There is concern among analysts about a potential civil war following the capture and killing, this past Sunday, February 22, of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes “El Mencho”, leader of the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación, in a military operation. The cartel’s violent reaction—burning vehicles and businesses simultaneously in more than 20 states—demonstrates not only their territorial presence but also a possible theater of operations for a dispute over the organization’s leadership.
The capture in June 2024 of drug lord Ismael Zambada “El Mayo”, now on trial in the United States, decapitated the Cartel de Sinaloa, provoking a struggle for leadership between two factions and a war that has left thousands dead and disappeared. If there is no consensual leadership within the Jalisco Nueva Generación Cartel, the situation could escalate exponentially.
Mexico has spent 20 years militarizing its drug policy—not just by bringing the army in to fight a drug war, but because cartels in response have transformed into armed criminal enterprises that not only sell drugs but also control territories through extortion, domination of local politicians, and many other criminal businesses, as already described by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. From the standpoint of peace and the rule of law, this policy has failed; from the standpoint of business, it appears to be a success, not only for the cartels.
The armed forces, like organized crime groups, have gained greater political and economic power as a result of a failed drug policy, and both are responsible for thousands of victims. According to official figures, from 2006 to 2025, there have been 497,446 intentional homicides—oscillating between 25 and 30 per 100,000 inhabitants—and as of today, 391,722 disappeared persons, of whom 131,819 remain missing.
The conditions that enable the growth of lethal power on both the military and criminal sides include corruption among political elites who co-govern with organized crime, the impunity that leaves crimes on both sides unpunished, and the lack of transparency and accountability among the military, political parties, and public representatives. The fight against organized crime must use the tools of democracy and justice. Weapons have only brought more violence.
The Secretary of Defense, General Trevilla, stated forcefully that the operation to capture “El Mencho” demonstrated the strength of the Mexican state. The truth is that the state’s strength lies in its civilian institutions. Instead of strengthening institutions of justice and transparency, the Mexican government and Congress have been dismantling them, creating conditions that undermine basic rights. This is why a group of Mexican human rights organizations has asked United Nations bodies to intervene to protect victims and guarantee their rights.
The current crisis of the multilateral system stems from the fact that the West, as Mark Carney noted at the most recent World Economic Forum, has been living in a “useful fiction” in which it pretends that the rules apply equally to all, including Mexico. The United Nations, and especially its member states, must embrace universal values for a “new world order” and demonstrate this through action by upholding human rights in any country, regardless of its degree of power. The authorization, support, and acquiescence of the Mexican government toward crimes committed by Mexican cartels must be a subject of discussion and decision-making in the UN General Assembly, as requested by the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances.
Additionally, criminal organizations are enabled by weapons manufacturers, particularly in the United States, due to the ease of access to firearms. Arms companies benefit from this militarized policy because they sell to all sides of the conflict. Approximately 80% of the weapons used by cartels are acquired in the US. Still, they are also the main suppliers to the armed forces in Mexico—a win-win business that the United States Congress allows by failing to regulate the domestic and international sales and traceability of weapons. Congress must adopt comprehensive legislation—such as the ARMAS Act—beginning with restoring authority over controlled weapons sales to the U.S. Department of State rather than the U.S. Department of Commerce, followed by stronger controls on public sales in the United States to ensure traceability and prohibit transactions for individuals linked to criminals, including cartel members.
Criminal structures require “legal” business networks to transfer and launder money, such as banks, money transfer companies, currency exchange houses, and bitcoin networks that the U.S. Department of Justice has already detected. These transnational criminal enterprises rely on transnational complicity networks to move drugs to end consumers and bring money back. The U.S. government does not appear interested in dismantling these networks or regulating money-transfer and bitcoin businesses that become complicit service providers to criminals in the United States. A criminal policy focused on dismantling criminal networks—not just capturing drug lords, which is often popular for winning votes but ineffective at stopping criminal enterprises and violence—is needed. Along with conducting serious investigations into collusion between U.S. businesses and cartels, there must be greater oversight and monitoring to prevent transactions to criminal groups through banks, exchange houses, money transfers, and bitcoin.
The effects of the capture and killing of “El Mencho” remain to be seen. Still, organized crime will continue operating as long as drug policy remains militarized rather than civilian-led and focused on strengthening institutions of justice, transparency, and anti-corruption in both Mexico and the United States.
Michael W Chamberlin is a CIP Senior Non-Resident Fellow.
