Omar Hamed Beato Archives

This Indigenous tribe fights for Indonesia’s vanishing forests

Omar Hamed Beato is a visual journalist from Spain covering conflict, climate change, migration, and social issues. You can find him on Instagram and follow his work here.

It is a blistering afternoon in the mangrove forest of Langsa, a town located on the eastern shores of Aceh province, at the northernmost tip of the island of Sumatra. The dry season has now kicked into full gear as the relentless sun beats down the small patrol boat organized by locals who try to deter illegal logging. After hours of sailing around the forest, a bang noisier than the boat’s own engine can be heard in the background. It is only getting louder. It is an illegal logger cutting some branches of a mangrove tree.

”Stop! What are you doing?,” one of the members of the boat patrol shouts at the logger across the distance.

By the time the patrol reached the area, the logger had managed to flee with the wood. It is a hopeless scene they all are too familiar with. The mangrove has been destroyed and their boat can’t keep up with the logger on his more powerful boat. ”We always lose,” one of the members of the patrol said as they gave up on the chase. ”We can only scare them away,” he said.

*A ranger in a destroyed mangrove.* (*Omar Hamed Beato*)

Indonesia has the biggest share of mangrove forests than any other country on earth, accounting for about a quarter of the world’s mangroves. This kind of forest is essential to the fight against climate change as globally they store 11 billion tons of carbon — the equivalent of the CO2 emissions over 5.4 billion homes in a year in the United States — and their storage capacity is four times that of other tropical forests. Mangroves also provide critical habitat for countless bird and fish species, while supporting the livelihoods of Indigenous communities who have coexisted with these environments for generations.

In Aceh — notorious for its implementation of Sharia Law — the coastal town of Langsa has not been spared from forest loss. Over the past few decades, about 86 percent of its mangrove cover has been destroyed to make way to palm oil plantations, urban areas, or cut down by the logging industry. While the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami killed more than 140,000 people in the province (and killed a total death toll of 230,000 around neighbouring countries), the villages that preserved their mangrove forest suffered less damages and fewer deaths than those that had converted them for other uses. In response, a group of locals formed boat patrols in 2016 to bring illegal loggers to justice and deter the growing illegal logging business. Operating under Adat law, or Indigenous customary law, they now guard a mangrove area of 255 hectares — roughly the size of 350 football fields.

”We had so many mangroves before but a lot of people cut off the trees. That’s why a lot of local people feel sad. A lot of people think that the trees are given by God and have the right to take them. From when I was a kid until 2016, we have lost 70 percent of mangroves but because we have been planting mangroves back we are now at 50 percent loss,” says Jaiful Anwar, the 53-year-old head of the Kelompok Tani Hutan Bangka Bantimoh or Growing Mangrove Forest Farmers Group which organizes the patrols. ”There is a lot of conflict between local people and those who cut the mangroves. Three years ago, I was on patrol and the loggers came to attack me with a machete, but we ran away,” he recalled.

*A logger cutting mangrove branches into smaller pieces that are then transformed into charcoal. (Omar Hamed Beato)*

Despite their best efforts to arrest the loggers and bring them to local courts, Anwar is aware that with their lack of resources, it is nearly impossible to completely stop illegal logging. ”In 2016, we asked the government to give us a speed boat but in 2020, the speed boat broke and now we always lose in the patrols because we don’t have a fast enough boat,” Anwar explained.

According to the Aceh Wetland Foundation (AWF), an NGO founded in 2010 to protect marine areas in Aceh from being erased by development projects, the government is not doing nearly enough to protect the 45,000 hectares of protected mangroves in the province due to a lack of resources. “The government has no money, no boats — nothing. They’re lazy and don’t care. They only have rangers, and even those don’t have boats,” says Yusmadi Yusuf, founder of AWF. Locals in Langsa city have pioneered boat patrols as a big share of their local economy relies on the mangrove forest to obtain crabs, shrimps, or other kinds of fisheries that are then exported to feed China’s massive seafood market.

”The forest can live without humans, but humans cannot live without the forest,” he says, sipping a cup of mangrove juice under a tent beside the forest.

No easy way out

At a local coffee shop or Warung under the midday sun, fishermen have gathered to discuss possible solutions to the problem. ”The loggers are so dangerous for our livelihood,” says Zaimal Mohammad Yusuf, a 45-year-old fisherman who has been fishing in the city for over 10 years. ”Mangroves are disappearing and we need a solution. I have had violent incidents with the loggers four times now but we haven’t been given a solution by the government — the loggers have no space in our village”

”We want the government to protect our forest. Working is more difficult now. It is harder to find fish because there are less mangroves, we need to navigate for two hours to find fish, before it was only 10 minutes away.”

Climate organizations should find ways to back indigenous people protecting mangrove forests, from materials like faster boats to paid opportunities to do forestry protection instead of logging.
States should condition engagement with Indonesia’s economy on meeting its climate goals, and be willing to impose real costs should Prawobo continue with deforestation
The state should recognize indigenous people's rights to their forests and prioritize sustainable development

According to data provided by the local government to International Policy Journal, 27,000 people living in the towns of Langsa, Aceh Tamiang, and Aceh Timur, three of the bordering regencies home to the mangrove ecosystem, work in the illegal logging industry. Many of the loggers are forced into this business due to lack of job opportunities in an area with more than 12 percent of its population living under the poverty line, just above the country’s average of eight percent.

”Some people [can only] find jobs by cutting mangroves,” says Suriyatno, deputy mayor of Langsa city for the last 10 years. ”When people get arrested by Adat law, it says you have to fix what you destroyed. We cannot use Sharia Law because people have to cut the mangroves to stay alive.”

*Fishermen in a meeting with Yusuf exposing their concerns about illegal logging and discussing possible solutions.* *(Omar Hamed Beato)*

Despite the local government’s efforts to subsidize small canoes and nets to incentivise illegal loggers to switch to fishing, many struggle to change professions due to limited educational opportunities to learn new skills. Abdul Mutallib is one of them. At 70, he has been cutting trees since his childhood — he can’t recall how old he was when he began cutting trees as he followed his father’s footsteps, who also worked in the logging industry. As a father of five and grandfather of 12, Mutallib says the work is increasingly difficult and often unprofitable — some days bringing in nothing, and on others just a single bag of charcoal sold for as little as USD 1.80. “I never considered doing something else. This is the only thing I know how to do. If we got support, I could consider doing something else, but I am too old,” he says, sitting by the river where loggers have set up a camp to turn felled wood into charcoal.

Strongmen politics, the environment, and net zero

Since President Prawobo — a former army general — rose into power in the 2024 elections, he has adopted different pro-industry policies that put the environment at risk of further degradation. Last January, the ministry of forestry proposed the deforestation of 20 million hectares (50 million acres) of forests to make space for crops, an area roughly the same size as the U.S. state of Nebraska or double the size of South Korea. This will not only put a strain on the environment and the communities that rely on it, but also jeopardize the country’s goal to be carbon neutral by 2060, as the country’s yearly greenhouse gas emissions have yet to reach their peak in the upcoming years.

”If the country plans to reach net zero, it basically requires really steep reductions [of emissions] after 2030,” says Jamie Wong, a climate policy analyst at NewClimate Institute, a non-profit focusing on climate policy and sustainability. ”This administration’s goal is to pursue economic growth at all costs. There’s an ambitious eight percent economic growth target a year and what that means is an expansion of extractive activities. In mining, you see the industry expanding its bioenergy visions of increasing biofuel production and that’s coming from palm oil. An expansion in palm oil production requires land and emissions. It seems like the current government’s policy direction and the way that they aim to achieve economic growth is not really compatible with its climate goals or with protecting the environment and halting deforestation.”

*Indigenous people reaching the scene moments after the illegal logger managed to flee with the wood. With only one small and slow patrol boat, they have little odds of succeeding against the loggers.* *(Omar Hamed Beato)*

What is more, earlier this year, following Donald Trump’s authoritarian playbook, Prawobo authorized a regulation to deploy the country’s armed forces to crack down on illegal forest use, a militarization that has been also present during last week’s anti-government protests when the army was deployed to the streets. This has raised questions about the army cracking down on small farmers and loggers rather than on big corporations that have the ability to bribe government officials. “Judging from the long history of this country, it is easier to regulate, evict and seize people’s land than to reclaim forests and lands that have been illegally or legally but illegitimately controlled by corporations,” explained Uli Arta Siagian, a member of Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Walhi), the largest environmental NGO in Indonesia, for Mongabay.

In a statement released by Walhi in February, the NGO stated: “The Minister of Forestry should maximize the role of communities who have been working to protect and restore forests. This full maximization can only be achieved by first recognizing people’s rights to their forests and prioritizing the knowledge and experience of Indigenous Peoples and local communities in and around forest areas who have been working to protect and restore them.”

Until then, safeguarding the mangroves will fall upon the fishermen taking it upon themselves, protecting the environment no matter how hard, hoping for the day their plea for help is heard.

Trump’s Aid Freeze Could Leave Millions of Syrians in the Dark

Omar Hamed Beato is a visual journalist from Spain based in the Middle East covering conflict, climate change, migration, and social issues. You can find him on Instagram and follow his work here.

As night falls over Qaboun, one of the many shattered neighborhoods on the outskirts of Syria’s capital Damascus, it almost becomes impossible to witness the devastation left by over thirteen years of civil war. What was once a bustling area with cars weaving through streets and vendors hawking their goods amid the rubble has now transformed into a ghost town, deserted streets dark except for the far in-between pockets of light from those wealthy enough to afford electricity generators. Rania Laila, a 38-year-old mother of four, lives in a small rental house that has recently been rebuilt surrounded by half-collapsed buildings. In their dimly lit living room, the family relies on candles and a small rechargeable lamp, charged during the single hour each day when the government briefly activates the neighborhood’s electrical grid.

”I hope for the electricity situation to get better because it’s the most important thing, we just want to be able to live our lives,” says Laila, in her living room surrounded by her family.

Unlike many others who managed to flee during the war, Laila and her family had to stay in Qaboun during the war as they had no means to move elsewhere. Most of the electrical infrastructure in the area has either been destroyed or looted, and they count themselves among the fortunate few who can at least recharge their phones. Not having electricity means the family has to shower in icy water during the cold winter months where it is not uncommon to reach freezing temperatures in their unheated home. At night, the entire family huddles together in the living room, wrapped in layers of thick blankets to stay warm.

Rania's family and neighbors visit her home after sunset. — *Rania’s family and neighbors visit her home after sunset.* *Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.*

”We would like to go somewhere where there is electricity because electricity is everything in life,” she says. ”We are here without water, we wait for the electricity to come so we are able to shower. Yesterday was a tragedy. We all needed to shower but we couldn’t. Some days we get electricity for one hour, some days it is just from five to fifteen minutes and some days it turns on while we are asleep so we miss it. We have to be careful about using the phone’s battery because it is the only way we can know what time of day it is.”

Laila’s situation, while difficult, is not exclusive to her family. The entirety of the country lives with two hours or less of electricity a day — even in major cities like Damascus. Rural areas, meanwhile, are often left with no electricity at all. After more than thirteen years of civil war, Syria bears the scars of conflict, with 6.2 million people seeking asylum abroad and 7.2 million internally displaced. Combined, the displaced population amounts to more than five times the population of the city of Chicago. For those who have remained in the country, the situation is even worse —nine out of ten live below the poverty line, or on less than $2.15 per day.

*Rania uses her smartphone to light up the kitchen and do the dishes.* *Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.*

The lack of electricity is a significant factor contributing to the hardships faced by Syrians. Electricity is essential for performing basic household chores, powering hospital operating rooms, and sustaining the production processes of countless businesses. Without it, leaving poverty behind seems like an impossible task. This is the case of Mohammed Kamal Kashef, a 51-year-old carpenter working in Yarmouk, Syria’s largest informal Palestinian refugee camp —an area that witnessed some of the darkest chapters of the war. The camp endured a nearly five-year siege by pro-Assad forces, three of which while it was under the control of the Islamic State, until 2018. Kashef fled to Sudan during the war and returned to Syria in 2019, when the frontlines stabilized and Damascus became a relatively safer zone. Six months ago, he opened his business on the camp’s main street, using a small generator to power the machinery needed for cutting and treating wood.

”This is the third or fourth time I’ve started [my life] from zero,” recalls Kashef from inside his shop. ”We have no services in Yarmouk. I have a generator, it is enough for my work. I pay for fuel depending on the amount of work I have.”

He says he could produce more stocks if he had cheaper access to electricity. ”Right now, I can’t use the generator unless a client asks for something specific. If I had electricity, I would have pre-made some sets to sell like tables, closets or even kitchens that would save me some time. Life needs fighting and in the end, God will help us. If we work, we eat, if we don’t, we starve.”

A long way towards reconstruction.

Years of war decimated Syria’s power plants and infrastructure, leaving half of the country’s electricity grid out of service. Power stations in Aleppo, Mahardah, and Zayzoun were destroyed and energy substations —in charge of distributing electricity coming from the main power station to different areas across population centers— have lost most of their transformers. As a result, even when electricity is available, it can only be supplied to limited areas at any given time. According to information obtained by the International Policy Journal (IPJ) from the Syrian Ministry of Electricity, which has recently been merged with the Ministry of Energy after the formation of the new transitional government, it will take $40 billion to rebuild the electricity grid alone. Some estimates put the total cost of reconstruction of Syria at $250 billion, a figure comparable to New Zealand’s annual GDP.

Fuel shortages have further worsened Syria’s electricity crisis. Before the Arab Spring in 2011, Syria produced over 330,000 barrels of oil per day; by 2014, three years into civil war, that figure had plummeted to just 20,000 barrels. To compensate for this decrease in production, a sizable quantity of fuel began to be supplied by the Iranian government.

'[We want] to live life with dignity.'' Portrait of Mohammed at his shop. — *“[We want] to live life with dignity.” Portrait of Mohammed at his shop.* *Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.*

“We used to get fuel from Iran. The supplies were cut off and we are facing [international] sanctions,” says Omar Shakrouk, the appointed minister of electricity after Assad’s fall, speaking from his office at the Ministry in Damascus. To compensate for the shortage of electricity, the Qatari and Turkish governments are set to send electricity-generating ships to Syria that can produce 800 megawatts (MW). However, the ministry has not been able to confirm the arrival date of these ships.

”As you know the electricity situation is very bad in Syria, there’s a shortage in generation and the energy supply. The situation is bad in general,” continues Shakrouk. According to him, the country can currently produce 1,700 MW of electricity; that figure will have to be increased seven-fold to meet the 12,000 MW country-wide demand over the next five years. To bridge the gap, the government will have to repair the damaged infrastructure. However, a shortage of spare parts and oil, as well as a lack of skilled labour make it increasingly challenging.

With Assad now in Russia and Iranian troops withdrawn from Syria, Western sanctions enacted against the now-absent regime present a major hurdle for the new government’s reconstruction efforts. These sanctions not only block the government’s purchase of essential spare parts but also limit the import of the oil needed to run the remaining infrastructure at full capacity.

Although the U.S. has removed the $10 million bounty on Interim President Ahmed Al-Shaara, the rebel group he led towards Damascus last December, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is still classified as a terrorist organization by the UN Security Council, the European Union, and the U.S., with its former ties to Al-Qaeda remaining a point of concern.

Despite this, Western nations have adopted a cautious “wait-and-see” approach, signaling a readiness to lift sanctions if the new Syrian administration enacts meaningful reforms, such as protecting the rights of minorities and women. For instance, in January, the former Biden administration issued a six-month waiver of sanctions, and, at the end of February, the EU lifted sanctions targeting key sectors such as energy and banking.

Hired workers removing rubble. Removing the rubble created by years of war will be one of the most challenging tasks of the new government --without international help, qualified civil engineers, and heavy machinery, this task will likely take decades before neighborhoods resemble some normalcy. — Hired workers removing rubble. Removing the rubble created by years of war will be one of the most challenging tasks of the new government –without international help, qualified civil engineers, and heavy machinery, this task will likely take decades before neighborhoods resemble some normalcy. *Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.*

However, even after repeated visits by Western diplomats to Damascus following the fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime last December, and Ahmed Al-Shaara’s ongoing efforts to build relationships with the West, many of the sanctions imposed on Assad’s regime for its oppressive actions remain largely intact.

”If you want big investments in Syria, you need to stop sanctions indefinitely, not only temporarily. If the EU lifts sanctions while the US keeps them in place, it won’t make any effect because companies have a much bigger stake in the US than in Syria,” explains Joseph Daher, a Syrian political economist and author of the book Syria after the uprisings: the political economy of state resilience, via phone call from Switzerland.

”The power plants need complete maintenance, we could not secure the needed parts. Buying fuel from other countries is complicated. We are struggling to secure flows of funding and the international currency that we need, ”continues Shakrouk. ”The sanctions impact every area, for example securing spare parts and [bringing foreign] companies. With the European sanctions lifted there is more space to have international companies, but the U.S. sanctions have a bigger impact especially because of the currency exchange and [lack of] funding. The removal of the U.S. sanctions is the most important step toward reconstructing Syria. If it doesn’t happen, the rebuilding will be impacted and much harm will be done.”

It’s not only the sanctions, it’s also the aid

The Trump administration’s decision to dismantle USAID and halt foreign aid, followed by significant aid cuts from the British government, means the funding for Syria’s reconstruction remains uncertain. The U.S. has historically been Syria’s top aid donor contributing to a quarter of all foreign aid going into the country —that compromised almost $390 million in 2024 alone. This will only exacerbate the strain on Syria’s chronically underfunded programs. In 2024, the UN inter-agency funding plan for Syria had a 64 percent funding shortfall.

At a video appearance at the Ninth Annual Brussels Conference ‘Standing with Syria: meeting the needs for a successful transition’ on March 17, Antonio Guterres, UN Secretary General, urged countries to reconsider funding cuts. ”Syria [is] one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world, but funding for the humanitarian response continues to fall short. The international community must move with urgency to invest in Syria’s future, By expanding humanitarian support and reconsidering any cuts to funding at this critical time. By investing in Syria’s recovery, including addressing sanctions and other restrictions.”

A barber shop at night. The government plans to improve electricity in stages with big cities as the main priority before that is extended to rural areas. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

On the same day, the EU pledged $6.5 billion in grants and low-interest loans towards the reconstruction. Natasha Franceschi, US deputy assistant secretary for the Levant and Syria, who was also present during the meeting, did not disclose any further aid assistance to Syria on behalf of the U.S. government as they ”expect that other nations are going to help shoulder the financial burden.”

”You need international assistance to rebuild the main cities of Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs. All assistance is needed and it should not be conditional. Aid [and sanctions] are a tool of the U.S. government to have leverage with the new government –this is the problem,” says Daher.

According to Reuters, during the donor conference in Brussels, the U.S. gave the new Syrian government a list of demands to partially lift some sanctions. These include the destruction of remaining chemical weapon stockpiles, collaboration on counter-terrorism efforts, creating a liaison office to help on the search of Austin Tice, the U.S journalist who disappeared in Syria over a decade ago, and barring foreign fighters to take on senior government roles among others.

*Aerial view of Yarmouk. Many of its inhabitants live in destroyed buildings with no services.* *Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.*

Given that the EU is hosting millions of Syrian refugees who fled the country in the 2010s, it has an interest in stabilizing Syria so member states can legally begin returning refugees. On the other hand, the U.S., which only accepted 18,000 Syrian refugees during the height of the war, has its sights on accomplishing Israel’s policy goals on Syria. Both blocs have different policy interests when it comes to the future of Syria.

”There are contradictions [between the U.S and] the EU when it comes to Syria. The EU sees the lifting of sanctions will allow the return of Syrian refugees,” states Daher. On the other hand, he believes that ”the US government is pressuring Syria to make a deal with Israel and to weaken the region to seek normalization between the region and Israel.”

It’s not all about the money

Ahmed Al-Shaara is confronted with the nearly-impossible task of reuniting a country where social divisions run deep after fourteen years of brutal civil war. Alawites, Kurds, Christians, and Druze are some of the minorities inhabiting Syria, all wary of the steps Al-Shaara’s government may follow. In February, the government launched the ‘national dialogue conference,’ in which roughly 600 people from across the country, including minorities and women, were invited to the presidential palace in Damascus to discuss the political reconstruction of the country. Furthermore, after a delay of one month, on March 29, Al-Shaara unveiled the new transitional government, which includes a Christian woman, an Alawite, and a member of the Druze community. It remains to be seen whether this will be enough to bring different sects onboard the new government’s vision for Syria.

In the meantime, Al-Shaara has reached a deal with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who control the north east part of the country —where most of the country’s oil reserves are located and the majority of Kurds live, to integrate the group under the Syrian Ministry of Defence and achieve a ceasefire in the east side of the country, where there have been clashes between the SDF and armed groups loyal to the government in Damascus. Shortly after, the interim President signed the draft of a new constitution which, in theory, will saveguard freedom of expression, press, or minorities, and women rights, with Islamic law as the base of Syria’s legal system. Additionally, he has established five-year presidential terms with promises of elections within the next five years. He stated he hoped the constitution would open a new era in Syria ”where we replace oppression with justice.”

In central Damascus, largely spared of the war, relatively wealthy people have bought their own generators and solar panels to have an independent electricity supply. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Yet, the path towards reconciliation will be anything but straightforward. Already there is internal conflict along sectarian lines. The Assads came from and privileged the Alawite community during their rule, but are no longer in power. At the beginning of March, after weeks of revenge killings and kidnappings targeting the Alawite community, Alawite armed groups loyal to Assad ambushed HTS-led security forces in the coastal regions, home to many Alawite communities. This sparked a brutal counter insurgency operation in which HTS, foreign mercenaries, and other armed groups from all over the country with resentment towards the Alawite community rushed in to fight the remnant of the regime. This resulted in over 803 extrajudicial killings and mass executions between March 6 and March 10, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, a human rights organization documenting human rights abuses in Syria. Motivated by revenge and sectarianism, the killings also claimed the lives of non-combatants, including women, children, medical personnel, humanitarian workers, and journalists.

”You have remnants of the regime that create instability, especially in rural areas. HTS is also responsible because of their policies: lack of inclusivity in consolidating their power and not tackling sectarian issues, there hasn’t been transitional justice because they have no interest in that because [HTS] should also be prosecuted for their crimes, especially Ahmed Al-Shaara and other commanders,” says Daher.

These killings have fueled skepticism about Al-Shaara’s true intentions among various groups that have yet to align themselves with Damascus. This has been the case of the Druze community, who has historically enjoyed some level of autonomy from Damascus, in the southern province of Sweida bordering Jordan and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajri, the spiritual leader of the Druze community, has so far rejected unifying the Druze community with the central government in Damascus calling the new constitution ”dictatorial.”

*Protesters in Sweida demand justice for the Alawite minority who have been massacred in the coastal areas in recent weeks. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.*

In the city of Sweida, home to the Druze community, after a minute of silence held at a student-led protest against the indiscriminate killings of Alawites, Shaza al-Khatib, a 22-year-old medical student said “[Alawites] were killed in the worst possible ways, and sadly the bloodshed is still happening even after the old regime fell. I have no trust right now. I’ll criminalize the defense ministry now just like I [criminalized] the old regime. This ministry doesn’t represent us, they killed people who trusted them and surrendered their weapons. As a Syrian, I am scared we will be killed just because we are Druze.”

Despite my meeting with Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajri at his residence in Sweida, he refused to provide any on-the-record comments on his views regarding the role of the Druze community in post-Assad Syria.

Israel has joined the game

Since the fall of Bashar, tensions between the Druze, who enjoyed certain privileges under the regime, and HTS, in the role of Syria’s transitional government, have been on the rise. At the beginning of March, there were four days of clashes between Druze armed groups and HTS in Jaramana, a suburb of the capital majorly inhabited by the Druze community. Israel, which illegally occupies the Golan Heights (where a sizeable Druze community lives), claimed it would intervene to ”prevent harm to their Druze brothers in Syria.”

Since the fall of Assad, Israel has seized more territory adjacent to the illegally-occupied Golan Heights, striked different military sites across Syria, and declared a non-militarized zone between Damascus and its border under the pretext of ‘security concerns.’

”Conflict with Israel is not only slowing down the reconstruction of Syria but destroying more of it”, continues Daher. ”The Israeli government is trying to destabilize the new Syrian government. There is a long history of Israel trying to instrumentalize sectarian differences —it is not new at all. Israel is opposed to democratization of the region and this has been done with support of the U.S..”

He further emphasized that “If you democratize the region, you have[more] solidarity with Palestine. The day they announced a ceasefire in Gaza, you had demonstrations in Syria in favour of Palestine. The Assad regime had a policy of stopping any group from stating they want to liberate the Golan Heights. If you democratize the Middle East, that would force governments to have a more radical opinion of Israel. When people protest in favour of Palestine, they also protest against their country’s complicity with Israel and the U.S.. Israel knows that if you have more democracy, you have more opposition.”

In Sweida, Amer Alba, a commander of the Sweida Military Council —a Druze armed group formed last February by former soldiers and officials of Assad’s regime to protect the Druze community— welcomed me at one of their sites. The setting is stark, with assault rifles, .50 caliber machine guns, and rocket launchers surrounding him. The group has been accused of having pro-Israeli views.

Alba (right) at a garrison in the outskirts of Sweida. ''We don't want our weapons, we love peace but they made us keep them because of the massacres that are happening in the coast'' — Alba (right) at a garrison in the outskirts of Sweida. “We don’t want our weapons, we love peace but they made us keep them because of the massacres that are happening in the coast.”Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

”[HTS] didn’t respect its people, not a child, not a woman, it’s like they’re slaughtering sheep. Al-Shaara is not different from the old regime,” says Alba. ”We will never surrender our weapons to killers and mafia like HTS. I refuse dealing with them or their existence in Sweida. There will be a waterfall of blood in the governorate [if government forces arrive]. If Israel had not intervened in Jaramana, it would’ve been a massacre just like in the coast —we will collaborate with any state that will protect our people. Sadly HTS are rejecting our existence in this country.”

The International Policy Journal has not been able to independently verify how Israel intervened in Jaramana beyond statements given by government officials.

At the local market, Marwan al-Srekhy, a 58-year-old vendor believes that the Druze community has majoritarily rejected Israel’s interference in Syria. ”The people of Sweida in general are with the government. [We support] unifying all of Syria’s groups —every citizen wants this. We want to be a part of the government and under the same flag, but [they] need to give citizens their rights,” the 58-year-old explains.

He continues, ”We don’t have anything against the current president but the people around him are bad. The government should include every group of people, but this government does not. Religion is for God and the homeland is for everyone.”

An unexploded mortar shell next to a destroyed power station in Qaboun. The manager at the only remaining power station in the area says only two out of eight of the transformers are operational. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

This post also appears on the IPJ Substack, read and subscribe here.

Inside Armenia’s geopolitical shift to the West

Omar Hamed Beato is a visual journalist based in the Middle East covering conflict, climate change, migration, and social issues. You can find him on Instagram and follow his work here.

Protesters march across Yerevan the night before the commemoration of the Armenian genocide on the 23rd of April. Manifestations like this are often used by political parties to foster nationalism. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

As the sun sets over Yerevan –Armenia’s capital– on the verge of the 109th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, thousands of people flock to Republic Square to remember past and current struggles with neighboring Turkey and Azerbaijan. This genocide, often referred to as the first of the 20th century, claimed the lives of as many as 1.2 million Orthodox Armenians in the Anatolian peninsula during World War I. Over one hundred years later, the wounds of war and mass displacement remain wide open in the minds of the Armenian people. Continuous wars with neighboring Azerbaijan over the majority Armenian-populated territory of Nagorno-Karabakh in the 1990s and recent years have only exacerbated militaristic and nationalist sentiments within Armenian society. The territory, known by locals as Artsakh, is a self-proclaimed republic within the borders of internationally recognized Azerbaijan. A mix of anger, sadness, and worry can be felt in the ambient – it’s been only seven months since the latest chapter in the war came to a close. Nagorno-Karabakh was completely taken over by Azeri forces prompting almost its entire population of 120,000 to flee to Armenia.

“In the second decade of the 21st century, the Armenian nation has been subjected to genocide once again,” said a speaker at a political rally in Yerevan the day before the commemoration of the genocide on April 24th –a cry that attracted the attention of attendees. “Genocide is the policy of the Turkish state [referring to Turkey and Azerbaijan], the enemy wants to destroy us. One part of Armenia [from Karabakh] was displaced from its homeland of thousands of years.”

Every year, Turkish and Azerbaijani flags are publicly burned in Republic Square, Yerevan. This is the portrayal of a society that is deeply hurt and humiliated after decades of conflict. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Yet, despite all the nationalistic sentiment, not everyone at the manifestation agrees on a way forward for Armenia. Mariam, a young Armenian woman who took part in the event, whose real name is being withheld due to the sensitive nature of the topic in the country, sees it as simple rhetoric rather than a realistic possibility. “I think this gathering is quite populist,” she says while crowds prepare to march across the city. “Don’t get me wrong, I would like Armenia to retake Nagorno-Karabakh to allow everyone to go back home but I don’t think it is possible, Azerbaijan has more power,” Mariam says before the interview gets abruptly interrupted by other people overhearing it from the crowd.

Many in Armenia have lost loved ones to the different wars between these two neighbors since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, a collapse that reignited the dispute over the territory that remained relatively calm when Armenia and Azerbaijan were coexisting within the Soviet umbrella. For a while, Russia, as Armenia’s historical security guarantor and main economic partner, prevented Azerbaijan from escalating the conflict into a full-out war.

During the 2020 war –when Azerbaijan conquered adjacent territories of Nagorno-Karabakh that Armenia took in the 1990s– Russia played an important role in brokering a peace deal between both states. However, things changed in February 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Unable to divert resources from the war effort, Russia was in no position to defend Karabakh from any incoming Azeri invasion. This was put to a test when Azerbaijan began the 10-month-long blockade of Artsakh in December 2022, rationing medicine, food, and fuel, practically isolating this territory from the rest of the world.

Russia’s inaction to the blockade triggered the belief in Baku that there would be no Russian intervention if it decided to go ahead with a complete takeover. Almost a year later, in September 2023, Azeri troops began to hit Karabakh with artillery and drone strikes making Armenians lay down arms within the first 24 hours of the incursion. The mass exodus of the population to Armenia began in September 2023, and on January 1st 2024 Azerbaijan forced the dissolution of the self-proclaimed republic.

Coping with a humanitarian crisis on its own

Despite a strong post-pandemic economic recovery, Armenia is still, by many means, a developing economy. According to a 2022 World Food Program report, about one-fourth of Armenians suffers from food insecurity and one in three lives below the poverty line of USD 115 per month.

Hence, since the fall of Karabakh, refugees have been struggling to start anew. The government has promised benefits to the newcomers: a one-off payment of $250 to every adult and a monthly allowance of $125, or about 65 per cent of the minimum wage in Armenia, to cover rent and other basic needs. Yet many refugees complain the much-anticipated money is stuck in bureaucratic backlog. Due to the global focus on the crises in Palestine and Ukraine, only 47 per cent of the $97 million pledged by the United Nations for the emergency phase of the crisis has been raised.

This has affected refugees like Andranik, 47, and his family. Like most displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh, they are living in a small village on the outskirts of Yerevan. He is living with his wife, mother, and three other children –all of whom complain about the lack of aid coming from the government since they arrived in Armenia.

Andranik in front of his house in Yerevan. During the 2020 war –which also claimed the lives of his nephew and younger brother– he was hit by Azeri bullets three times, which has hampered his mobility and consequently, hurt his prospects of finding employment. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

He claims to only be receiving a $50 stipend for his disability –for some reason, he stopped receiving the $125 monthly allowance in February –which is insufficient for a large family like his to survive in Yerevan. “Our economic situation is very bad,” he explains. “We are not expecting any support from the government… [our only hope] is going back to Artsakh one day.”

Due to their economic situation, his family can barely afford any food or essential medicine for his aging mother. They rely on food donations to support their subsistence. “My friends support our family; time to time bring some wood, some food etc. My old friends from Armenia who served in [the military] in Artsakh supported us many times,” Andranik laments while speaking in front of his family. “I am cultivating the land of this rental house to support ourselves [with] some food. We grow some greens, onions, and potatoes. We [are also] keeping some chickens and turkeys as well.”

Andranik’s mother, Nina, 86, shedding tears when talking about her home in Artsakh. Due to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, she has been forcibly displaced four times in her life, having to start from zero on every occasion. Humanitarian workers comment refugees haven’t received proper psychological support since they were displaced to Armenia. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Difficult living conditions and lack of job opportunities across rural areas in Armenia have prompted about three out of four refugees to settle in Yerevan and adjacent provinces.

“The situation for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians is really bad” says Benyamin Poghosyan, a senior research fellow at the Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia –an independent Armenian think tank. “They lack housing and many of them have no jobs. What the government is paying is barely enough to rent an apartment, especially in Yerevan.”

Beyond the Armenians displaced from Artsakh, the country has seen a significant influx of Russians opposing the regime since the war in Ukraine broke out. These recent arrivals en masse mean that the Armenian labor market is struggling to absorb all these new workers –especially as the country has historically been characterized by high unemployment amongst the most vulnerable. A December 2023 report by the International Monetary Fund estimates these influxes to account for a 3.5 per cent increase in the labor force relative to 2021. Figures show a grim outlook for Karabakh Armenians –it will take until at least 2028 for them to be fully integrated into the job market.

Adella, 65, and her son Radik, 41, are examples of this. Once considered well-off in Karabakh, now they find themselves living in a warehouse in the town of Masis, some 30 minutes away by car from Yerevan. Since they moved here, they have struggled to find jobs – they are only able to generate some extra income when they sporadically sell on the streets some shipments of perfume sent by their relatives living in the UK and Russia.

“I would like to find a job, any kind of job. I will do heavy jobs if necessary,” explains Radik. “[Unfortunately], there are no jobs here.”

Lack of jobs and aid means mother and son live in an unhygienic house with no running water or electricity. “There’s no furniture inside the house –they just gave me a blanket. It’s just cold at night. [We have a] heater but it is not powerful enough,” says Adella as she gazes at Mount Ararat in the background. Due to inadequate infrastructure at home, Adella and Radik have to visit their relative’s house two to three times a week to shower.

Life on pause. Adella video calling one of her relatives living in Russia inside the warehouse where she lives. Due to her age, she is struggling to find work as employers prefer younger workers. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

To address the housing issue, the government initiated a program aimed at assisting Karabakh refugees in securing permanent housing. However, this initiative has encountered opposition within the refugee community. The government offers up to $13,000 for families to construct or purchase homes in sparsely populated areas, where employment opportunities are scarce, and $5,000 in areas near Yerevan. Benyamin argues that “this scheme only allows Nagorno-Karabakh refugees to buy old Soviet-era houses on the borders of Armenia,” where they do not want to live.

Anna, 45, together with another family from Artsakh, currently rents a house for $390 a month in the surrounding areas of Yerevan. She works at a tobacco factory six days a week, while her husband, Artur, 59, works in the land. They express concern that the government is failing to acknowledge the refugees’ apprehensions about living near Azerbaijan. “We are not prepared to endure another displacement disaster,” Anna laments, humorously remarking that the pledged funds would only enable them to afford “half a house.”

Portrait of Ararat, Anna’s relative who died during the 2020 war against Azerbaijan. Most families from Artsakh and Armenia have relatives who have died fighting in the last few years. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Greta, Anna’s 80-year-old mother-in-law, adamantly rejects the idea of purchasing a house in Armenia. Her thoughts are fixated on returning to her home in Artsakh –where she lived her entire life until September 2023. “I would love to return if the Azeris were not present. I long to visit the graves of my son and husband, and to see my house and everything again”, Greta emotionally expresses, wiping away tears. “During the day, I am in Armenia, but at night, my heart is in Artsakh.”

Greta next to the window in her rental house. Due to the inability to afford rent individually, many families have joined together, residing in crowded accommodations. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Is the West the answer to Armenia’s woes?

Unable to handle the humanitarian crisis on its own and with its security constantly under threat of further Azerbaijani attacks, Armenia has –in recent months– begun diversifying its alliances’ portfolio by mainly decoupling from Russia and looking to Western partners for economic aid and security assistance.

Since the fall of Nagorno-Karabakh, repeated meetings have been taking place –in Yerevan and Western capitals alike– between Armenian officials and their Western counterparts looking to establish new economic partnerships. This culminated in a meeting between Ursula Von Der Leyen, Josep Borrell, Anthony Blinken, and Armenia’s Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, in Brussels on April 5th leading to a $293 million aid package from the EU over the next four years and another further $65 million coming from the US.

“This shows that the European Union and Armenia are increasingly aligned in values and interests,” commented Von der Leyen during the press conference that followed the meeting. “The humanitarian situation of refugees in Armenia remains a priority…we’re ready to do more to support the long-term integration of refugees.”

In a recent meeting between US and Armenian officials in Yerevan on June 11th, the US reiterated its commitment to support ongoing efforts to accommodate refugees. “The United States acknowledges the ongoing economic and social challenges Armenia faces in supporting displaced persons and refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh and intends to continue to assist the Government of Armenia’s efforts in this regard,” reads the press release. “The United States praised Armenia’s efforts to shelter displaced persons and refugees, and Armenia offered appreciation for the more than $21 million in humanitarian assistance the United States has provided to support displaced persons and refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh since September 2020.”

To avoid repeating history and the events of the last years and decades, Armenia is not only seeking new economic partnerships and aid, it’s also modernizing its defense capabilities. For instance, since 2020, Armenia has purchased artillery, radar, and missile systems from India and last November, France began supplying precision rifles, radars, and armored vehicles to the Armenian armed forces. “For Armenia, enhancing military capabilities is the least it can do because they can’t trust Russia anymore,” says Marylia Hushcha, a southern Caucasus and eastern Europe researcher at International Institute for Peace, a Vienna-based NGO promoting peaceful conflict resolution across the world.

Praying for a better tomorrow. Armenian youth has embraced Western values more than any other generation in the country. Despite the desire to pivot West, many feel uncertain about how, and if, this will be achieved. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

“There is this fear in Armenia that Azerbaijan may attack again in the future, especially in the south,” she continues, referring to the dispute over the Zangezur corridor, a narrow strip of land connecting Azerbaijan proper to its western region of Nakhchivan and Turkey alongside the Armenian-Iranian border.

“The decision of the Soviet government to separate West Zangezur, our historical land, from Azerbaijan and hand it over to Armenia led to the geographical separation of the Turkic world,” posted Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s president, on X (formerly known as Twitter). “We will implement the Zangezur corridor, whether Armenia wants it or not,” he threatened back in 2021.

The geographical location of Armenia has made finding security all the more difficult. To the East and West, it is surrounded by adversaries Azerbaijan and Turkey. To the south, it borders Iran –which despite its historically strong ties with Armenia is increasingly cooperating with Azerbaijan on a variety of infrastructure projects like the recently inaugurated Qiz Qalasi dam. “Armenia has no allies in the region whereas Azerbaijan feels secure because it has its own military power but also it has the support of Turkey,” adds Marylia via video call. “Armenia has had a military alliance with Russia which isn’t working and Azerbaijan has an alliance with Turkey that is working”. An example of this close cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey, Turkish-made drones supplied to the Azeri armed forces played a major role in the 2020 war and the subsequent takeover of territories surrounding Artsakh, as did the provision of arms by Israel.

“You need two armies with similar power not to start a war. By acquiring more weapons from the West, Armenia is, to some extent, trying to counter Azerbaijan’s military advantage on the battlefield and enhance its security,” Marylia tells the Center for International Policy.

Armenia’s Russia problem

While Armenia has been taking concrete steps to decouple from Russia, the high degree of interconnectedness between them means there is still a long way ahead before the vision of the Armenian government becomes reality.

While former Soviet republics such as Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia –all of which are now candidates to join the EU– took concrete steps in the 2010s to get closer to the West, Armenia’s government at the time decided to strengthen its cooperation with Russia. In 2013, Armenia announced it would join the Eurasian Customs Union, a free trade zone comprised of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and Armenia. To this day, Armenia is officially still part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a security alliance akin to NATO formed of ex-Soviet states –although the government claims their membership is now on pause.

Graffiti showing resentment towards Russia. Many in Armenia blame Russia for leaving them vulnerable against Azerbaijan. Negative feelings against Russia will likely last for decades if not generations. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Historically, Russia has been the biggest arms exporter in the region –to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Given Armenia’s lack of indigenous military Industry, in the 2010s, 94 per cent of all the weapon imports came from Russia. This has served Moscow’s purpose of enhancing profits for its military industry and destabilizing the region. Achieving a quick modernization of its armed forces with Western equipment seems unlikely after decades of investments in Russian-manufactured gear. “The EU is not a military power and the US is unlikely to fill the gap to substitute Russia as a major weapons exporter to Armenia, especially as both are focused on Ukraine and Gaza,” Marylia comments.

Furthermore, Armenia’s former imperial power maintains control over all energy infrastructure in the country, along with key transportation systems like railways, where it continues to maintain approximately 3,000 soldiers until at least 2044. “Russia’s presence in Armenia is very strong”, explains Marylia. “Armenia is trying to reach out and connect with the West but practically it is very difficult –quite impossible I would say. It is unlikely Russia would not intervene if Armenia goes against Russian interests.”

According to Benyamin, the feasibility of this shift depends on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. “If Russia doesn’t lose the war, it will have more resources to look into other neighborhoods like the South Caucasus. Russia will say ‘ok guys, games are over and you were dreaming or making some steps against Russia. I am back and you will do whatever I want’. [This will happen] regardless of who is Prime Minister in Armenia.”

The road towards peace

The Armenian government has been signaling that it is ready to make concessions to Azerbaijan in order to reach a permanent settlement to the conflict. There have been no indications from PM Nikol Pashinyan and his environment suggesting any military action against Azerbaijan.

On the contrary, in January, the Armenian government launched the so-called ‘Crossroads for Peace’ initiative with the intention of enhancing “diplomatic initiatives, dialogue, and cultural exchange” in the South Caucasus. In an article by Armenia’s President Vahagn Khachaturyan published in the World Economic Forum, he wrote “Armenia is committed to turning the aftermath of the crisis into an opportunity for building lasting peace and promoting regional cooperation.”

“There is a belief in the Armenian government that Armenia cannot develop without normal relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. [They think] Armenia should pay whatever price to get this normalization,” adds Benyamin. Hence, in April, the Armenian government gave up four villages to Azerbaijan in the Tavush region, located in Armenian’s north, villages it had conquered from Azerbaijan during war in the 1990s.

Yerablur military cemetery in Yerevan. Many families visit graveyards of soldiers on a weekly basis –mandatory military service in Armenia means many of these fallen soldiers were 20 years old or younger –a painful reality still highly present for many. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Yet despite the government’s good intentions, it is unlikely it will sail through smooth waters. The transfer of these border villages has sparked widespread protests around the country demanding the government revert this decision. The fall of Karabakh has created a sense of humiliation in Armenian society. It is unlikely that a peace deal –signed on Azerbaijan’s terms– will provide the much anticipated lasting peace to the region.

“At the end of the day, one day there will be a new government which may want to take some of the losses back. This [one-sided deal] will be the recipe for the next Armenia-Azerbaijan war,” says Benyamin.

Center for International Policy contacted the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and Armenia requesting comments on their respective views on the peace process. However, no responses have been received by the time of publication.

Armenia is in a weaker position than Azerbaijan militarily and politically speaking. Arguably, it needs the peace treaty more than Azerbaijan. Marylia believes the Armenian government is caught between a rock and a hard place as its approach to peace faces “resistance from the public and Azerbaijan is not the easiest negotiating partner.”

The shift to the West may try to provide the Armenian people with some economic relief and a renewed sense of security. However, it will take many decades until peace can be achieved, not only between governments but between societies, allowing cultural communication, trade, shared infrastructure, etc. “The EU [and the US] don’t have enough leverage over Azerbaijan to make it more accommodating with Armenia,” she adds. The West’s ambition is “to act as a mediator but their attempts have not worked.”

Resource Author: Omar Hamed Beato