ability to build nuclear weapons. But if the pro-Putin, far-right AfD party, already the second largest party in Germany, takes control, Germany’s weapons would certainly not protect other nations from Putin. Worse, if America walks away from NATO while bolstering these anti-American parties, “it will lead to a Germany once again led by fascists and willing to arm itself with nuclear weapons,” warns New York Times columnist Bret Stephens.

Poland could reasonably conclude that it must develop its own arsenal. Polish President Donald Tusk is already preparing for a post-NATO future, pledging to increase military spending, have every man undergo military training and adding, “We must be aware that Poland must reach for the most modern capabilities also related to nuclear weapons and modern unconventional weapons.” Sweden, Norway and others might feel the same.

*From “Development of nuclear capabilities by fourth countries: likelihood and consequence”, a July 1958 assessment*

We have seen this dynamic before. The first comprehensive national intelligence assessment of the risk of nuclear proliferation was in the Eisenhower administration in 1958. It assessed that 16 nations had the ability to produce nuclear weapons. Twelve were in Europe, including West Germany and Poland.

That is why President John F. Kennedy asked us to consider “what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament.”

In nonproliferation’s twilight, disarmament’s dawn?

Kennedy understood that non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are two sides of the same coin. He tried to limit both existing arsenals (most dramatically with the 1962 Limited Test Ban Treaty) and prevent new ones. Reducing existing nuclear arsenals helps convince other nations not to get them; stopping new programs gives states the confidence to reduce their stockpiles. You cannot do one without the other.

This core truth must guide the three steps we must take to avert the nuclear nightmares Trump has unleashed. First, future presidents will have to recommit to the collective defense of Europe. Second, to prove we mean it this time, America must have an urgent action plan for reducing the global nuclear arsenals, launching negotiations with Russia and China that can eventually bring in as many of the other six nuclear-armed states as possible. Finally, the next administration must rebuild the interlocking system of treaties, controls and security agreements that Trump and Putin are tearing down.

To kill the nuclear nightmares now rising from the grave, Democrats will need their own Project 2029 plan, and be willing to implement it as rapidly as Trump has implemented his.

Ordinary Republicans like Marco Rubio are Dismantling American Foreign Policy

Rui Zhong is a writer and researcher living in the Washington D.C. metro area. She studies China, censorship, and technology’s role in nationalism and foreign policy

Donald Trump began his second Administration allowing Elon Musk to spearhead a sweeping ransacking of the federal workforce, beginning with foreign policy. Tasked with overseeing the rapidly dissolving network of embassies and formerly independent USAID offices is Trump’s Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a longtime Republican fixture within American foreign policy. Rubio is working with colleagues within the Trump administration to renege, avoid or otherwise thwart attempts to make good on financial and policy commitments in the international space. In conjunction with the Department of Justice, Rubio argued (in his secondary role as the terminal Administrator of USAID) that the United States had no obligation to pay out frozen aid contracts already committed to ongoing projects – and then declared the overwhelming bulk of them terminated

Pay What’s Owed. Foreign policy spending, while directed by the Secretary of State, must pay out what is allocated by Congress, and a Secretary of State should resign rather than authorize DOGE-scale cuts.
Vote Against Appointees Without Guarantees. Senators should look beyond congeniality when confirming nominees to execute bipartisan foreign policy
Design future aid institutions with an eye towards safeguarding them against the kind of sabotage authorized by Rubio.

The thorough complicity of Marco Rubio and other institutional Republican stalwarts goes far deeper than mere verbal hypocrisy. Within Trump’s first administration, Rubio identified the problem of Trump’s conduct against Ukraine following impeachment by the House of Representatives, but ultimately declined to convict him.

“Can anyone doubt that at least half of the country would view his removal as illegitimate — as nothing short of a coup d’état?” Rubio wrote at the time in a blog post justifying his decision. “It is difficult to conceive of any scheme Putin could undertake that would undermine confidence in our democracy more than removal would.”

Five years later, Rubio’s entry and active participation in the second Trump Administration reflects a shift in conventional Republican culture, a highly visible reminder of the party’s transformation from one that first mocked, then reluctantly welcomed Trump, to one that is fundamentally about Trump. On international relations in particular, mainstream Republicans have changed to accommodate Trump, with Rubio only the latest member of the cadre to bend the knee.

Of all the selections by Donald Trump for the Cabinet of his second administration, Rubio has the longest tenure within Republican politics and conservative spaces. Foreign policy was one of the ways Rubio had appealed to moderates and even liberals, taking photo opportunities with Hong Kong dissenters and through his service on the human rights-centric Congressional-Executive Commission on China.

During his confirmation hearings, Democratic Senators praised the cordial lines of communication they maintained over the course of his fourteen-year Senate career. “You and I have also had a good working relationship for many years,” said Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH). “I believe you have the skills and are well qualified to serve as secretary of State.” The Senate voted to confirm Rubio 99 in favor with no dissents, greeting Rubio’s nomination to Secretary of State as the promise of a steady hand to steer foreign policy.

Most of his former Democratic colleagues likely did not envision Rubio rushing to sign off on decisions such as abruptly ending funding the Fulbright Program, nor his sullen silence as Trump and Vance berated Ukrainian President for lack of deference during a March 1st Oval Office Meeting. When asked about his opinion of the meeting by CNN, Rubio said: “I think he should apologize for wasting our time for a meeting that was gonna [sic] end the way it did.” Putin’s schemes were not mentioned. Likely, such topics are not encouraged under the Trump administration.

It is easy to understand why Democratic Senators might have expected Rubio to continue the hawkish but structurally normative habits of his Senate career. During Trump’s First Administration, then-Senator Rubio and most Republicans stuck to a baseline level of support for American soft power institutions and foreign policy practices. Non-political staffers were not subject to executive office oversight, and the Hill mostly consulted agencies for technical information in a neutral relationship. The second Trump administration began instead with a bombastic declaration to cut departments, a process rhetorically and explicitly guided by Elon Musk, through his role in the new Department of Government Efficiency.

Elevated to Secretary of State, Rubio capitulated to these cuts almost immediately, discarding the values-based steps he took to secure the cabinet nomination in the first place. As the White House cut State Department offices like the office of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, he accepted such closures as collateral damage in service of the same fictional concept of cutting government to efficiency pursued by Musk and his hit team of hired henchmen. At the time of the writing of this piece, Rubio also allegedly pursued the usage of AI to deport students that appeared “pro-Hamas.” He also moved to exempt a wide swath of policies from public commentary during draft phases, removing a mechanism that allowed for democratic input on policies under consideration. And he has, the New Republic reports, “terminated a contract that was in the process of transferring evidence of alleged Russian abductions of Ukrainian children—a potential war crime—to law enforcement officials in Europe.”

Rubio’s foreign policy doctrine and its wide-ranging surveillance and policy process changes would not look out of place in the authoritarian regimes he’d pursued hawkishly as a Senator. It is not unheard of for politicians to change opinions or policy positions as they rise in power and prominence, nor is it unorthodox practice for them to discard previously-held values at the apex of that political climb. Rubio’s opportunism, however, stands out because he presides over a particularly monumental and irreversible demolition project. If Rubio took the position under the hopes that he would guide foreign policy as he had from the Senate, he has instead been tasked with dismantling the very institutions needed to execute US diplomacy in the world. Partners, contractors and grantees in the United States and abroad cannot forget or experience in reverse the betrayal they feel at getting abandoned. Because Rubio put his face and name to the abandonment, there can be no lifeline offered from any other mainstream Republicans, unless an unforeseen sea change occurs.

Immediate monetary disbursement and assurance given to grantees, allies and partners are the absolute minimum of what would be needed to restore this historic crisis of confidence in the U.S. foreign policy institutions. Money obligated to agreements are a cornerstone of maintaining the reputation of the United States as an implementation partner on the most fundamental diplomatic, consular and development policies. Based on current trajectories of agencies and programs being cut, frozen or suspended, Rubio and the purportedly “stabilizing” element of the Republican party can be written off as uninterested, unwilling or unable to curb the impulses of Musk and Trump.

In the Face of Trump’s New Term: A Stronger, Honest, and Progressive Europe

Pere Aragonès i Garcia is a former President of Catalonia, having served from 2021 to 2024.

There is no doubt about the crucial importance the coming years will have for history and how Donald Trump’s renewed presidency, which is just beginning, will unfold—not only for U.S. citizens but also for other regions of the world, especially Europe. It is an uncontested victory that we must understand well. In a context of accelerated global changes—geopolitical, economic, demographic, climatic, and technological—the difficulties this may generate for the rest of the planet, and for Europe in particular, are clear. We must remain vigilant and react decisively and swiftly.

One of the main concerns from this side of the Atlantic is the impact on democratic institutions and the rule of law during these rapidly changing times. Trump’s traditional disregard for the separation of powers and shared rules, as evidenced by his role in the January 2021 Capitol assault, poses a problem not only for the U.S. but for the world as a whole. Europe is all too familiar with the implications. The European far-right and right-wing populism see Trump as a reference point, both for the substance of his policies—financial deregulation, protectionist nationalism, and opposition to civil rights—and for his style. His disdain for democratic institutions, attacks on the media and press freedom, and use of falsehoods as political tools are now being emulated by many representatives of the reactionary movement in Europe.

This is why now, more than ever, we must reaffirm a firm defense of democracy, respect for the system of checks and balances, and the preservation of rigorous, ethical political debate, free from lies. This is more necessary than ever.

At the same time, in a world that is increasingly globalized yet more multipolar, with the rise of new global powers such as China and India, a U.S. commitment to defending multilateralism and a rules-based world order is more critical than ever. This includes the need for a democratic Syria that respects its internal diversity. Moreover, we urgently need to work tirelessly and without excuses toward a definitive peace in both Gaza and Lebanon, with all parties assuming their clear responsibility. We cannot look the other way, nor can we afford the indiscriminate killing of civilians. It is intolerable. History will judge our generation if we fail to do everything possible to end these atrocities, whether in this conflict or wherever our capabilities can reach.

Regarding Europe, it is essential that the historic transatlantic defense alliance maintains a strategic partnership rooted in democratic values, the defense of a just international order that upholds human rights, and the ability to preserve peace and democracy. The destabilization of this alliance, as could be anticipated during Trump’s presidency, is exactly what Vladimir Putin desires to accelerate his plans for Ukraine and possibly beyond, including in Moldova, the Baltic states, or the Balkans. At the same time, this would weaken the European Union’s position, forcing it into strategic dependence on Russia—something that must be avoided not only for geopolitical reasons but also to preserve democratic values on the continent. This would be harmful to Europe, its allies, and, consequently, the United States. Similarly, seeking internal advantages at the expense of other democratic states, as recently seen in the Greenland issue, is equally damaging. All territories have the right to be respected and to freely determine their future without external interference.

Europe and the U.S. must strengthen their strategic economic alliances for mutual benefit. We are witnessing a global economy undergoing a profound disruption of value chains, with an increasing risk of strategic dependency on non-democratic states for raw materials and intermediate products. Technological development, decarbonization, combating climate change, and the production of goods and services must be well-governed. At the same time, a political and economic relationship with the Global South must be based on mutual respect, inclusive development, human rights, and democracy. This is, and must remain, a demand of the citizenry.

We cannot afford delays, especially in implementing progressive economic policies that guarantee quality jobs for everyone. However, the coming years are likely to head in the opposite direction. Prioritizing internal interests and opting for isolationism and unilateralism would be a grave mistake. Should this occur, we must remain calm and return to the path of collaboration as soon as possible, standing firm democratically and convincing citizens through bold, transformative progressivism—not just ideology.

During President Biden’s term, significant strides were made, such as adopting climate policies that placed decarbonization as a cornerstone of economic and international policy. The U.S. and Europe must act together, aiming for much more ambitious measures to mitigate climate change. A U.S. president who denies scientific evidence, as Trump does, is paving the way for the acceleration of irreversible global warming. This affects all of us and especially our future generations. There is no time to waste.

Above all, defending human rights must remain a shared value between Europe and the U.S. In a demographic context where migration flows toward Europe and the U.S. will persist—albeit at varying intensities—any migration policy must incorporate a humanitarian perspective. Europe, where the struggle between border closures at the expense of human rights (championed by the right and far-right) and a pragmatic, humane migration policy is ongoing, needs a U.S. where individuals’ rights to forge a future in freedom and security are not only promoted but fully guaranteed. Progressives must be coherent and responsible, addressing this complex issue without succumbing to pressure from ultra-populism.

The American people have spoken clearly. Donald Trump is the new president, and if he fulfills his commitments, the coming years will be challenging for rights, freedoms, and relations with Europe. We must stand firm and build global democratic alternatives.

From Catalonia, where we work to defend rights, freedoms, and a fairer world, and where we continuously strive to improve the welfare state and equal opportunities, we recognize the importance of maintaining and strengthening the understanding and solidarity with progressive and Atlanticist United States. We will be here, ready to steer in the right direction, now and when the time comes. From Europe, we echo Eleanor Roosevelt’s words: “True patriotism springs from a belief in the dignity of the individual, freedom and equality not only for Americans but for all people on earth, universal brotherhood and goodwill, and a constant striving toward the principles and ideals on which this country was founded.”

Duss: Trump’s Gaza Proposal is Less Original Than He Thinks

Trump’s Gaza ethnic cleansing plan reflects the same disregard for Palestinian rights that has handicapped U.S. policy for decades. He’s making the same mistake as past administrations, just in a bigger and uglier way, argues Matt Duss in a new Foreign Policy analysis. He writes:

While it’s possible that Trump has proposed the mass expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza as a bargaining ploy, creating a potential “concession” out of thin air, we shouldn’t lose sight of the gravity of this moment.

The president of the United States has made the commission of a crime against humanity the explicit policy of his administration. The fact that Trump sees such a proposal as within the realm of acceptable discussion is itself a reflection on our deeply broken and corrupt political discourse, especially as it relates to the Palestinians.

While Trump’s proposal was particularly offensive, Tuesday’s press conference with Netanyahu demonstrated more continuity than many in Washington would like to admit. The spectacle of a U.S. president and an Israeli prime minister presuming to determine between themselves the future of the Palestinians is emblematic of decades of U.S. policy toward the conflict and a key reason for that policy’s consistent and continued failure. Trump is making the same mistake as past administrations, albeit in a bigger and uglier way.

Read the full piece on Foreign Policy or at the PDF below.

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The Illusion of Opportunity in Attacking Iran

Sina Toossi is a senior nonresident fellow at the Center for International Policy.

In the wake of a fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, the Middle East stands at a critical juncture. The recent agreement, brokered with the involvement of both the outgoing and incoming US administrations, has halted hostilities for now, but its durability remains uncertain. Amid this tenuous peace, Israeli leaders, emboldened by President-elect Donald Trump’s historically supportive stance, reportedly see a prime opportunity to push for direct war against Iran—a goal Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pursued for decades.

Exacerbating these tensions is the possibility of Trump doubling down on his “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran, which dismantled the Obama-era nuclear deal and inflicted crippling sanctions on Iran’s economy. Reports from The Wall Street Journal reveal Trump is even weighing military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Yet, in his inaugural address, Trump remarked, “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win, but also by the wars that we end, and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into.” This juxtaposition highlights a critical decision between diplomatic de-escalation and military action

Trump would be wise to pursue diplomacy. Granting Netanyahu the U.S.’s backing for such a conflict would further destabilize the region, heighten already white-hot anti-American sentiment, and derail Trump’s broader agenda. For Iran hawks, these shifting circumstances may seem like the ideal moment to act, but such enthusiasm dangerously ignores the lessons of Israel’s recent wars and the complexities of the region’s current security landscape. If Israel failed to decisively defeat a smaller non-state adversary like Hezbollah, how could it expect success against a well-fortified state like Iran? A preemptive strike would almost certainly provoke massive retaliation, fail to topple the Islamic Republic, and risk igniting a far-reaching, devastating conflict.

Instead of courting disaster, U.S. and Israeli policymakers should seize the moment to pursue diplomacy. Renewed negotiations and a verifiable nuclear agreement could deliver real security while steering the region away from catastrophic war.

Hezbollah’s Survival as a Cautionary Tale

Advocates of a strike on Iran often overlook a critical lesson from Israel’s recent conflict with Hezbollah: even with a relentless military campaign, Israel failed to decisively neutralize a much smaller non-state adversary. Over months of intense fighting in Lebanon, Israel launched an extensive air assault and a punishing ground invasion aimed at crippling Hezbollah’s arsenal. While Hezbollah suffered significant losses, including the assassination of its leader Hassan Nasrallah and senior commanders, its ability to strike Israel was not eliminated. Throughout the bombardment, the group continued firing rockets, missiles, and drones deep into Israeli territory. Major population centers, including Tel Aviv, were hit just days before the ceasefire, causing casualties, widespread displacement, and severe economic and psychological insecurity.

This experience offers two key lessons for policymakers. First, Israeli military superiority is not the absolute guarantee of success it is often assumed to be. Second, if Israel struggled to decisively defeat Hezbollah, a non-state militia, it is unrealistic to expect a knockout blow against a fortified state like Iran. Iran’s defense systems, nuclear facilities, and missile and drone stockpiles are far more robust and dispersed. Recent history underscores that a swift, clean military solution is less a viable strategy and more a dangerous illusion.

Iran’s Retaliatory Capabilities and the Costs of Escalation

Critics of diplomacy also often underestimate Iran’s ability to defend itself and respond effectively to an attack—a miscalculation fraught with danger. Over the past year, the back-and-forth strikes between Iran and Israel have vividly demonstrated Tehran’s growing military capabilities and its capacity for retaliation. For instance, on October 1, Iran launched a coordinated missile and drone attack on Israel, bypassing advanced Israeli air defenses and inflicting both material damage and insecurity. In response, Israel struck back on October 27, targeting Iran’s Russian-made S-300 air defense systems, ballistic missile production facilities, and solid fuel manufacturing infrastructure for long-range missiles.

Hawks portray the Israeli strike as a decisive blow, leaving Iran vulnerable to a low-cost U.S. or Israeli attack. Yet even Israeli officials disagree. The Nagel Committee in Israel recently confirmed that the country does not have the capability to launch a decisive attack on Iran’s military and nuclear facilities without U.S. support. Former IDF spokesperson and air defense commander Ran Kochav reinforced this reality, cautioning, “I would cautiously say they [Iran] still have strength left; it’s not as if this morning they have no air defense system at all and are completely exposed.” Retired Major General Yaakov Amidror warned an attack without U.S. coordination would risk severe retaliation requiring American intervention.

Despite Israel’s recent attack, many of Iran’s air defenses remain intact, bolstered by advanced systems reverse-engineered from Russian, Chinese, and U.S. technology. In recent military drills, Tehran has showcased its readiness, simulating responses to airstrikes and unveiling new underground “missile cities” alongside advanced drones and missiles. These moves send a clear signal: Iran is prepared to retaliate forcefully against any attack.

A large-scale assault on Iran’s nuclear facilities would all but guarantee a massive retaliatory campaign—one that could escalate beyond Israel’s borders to U.S. forces and partners in the region. At best, military strikes might set Iran’s nuclear timeline back by a few years. But at worst, such an action would ignite a far-reaching conflict that compromises energy security, endangers U.S. personnel, undermines regional stability, and strains diplomatic ties with allies who have no appetite for another protracted conflict in the Middle East.

Why a Foreign Attack Won’t Topple the Islamic Republic

A persistent idea among hawkish policymakers is that a foreign military strike could trigger the collapse of the Islamic Republic. But this belief overlooks a powerful force within Iran: nationalism. History shows that foreign aggression tends to unite Iranians against the invader, fostering a sense of shared solidarity that could bolster, rather than weaken, the ruling theocracy.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has long attempted to stoke dissent within Iran, even addressing Iranians directly multiple times in recent months to portray himself as some sort of savior against their repressive government. However, the aftermath of Israel’s October strike on Iran reveals the futility of this strategy. Instead of sparking mass opposition to the government, the attack plunged ordinary Iranians into fear and uncertainty. Civil society leaders and groups, pro-democracy activists, and political prisoners alike issued stark warnings: war would derail prospects for democratic change, not hasten them.

The reaction from everyday Iranians was equally telling. Many took to the streets—not in protest against the regime, but to mourn the soldiers killed in the assault. These moments of collective grief underscored a broader truth: foreign attacks are broadly seen as assaults on the nation itself, not just its government.

Far from weakening the Islamic Republic, a military campaign is likely to strengthen its hold, at least in the short term, and deepen the challenges faced by those fighting for a freer and more democratic Iran. The lesson for policymakers? Toppling the regime from the outside isn’t just wishful thinking—it’s counterproductive.

A Better Path Forward: Diplomacy and a Deal

With the risks clear, the pressing question remains: How can policymakers prevent Iran’s nuclear program from advancing while avoiding a devastating regional war? The answer lies in reinvigorated diplomacy.

The 2015 nuclear deal provided a proven framework for freezing and even rolling back key elements of Iran’s nuclear program. Next October, the UN sanctions “snapback” mechanism—a crucial part of that deal—expires, and if triggered by France, Germany, and the UK, it would automatically reinstate sanctions. Iran has warned that such a move would force it out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), destroying remaining safeguards and leaving diplomacy in tatters.

This looming deadline demands urgent action. If the Europeans trigger snapback, the reimposition of UN sanctions and Iran leaving the NPT would dramatically increase tensions and make future negotiations infinitely harder. Policymakers must prevent this domino effect by re-engaging diplomatically now.

Diplomacy offers tangible, achievable benefits that make it the most viable path forward. A revived or updated nuclear deal can reimpose verifiable restrictions and intrusive inspections on Iran’s nuclear program, significantly hindering any covert pursuit of a nuclear weapon. It also creates critical channels of communication that can help address broader regional flashpoints, reducing the risks of miscalculation and violent escalation. Furthermore, by incorporating economic incentives, diplomacy has the potential to empower civil society within Iran over time, avoiding the backlash and rally-around-the-flag effects that often result from military action or coercive measures.

Policymakers in the U.S. and Europe have a narrow but critical window to prioritize negotiations. Restoring or updating a nuclear deal—while leveraging the pressure of sanctions and Iran’s own economic vulnerabilities—offers the best path to curbing Tehran’s nuclear ambitions without plunging the region into chaos.

Biden, Trump and the Impact of US Pressure on Gaza Ceasefire Deal

Stephen Semler is a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and author of the Polygraph newsletter on Substack.

The Israeli government is slated to meet today to ratify the recently-announced ceasefire deal with Hamas, despite mixed messages from Netanyahu on implementation and resistance from some of his most extreme ministers. The Israeli government is slated to meet today to ratify the recently-announced ceasefire deal with Hamas, despite mixed messages from Netanyahu on implementation and resistance from some of his most extreme ministers. For its part, Hamas remains committed to the ceasefire agreement, and has reportedly urged president-elect Donald Trump to pressure Israel to honor its initial commitment. Pressure is what had been missing from Joe Biden’s approach.

The framework of the deal is nearly identical to the ceasefire agreement Biden presented from May. At the time, Biden stated that Israel had initiated the proposal, but Netanyahu dismissed it as a “nonstarter” the next day. Netanyahu then derailed negotiations by introducing new demands, such as the permanent occupation of Gaza’s border with Egypt, which appeared to be aimed solely at undermining the deal. Negotiations over a ceasefire and hostage release stalled thereafter. The fact that the agreement announced Wednesday is nearly identical to the one proposed in May suggests that Israel has since abandoned some of the key demands that previously sabotaged the deal.

What changed? As far as US actions are concerned, Biden and Trump both credited themselves for the diplomatic breakthrough, and are now jockeying for the greater share of it. “I laid out the precise contours of this plan on May 31, 2024,” Biden declared in a statement. “My diplomacy never ceased…to get this done.” That’s true, but Netanyahu publicly rebuffed the plan, embarrassing the administration. Yet, when presented with a nearly identical proposal seven months later by Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, Netanyahu agreed to it.

The difference was Trump’s willingness to pressure Netanyahu—pressure Netayahu knows he is better off not to resist. Arab officials reportedly told The Times of Israel that Trump’s envoy “swayed Netanyahu more in one meeting than Biden did all year.” While Netanyahu brushed off Biden, Trump “bulldozed” him into accepting the deal, according to Haaretz. A diplomat familiar with the negotiations told The Washington Post that Trump’s intervention was “the first time there has been real pressure on the Israeli side to accept a deal.” Former Democratic Congressman Tom Malinowski acknowledged this dynamic, writing, “This was Biden’s deal…but he couldn’t have done it without Trump.” Malinowski credited the breakthrough to Trump’s blunt warning that the war must end by January 20, contrasting this with Biden’s reluctance to exercise similar leverage.

The Biden administration pretended it was powerless to shape Israel’s behavior over the last year. For instance, in February, State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller claimed, “There is a mistaken belief that the United States is able to dictate other countries’ sovereign decisions.” Meanwhile, the administration was sending Israel new weapons shipments every 36 hours, on average. These shipments empowered Netanyahu’s government to reject ceasefire agreements and pursue its preferred course of action instead, namely, continuing its genocide of Palestinians in Gaza.

Without the unprecedented levels of military aid approved by Biden, Israel’s war machine would have ground to a halt. Retired Israeli General Yitzhak Brik underscored this, stating, “All of our missiles, the ammunition, the precision-guided bombs, all the airplanes and bombs—it’s all from the US. The minute they turn off the tap, you can’t keep fighting. Everyone understands that we can’t fight this war without the United States. Period.” Instead of forcing Israel to accept a ceasefire, the Biden administration spent tens of billions in US taxpayer dollars incentivizing Netanyahu not to. Achieving the current breakthrough did not require Trump’s election but rather a change in course from the policy Biden enacted and Kamala Harris endorsed on the campaign trail.

The path forward is clear: Trump must sustain pressure on Israel. Without it, the massacres that have continued even after the ceasefire announcement are likely to persist. If Trump’s administration fails to maintain this pressure, Netanyahu’s statement from last month may become a grim reality: “If there is a deal—and I hope there will be—Israel will return to fighting afterward. There is no point in pretending otherwise because returning to fighting is needed to complete the goals of the war.”

Fortunately, the United States holds immense leverage over Israel. It is crucial to question whether the Trump administration will use it effectively to ensure the ceasefire progresses past its initial stages and leads to a lasting ceasefire, one that involves the unconditional release of hostages and political prisoners, a total Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and implementation of security and reconstruction efforts needed to allow Gazans to return home.

This piece was co-published with Common Dreams.

Cooled Prospects for Gender Justice from COP29

Anmol Irfan is a Muslim-Pakistani freelance journalist and editor. Her work aims at exploring marginalized narratives in the Global South with a key focus on gender, climate and tech. She tweets @anmolirfan22

For years, gender activists have been trying to draw attention to the disproportionate ways in which the climate crisis has been affecting women and girls. Studies show that by 2050, climate change may push 158 million more women and girls into poverty, which is 16 million more women and girls at risk than men and boys at the same level. For gender activists, there were small victories at this year’s United Nations COP29 climate change conference, held in Baku, Azerbaijan, but overall morale seems low as many find progress within this arena slow and tiring.

COP 29 participants described the discussions as slow in many ways – and the intersection of gender and climate has been one of them. Following the conclusion of the conference, some of the victories recognized with the gender justice space have included the extension of the Enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender, for 10 years which will help hold governments accountable as they implement their climate policies. There was also an acknowledgement of gender within climate finance goals and an increase in participation of women at the conference, though it was late in the conference. With COP29 wrapped up in Baku this year, gender activists leave Azerbaijan fatigued and unsure about the future of their work.

“I’ve been to so many COPs and this was one of the hardest ones” says Elise Buckle, founder of Climate Bridges and SHE builds bridges, when talking about what it was like to be in the room when gender just policies and solutions to climate change were being discussed and proposed at this years COP29 in Baku. “ We thought we wouldn’t have any texts, and then at the last minute we got it [extension of the Lima Work Programme ] so it gives me hope that this can be a floor not a ceiling”, she adds.

Despite pushing for gender just solutions for decades, many have called this COP a “disappointment” and questions remain about whose responsibility it really is to accommodate the needs of women and girls within climate justice.

What Went Wrong?

Lorena Aguilar, Executive Director at the Kaschak Institute for Social Justice for Women and Girls, describes the conversation around gender justice as constantly being in motion between success and failure. “When you talk about women rights and when you talk about gender equality , it’s like a pendulum, sometimes they [leaders] ignore, sometimes they accept and that’s what is happening with the UNFCCC,” she says.

At Baku, it seems the pendulum swung the wrong way. As one of the nine stakeholder groups of the United Nations Framework Convention For Climate Change (UNFCCC) the Women and Gender Constituency was one of the main groups leading the call for more focus on gender-just initiatives during the conference. Environmental lawyer, researcher and activist Claudia Rubio Giraldo, who was one of the co-coordinators of the Gender Working Groups and the WGC’s representative in the room for many of the gender related negotiations, expected parties to move onto negotiations that built on red lines set by previous discussions.The Women and Gender Constituency typically divides areas around which red lines are often established into three groups: finance and implementation, language, and praxis. Rather than start from this point, Rubio says that backtracking on many previous discussions [by many countries who had an issue with the language around gender] made it tough to be in the room. She points out that despite parameters being set in forums before COP, many parties wanted to re-negotiate boundaries which meant actual action plans didn’t go forward till much later.

“There was a backtracking of previously agreed human rights language,” Rubio says. She’s talking about how the use of the term “women in all their diversity” became an issue at this year’s conference, as many other gender advocates also pointed out.

Much of the contention came from conservative countries, led by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Russia and the Vatican, who felt that the use of the word ‘diversity’ within gender related language meant supporting LGBTQ communities, which is a topic many of those governments still have issues with. But while it’s sometimes easier to pass the burden of this thinking onto more ‘conservative’ countries, Imali Ngusale, founder of the African Center for Health, Climate and Gender Justice Alliance, also adds that there had been speculation that the US was supporting Saudi Arabia, which many believe was for personal gain.

“In the past 2 weeks we saw how parties stepped forward to accommodate women “women in all their diversity”, and other countries opposed this. There’s significant language that remains bracketed around diversity. There’s a war around narratives and that’s how we’re coming to see how different countries and different parties receive lang around it,” says Natalie Sifuma, founder of Sisters in Climate.

Another barrier that gender justice groups faced was the lack of women within decision making and leadership positions. “In terms of the lack of women representation at the highest level of leadership, that’s the same, that hasn’t improved. Only 8% women were represented in the world leaders summit,” Buckle says, adding “ So in a way Cop29 is a mirror of the world. And it’s true there is a backlash on women’s rights in many countries around the world, like the issue of abortion rights in the US, or the more serious situation in Afghanistan.”

She connects the overall backlash against women’s rights in many places across the world – including the US, as many feel has been demonstrated by the recent election – to the backtracking of gender justice in the climate space.

Ngusale also further points out that the lack of gender diversity in leadership is amplified by the fact that women are burdened with unpaid care work across the world, making it difficult for them to also take up leadership positions because they “ cannot be in two places at one time.”

Not A Monolith

But even as we talk about women’s rights across the globe, Aguilar points out that the “women of the world” as it’s often termed, are not all the same. “They try to put all women in the same bag, we need to understand the knots of gender inequality, which can be very different for different women, such as the way that our countries allow us to have control, or how we can have agency,” she says.

This is also what makes it far more complicated for groups like the WGC to advocate for the different needs of women and girls across the world, because they already find themselves fighting for space in these discussions which can make advocating for all the diversity in a nuanced way very difficult.

One example is how cultural norms manifest into gender restrictions differently across the world in ways other cultures or countries may not understand. Mobility restrictions on women due to religious and cultural norms in Kyengeza, Uganda, mean that men are twice as likely as women to travel to purchase improved seeds or visit markets, both of which are crucial factors to agricultural productivity and climate adaptation. This means if the solution international platforms are implementing is something like drought-resilient seeds, women on ground are probably not benefiting from it even if documents say that they should be.

With gender and climate often being an afterthought in policy drafts and papers, it doesn’t leave a lot of room to go into further “knots” around class, access, ethnicity and much more. Aguilar also shares one instance of how a group of low-income women on the coast of Honduras were affected by disaster.

“There were women in Honduras who were told winds of 260 km comings but they didn’t know what that meant, whether that was fast or slow, and so they continued to be on the coast and one of them lost two of her kids,” she says adding that when an NGO came to help them rebuild their house which had also been destroyed, they asked them for land property rights papers which these women didn’t have.

“That’s a group of women that need to be supported,” Aguilar says.

Implementing the Policies

But agreeing that women should be supported is one thing and actually implementing policies that work in the aftermath of discussions at spaces like COP becomes a whole other hurdle.

Some of the biggest barriers within implementation are a lack of accountability and climate financing.

“We want funds that are more liberating. Most of the funds given are not even sufficient to reach the grassroots, so there needs to be a scaling up of global finance in climate action,” Ngusale says, adding that it is crucial that these funds are scaled up in a way that directly funds locally led grassroots level action so the most vulnerable groups of women and girls can be affected.

Unfortunately a big area of contention at this year’s COP – and previous conferences – has been that receiving countries have thought the finance pledges were too low and givers thought it was too high.

But what many activists like Aguilar and Sifuma point out in different ways is that until countries like the US, and international bodies that have undeniable influence over global action – and in this case are also being called to account with regards to climate financing – don’t design implementable policies that take gender into account, nothing will change on ground.

Aguilar shares that many countries being called on for climate finance keep sidelining gender because “they have bigger fish to fry.”

“To which I always ask which fish and how are you frying them,” she says. She adds “You can’t leave half of the population behind. Disregarding the potential of half the world’s population is not logical, it’s absurd.”

Biden-Harris’s Gaza policy abandoned American workers

Abdelhalim Abdelrahman is a Palestinian-American political analyst and writer advocating for a restrained U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East centered around American laws and respect for Palestinian human rights.

When Vice President Kamala Harris lost to President-elect Donald Trump on November 5th, she did so without carrying any of the seven battleground states. Armchair post-mortems of her defeat by pundits across the nation have identified many issues as possible culprits for Harris’ defeat, from the disillusionment of working-class Americans after a period of inflation to lack of enthusiasm for both candidates, and of course ongoing support from the Biden-Harris administration for Israel’s actions in Gaza. Pundits have been quick to label Gaza, and especially the U.S. role in allowing Israel to facilitate likely war crimes with U.S.-made weapons, as a phenomenon that only impacted Michigan’s Arab American community. While Gaza was a significant factor in why Kamala Harris lost the state, labeling Gaza as a problem unique only to Michigan’s Arab American is disingenuous.

U.S. labor unions in swing states, working class Americans and younger voters all played a significant role in protesting the onslaught in Gaza, and they represent an overlooked demographic within the anti-war bloc over the last year. Gaza hit home with America’s labor unions and youth, marking foreign policy not as a separate issue from domestic issues but one intimately bound up in them. The inability of Democrats to enforce U.S. law, adopt a restrained foreign policy, and focus on working class issues at home contributed in overlapping ways to Kamala Harris’ defeat.

U.S. Labor Unions Spearheaded Anti-Genocide Protest Efforts

Early signs of this split could be seen in the organs of workplace democracy. Major labor unions across the United States threatened to withhold endorsing Kamala Harris unless she broke with President Biden and his unwavering commitment to Israeli security. Such a sentiment was widespread amongst local labor unions in key swing states such as Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin–the proverbial “blue wall” that Democrats have heavily relied upon in past elections. However, this time around, the “blue wall,” containing nearly 1.5 million labor union workers (530,000 in Michigan, 730,000 in Pennsylvania, and 205,000 in Wisconsin), crumbled.

The National Labor Network for a Ceasefire spearheaded a campaign for a ceasefire in Gaza and an arms embargo on Israel. The seven unions in the network represent 9 million workers, and on July 23 they made public a letter to the Biden administration in which the labor network called for a ceasefire and a halt on military aid to Israel. While most major labor unions went on to endorse Kamala Harris, not all of them were quick to do so. Shawn Fein, president of the United Auto Workers Union (UAW), held out on endorsing Ms. Harris initially. While Fein and the UAW did endorse Harris, he and the UAW remained relentless in calling for a ceasefire.

Throughout the last year, labor union workers across the United States told reporters how they saw themselves in Gaza, indicating that the issue impacted more Americans than pundits may have realized.“Workers are always being attacked by companies or being exploited,” said labor union worker Marcie Pedraza in an interview with The Nation back in December. Pedraza continued, “Why wouldn’t this same concept apply to people being targeted in a lethal military campaign in another part of the world, who are suffering unimaginable levels of persecution and loss?”

UAW Region 9A Director Brandon Mancilla similarly told In These Times, “The amount of political backing, arms resources we supply to the State of Israel is astronomical… we spend so much on defense, military spending in lieu of actually trying to solve deep social crisis in this country, of inequality of healthcare, of food access, education, the things you need to survive in this country.” UAW’s Region 9A encompasses 34 local unions across eastern all six New England states plus eastern New York and Puerto Rico. While Trump did not win any of these states, he improved on his 2020 performance in New York State, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island.

Pedraza and Mancilla’s comments highlight how as workers they’ve connected the struggle of working class Americans to the harms of spending money on the military of other nations, especially when that spending is accepted as an unquestioned part of bipartisan consensus politics.

It is clear to American workers that a foreign policy that runs counter to American interests has a detrimental impact on their living conditions. And while Gaza was not the sole reason for Kamala Harris’ failure earlier this month, it at least serves as a contributing factor as to Democrats’ loss of credibility amongst America’s working class.

Embargoing Arms To Israel Is A Popular Position Democrats Refused to Embrace

An arms embargo on Israel is not just a specific focus of the working class and labor unions, it was and remains a popular position for most Americans, again demonstrating that Gaza was not an issue relegated solely to Arab-Americans. According to the Institute for Middle Eastern Understanding (IMEU) Policy Project, pledging to impose an arms embargo would have given Kamala Harris an edge in Arizona, Georgia, and Pennsylvania, states Harris lost. The IMEU study found that 35% of Democrats and Independents polled in Arizona said they would be more likely to vote for Harris had she embraced an arms embargo, versus 5% who said they would be less likely. The figures were similar in Georgia (39% versus 5%) and Pennsylvania (34% versus 7%).

Polling in other groups paints a similar picture. A poll conducted by CBS in June 2024 showed that 61% of Americans (including 77% of Democrats) were against sending aid to Israel. Additionally, studies conducted by CIRCLE at Tufts University in January 2024 showed that 38% of youth ages 18-34, including 56% of those who identify as Democratic or lean Democratic, thought Israel’s military operation was going “too far.” CIRCLE also noted that that 49% of youth voters believed there was a genocide happening in Gaza.

Had Harris embraced this popular position with American voters, she would have been in a much better position to win the election. However, by ignoring calls for an arms embargo on Israel and a ceasefire in Gaza, Harris and the Democrats at large undermined the notion that American foreign policy is for the middle class. Instead, it signaled that the U.S. is perfectly willing to bend its own rules against arming human rights violaters, and will do it over the objections and needs of young voters and working class Americans.

Internationale Laws

Going forward, progressives must communicate effectively how recalibrating America’s foreign policy is beneficial to Americans, especially young people and union workers. For example, despite credible evidence from human rights observers indicating that Israel has U.S. weapons to facilitate war crimes in Gaza and block aid from coming into the enclave –both blatant violations of the United States’s Leahy Law and Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act–, Biden and Harris continued to provide Israel with unconditional arm shipments.

To re-engage the youth, working class and labor union workers, the United States must demonstrate a commitment to enforcing U.S. laws against human rights violators. That starts with enforcing the Leahy Law and Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act. Another crucial step is showing hard-working Americans that the United States is committed to a foreign policy rooted in restraint and rule of law.

In 2024, unions and workers showed politicians how they understand solidarity with workers across the world. Bringing them back into the “big tent” means treating their analysis as honest, their qualms as real, and their goals as legitimate aims. If the U.S. can carve out special rules for favored allies, what’s to stop presidents from playing favorites with bosses over workers? Either we have a system of international laws that applies to everybody, or we don’t. Workers saw that. Maybe by 2028, presidential candidates will too.

Colombia: Don’t Call it a Model

An article examing Colombia’s security gains in light of the Plan Colombia

Resource Type: Article