Washington is pressing for a wider UN arms embargo on Sudan while refusing to use its direct leverage over the UAE. The war on Iran explains why.
In August, the United States started pressing for broadly expanding the UN Security Council’s Sudan arms embargo beyond Darfur to cover the whole country, bind every party in the war, and cover drones explicitly. On October 8, 2026, the Security Council voted to extend the current sanctions regime, untouched since 2005, for another two months, as discussions continue and several members, including Russia, oppose changes. As the war spreads beyond Darfur into Kordofan and Blue Nile, Washington’s draft covers more territory and more weapons, yet it still does not explicitly name the state actors fueling this conflict.
In reality, Washington does not need the Security Council to change this war. It arms and funds the governments backing both sides, and it does not need anyone’s permission to stop. It has gone to the Security Council instead, where the twenty-two year old embargo has done nothing to stop the flow of weapons into Darfur. At the very least, the resolution it writes in December should name the governments doing the arming. This is problematic only because the largest of them, the United Arab Emirates, or UAE, has become an essential American partner in the midst of the Iran War.
Monitoring Security Assistance
Sudan is suffering the world’s most pressing humanitarian crisis, where the war has killed an estimated 150,000 and forcibly displaced more than 12 million, according to the United Nations Human Rights Council. On September 13, 2026, drones struck Ed Damazin, the capital of Blue Nile State, killing at least four people and damaging civilian infrastructure.
UN investigators and flight-tracking analysts traced a supply line running through Bosaso in Puntland, al-Kufra in eastern Libya, and Ethiopian military airfields. The UN Panel of Experts found that Ethiopian territory served as a supply conduit for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). A UN fact-finding mission counts at least 350 and as many as 2000 Colombian military contractors operating alongside RSF units, recruited through private security firms and trained at Emirati bases, according to Human Rights Watch.

Massad Boulos, President Trump’s senior adviser on Africa, told the BBC in September that “there might be some traders or whatever that are doing these sorts of supplies, providing supplies to both sides.” He said the U.S. was pursuing a comprehensive arms embargo rather than targeting specific state sponsors. Both sides are armed from abroad. The UN fact-finding mission found that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) used Turkish and Iranian drones in attacks it determined amounted to war crimes.
Washington is well aware of the UAE’s role in the war, and in January 2025, the Biden administration in its last thirteen days determined that the RSF was committing genocide and sanctioned RSF head Hemedti along with seven UAE-based companies who had ties to the RSF. In June 2026, the Trump administration sanctioned SBL Energy, an Indian explosives manufacturer that had sent more than two hundred shipments to a company controlled by Sudanese military intelligence. In that same announcement it described an Emirati company supplying a sanctioned Sudanese firm and left it off the list. In November 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the war would not be happening without external actors and declined to name any of them.
In Congress, Senator Van Hollen and Representative Sara Jacobs filed resolutions of disapproval in November 2024 against a $1.2 billion munitions sale to the UAE. Three more resolutions followed in May 2025, and all of them failed. A year later Van Hollen brought two amendments to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, one barring sales to the UAE until it stopped supplying the RSF, the other barring major sales to any country supplying either side of the war. Neither advanced. On August 3, 2026, Van Hollen and twenty other Democratic senators wrote to Rubio asking the State Department to halt certain arms sales to the UAE, which they named as the RSF’s principal external backer.
Ten days later, the US mission at the UN circulated a draft resolution to the other fourteen Council members. It would have extended the embargo to the whole country and written new grounds for sanctioning individuals. Yet, there was still no mention of foreign governments supplying weapons.
A Code of Silence
In March 2025, Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed, the Emirati national security adviser, spent a week in Washington meeting with the president, the CIA director and the heads of Microsoft, Nvidia and BlackRock. Days later the White House announced that the Emirates had committed to $1.4 trillion in American investment over ten years, aimed at artificial intelligence, semiconductors, energy and manufacturing. Sheikh Tahnoun also chairs the sovereign fund behind the air cargo group that Middle East Eye has tied to the RSF’s supply route.
The war on Iran made the UAE seemingly indispensable to the Trump Administration’s regional approach. American forces fly from Al Dhafra outside Abu Dhabi, which Iran began striking on February 28. By March 8 the Emirati Defence Ministry had counted 1,422 incoming drones and intercepted 1,342 of them, and roughly half of everything Iran launched anywhere was aimed at the UAE. In May, the Wall Street Journal reported that the UAE had launched their own strikes against Iranian targets.

Iran has complicated who the U.S. can and will work with in Sudan since July 2024 when Burhan, the leader of the SAF, restored relations with Tehran and gained access to Iranian drones. Israel, meanwhile, has worked both sides since the war began; however, Africa Intelligence reported in August that RSF delegations traveled to Tel Aviv in May 2025 and February 2026, meeting Israel’s foreign ministry and its intelligence services.
By the time the Iran war started, the RSF had spent a year promoting a mission quite aligned with American interests. The RSF’s Sudan Founding Charter outlines priorities for “Achieving International Peace and Security,” which include ensuring safe passage for commercial shipping along Sudan’s Red Sea coastline and cooperation against terrorism. This makes the RSF — which in 2024 was accused of genocide by the USG – less than two year later an asset for Washington to remove the threat of an Iran-aligned force in Africa.
American silence on who is arming the conflict is deliberate, and the war with Iran has sharpened the incentive to maintain it. Such a strategy comes at major humanitarian costs, with more than a thousand civilian deaths from drone strikes in the first five months of this year alone.
Widening the embargo would still be the most serious action the Security Council has taken on Sudan in twenty-one years. It would make the transfer of munitions illegal. Yet the 2004 embargo on Darfur is now more than two decades old, and weapons flow in despite it. The Council has the power to identify foreign interference in Sudan, a power it used to designate three individuals responsible for recruiting former Colombian soldiers to the RSF to serve as drone pilots. The council has yet to designate anyone who sent the drones.
The extension of negotiations on the embargo to December allows time for the Security Council to take the issue of foreign actors into consideration. Council members should back the expansive resolution, one that names suppliers on both sides. However, such action is the bare minimum of what is actually possible. The sales and the funding that reach both sides of this war are American decisions, and they require no vote, no draft text, and nobody’s permission. Disarming the interior of Sudan is not possible without disarming its exterior, which means confronting the relationships the United States has chosen to protect.
Michael Ishak is a fellow at the Center for International Policy.


