Omar Shaban Archives

A Reading of the Ceasefire Agreement Between Israel and Hamas – Dimensions and Challenges

Omar Shaban is the founder and director of Palthink for Strategic Studies and the inaugural Leahy Fellow at the Center for International Policy.

On January 19, 2025, Israel and Hamas announced a ceasefire, with the goal of ending a devastating round of conflict in Gaza that lasted nearly 15 months, amid complex international and regional contexts and conflicting interests. As of publication, the two sides are set to discuss the terms for implementing phases two and three of the agreement, though without guarantee of success or long-term enforcement. While the agreement has been described as a step towards calm, it does not yet represent a definitive solution to the conflict. Rather, it may be part of a long-term strategy that seeks to reshape the political and military landscape in Gaza and the region.

Successive official statements by international parties and mediators show that the agreement still contains ambiguity in its terms, raising questions about its viability and prospects for implementation.

The objectives of the agreement and its undeclared dimensions

American statements indicate the war is not over yet: Despite the announcement of the agreement as a first step towards calm, statements from the forthcoming Trump administration representing Israeli intentions reveal hidden goals beyond the ceasefire, for example statements by Trump’s new National Security Adviser Michael Waltz. He said that the complete demilitarization of Gaza and the destruction of Hamas remained goals, and that war could resume once Israeli and American hostages were released. He went even further by declaring, “If Hamas violates this agreement, we will support Israel 100 percent to return to war.”

Ambiguity about the fate of military leaders: The ceasefire’s clauses on medical treatment, which refer to the daily departure of 50 wounded soldiers with three escorts through the Rafah crossing, with the approval of Israel and Egypt, will need to be monitored closely and transparently, as it could potentially serve as a cover for the deportation of Hamas military and political leaders from the Gaza Strip.

This condition has already been put forward by Israel and the United States as part of any settlement. In the absence of transparency, it appears that the agreement may include secret arrangements that preserve Hamas’s face while serving Israeli and U.S. strategic goals. This raises the question of the various powers’ ability to impose such a clause on Hamas inside the Gaza Strip, which has made successive statements about its refusal to leave the Gaza Strip under any justification.

Last Minute Consensuses: Mutual Concessions or Interim Tactic? The announcement of a series of last-minute resolutions of differences between Israel and Hamas, and the imminent meeting of the Israeli cabinet to approve the deal, indicate intense regional and international pressure to ensure the implementation of the agreement. But the nature of these concessions is unclear, fueling speculation that some of the undeclared clauses may be more influential than those announced.

The main challenges in the agreement

Ambiguity in later stages: The agreement is divided into multiple phases, but the details of the second and third phases (such as reconstruction, full withdrawal, and final ceasefire) remain vague and subject to further negotiations. This opens the way for postponing these essential items, if all of these are subject to the ability of Hamas to implement everything contained in the provisions of the first phase, i.e. there is a severe test for Hamas to gain the confidence of mediators, especially the United States, in the first phase. The second and third phases are also fraught with many obstacles, with fundamental differences in perception between Israel and Hamas.

Israel makes it clear that, as part of the phase II negotiations, it will be possible to end the war only under the following conditions:

Release all abductees.

Hamas leadership agrees to exile (via safe exit) to a third country.

Agreeing to dismantle its military capabilities.

Avoid any active political participation in the form of Hamas in Gaza “the next day.”

According to Israeli officials, if Hamas agrees to these terms, Israel will not have to return to fighting, but if it refuses — and in Israel they estimate that Hamas will refuse — there is a high probability of resuming fighting.

Lack of real guarantees: The agreement lacks genuine and binding oversight mechanisms to ensure its transparent implementation, making it vulnerable to violations by the stronger party. US-Israeli statements linking the continuation of the truce to Hamas’s commitment reflect a reliance on the balance of power rather than a clear international or legal framework. This lack of guarantees opens the way for Israel to interpret the terms of the agreement in a way that serves its security and strategic interests, as happened in previous experiences such as the Oslo Accords.

Exclusion of the Palestinian Authority: The exclusion of the Palestinian Authority deepens the internal Palestinian division and makes the agreement a solely bilateral one between the Israelis and Hamas. This deprives the agreement of any overall national legitimacy and weakens the chances of turning it into a genuine political settlement.

Internal Israeli politics: Israel’s internal differences are currently felt strongly between Netanyahu and the right-wing led by Smotrich and Ben Gvir, the latter of whom resigned over the signing of the agreement between Hamas and Israel and stipulated that the return to the government is primarily contingent on Netanyahu’s commitment to return to fighting in Gaza after the first phase.

This calls into question Netanyahu’s ability to retain the government. Although there is consideration of the opposition’s promises to secure a safety net in the event that the far right withdraws from the government, Netanyahu is well aware that the opposition bloc led by Yair Lapid will work to save the government only until the deal is completed, and then it will withdraw at the first opportunity so as to collapse the Netanyahu government. The opposition is also seeking power in its own right and to do so must collapse the government in order to go to elections and compete for the parliamentary majority. These dynamics show that domestic politics may play a decisive role in determining the future of an agreement. Netanyahu may resort to disrupting or reinterpreting the agreement as a way to strengthen his domestic political position.

Other weakness of the agreement

The current agreement is more akin to a declaration of principles than to a permanent settlement, as its continuation depends on the commitment of the parties to implement the first phase smoothly. It is only the first step in a series of mysterious stages. Which is perceived as an unfinished frame.

The agreement lacks clear implementation guarantees and effective international oversight mechanisms. This reflects Israel’s continued policy of exploiting agreements as tools to manage negotiations and conflict, not resolve it.

The exclusion of other Palestinian parties threatens to turn the agreement into a “temporary truce” and the lack of any overarching national dimension makes it more difficult to achieve sustainable peace.

The announcement of the agreement from Doha and not Cairo reflects a regional competition between mediators, especially competition for the expected regional role in the US strategy for the region, which may exclude the party that does not seem to have much influence in imposing its conditions or influence on Hamas. This rivalry may weaken coordination and increase the fragility of the agreement, especially with the possibility of undeclared clauses and the ambiguity of the second and third phases, which may reflect differences in interests between regional parties.

Trump’s recent comments about the future of the Gaza Strip, both in regards to who should have political control over it and the fate of the Palestinians of Gaza during reconstruction, could undermine the implementation of the agreement in its later stages. It could also cause a crisis in neighboring countries like Jordan and Egypt, essential stakeholders in seeing de-escalation happen.

Opportunities and motives for the continuation of the agreement

Feeling the American determination and the role of the Trump administration and Baden in drafting the agreement through: – The balance between the two US administrations The agreement is not the product of the efforts of one administration but a combination of multiple factors, including international pressure on Israel after the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, and the role of regional mediators such as Qatar and Egypt. – Biden: Quiet diplomacy The Biden administration has worked to continue efforts through diplomatic channels, taking advantage of relations with mediators (Qatar and Egypt). Biden’s statements about the continuation of the ceasefire during the second and third stages of negotiations, even if the duration of the first phase exceeds the specified time, shows the administration’s desire to avoid the collapse of the agreement.

Trump: Maximum pressure policy

Trump relies on a “big stick” policy, as his statements and those of his advisers show unlimited support for Israel in the event of renewed war. But on the other hand, it was indirect pressure that pushed the parties to the agreement, and Trump himself is proud that his presence is what prompted this agreement to crystallize, not to mention his personal determination to the demands of calm in the Middle East, and that he has broader projects in the region, which are projects subject to strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and normalization with Israel, in order to devote himself to the great economic project and compete with the next China, which is the main goal that he does not manage in the coming stages, and he has no time to drain America, financially or militarily, in any future wars, economic peace depends on calm in the Middle East. Versus China’s competition.

As the agreement is not the product of the efforts of just one administration but a combination of multiple factors, including international pressure on Israel after the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, and the role of regional mediators such as Qatar and Egypt. That means the ceasefire agreement is most likely to sustain. The ceasefire agreement has regional and international back up.

Biden’s quiet diplomacy: Biden administration has worked to continue efforts through diplomatic channels, taking advantage of relations with mediators (Qatar and Egypt). Biden’s statements about the continuation of the ceasefire during the second and third stages of negotiations, even if the duration of the first phase exceeds the specified time, shows the administration’s desire to avoid the collapse of the agreement.

Trump’s Maximum pressure policy: Trump relies on a “big stick” policy, as his statements and those of his advisers show unlimited support for Israel in the event of renewed war. But on the other hand, it was indirect pressure that pushed the parties to the agreement, and Trump himself is proud that his presence is what prompted this agreement to crystallize, not to mention his personal interests and determination to the demands of calm in the Middle East, and that he has broader projects in the region, which are projects subject to strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. There is also the prospect of further Arab normalization with Israel, which he has repeatedly affirmed he has interest in building upon.

The Trump administration’s desire for the return of the Palestinian Authority: News reports have suggested that Trump will restore the Palestinian National Authority to run the Gaza Strip despite Israel’s opposition. Palestinian Authority officials said that President Trump asked the PA to control the crossings in the Gaza Strip, in a conversation with the Director General of the Crossings in the Palestinian Authority, Nazmi Muhanna, and the Attorney General of the Ministry of Civil Affairs in the Palestinian Authority, Ayman Qandil, who went to Cairo at Trump’s request, in order to close the details of this file and prevent Hamas or any other party from control, and this means that Trump has a vision about the future of any agreement with Saudi Arabia, which conditions normalization on the understanding of the solution of the Palestinian state and the need for its control over the Gaza Strip as part of any upcoming agreement.

However, political arrangements at the Rafah crossing remain dependent on Israel’s statements about maintaining a security presence in the Philadelphia axis, raising questions about its intentions towards a complete withdrawal or easing of the blockade of Gaza. Where control of the crossing may remain controversial, issues related to humanitarian aid are subject to the possibility of being used as leverage in later stages. At the same time, Trump’s ambiguous and incendiary comments about US control over the Gaza Strip could also embolden the Israeli government and undermine the Authority’s bid to reassume governance in the enclave.

Positions of key regional mediators:

While the announcement of the agreement was made in Doha instead of Cairo, despite the vital Egyptian role, there are differences between the two governments’ positions. Qatar has a great interest in ensuring this agreement by any means, as this is its first experience with regard to stopping a war in the Gaza Strip, which gives it an important place in any future Middle Eastern arrangement.

The Palestinian file historically represents an important issue for Egypt, especially through previous strategic interventions in this file, as it is an Egyptian national security file. This is especially true for the Gaza Strip, not to mention its real desire to stop the war in any way, in order to restore its economic losses and the return of navigation in the Suez Canal, which was severely affected by the support for the Palestinian people that was approved by Ansar Allah (Houthis) in Yemen, which targeted ships in the Red Sea, affected navigation in the canal, and in turn affected the canal’s revenues dramatically. Egypt has been able to prove that it is still an influential and strong player in this file through the Rafah land crossing, which is the only exit to the Gaza Strip and controlled by Egypt, where one of the conditions of the ceasefire agreement was to return to the management of the Rafah crossing through Egyptian supervision, and that Israel has the right to supervise the lists of injured military travelers who are required to be treated outside the Gaza Strip.

Hopeful recommendations

Future moves by Israel and the United States will determine whether the subsequent phases bring about a real calm, or be used as a cover for re-escalation. The following are recommendations that, if they were implemented, could be used to sustain the ceasefire and provide a framework for long-term peace.

Involve all Palestinian parties: The PA and the PLO should be included in any future negotiations to ensure the inclusiveness of the agreement. In the longer term, PA reform and new elections are essential for the PA to be seen as legitimate and effective.

Establishment of an international monitoring mechanism: the need for an impartial international body to supervise the implementation of the terms of the agreement and prevent violations.

Strengthening regional coordination: Push Qatar and Egypt to coordinate their efforts to avoid competition and achieve real stability in mediation.

Rebuilding international trust: engaging the United Nations and international actors to ensure a transparent and sustainable negotiating framework.

Affirm the territorial integrity of the whole of Palestinian territory including the Gaza Strip as part of a future Palestinian state.

Is the agreement the beginning of a solution or a temporary break?

While the agreement is seen as an opportunity to stop the bloodshed in Gaza, the ambiguity of its terms and the continued Israeli and American goals in reshaping the Palestinian landscape keep it within the framework of the temporary truce. The absence of international guarantees and the deepening of Palestinian and regional divisions make the future of the agreement dependent on complex political balances that could return the region to the cycle of escalation at any moment.

The Cairo Review – A Reading on the Future of Hamas

There will come a time in Gaza when the guns fall silent, when the people left alive attempt to pick up the pieces, and when, most likely, some incarnation of Hamas will reach an agreement with the government of Israel about the immediate future of the strip, the people in it, and the adversarial organizations that have dominated life in Gaza for decades. Omar Shaban, CIP’s inaugural Leahy Fellow for Human Rights and Security, published a thoughtful meditation on the future of Hamas at Cairo Review, starting from the recent death of Yahya Sinwar, and the growing role of Hamas’ five-person council directing the organization from outside of Gaza.

Writes Shaban:

For the civilian population in Gaza, the first and foremost issue is immediately ending the genocidal war against them by the Israeli military. When it comes to post-war governance and administration of the Strip, Palestinians in Gaza will support whichever entity actively contributes to stopping the war and working toward reconstruction and rehabilitation in all respects—societal, economic, psychological, and political. Given the above, Hamas’ ability to provide for the needs of the Palestinians is in question.

But does this mean removing Hamas entirely from the political map in Palestine and the region? The most pragmatic answer is, no. Hamas is a resistance movement with an Islamic ideology that is deeply woven into the Palestinian popular fabric and has become an ideological mainstay in the Palestinian lexicon.

Shaban further outlines an argument that Hamas as an entity will still exist, or at least in enough of a form to make a major decision about the shape and structure of the group after the present war. The three options are, in summary: lay down arms in exchange for becoming a purely civilian government of Gaza, reconcile with other Palestinian parties and play a diminished role in a national consensus government, or step aside from direct government of Gaza and instead let a technocratic entity rule while maintaining Hamas independence as an organization.

To understand the possible shape of a coming peace, read Omar Shaban in The Cairo Review.

اقتراح لإنشاء مجلس إعادة إعمار غزة

مدير مؤسسة بال ثينك للدراسات الاستراتيجية عمر شعبان

منذ اندلاع الحرب في غزة، استمر الجدل حول إدارة القطاع بعد الحرب دون الوصول إلى خطة ملموسة وشاملة. يحتاج الناس الذين بقوا في غزة إلى تدخل فوري للتخفيف من معاناتهم وتسريع عودة الحياة الى قطاع غزة. إن الدمار شبه الكامل للقطاع، والخسائر الشخصية الهائلة في الأرواح، وعدم المساءلة عن أفعال إسرائيل، وغياب أفق سياسي لإنهاء أكثر من نصف قرن من الاحتلال الذي سبق 7 أكتوبر، يخلق أرضًا خصبة لأولئك الذين يسعون لإشعال المزيد من العنف والتطرف. من الضروري وجود خطة شاملة لإدارة القطاع في فترة ما بعد الحرب مباشرة لضمان الاستقرار الكافي لإعادة بناء القطاع ومنع عودة القتال.

هذا الاقتراح لإدارة غزة بعد الحرب مباشرة يستند إلى مجموعة من الافتراضات: أن للشعب الفلسطيني الحق في العيش حياة طبيعية بكرامة وأمان، وأنه لا يمكن ولا ينبغي لهم الانتظار لفترة طويلة من التشاور قبل تحقيق هذه الحقوق؛ أن إسرائيل ومعها العديد من دول العالم لن تقبل بأن يكون لحماس أي دور سياسي أو حاكم في اليوم التالي، ومن ناحية ثانية بما أن حماس لم تعط مباركتها للحكومة الفلسطينية المعينة حديثًا العمل بشكل كامل في غزة؛ ، فمن المحتمل ألا تسمح لها بالعمل بحرية في غزة.

بالإضافة إلى ذلك، سيكون من غير الواقعي وخطير جدًا محاولة استعادة السلامة العامة أو إطلاق أي عملية إعادة إعمار دون التنسيق والتعاون الكافي مع الموظفين المتبقين من السلطة الفعلية في غزة، أي حماس، التي كانت الهيئة الحاكمة في غزة منذ عام 2007.
ستتطلب إعادة إعمار غزة إشراك موظفي الخدمة المدنية للسلطة الفعلية السابقة جنبا ألى جنب موظفي السلطة الفلسطينية في قطاع غزة . موظفي السلطة الفلسطينية ليسوا كافيين والبعض منهم غادروا قطاع غزة او تقاعدوا والكثير منهم لم يمارس عمله منذ 2007. هناك 5000 موظف بلدي في غزة، لا ينتمي أي منهم للسلطة الفلسطينية . قبل 7 أكتوبر، شمل قطاع العمل الحكومي في قطاع غزة حوالي 24000 موظف في الخدمة المدنية، خاصة في قطاعي التعليم والصحة إضافة لــ 18000 شرطي. عندما تم انتخاب حماس في عام 2007، تم فصل الكثير من موظفي السلطة الفلسطينية في غزة –وإستمر الكثير منهم في مواصلة عملهم تحت إدارة حكم حركة حماس خاصي في قطاعي الصحة و التعليم. يقدر عددهم بحوالي 25000، منهم 15000 موظف مدني و10000 من أفراد الأمن. بعضهم بحاجة إلى إعادة التدريب والتوجيه. لذلك، يعد إشراك موظفي الخدمة المدنية للسلطة الفعلية السابقة أمرًا ضروريًا لبدء عملية الإدارة المدنية مع عودة موظفي السلطة الفلسطينية الذي بقوا في منازلهم دون عمل. تفترض هذه الخطة دمج موظفي السلطة الفلسطينية للعمل في القطاع الحكومي مع موظفي حكومة غزة . ليس من الخيارات عدم إشراكهم جميعا لتعزيز النظام العام وتحقيق النتائج. في ضوء هذه الحقائق، تتكون هذه الخطة من أربعة عناصر متكاملة:

العنصر الأول: إنشاء مجلس إعادة إعمار غزة. سيتألف المجلس من 15 إلى 20 شخصًا، سيكونون في الغالب من موظفي السلطة الفلسطينية الذين يعيشون في غزة، والذين يتم دفع رواتبهم من السلطة الفلسطينية في رام الله. سيقوم هذا المجلس بتنسيق عمله مع المنظمات الدولية التي ستعمل على إعادة إعمار قطاع غزة. يجب التأكيد على أن هذه اللجنة ستكون بمثابة فرع غزة للحكومة الفلسطينية، وستنسق عملها بشكل كامل مع الحكومة الفلسطينية. يجب السماح لأعضائها بالسفر الروتيني واليسير إلى رام الله والعودة منها، والاجتماع مع رئيس السلطة الفلسطينية ورئيس الوزراء. يجب أن تعلن هذه اللجنة أيضًا أنها ستعمل مع موظفي الخدمة المدنية للسلطة الفعلية. هذا ضروري لكسب تعاون ودعم القوى السياسية و المجتمعية في قطاع غزة. يجب على مجلس إعادة إعمار غزة أن يعلن بوضوح أن ولايته لا تحمل أي مسؤوليات سياسية، وأنه هيئة مؤقتة ليس لاكثر من عامين وتكون مسؤوليته محصورة في تخطيط وإطلاق وإدارة عملية التعافي المبكر والإعمار. يجب على المجلس تنسيق عمله وتمويله وخطته مع المجتمع المحلي و الدولي، يتوجب إنشاء موقع إلكتروني للإعلان عن عمله للجمهور والمانحين بشكل منتظم. يجب أن يضمن هذا المجلس فصل أموال الإعمار عن أي أغراض أخرى من خلال تخصيص حساب بنكي مستقل بإشراف محلي دولي . يجب أيضًا إشراك الشتات الفلسطيني في هذا الجهد، حيث يمتلك الكثيرون المعرفة الفنية الأساسية والموارد اللازمة لتحفيز الاستثمار في مستقبل غزة.

يجب أن تشمل المناصب في المجلس ممثيلن من قطاع غزة للقطاعات التالية-

- - قطاع غزة للقطاعات التالية-:
  العنصر الثاني: إنشاء قوة شرطة محلية لإنفاذ القانون و الحفاظ على الأمن و السلم الأهلي. ستكون القوة مكونة من 5000 شخص، منهم 2500 من قوات الأمن التابعة للسلطة الفلسطينية الذين استمروا في العيش في غزة، و2500 من الموظفين المتبقين من السلطة الفعلية في غزة. سيتم تعيين رئيس للشرطة من مصر أو رام الله. و سيتم دعوة 20-25 من كبار محترفي الشرطة من مصر والأردن والمغرب للمجيء إلى غزة للإشراف على وتدريب وتوجيه قوة الشرطة المشكلة حديثًا. سيكون لرئيس قوة الشرطة مقعد في مجلس إعادة إعمار غزة.
  العنصر الثالث: مراقبة وإدارة معابر غزة. يجب دعوة الاتحاد الأوروبي والولايات المتحدة للتعاون مع إدارة المعابر في السلطة الفلسطينية لتحمل المسؤولية عن مراقبة والإشراف على تدفق المواد و بالتنسيق مع الحكومة الاسرائيلية ، إلى جانب موظفين محليين من مختلف وزارات السلطة الفلسطينية في غزة. سيتطلب ذلك أيضًا التنسيق مع رام الله. يستوجب ذلك رفع الحصار على دخول المواد الخام و المعدات اللازمة. يجب فتح معبر رفح بشكل دائم للسماح بعودة العديد من الأشخاص المؤهلين والفنيين الذين غادروا غزة خلال الحرب. لا يمكن أن تكون هناك عملية إعادة إعمار في غزة بدونهم.
  
  العنصر الرابع والمهم بشكل خاص: تعزيز المجتمع المدني في غزة. يجب إنشاء صندوق خاص من قبل الدول المانحة لمساعدة المجتمع المدني في غزة على إعادة بناء مكاتبهم وممتلكاتهم ومعداتهم والبنية التحتية الأخرى. يجب أن يدعم هذا الصندوق برامج معالجة الاثار النفسية والاجتماعية التي سببتها الحرب وتعزيز ثقافة التسامح والصمود ونبذ العنف والتعايش والسلم الاهلي وبناء النسيج الاجتماعي ، ويكمل عمل المجلس. يشمل ذلك مساعدة الجامعات في غزة التي دمرت بفعل الحرب على إعادة بناء برامجها.
  هناك بالطبع عدة شروط ضرورية لتنفيذ هذا الاقتراح بنجاح. أولاً، يجب أن توافق الولايات المتحدة، السلطة الفلسطينية، إسرائيل، والاتحاد الأوروبي والدول العربية ذات العلاقة خاصة مصر على الخطة – ويجب أن يتوافر للمجلس الدعم و المساندة من كل القوى السياسية في قطاع غزة. ثانيًا، يجب على المجلس أن يعلن أنه هيئة فنية إدارية مؤقتة، لا يحل محل أي هيئة حاكمة أخرى، وليس لديه أي أجندة سياسية تتجاوز إعادة إعمار غزة. أخيرًا، يجب على المجتمع الدولي، وبشكل رئيسي الولايات المتحدة، الاتحاد الأوروبي والدول العربية الرئيسية، تقديم تعهدات مالية كبيرة لمشاريع إعادة الإعمار ودعم الميزانية المخصصة للأنشطة التي ينسقها المجلس. هذه هي خطة عريضة تتطلب خطط تفصيلية يتم إعدادها من قبل المجلس بالتنسيق مع خطط السلطة الفلسطينية والمنظمات التمويل الدولي. يتوجب تعزيز مشاركة شركات القطاع الخاص المحلية والمتضرريين من الحرب وقطاع الحكم البلدي في عملية التخطيط و التنفيذ و الرقابة بقدر الامكان كي تتوفر الحماية و المساندة المجتمعية لعملية إعادة الاعمار.
  
  يتم تنظيم مؤتمر دولي لإعادة الاعمار تشارك فيه الدول الغنية و المؤسسات الدولية لرصد التمويل اللازم لبدء عملية إعادة الاعمار بشكل كبير بحيث يعطي الامل لمواطني قطاع غزة الذي عانوا ويلات الحرب بمستقبل افضل. يجب تشجيع العشرات من اصحاب الكفاءة والخبرة من فلسطيني الشتات خاصة الذين غادروا قطاع غزة بسبب الحرب على العودة للمساهمة في عملية إعادة الاعمار.
  
  التحديات السياسية لتنفيذ هذا الاقتراح كبيرة، ولكن يجب على القادة إظهار الرؤية والشجاعة اللازمة لمواجهتها والتغلب عليها إذا أردنا تجنب تكرار هذا الكابوس.

To read this post in English, click here.

A Proposal for a Gaza Reconstruction Council

Omar Shaban is CIP’s inaugural Leahy Fellow for Human Rights and Security. He is also the founder of PalThink for Strategic Studies, an independent Gaza-based think tank with no political affiliation.

When the war on Gaza ends, the survivors will need immediate help and a government to administer that aid. Yet the debate on the post-war administration of the territory has continued throughout the invasion without reaching a concrete and comprehensive plan. The people who remain in Gaza will require immediate intervention to alleviate their suffering. The near-total devastation of the territory, enormous personal losses of loved ones, and the absence of a political horizon for ending the more than half a century of occupation that preceded October 7th create fertile ground for those seeking to foment more violence and extremism. A comprehensive plan for administration of the territory in the near-term aftermath of the war is necessary to ensure sufficient stability to rebuild the territory and prevent a relapse of fighting.

Terms for Reconstruction

This proposal for the immediate post-war administration of Gaza is built on a set of assumptions: That the Palestinian people have the right to live in dignity, safety, and normalcy, and that they cannot and should not wait for a long process of consultation before these rights are honored; that Israel will not accept Hamas having any political or governing role the day after, and will likely make it difficult for the newly appointed Palestinian Authority (PA) government to operate fully in Gaza; as Hamas did not give its blessing to the recently appointed Palestinian Authority (PA) government, it likely wouldn’t allow it to work in Gaza freely.

Additionally, it would be unrealistic and very risky to attempt to restore public safety or launch any reconstruction process without the adequate coordination and cooperation with the residual personnel of the Gaza de-facto authority, i.e. Hamas, which has been the governing body in Gaza since 2007.

The reconstruction of Gaza will require engaging civil servants of the previous de-facto-authority. Non-Hamas PA employees in Gaza are not enough. There are 5,000 municipal employees in Gaza, none of whom are PA employees. Before October 7, this sector included approximately 24,000 civil public servants (in the education and health sectors) and 18,000 policemen. When Hamas was elected in 2007, all PA employees in Gaza –estimated to number around 25,000, of which 15,000 are civil public servants and 10,000 are security personnel– were dismissed. Many of them have been furloughed since 2007, and are thus in need of re-training and orientation. Therefore, engaging the public servants of the previous de-facto authority is absolutely necessary to get the process of civil administration started. It is not an option not to engage them to enhance public order and to reach results.

In light of those realities, this plan consists of four integrated elements: a Gaza Reconstruction Council, a police force for domestic security, monitoring and management of the Gaza crossings, and strengthening Gaza’s civil society.

The Gaza Reconstruction Council

The first would be to create a Gaza Reconstruction Council. Ranging from 12 to 15 persons, it will be composed mainly of the PA employees who live in Gaza, who will be paid by the PA in Ramallah and were previously granted permits by Israel to exit Gaza (i.e. who are previously vetted). This body will coordinate its work with the international organizations who will be working on the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. It must be emphasized that this committee is the Gaza branch for the PA government, and it will fully coordinate its work with the PA government. Its members must be allowed to routinely and easily travel to and from Ramallah, meeting with the PA president and Prime Minister. This committee must also announce that it will be working with the public servants of the de facto authority. This is vital to gain Hamas’ cooperation and support. The Gaza Reconstruction Council should announce clearly, its mandate has no political responsibilities, it is a temporary body whose responsibility is confined to launching and administrating the early recovery and reconstruction process. The council must coordinate its work, finance, and plan with the community; it must set up a website to declare its work to the public and to the donors on a regular basis. This council must ensure the separation of reconstruction funds. The Palestinian diaspora should also be involved in this effort, as many possess key technical knowledge and resources needed to mobilize and invest in Gaza’s future funds.

Positions in the regional council should include the: Head of the water authority, Head of the energy authority, Head of contracting syndicate, Head of businessman association, Chief of police, and 2-3 members of civil society.

In addition, the regional council should have representatives of: Ministry of health, Ministry of social affairs, Ministry of local government, Ministry of agriculture, and the Ministry of housing and public works.

As well as observer-liaisons from international organizations, including: UNRWA, World Food Programme, World Health Organization, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Palestine NGOs.

Domestic and Border Security

The second element is to create a police force for domestic security. A force of 5,000 persons will be composed of 2,500 from PA security forces who have continued to live in Gaza, and 2,500 from residual employees from the Gaza de-facto authority. Responsibility for this force will be given to a head of police from Egypt or Ramallah. 20-23 senior police professionals from Egypt, Jordan and Morocco will be invited to come into Gaza to supervise, train, and orient the newly formed police force. The head of the police force will have a seat on the Gaza Reconstruction Council.

The third element is the monitoring and management of the Gaza crossings. The European Union (EU) and USA in cooperating with the PA crossing department should be invited to be responsible for monitoring and supervising the in-flow of material, along with local staff from different PA ministries from Gaza. This will also require coordination with Ramallah. At a minimum, Rafah crossing must be opened permanently to allow many of the qualified and technical people who exited Gaza during the war to return. There can be no reconstruction process in Gaza without them.

Civil Society

A fourth and particularly important element involves strengthening Gaza’s civil society. A special fund must be created by donor countries to help civil society in Gaza rebuild their offices, assets, equipment, and other infrastructure. This fund should support programs for tolerance, resilience, and non-violence, and complement the work of the council. This includes helping Gaza universities destroyed by the war to rebuild their programs.

There are obviously several conditions necessary for the successful implementation of this proposal. First, the United States, PA, Israel and EU must agree to the plan – and there must be a reasonable level of confidence that Hamas will not actively thwart it. Second, the council must announce it is a temporary body, it doesn’t replace any other governing body, and it doesn’t have any political agenda beyond the reconstruction of Gaza. Finally, the international community, mainly the US, EU and key Arab states must make and follow through on major financial pledges for reconstruction and budgetary support for activities coordinated by the council.

The political challenges to implementing this proposal are considerable, but leaders must show vision and courage necessary to confront and overcome them if we are to avoid repeating this nightmare.

اضغط هنا للحصول على النسخة العربية

The Israeli War on Gaza: Post-War Scenarios

The attack of October 7th 2023 was a pivotal event at the local and international levels, ushering in a new era in the life of the Palestinian people and relations with the conflict with the Israeli occupation. For the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel was subjected to a surprise attack by militants belonging to armed organizations, not an organized army, who broke through the border and reached about 14 small towns in southern Israel, inflicting a number of Israeli and foreign civilian and military casualties, and kidnapped and held hostage dozens of civilians, military personnel and non-Israeli foreigners.

The Hamas-Jihadist attack came as a shocking surprise to everyone, Israel, the world, the Palestinian people, and a large part of the leadership and members of Hamas itself and Palestinian society in general, because there were no indications of the possibility of such an event taking place. A few hours after the attack, Israel launched its war on the Gaza Strip in general and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in particular. This war, which is still going on for the 205th day as of this writing, is one in which Israel used all means of killing, destruction, death, and starvation, amounting to genocide, with a case submitted to the International Criminal Court by the State of South Africa.

The Israeli government headed by Benjamin Netanyahu and the War Cabinet set goals for the war: 1), to free the hostages held in the Gaza Strip, and 2), to eliminate Hamas’ military capabilities, and undermine the regime it runs in the Gaza Strip, and 3) ensure that Gaza will not pose a future threat to Israel’s security. These objectives, if realized, will necessarily produce radical changes in Gaza’s system of governance, and their effects will be long-lasting. Research and policy analysis centers have been studying the concepts and scenarios of the results of this war and what it will entail in the short, medium, and long term. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has referred to the battle in Gaza as the second war of independence for the State of Israel, just as the Palestinian Nakba was the first war of independence, and the term “the day after the war on the Gaza Strip” is commonly used by Israeli politicians as a term that refers to transcending the presence of Hamas in the future of the Gaza Strip.

However, the Israeli government, represented by its leaders or the War Cabinet, was unable to present a clear vision for this future, although they expressed some features of it in the context of the military campaign, such as Israeli ministers declaring repeatedly that they do not want UNRWA, the Palestinian National Authority, or Fatah to participate in the future of Gaza. These Israeli goals partially intersected with the US vision of dealing with the war on Gaza, which was represented in the vision of US Secretary of State Blinken: First, defeating Hamas and rejecting a role for it as part of Gaza’s future, second: the US refusal to displace the population of Gaza, and third, the refusal of Israel permanently reoccupying Gaza. Talking about the day after the war became one of the most important results of the convergence of the desire to defeat Hamas. While recognizing that the answer to the question “What comes the day after the war?” carries with it divergent views: the United States wants to see a Palestinian National Authority with radical reforms in the Gaza Strip, while Israel opposes the presence of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip and does not want to see unity within the Palestinian political system.

The day after the war: Possible scenarios

This paper attempts to anticipate the future by examining possible scenarios for managing the Gaza Strip after the end of the war and analyzing the possibilities and obstacles of each scenario.

Before reviewing these scenarios, it should be noted that the question of the day after the war on Gaza has become an important question to be answered by Israel after the failure of the plan to deport the residents of the Gaza Strip to Egypt. Israel tried to gain Western sympathy in the first days of the war to pass the plan to deport Gaza residents, but this plan failed because of Arab and international rejection, especially from Egypt, which firmly refused to open its territory, in addition to the resistance of the residents of Gaza and their refusal to be deported again. Netanyahu and the Israeli War Cabinet went on to destroy all forms of life in the Gaza Strip by targeting all the basic elements of life, such as water, energy, and sanitation networks, shelling hospitals, schools, churches, and mosques, in addition to turning to rubble all government offices, residential towers and hundreds of thousands of housing units as well as refusing to allow in fuel and rationing food and medical aid, in an attempt to submit life in Gaza to the power of death. Interestingly, it is the US administration that has taken the initiative to develop scenarios to manage the governance of the Gaza Strip after the war.

Blinken’s multiple visits to the region during the first months of the war came within the framework of presenting scenarios for governing the Gaza Strip after the end of the war, as the US administration identifies with Israel’s goal and continues to support by all means its war against the Palestinian people in Gaza. In his meeting with Arab foreign ministers in Jordan, the US Secretary of State put forward the idea of managing the Gaza Strip through a joint Arab force, a proposal that was rejected by the foreign ministers. This prompted him to visit President Mahmoud Abbas and present the proposal to him, which Abbas conditionally accepted the governance and management of the Gaza Strip but only within a political process that leads to a Palestinian state according to international legitimacy resolutions, which Israel certainly rejects. In light of these changes, the Israeli war on Gaza opened the door wide for all possible scenarios for managing the governance of the Gaza Strip, and some of the possible scenarios are as follows:

1- Hamas containment scenario

This scenario assumes that the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip will not intentionally or effectively succeed in eliminating Hamas, but the continuous Israeli pressure on Hamas using all means of war, including killing, destruction, starvation, and humiliation, will push it to make fundamental concessions that affect the foundations and principles of the movement. These concessions include recognizing Israel’s right to exist, renouncing violence, and accepting a political-negotiating approach. The movement may then have the opportunity to survive, preserve what remains of its capabilities, participate in governing the Strip, and engage in its reconstruction on new political bases. If Israel succeeds in achieving this, it will have completely domesticated the Palestinian situation.

In a recent statement by the Hamas leadership, Khalil al-Haya said: Hamas is ready to abandon the military approach and give up weapons if a Palestinian state is approved.

Arguably, this most recent Hamas position represents a radical change from its previous positions.

Getting Hamas to abandon its military program is the strategic goal that Israel is trying to achieve in this war, and if it succeeds, it will have won. This would mean Hamas entering the path of compromise and abandoning the armed struggle, which is the same scenario the PLO had in 1982, after Israel invaded Beirut and PLO forces and its head at the time, Yasser Arafat, left the country. Israel would have succeeded in maintaining the separation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank and keeping the Palestinian political divide intact, thus not having to respond to international and regional calls for the need to open a political track for the conflict that ends with a two-state solution. This scenario also guarantees Israel freedom of security and military action in the Gaza Strip, including raids, arrests, and suppression of any Palestinian resistance, without an actual military presence on the ground. This scenario has strong prospects because it is consistent with Israel’s traditional policy toward Hamas since it took control of the Strip in 2007, which is a policy of mowing the grass rather than eliminating it. There has been a change in the stated goal of the Israeli war on Gaza from eliminating Hamas and overthrowing its rule to destroying the group’s military capabilities and preventing it from repeating the October 7th attack. A report published by Al Jazeera lists the opinions of some Israeli experts that Hamas will remain in Gaza the day after the war and that any authority cannot fill the vacuum, and must participate in the civil affairs of Gazans. The realization of this scenario depends on the results of the ongoing battle on the ground, how and when it ends, and whether Hamas will be able to survive and realize some achievements that enable it to possess some power cards.

Influential parties, such as Qatar and Turkey in particular, may contribute to convincing the movement’s leadership abroad to accept this scenario, but this scenario would cause Hamas to lose the support and allegiance of the resistance forces such as Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah. This approach will greatly affect the future of Hamas, especially in front of its supporters and in its ideological stance against Israel, and may lead to a partial collapse and a split in the movement, in addition to the major rift that may occur with other resistance factions such as Islamic Jihad, and the axis of resistance (Hezbollah and Iran). This scenario will also find strong opposition from some Arab parties such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, which prefer Hamas to disappear from the scene and its integration into the Palestinian political system, as they are at odds with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood.

2- Interim international, regional and local supervision of the Gaza Strip

This scenario assumes that after the end of the war, and to fill the vacuum that may arise as a result of the collapse of the regime in the Gaza Strip, influential powers (USA, the European Union, Arab countries influential in the Palestinian case, Egypt and Jordan in particular) may be forced to form an Arab and international force with the participation of local representatives from Gaza to manage the Strip. This entity will manage the reconstruction process and supervise sectors such as education and health and may be supported by an external military force to maintain security, such as a UN peacekeeping force.

This scenario is very much on the table, as Arab countries have announced their readiness to send troops to the Gaza Strip to contribute to its security. The realization of this scenario is mainly linked to Israel’s success in achieving all of its goals and effectively eliminating Hamas and weakening it to the point where it cannot resist. The resistance factions have announced their rejection of this proposal. This scenario, even if it is on the table, requires a legitimate cover from the Arab League or the United Nations as well as acceptance by the Palestinian Authority, which may see this scenario as a transgression against it, especially in light of the legitimacy of Palestinian representation in the PLO and questions over the roles the Arab participants wish to play in the Gaza Strip, especially since they may not be eager to engage in the quagmire of the Gaza Strip in the absence of a permanent political solution. Under this scenario, the PA would not be able to extend its control from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip. Over time and as the situation evolves, its presence in the West Bank would be eliminated by moving its center to the Gaza Strip, or by replacing it entirely with another authority in the Gaza Strip. The outcome of this path could be the realization of a two-state solution by establishing a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip, which could enjoy certain aspects of sovereignty. The price for this would be to keep the status of Jerusalem and the West Bank suspended and separate from that of the Gaza Strip, while keeping hope aflame, in line with a step-by-step policy, that the fate of that area will be dealt with in the future. Of course, land annexation, Judaization, and settlement will continue until Israel ends up swallowing the entire West Bank, including Jerusalem.

3- The scenario of returning the authority to the Gaza Strip

This scenario requires Israel to agree to enable the Palestinian National Authority to reorganize itself in the Gaza Strip, including security control over the Strip, which may require recruiting local elements, bringing in forces from the West Bank or diaspora refugee camps, or containing the existing security forces in the Gaza Strip according to new security principles and doctrine. The PA favors this scenario, as it has already prepared itself for it after Prime Minister Mohammed Ishtia resigned and President Abbas appointed Mohammed Mustafa to form a new government, predominantly from experts and technocrats, in response to repeated calls from the European Union and the United States for the reforming of the PA. This scenario requires Palestinians to build genuine Palestinian reconciliation, form a national technocratic government that would be tasked with rebuilding the Gaza Strip under international auspices, curb Israel’s aggressive policies, establish Palestinian elections, and introduce political reforms in the structure of the political system to prevent the escalation of the conflict and unify the Palestinian decision in time of peace and war, paving the way for a political path in the future.

The Israeli government announced earlier that it would not allow a Fatahistan state in the Gaza Strip, as this scenario would force Israel to go through a comprehensive political process that would eventually lead to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, a change in Israel’s attitude toward the PA has become evident with secret meetings held between influential Palestinian security figures and Israel. Given these changes in Israeli attitudes, it is worth considering the price Israel will demand from the PA for allowing it to administer the Gaza Strip after the war, which will be in the context of completing Israel’s mission to eliminate pockets of resistance and prevent them from being armed.

However, if this scenario is the most likely to happen, then the survival of Hamas as an active part of the Palestinian political system depends on three factors. The first factor is the acceptance of Hamas to fully integrate into the structure of the political system, abandon dependence on the resistance axis, and abide by the PLO agreements, without requiring it to explicitly recognize the State of Israel. The second is the extent of the international community’s enthusiasm to accept the presence of Hamas in the Palestinian political system the day after the war. And the third factor is Fatah’s acceptance of Hamas in the political system after its defeat and declining strength, as undoubtedly Fatah views Hamas as a political rival that has repeatedly presented itself as an alternative.

4- Scenario of the return of the Israeli civil administration to the Gaza Strip

This scenario assumes that the Israeli military will remain present – permanently or temporarily – in the Gaza Strip the day after the war. This scenario is imposed in specific parts of the Gaza Strip, such as the northern area, Gaza City, and even the center of the Strip, without being applied in the southern area of the Strip, which includes the governorates of Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah. If so, it will require re-establishing the civil administration in the same fashion the occupation forces used to run the Gaza Strip before withdrawing from it in 1994 under the Oslo Accord. Under this scenario, the occupation forces would provide services to the residents of the Gaza Strip, and the army and Shin Bet would take over the security management of the Gaza Strip. This scenario will also push the Israeli army to strengthen measures it has already put in place, such as what is known as the logistics road linking Israel and Gaza City, which has become like the border of the buffer zone between northern and southern Gaza. This road is equipped with two military posts on the Gaza shore and near Salah al-Din Street, with both posts equipped with air-conditioned rooms and sleeping quarters for soldiers similar to those in the West Bank. In addition, the establishment of the port in an area south of Gaza City indicates that the measures taken are not for the short term but may remain effective in the long term.

This scenario requires the complete elimination of Hamas’s power in the Gaza Strip, especially in Gaza City and northern Gaza. In any case, Israel has considerable experience in civilian administration of PNA areas, and so it will not start from scratch, especially with its tendency in recent years to deploy mobile apps that directly address Palestinian citizens and facilitate communication with them, such as the “Coordinator’s App.” However, the cost of this option is very high for Israel, both in human and financial capital, especially given the deteriorating living conditions of citizens in the Gaza Strip after the war, the cost of reconstruction, and its assumption of full responsibility for providing services to citizens as the occupying power and its need to manage popular resistance and Palestinian and regional rejection of occupation. This option would make Israel the occupier of all Palestinian territories, a return to the pre-Oslo era, and would mean the end of the two-state solution. This scenario was rejected by the United States and Europe, which clearly demanded that Israel not remain in the Gaza Strip and that the PNA return to it. In mid-February 2024, Blinken announced the US rejection of any “new occupation” of Gaza after the end of the war, in response to Netanyahu’s announcement of a plan for after the end of the ongoing war in the Strip.

5- Restoring village ties with Israeli military rule

This scenario is based on the formation of a group of Palestinian local administrations made up of family, tribal, and community figures to manage the life affairs of Palestinian citizens in their areas of influence and cooperate with the international community in the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, while the issue of security remains in the hands of the Israeli army. This would be similar to the administrative formations established by Israel in 1978 to manage the Palestinian areas in the West Bank and create an alternative leadership to the PLO that is locally acceptable. It should be noted here that since November 2023, the occupation forces have begun communicating with tribal figures to explore the prospects of managing the Gaza Strip through local collaborators working at this stage to manage the humanitarian aid file. However, the occupation forces did not achieve any breakthrough in this regard as of the time of the writing of this paper, in light of a public refusal to cooperate with the occupation. The Gaza Mukhtars Association announced their refusal to cooperate with the Israeli war government to manage the affairs of the Gaza Strip. Gaza’s tribes and families announced their rejection of the Israeli proposal through an official statement titled: “We refuse to be an alternative to any political system.” Hamas also rejected this scenario, calling Israel’s attempt to communicate with Gaza’s mukhtars and clans “a betrayal that we will not allow.” This scenario is difficult to realize for two reasons; first, Israel will not find acceptable family or local figures in the Gaza Strip with influence and tribal respect that would accept to play this role, as it is a national betrayal, in addition to the Palestinian Authority and Arab countries in the region rejecting it, not to mention that it would fuel popular resistance in the Gaza Strip against it. This scenario has been proven to fail in the past when Israel tried to form village associations in the West Bank as an alternative to the Palestinian leadership.

6- Egyptian management of the Gaza Strip

The Gaza Strip represents strategic depth for Egypt, which administered the Gaza Strip from 1948 until June 1967, when Israel occupied the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt may have to play this role to fill any vacuum that may arise as a result of Hamas’s military defeat and the fear that extremist terrorist forces will fill this vacuum, as Egypt has bitter experience in the war against terrorism in Sinai, whose borders are connected to the southern Gaza Strip. Egypt would not necessarily administer the Gaza Strip directly but could do so by expanding the influence of the Egyptian intelligence service in the Gaza Strip, as it is currently doing in eastern Libya, which is controlled by General Khalifa Haftar without an actual Egyptian administration. This means that Egypt may view the border that Israel is trying to impose in the northern Gaza Strip through what is known as Route 749 as the border of its national security area, similar to the Sirte-Jufra line, which Egypt set up in 2020 and declared it to be its area of influence and a red line for its national security.

Although this option is unattractive from the Egyptian point of view at the moment, important factors may push it to consider this scenario in one form or another. These are: (1) Egypt’s national security, (2) the desire to benefit from the gas fields in the Gaza Strip, where Egypt, represented by the Egyptian Gas Holding Company (EGAS), previously signed an agreement with the Palestinian National Authority to develop the Marin Gaza gas field, and (3) Egypt’s desire to manage the reconstruction process and benefit from contracts for large-scale infrastructure rehabilitation operations expected to be launched after the war on Gaza. On the Palestinian side in particular, Hamas may view Egypt’s management of the Gaza Strip as a way to preserve itself from completely disappearing as a result of the occupation of the Gaza Strip. However, this scenario would not be welcomed by the Palestinian Authority, which considers the Gaza Strip an essential part of the territory of the Palestinian state, giving it the exclusive right to govern the Strip.

A perspective on what Gazans aspire to the day after the war

In reviewing the various scenarios for the situation in the Gaza Strip the day after the end of the war, it is important to take into account what the Gazans themselves, the first and foremost stakeholders in this context, aspire and expect. After the end of the war, civilians in the Gaza Strip look for a future of peace and prosperity. The wars and escalations of the past 17 years have cast a bloody shadow on the daily lives of the population, and the people of Gaza are steadfast in their desire to end the cycle of violence and build a bright future for the next generations. The Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip are demanding an end to the war and a Palestinian leadership capable of bringing peace and stability to civilians, promoting reconstruction, and implementing development projects that restore the health system, food security, job opportunities, and freedom of travel, demands they have been making since the imposition of the blockade on the Gaza Strip in June 2007.

The humanitarian crises in the Gaza Strip are threatening the lives of hundreds of civilians, in addition to the scourge of the war, which has destroyed the economic life and future of thousands of young people. People in the Gaza Strip aspire to restore the democracy they have been deprived of since 2007 by holding parliamentary, presidential, and university council elections. On the tenth anniversary of the division in 2017, PalThink published an open letter signed by 52 NGOs calling on the Palestinian government to hold local government elections in the Gaza Strip.

This would lead to a phase of stability and development with a unified and youthful Palestinian political system, working with all available means to achieve political and development goals and build a better future for all. This was emphasized in the research paper published by MIFTAH in 2021, which included the following: civil society organizations affirm their position that local elections must be held in accordance with the requirements of the law, and believe that there is still time for the government, political forces and parties to stop the first phase and not to fragment the elections and hold them on one day and in all governorates.

Gazans also aspire to begin the process of rebuilding what was destroyed by the multiple wars, which caused a significant deterioration in all economic and social indicators. The citizens of the Gaza Strip realize that the years of siege and multiple wars have not achieved any political goal for the Palestinian people, but rather have been a huge burden on them and an obstacle to the realization of the Palestinian national project. It is worth mentioning here that the preparations for the legislative elections that were scheduled for May 2021 witnessed the submission of 36 electoral lists to participate in the elections, 26 of which were formed by young people who are not known and are not from the traditional Palestinian political system. The residents of the Gaza Strip are part of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and since the division and the suspension of the nascent democratic process, they have not stopped demanding an end to this division and the holding of elections.

The citizens of the Gaza Strip believe that the best and only scenario for them is to be under an elected Palestinian national leadership that represents them and works to achieve their goals and aspirations.

Conclusion

It may be easy to start a war, but it is not easy to end it, and it is even more difficult to decide the day after. This is true of Israel’s seven-month war on the Gaza Strip. At the beginning of the war, the objectives were clear, as announced by the Israeli War Cabinet, but as time passes these objectives seem less clear and unfulfilled. Hamas has not been completely defeated, the hostages have not been freed, and the population of Gaza has not been abandoned. The ambiguity of how to end the war and decide the next day stems from the fact that most proposals are “wishful thinking” and are out of touch with reality. The October 7th offensive was indeed a pivotal event that can be said to mark a new historical era in the life of the Palestinian people, an era that is currently being termed “the day after the war on Gaza.” This term has become synonymous with the unknown future of Gaza, not only from the Palestinian perspective but also from the Israeli and regional perspectives, as positions within the Israeli government, as well as within the War Cabinet, diverged towards the future of Gaza. This means that discussing the issue of the day after the war on Gaza may take us to think about the future of the current Israeli government, whose possible fall would represent the fall of the Israeli extreme right-wing forces and the fall of Israeli proposals to displace the population of the Gaza Strip. It may also represent the fall of normalization proposals between some Arab countries and Israel without resolving the Palestinian issue. It can be said with confidence that the war on Gaza has not only destroyed the Gaza Strip but also dispelled political ideas and extremist proposals that some in Israel and the region thought were achievable.

Therefore, we must go to the most realistic scenario, one that is most consistent with the principles of international law and legitimacy. It is a scenario that is based on ending the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and enabling the Palestinians to restore unity and decide on the form of the political system they want and the way to achieve it freely and without external interference. The war on the Gaza Strip, with all the killing and destruction it has caused, must provide a historic opportunity to start a new path towards a landmark settlement that ends the century-old conflict and achieves stability and peace in the Middle East.

This story originally appeared at Arab Reform Initiative on April 30, 2024.

Resource Author: Omar Shaban