Resource Author: Sina Toossi

The Illusion of Opportunity in Attacking Iran

Sina Toossi is a senior nonresident fellow at the Center for International Policy.

In the wake of a fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, the Middle East stands at a critical juncture. The recent agreement, brokered with the involvement of both the outgoing and incoming US administrations, has halted hostilities for now, but its durability remains uncertain. Amid this tenuous peace, Israeli leaders, emboldened by President-elect Donald Trump’s historically supportive stance, reportedly see a prime opportunity to push for direct war against Iran—a goal Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pursued for decades.

Exacerbating these tensions is the possibility of Trump doubling down on his “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran, which dismantled the Obama-era nuclear deal and inflicted crippling sanctions on Iran’s economy. Reports from The Wall Street Journal reveal Trump is even weighing military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Yet, in his inaugural address, Trump remarked, “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win, but also by the wars that we end, and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into.” This juxtaposition highlights a critical decision between diplomatic de-escalation and military action

Trump would be wise to pursue diplomacy. Granting Netanyahu the U.S.’s backing for such a conflict would further destabilize the region, heighten already white-hot anti-American sentiment, and derail Trump’s broader agenda. For Iran hawks, these shifting circumstances may seem like the ideal moment to act, but such enthusiasm dangerously ignores the lessons of Israel’s recent wars and the complexities of the region’s current security landscape. If Israel failed to decisively defeat a smaller non-state adversary like Hezbollah, how could it expect success against a well-fortified state like Iran? A preemptive strike would almost certainly provoke massive retaliation, fail to topple the Islamic Republic, and risk igniting a far-reaching, devastating conflict.

Instead of courting disaster, U.S. and Israeli policymakers should seize the moment to pursue diplomacy. Renewed negotiations and a verifiable nuclear agreement could deliver real security while steering the region away from catastrophic war.

Hezbollah’s Survival as a Cautionary Tale

Advocates of a strike on Iran often overlook a critical lesson from Israel’s recent conflict with Hezbollah: even with a relentless military campaign, Israel failed to decisively neutralize a much smaller non-state adversary. Over months of intense fighting in Lebanon, Israel launched an extensive air assault and a punishing ground invasion aimed at crippling Hezbollah’s arsenal. While Hezbollah suffered significant losses, including the assassination of its leader Hassan Nasrallah and senior commanders, its ability to strike Israel was not eliminated. Throughout the bombardment, the group continued firing rockets, missiles, and drones deep into Israeli territory. Major population centers, including Tel Aviv, were hit just days before the ceasefire, causing casualties, widespread displacement, and severe economic and psychological insecurity.  

This experience offers two key lessons for policymakers. First, Israeli military superiority is not the absolute guarantee of success it is often assumed to be. Second, if Israel struggled to decisively defeat Hezbollah, a non-state militia, it is unrealistic to expect a knockout blow against a fortified state like Iran. Iran’s defense systems, nuclear facilities, and missile and drone stockpiles are far more robust and dispersed. Recent history underscores that a swift, clean military solution is less a viable strategy and more a dangerous illusion.

Iran’s Retaliatory Capabilities and the Costs of Escalation

Critics of diplomacy also often underestimate Iran’s ability to defend itself and respond effectively to an attack—a miscalculation fraught with danger. Over the past year, the back-and-forth strikes between Iran and Israel have vividly demonstrated Tehran’s growing military capabilities and its capacity for retaliation. For instance, on October 1, Iran launched a coordinated missile and drone attack on Israel, bypassing advanced Israeli air defenses and inflicting both material damage and insecurity. In response, Israel struck back on October 27, targeting Iran’s Russian-made S-300 air defense systems, ballistic missile production facilities, and solid fuel manufacturing infrastructure for long-range missiles.

Hawks portray the Israeli strike as a decisive blow, leaving Iran vulnerable to a low-cost U.S. or Israeli attack. Yet even Israeli officials disagree. The Nagel Committee in Israel recently confirmed that the country does not have the capability to launch a decisive attack on Iran’s military and nuclear facilities without U.S. support. Former IDF spokesperson and air defense commander Ran Kochav reinforced this reality, cautioning, “I would cautiously say they [Iran] still have strength left; it’s not as if this morning they have no air defense system at all and are completely exposed.” Retired Major General Yaakov Amidror warned an attack without U.S. coordination would risk severe retaliation requiring American intervention.

Despite Israel’s recent attack, many of Iran’s air defenses remain intact, bolstered by advanced systems reverse-engineered from Russian, Chinese, and U.S. technology. In recent military drills, Tehran has showcased its readiness, simulating responses to airstrikes and unveiling new underground “missile cities” alongside advanced drones and missiles. These moves send a clear signal: Iran is prepared to retaliate forcefully against any attack.

A large-scale assault on Iran’s nuclear facilities would all but guarantee a massive retaliatory campaign—one that could escalate beyond Israel’s borders to U.S. forces and partners in the region. At best, military strikes might set Iran’s nuclear timeline back by a few years. But at worst, such an action would ignite a far-reaching conflict that compromises energy security, endangers U.S. personnel, undermines regional stability, and strains diplomatic ties with allies who have no appetite for another protracted conflict in the Middle East.

Why a Foreign Attack Won’t Topple the Islamic Republic

A persistent idea among hawkish policymakers is that a foreign military strike could trigger the collapse of the Islamic Republic. But this belief overlooks a powerful force within Iran: nationalism. History shows that foreign aggression tends to unite Iranians against the invader, fostering a sense of shared solidarity that could bolster, rather than weaken, the ruling theocracy.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has long attempted to stoke dissent within Iran, even addressing Iranians directly multiple times in recent months to portray himself as some sort of savior against their repressive government. However, the aftermath of Israel’s October strike on Iran reveals the futility of this strategy. Instead of sparking mass opposition to the government, the attack plunged ordinary Iranians into fear and uncertainty. Civil society leaders and groups, pro-democracy activists, and political prisoners alike issued stark warnings: war would derail prospects for democratic change, not hasten them. 

The reaction from everyday Iranians was equally telling. Many took to the streets—not in protest against the regime, but to mourn the soldiers killed in the assault. These moments of collective grief underscored a broader truth: foreign attacks are broadly seen as assaults on the nation itself, not just its government.

Far from weakening the Islamic Republic, a military campaign is likely to strengthen its hold, at least in the short term, and deepen the challenges faced by those fighting for a freer and more democratic Iran. The lesson for policymakers? Toppling the regime from the outside isn’t just wishful thinking—it’s counterproductive.

A Better Path Forward: Diplomacy and a Deal  

With the risks clear, the pressing question remains: How can policymakers prevent Iran’s nuclear program from advancing while avoiding a devastating regional war? The answer lies in reinvigorated diplomacy.  

The 2015 nuclear deal provided a proven framework for freezing and even rolling back key elements of Iran’s nuclear program. Next October, the UN sanctions “snapback” mechanism—a crucial part of that deal—expires, and if triggered by France, Germany, and the UK, it would automatically reinstate sanctions. Iran has warned that such a move would force it out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), destroying remaining safeguards and leaving diplomacy in tatters.

This looming deadline demands urgent action. If the Europeans trigger snapback, the reimposition of UN sanctions and Iran leaving the NPT would dramatically increase tensions and make future negotiations infinitely harder. Policymakers must prevent this domino effect by re-engaging diplomatically now.

Diplomacy offers tangible, achievable benefits that make it the most viable path forward. A revived or updated nuclear deal can reimpose verifiable restrictions and intrusive inspections on Iran’s nuclear program, significantly hindering any covert pursuit of a nuclear weapon. It also creates critical channels of communication that can help address broader regional flashpoints, reducing the risks of miscalculation and violent escalation. Furthermore, by incorporating economic incentives, diplomacy has the potential to empower civil society within Iran over time, avoiding the backlash and rally-around-the-flag effects that often result from military action or coercive measures.

Policymakers in the U.S. and Europe have a narrow but critical window to prioritize negotiations. Restoring or updating a nuclear deal—while leveraging the pressure of sanctions and Iran’s own economic vulnerabilities—offers the best path to curbing Tehran’s nuclear ambitions without plunging the region into chaos.

The Danger of Viewing Iran as Enemy Number One

Sina Toossi is a senior non-resident fellow at the Center for International Policy

In a recent “60 Minutes Overtime” interview, Vice President Kamala Harris called Iran the United States’ “greatest adversary.” Her comments, no doubt influenced by the toxic political climate and the ongoing conflict between Israel, Hamas, and Hezbollah, were likely shaped by the recent Iranian missile attack on Israel. While Harris may have been responding to the immediate crisis, her statement invites a deeper examination of U.S. policy toward Iran. It underscores the urgent need for a more forward-thinking approach—one that draws on lessons from past mistakes and focuses on resolving the real, yet peacefully addressable, challenges Iran presents in the Middle East while safeguarding U.S. interests.

In approaching Iran and the broader Middle East tinderbox, Harris has the advantage of relying on her experienced national security advisor, Phil Gordon. Gordon has long focused on the region and helped negotiate the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This agreement successfully blocked Iran’s pathways to developing a nuclear bomb through diplomacy, offering a rare example of de-escalation since the 1979 Iranian revolution and the ensuing U.S.-Iran hostilities.

Unfortunately, the diplomatic success of the JCPOA was short-lived. The agreement was implemented in January 2016, but that same year, Donald Trump was elected President after campaigning on a promise to dismantle it. True to his word, he withdrew the U.S. from the deal in 2018 and launched a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. As a result, Iran never saw meaningful economic benefits from the JCPOA, and tensions began to escalate rapidly.

No Great Powers, No Great Satans

Since Trump set the U.S. on this confrontational path, we’ve seen a dangerous cycle of escalations between Iran, the U.S., and Israel, with each action met by a counteraction, driving the region deeper into instability. This tit-for-tat dynamic has steadily intensified tensions, leading to the precarious situation we now face, where the threat of all-out war looms larger than ever.

As Gordon warned in a 2018 article criticizing Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, “It starts with exiting the nuclear deal without a plan, and it could end with a messy, violent, and unnecessary conflict.” He echoed this concern in a May 2019 piece, noting, “Predictably, Iran has responded not by caving to U.S. demands (let alone collapsing) but with a pressure campaign of its own.” Gordon also explored the dangers of U.S. interventions in his 2020 book, Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East, which highlights the self-defeating nature of America’s regime change interventions abroad.

Gordon’s work underscores that while Iran does present challenges to U.S. interests, framing it as America’s greatest adversary ignores broader strategic realities and risks exacerbating the very tensions a Harris administration would aim to reduce. Reflexive hostility toward Iran has often blinded Washington to the high costs of such an approach. The notion of Iran being the U.S.’s “greatest adversary”—ahead of powers like China, Russia, or existential threats like climate change—threatens to perpetuate this cycle, driving the U.S. further down a path of conflict that undermines both its national security and stability in the Middle East and beyond.

A Moment for Military Realism

It’s important to recognize that Iran is far weaker in terms of conventional military strength than the U.S. and its key regional allies, Israel and the Arab Gulf states. Iran’s military spending and capabilities are dwarfed by these powers. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the U.S. and its Middle Eastern allies outspend Iran on defense by more than 50 to 1. Iran’s military is largely made up of outdated equipment, and its air force and navy are no match for the advanced capabilities of Israel or the U.S. Furthermore, with a population only a quarter the size of the U.S. and an economy just 2% of America’s, Iran simply lacks the resources to be a meaningful strategic competitor to the United States.

Yet Washington’s fixation on Iran has led to exaggerated threat assessments. Trump’s hyperfocus on Iran was especially driven by “political incentives and intensified lobbying by Israel and Saudi Arabia,” according to Daniel Benjamin, former Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U.S. State Department, and Steven Simon, who served on the National Security Council in the Clinton and Obama administrations.

Benjamin and Simon emphasized that this hostility comes at a high cost for the U.S., increasing the risk of armed conflict, alienating allies, and undermining regional stability. According to them, the U.S. has a compelling interest in finding a “modus vivendi” with Iran, much like it did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, by creating incentives for Iranian cooperation. Writing in 2019, they urged the “next administration to, at long last, give sustained engagement a try.”

Unfortunately, the Biden administration’s early signals to Tehran only deepened mistrust. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, along with other officials like Avril Haines and Jen Psaki, insisted that Iran fully comply with the JCPOA before the U.S. would return to its sanctions relief obligations under the deal, while also demanding additional concessions on regional issues and Iran’s missile program. This approach reinforced Tehran’s perception that the U.S. remained an unreliable partner, further undermining the chances for renewed diplomacy.

Unreliable Partners Make Bad Negotiators

For decades, Iran has experienced disappointment in negotiations with the U.S., with former President Hassan Rouhani’s JCPOA arguably the most egregious example of a moderate Iranian leader undermined by U.S. backtracking. The subsequent years would bear out that the Biden administration’s early belief that Trump’s “maximum pressure” provided leverage was a major miscalculation, missing the opportunity to revive the JCPOA under Rouhani’s government and instead pushing for unrealistic concessions.

By the time nuclear talks resumed in April 2021, Israel sabotaged negotiations with an attack on Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility, prompting Tehran to increase uranium enrichment to 60%. Iran, wary of U.S. intentions, demanded guarantees of sanctions relief before agreeing to scale back its nuclear program. By June 2021, with the hardline government taking power in Iran, trust further eroded, leading to 15 months of stalled negotiations, with Tehran’s skepticism of U.S. commitment at the heart of the impasse.

However, the situation has since shifted dramatically again, offering a new opening for diplomacy. Kamala Harris, if elected, will have a significant opportunity to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough with Iran. The death of conservative Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi last April triggered a major shift in Iranian politics, culminating in the election of Masoud Pezeshkian, a heart surgeon and former parliamentarian, as Iran’s first reformist president since 2005. Pezeshkian ran on a platform emphasizing diplomacy emphasizing diplomacy to resolve Iran’s foreign tensions and has consistently advocated for the revival of a nuclear agreement to lift sanctions. In a notable move, he reinstated much of Iran’s original nuclear negotiating team, including former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif as Vice President for Strategic Affairs.

Pezeshkian’s outreach faced an immediate test when, on the day of his inauguration, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran. Despite expectations of swift retaliation, Iran showed restraint for two months, allowing Pezeshkian to attend the UN General Assembly, where he emphasized Iran’s desire for de-escalation and called for the U.S. to seize the opportunity for broader diplomacy. However, the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and the lack of progress on a Israel-Hamas ceasefire led Iran to launch a large missile attack on Israel.

Re-Engaging With Iran During The Lame Duck

If Kamala Harris wins the presidency, the lame-duck period and her remaining tenure as vice president will be crucial for setting the stage for broader diplomatic de-escalation with Iran. During this transition, Harris should work with the Biden team to prioritize immediately reducing tensions. A key step would be restoring the informal de-escalatory informal de-escalatory agreement reached in August 2023, which saw Iran freeze its nuclear program’s expansion, release dual-national American prisoners, and restrain its regional allies from attacking U.S. interests in exchange for access to frozen Iranian funds in South Korean banks, which were transferred to Qatar for humanitarian purchases.

This agreement was pivotal because it sought to cap Iran’s nuclear progress, particularly its accumulation of 60% enriched uranium, while also connecting nuclear restrictions to regional security concerns for the first time. Although the deal unraveled after the October 7 Hamas attack, it provides a blueprint for Harris and the Biden team to revive. By offering Iran access to the funds still frozen in Qatar, in exchange for halting its nuclear expansion and committing to regional de-escalation, Harris can lay the foundation for broader diplomacy. Crucially, this should be linked to securing a Gaza ceasefire, which would help reduce tensions in Lebanon and Yemen as well.

Establishing this groundwork would position Harris to engage in serious negotiations with Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, early in her presidency. A new nuclear deal, built on the JCPOA framework, could eliminate the threat of Iran’s nuclear weaponization and stand as a major foreign policy achievement for her administration.

Now, the U.S. and Iran stand at a critical crossroads. The stakes have never been higher, with the specter of total war in the Middle East—along with its far-reaching ramifications, particularly for the global economy—looming large. In this moment, Harris must send the right signals to steer the situation back from the brink. If elected, she must learn from past U.S. failures with Iran, revitalize a diplomatic approach grounded in mutual compromise, and focus on securing core U.S. security interests in dealing with a middling power like Iran.

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Fact checking Trump’s claims about Iran in the debate

In Tuesday’s debate, Donald Trump again claimed that that Iran was “broke” under him and made $300 billion under Biden. In an interview with National Public Radio’s (NPR) Jackie Northam, CIP senior non-resident fellow Sina Toossi debunked these false claims.

SINA TOOSSI: He imposed what he – his administration called the so-called maximum pressure campaign, very stringent economic sanctions.

NORTHAM: That’s Sina Toossi, an Iran specialist at the Center for International Policy. He says Trump’s economic sanctions had an impact.

TOOSSI: Trump’s economic sanctions on Iran hurt the Iranian economy and hurt various key economic indicators affecting Iran’s population and its overall health of the economy.

NORTHAM: Not quite broke as Trump claims, but foreign reserves plummeted, inflation went up, and the middle class shrank.

[Video] What Iran’s new reformist president will mean for the country, the region and beyond

In this webinar on August 28 at 1400 – 15.30 BST (9am – 10.30am EDT), panelists including Center for International Policy’s Sina Toossi discuss what Iran’s new reformist president will mean for the country, the region and beyond.

WATCH HERE

Panelists

Sir John Jenkins, Senior Fellow at Policy Exchange; Joint Strand Leader, Middle East, Centre for Geopolitics, University of Cambridge

Dr Shirin Saeidi, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of The King Fahd Center for Middle East Studies, University of Arkansas

Dr Saeid Golkar, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga; Senior Fellow, United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI)

Sina Toossi, Senior Non-resident Fellow, Center for International Policy

 

Moderator

Humphrey Hawksley, Author & former BBC Asia correspondent

 

Thank you to The Democracy Forum for their work in organizing.

Iran’s Election Surprise: A Reformist Victory Amid Turmoil

In a dramatic turn of events, Masoud Pezeshkian’s election as Iran’s new president has set the stage for potential change in a nation grappling with deep-seated discontent and geopolitical turmoil. His victory in a snap presidential election, just 50 days after a helicopter crash that claimed the lives of conservative president Ebrahim Raisi, the foreign minister, a governor, and five others, carries significant implications for Iran, the region, and US-Iran relations. This election comes at a critical juncture, with ongoing conflicts such as the Gaza war, the looming threat of its expansion to Lebanon, continued US sanctions on Iran, a rapidly growing Iranian nuclear program, and shifting geopolitical winds challenging the US-dominated global order.

Pezeshkian’s victory is particularly noteworthy given Iran’s political system, which does not hold free or fair elections and is heavily influenced by unelected institutions and theocratic bodies. The Islamic Republic, born from the 1979 revolution that overthrew the US-backed Shah, has been characterized by a persistent power struggle between its republican factions, which advocate for greater political inclusion and reform, and its religiously fundamentalist and ideological factions, which prioritize theocratic governance and strict adherence to revolutionary principles. This internal tension has shaped Iran’s domestic and foreign policies, creating an often contentious political environment.

This election highlighted the enduring clash within the Islamic Republic’s political landscape, and was set against a backdrop of widespread discontent among Iranians. Many citizens are profoundly disillusioned or actively opposed to a political system that has imposed severe economic hardships, social and political restrictions, including pervasive internet censorship, and the enforcement of traditional religious norms like mandatory hijab, in an increasingly secular society. The political environment has also become more insular in recent years, with reformist and moderate figures who once played significant roles becoming largely marginalized.

Pezeshkian’s victory is significant on multiple levels. His approval to run by the Guardian Council—a 12-member body of clerics and jurists that vets candidates—marked the first time in years that a prominent reformist was allowed to seek the presidency. Pezeshkian, a five-term parliamentarian and former health minister in the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami, has represented Tabriz in northwestern Iran, near the Turkish border, where his core constituency includes Iranian Azeris and Kurds, reflecting his own ethnic heritage.

Speculation abounds regarding the motivations behind the Guardian Council, and by extension the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in allowing Pezeshkian to run. It was likely an attempt to increase voter turnout, which had dropped to historic lows in uncompetitive elections since 2021. The Guardian Council approved six candidates, with Pezeshkian being the only reformist, and his main competitors being hardline conservatives.
 

His approval to run by the Guardian Council—a 12-member body of clerics and jurists that vets candidates—marked the first time in years that a prominent reformist was allowed to seek the presidency.

The election’s outcome, however, likely deviated from the Guardian Council’s expectations. The first round saw a new historic low turnout of 39.93%, a reflection of the electorate’s deep-seated apathy and disillusionment. However, amid intense rivalry among conservatives, Pezeshkian emerged as the frontrunner, with Saeed Jalili, a staunch hardliner, advancing to the second round. This result shocked the Iranian political landscape, as historically, lower turnout has typically benefited conservative candidates.

In the second round, Pezeshkian, representing the republican wing of the Islamic Republic, faced off against Jalili, who advocated for autarky and a return to the 1979 revolutionary ideology. The results delivered another surprise: turnout increased to 49.68%.

A critical aspect of this election was the electorate’s strategic behavior. Two key groups emerged: those who actively voted for Pezeshkian in both rounds and those who abstained strategically in the first round but participated in the second. The former rejected Jalili’s ideology, while the latter, through calculated abstention, significantly influenced the outcome and sent an undeniable message to the authorities. By abstaining initially, they sent a message of discontent, and the subsequent participation of part of this constituency ensured Pezeshkian’s victory while maintaining their protest voice and signaling ongoing dissatisfaction.
 

By abstaining initially, [second-round voters] sent a message of discontent, and the subsequent participation of part of this constituency ensured Pezeshkian’s victory while maintaining their protest voice and signaling ongoing dissatisfaction.

Looking ahead, Pezeshkian faces numerous challenges. He ran on a platform calling for an end to mandatory hijab enforcement, easing social restrictions, opening up the political arena, and pursuing constructive international relations, including with the West. During debates, he emphasized the debilitating impact of sanctions and the need for negotiations to lift them. He defended the 2015 nuclear deal, abandoned by the Trump administration, which reimposed US sanctions and decimated the political capital of centrist former president Hassan Rouhani. He also criticized hardliners for actions that he said immensely harmed the country, such as attacks on the Saudi and British embassies.

Hardliners and unelected institutions in Iran will undoubtedly try to obstruct Pezeshkian’s reformist efforts. Their influence, coupled with continued policies of sanctions and regime change from hawkish forces in the US, Israel, and Europe, presents significant challenges. Yet, the Iranian electorate has made its stance unmistakably clear: it rejects extremism and desires a better quality of life, both domestically and through constructive international engagement. Pezeshkian’s platform, centered on economic revitalization and improving diplomatic relations, resonates deeply with the aspirations of many Iranians. This election signals a major moment in Iran, reflecting a collective yearning for progressive change and a break from the past.

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Post-CNN Debate: Visions for the World in 2025

On June 27, CNN held a debate between former president Donald Trump and incumbent president Joe Biden. Both men are in the unique position of running against a previous office holder, and the election itself is a rematch of the socially distanced contest held between the same two candidates in 2020.

There is arguably no area of governance where a president has greater freedom and impact than foreign policy. To better understand how the candidates used foreign policy positions on the debate stage, and the limits of their understanding or desired policies, the fellows of the Center for International Policy have assembled to offer some deeper insight. A transcript of the debate can be read here.
 

Sina Toossi, on the Middle East in the Debate

The presidential debate offered little hope for a more peaceful and just U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East. The most egregious moment was Trump’s use of “Palestinian” as an insult in an exchange with Biden over their “pro-Israel” stances, a shocking display of racism that has largely escaped mainstream scrutiny.

Trump’s false claims about his Iran policy—asserting Iran was impotent and “broke” by the end of his term—belie the reality of his maximum pressure campaign, which provoked increased aggression from Iran, including unprecedented attacks on U.S. assets and allies, and accelerated nuclear activities.

Biden also faltered, with factual inaccuracies about Iran having intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities and misleading claims about U.S. military members not being killed under his watch in the region. Both candidates failed to present a coherent vision of the realities of U.S. policies towards the region.

 

Joanna Rozpedowski, on NATO in the Debate

Voters concerned about America’s security and geopolitical strategy face a pivotal choice between two starkly different approaches to international conflicts the new president will inevitably confront.

In the CNN debate, President Biden emphasized the importance of robust alliances and collective security measures, arguing that NATO and allied support are essential for deterring Russian aggression and maintaining global stability.

Former President Trump’s transactional approach prioritized national sovereignty, extreme frugality, and direct negotiation over costly multilateral commitments. His rhetoric indicated skepticism about the economic and tactical burdens the US bears in supporting NATO’s Ukraine approach, which thus far failed to result in the war’s peaceful settlement and risks further escalation onto neighboring European countries.

In November, this strategic divide presents Americans with a critical decision: maintain strong international alliances, an aggressive deterrence posture, and multilateral NATO engagement or attempt to resolve the conflict through diplomatic channels and direct negotiation. The decision rests squarely with the electorate.

 

Michael Chamberlin, on Mexico in the Debate

Regarding the issue of fentanyl crossing the border, neither candidate focuses on addressing the root causes. They fail to discuss how to collaborate with Mexico to strengthen its justice and anti-corruption institutions or how to stop Mexican criminal groups from obtaining guns in U.S. stores. Nothing was said about gun control in the United States or the movement of guns south through the same border, which arms the cartels that later send fentanyl north. Additionally, they overlook the importance of preventive measures from a health service perspective. Approaching the problem from a prohibition standpoint alone will never stop drug abuse.

 

Negar Mortazavi, on Iran in the Debate

Neither Trump nor Biden offered a coherent policy on Iran and the broader Middle East. Trump claimed that Iran had no money under his administration which is false. It’s true that he imposed broad sanctions against Iran that hurt the economy. But the impact of sanctions is mainly felt by average Iranian citizens and it does not really influence or change Iran’s foreign policy and regional spending. In fact, during Trump’s term tensions were high between Iran and its network of allies, the Axis of Resistance, and the U.S. and its regional allies.

Trump’s assassination of the top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani brought the two countries to the brink of a dangerous war, with Iran retaliating against the U.S. by shooting missiles from its soil targeting U.S. forces in Iraq. Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy towards Iran was not only dangerous but failed to achieve its stated goal of bringing Iran to the negotiating table for a better deal.

Biden’s policy towards Iran in general has not been very different or successful either. Candidate Biden had promised to prioritize diplomacy with Iran and revive the nuclear deal, but he couldn’t deliver on that promise.

 

Van Jackson, on China in the Debate

Biden has accepted Trump’s premise about China and economic statecraft. He now thinks reducing the trade deficit with China is a mark of progress. He imagines political economy as a zero-sum terrain where their gain is not just our loss; it’s a threat to us. This is the kind of economic nationalism that ultimately serves defense-industrial interests and reactionary political projects.Trump, for his part, openly accused the sitting American president of treason and corruption–he called him a “Manchurian candidate.” This is actual red-baiting; literally John Birch Society stuff. The notable thing, which is of pattern, is that Trump is using China as the wedge to attack his political opponent. The fascistic, corrupt politician is using the China bogeyman to advance his politics against his democratic opponent. The GOP did much the same in 2020 and 2022.

It’s true that politicians from both parties try to play the “China card” to their advantage…but it’s false that the “China card” is some value-neutral object that anyone can use for their purposes with equal effectiveness. China-threat rhetoric systematically biases toward reactionary, demagogic political outcomes; it’s unfavorable terrain for democratic politics. That’s why Democrats who tried to out-hawk their opponents on China in 2022 fared poorly in the general election.

Trump is not wrong that Biden’s foreign policy is pushing us toward World War III—we’re still insisting on a strategy of primacy in a world where power realities simply make it impossible. And by pursuing primacy anyway, the national security state naturalizes the necessity of the most dangerous kinds of policies: containment, arms-racing, and economic nationalism. This will not end well for anyone. The falsity in Trump’s rant though is that he is any better. Indeed, Biden’s China policy is Trump’s China policy. Worse, Trump’s implied theory of war prevention appears to be a form of extortion. Cultivating personal relationships with dictators, he insists, is the way to prevent World War III. That means that Trump puts himself in the position of telling the public, “Look, you want me to be friends with Xi and Putin and Kim. That’s how I’m preventing Armageddon.”

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Israel’s Damascus airstrike was a deliberate provocation

Sina Toossi is a senior non-resident fellow at the Center for International Policy

On April 1st, an Israeli airstrike in Damascus dramatically escalated already simmering tensions between Israel and Iran. The operation led to the deaths of seven Iranians, including a senior commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The target, according to Iran, was an official consulate building. However, Israel disputes this claim, which would be a violation of international law. Despite this, many countries and the United Nations have condemned the attacks on grounds that diplomatic facilities were targeted. Notably, even U.S. allies in the region, such as the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, expressed their disapproval.

In response, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has vowed retribution, declaring that those responsible “will be punished by our brave men,” and that they will “regret this crime.” Iran’s Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, also indicated that Iran had sent an “important message” to the U.S. government, holding it accountable for supporting Israel’s actions. These developments suggest that Iran may be considering a substantial retaliation, which could include renewed actions against American forces in the region.

The Israeli airstrike occurs at a time when Israel, under the leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is grappling with a multitude of internal and external pressures. The war in Gaza has taken a severe toll on Israel’s societal fabric and economy. The military draft has drained the workforce, while the war’s ripple effects have contracted Israel’s GDP by an estimated 20 percent. Additionally, the government, already facing internal strife due to Netanyahu’s legal issues and public discontent, has been further strained by the fallout from failed hostage rescue operations and the loss of numerous hostages due to Israeli bombardments.

Adding to these internal challenges is Israel’s growing diplomatic isolation, exemplified by the UN Security Council’s demand for an immediate halt to military operations in Gaza. This call signifies a notable shift in the Biden administration’s approach, which is increasingly critical of Israel’s conduct.

Against this backdrop, Netanyahu’s decision to green-light the airstrike on Damascus seems to be a calculated act to amplify the hostilities. Such a move sharply contrasts with international appeals for restraint and indicates a deliberate escalation strategy.

Netanyahu seems to be aiming to provoke Iran and intensify the conflict to galvanize domestic and international political support and justify wider military actions, potentially in Rafah and against Hezbollah and Iran. This strategy risks drawing the United States deeper into the conflict, with potentially dire ramifications for regional stability.

The crucial issue now is Iran’s potential reaction.  A review of commentary from prominent Iranian analysts from across the Islamic Republic’s political spectrum reveals two prevailing narratives: one perceives Israel’s actions as a deliberate provocation of war that Iran should respond to with restraint, while the other suggests that Israel is capitalizing on Iran’s typically restrained responses and that failing to react proportionately will only invite further escalations. The latter perspective is gaining momentum, with increasing calls for a decisive response to deter future Israeli aggression.

Iran’s potential responses to the Israeli airstrike include a wide range of actions, such as targeting Israeli interests in third countries, reciprocal attacks within Israel’s own borders or the Golan Heights, or escalating cyber warfare attacks. The consequences of Iran’s decision could profoundly affect the Middle East and beyond.

The U.S. response to Netanyahu’s actions is also crucial. President Biden is at a critical juncture where he can exert significant coercive pressure on Netanyahu to prevent an escalation in regional tensions. Despite his hesitations so far, it is more vital than ever that he takes decisive action now. Failure to act could exacerbate the situation, potentially leading to a regional conflict with severe repercussions for U.S. interests and which would inadvertently benefit U.S. great power rivals like Russia and China.

Given the current developments, it is crucial for the U.S. and other global powers to intensify their efforts towards de-escalation. The initial step in this process should involve applying pressure on Netanyahu to cease further military actions. This could be achieved through various means, including halting arms shipments, imposing economic sanctions, or advocating for international legal action against Israel.

The foremost priority in this situation remains securing a ceasefire agreement. Achieving this would require Netanyahu to compromise on what he previously termed as “delusional” demands by Hamas for a hostage exchange and an end to the war. Another vital aspect is preventing escalation along the Lebanon border, especially considering statements from Israeli officials like Defense Minister Yoav Gallant about their intent to increase “firepower” against Hezbollah.

Up until now, Iran has been striving to manage the level of regional violence to avert a full-scale war. Iran and its regional allies have been calibrating their actions to pressure the U.S. and Israel to end the Gaza war. Iran has dissuaded its allied militias in Iraq from firing missiles at American forces in the region, understanding that these are tripwire forces and attacking them would allow for hawks in Washington to push for war.

Nevertheless, Iran holds escalatory dominance, capable of commanding its allies to renew attacks on U.S. forces. The question now is whether the U.S. and Iran can prevent this from escalating into a wider war, which neither side wants but Netanyahu seems bent on for his own political survival. The aftermath of the Damascus strikes will serve as a significant test.

Exiled Iranian monarchists align with Israel’s hardliners

When Iranians drove out the Shah in 1979, a revolution that ultimately ended with the Islamic Republic, supporters of monarchy were driven into exile or underground. In the decades since, these monarchists waiting for a restoration of the Pahlavi throne have found themselves part of the opposition to the present government of Iran, but sitting uncomfortably alongside other opposition movements, especially ones that dream and fight for a democratic Iran. This tension is reflected not just in how the separate opposition movements protest in the country, but in how they position the role of Iran in the world. Notably, Reza Pahlavi, claimant to the overthrown throne, has aligned Iranian monarchists with Israel, leading monarchists to wave the pre-revolution flag at rallies in support of Israel’s war on Gaza.

As Sina Toosi, senior non-resident fellow at CIP, writes for Al-Jazeera:

“…since the outbreak of the Gaza war, the Iranian monarchist movement has shown strong support for Israel online and at pro-Israel rallies in Europe and the United States. Their often-aggressive tactics have concerned many pro-Palestinian activists, with pro-Pahlavi lobbying groups in Washington, DC, such as the National Union for Democracy in Iran (NUFDI), seeking to intimidate pro-Palestinians activists who have been critical of Iranian-American supporters of Israel, labelling them “supporters of Palestinian terrorist groups”.”

This hard-line is a break from the last Shah’s actual foreign policy, which balanced US alignment, security cooperation with Israel, and vocal support for Palestine. Out of power and in exile, Iranian monarchists have not had to make concessions required even of autocrats. Instead, they’ve aligned with the hard right in the US and in Israel, supporting intervention, sanctions, and confrontation with the Islamic Republic.

This, Toosi writes, is in sharp contrast to the human rights-aligned pro-democracy movement within Iran:

“Other government critics and activists believe the Iranian monarchists’ support from Israel and its right-wing allies in the US – evident in their close ties with pro-Israel lobbies in Washington and their reliance on media support from Israeli-government-aligned outlets and influencers – is not a benefit, but baggage. It has exposed their lack of legitimacy and credibility, and their disregard for the Iranian people’s democratic aspirations.”

While hardliners may have found common cause with monarchists longing for a restoration of past glories, these are forces aligned in a cynical disregard for the democratic aspirations of people in their own countries, and abroad. Read Toosi’s full piece here.