Resource Author: Alexander Langlois

The U.S.-Iran War Cannot End Without U.S. Pressure on Israel in Lebanon

When the United States and Iran published the initial Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) meant to halt the months-long war initiated by the U.S. and Israel, its first article called for a “permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon.” It was a term acceptable to the Trump Administration, but not its co-belligerents in the conflict. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz summed up this dynamic on June 24, proclaiming that “we are not retreating” from Lebanon, “even if there is an American demand.” Such statements, while geared toward Israel’s hawkish voting base months before its parliamentary elections, reflect an unfortunate reality: Israel’s political leadership believes it can skirt the demands of its patron, even when its decisions go against U.S. interests. The reality, however, is that Washington can and should materially pressure Tel Aviv to end its military operations in Lebanon, especially if it wants already floundering talks with Iran to succeed.

That agreement explicitly demands a cessation of hostilities across the Middle East between the United States and Israel, on the one hand, and Iran and its allies, on the other. Indeed, it constitutes the first point of the framework for talks between Washington and Tehran, highlighting the importance they place on this component and their understanding of its potential to derail negotiations. The Islamic Republic risked collapsing talks with the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump to connect Lebanon and the region to the MOU, whereas the White House seems to understand that it cannot seriously reject this stance.

Israel, however, has other plans. Since the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, Israel’s genocide of the Gaza Strip, and its subsequent assault on most of its neighbors, it has worked to establish buffer zones of control beyond its borders in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. It claims to view Lebanese Hezbollah as an existential threat, which it views as justifying its forced displacement of at least 1.3 million Lebanese from the country’s south, razing of cities along the disputed border, destruction of civilian infrastructure, poisoning of the land, and refusal to allow any return to the area in what would amount to the war crime of unlawful transfer and ethnic cleansing.

As a result, both Israel and Hezbollah have continued to trade strikes, albeit to a lesser degree. The former has conducted a significant majority of those strikes, with Hezbollah almost entirely responding to them. Both, in turn, accuse each other of violating the ceasefire. For Israel, these developments are the goal, as it hopes to spoil the MOU and renew full, direct hostilities with Iran and continue its unchecked aggression against Lebanon and its neighbors. For a country predicated on land seizure, occupation, and apartheid, it should not be surprising that its only solution to real or perceived security threats was always indefinite and creeping land seizure and occupation.

Spoiling for a fight

Whether or not Trump’s supposed interjection into the situation, reportedly berating the Israeli prime minister in private calls while certainly doing so publicly, plays a role in what appears to be a significant slowdown in hostilities in Lebanon remains unclear. Vice President JD Vance is leading the overall MOU effort in what could be a realization by Trump that the war was not going his way ahead of midterms in November. Vance’s public appearances have focused heavily on selling the deal at home, including relatively historic criticisms of Israel’s political leadership over what he correctly assesses is their role in making his negotiating track more difficult.

Those developments could suggest that there is real and sustainable rhetorical pressure occurring in U.S.-Israel diplomatic engagements, although clear competition with Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the Middle East file suggests a bumpy road ahead. The so-called “historic” trilateral framework agreement between the United States, Israel, and Lebanon could operate as a competing effort designed to disconnect Lebanon from the broader regional file given its direct contradictions with the MOU related to Israeli military operations and withdrawal in and from Lebanon.

Rhetoric alone will not effectively prevent Israel from playing its spoiler role in Lebanon or elsewhere, nor do harsh words suggest real U.S. pressure on the Israeli state. As Israel’s genocide in Gaza highlights, public and private statements against proposed or actual Israeli actions have, at best, only delayed those actions. U.S. President Joe Biden and his team would strategically leak to the press that they were preventing Netanyahu from worsening the situation, just for the Israeli government to commit to that action down the road anyway. Its May 2024 invasion and razing of Rafah in Gaza’s south offers one such example, just as Israel’s late-2024 bombing campaign and invasion of Lebanon represents another.

It is crucial to note that in both instances, efforts existed to end the conflict at the time. That recurring trend cannot be discounted, as Israel has opted to escalate at key moments over the last two and a half years exactly when real opportunities to lower the regional temperature were gaining momentum. It has repeatedly used its military actions in Lebanon and Gaza as a springboard for escalation elsewhere, understanding how its actions would elicit a response that would bolster its calls for continued war – especially in talks with Washington.

Blank checks and balances

While the White House appears to recognize this dynamic, it has not yet taken the step of placing material consequences on its junior partner for actions that go against its interests. This time can and should be different. A real debate is underway in the U.S. Congress over reshaping American military aid to Israel – one admittedly dominated by positions that would dangerously tie both militaries closer together amid growing pushback and during a time of major upheaval in a region Washington should be pulling away from. While substantial support for amendments from figures like outgoing Congressman Thomas Massie to annual funding bills dictating foreign military aid represent pressure points on Israel, the defeat of these amendments on July 15 represent an ongoing, if faltering, rejection by a bipartisan majority in Congress of any policy moves that would seek to pressure Israel. While that fight is far from over, the Trump administration may have even more leverage over Israel than past presidencies to act on its own.

It can and should use its executive authority to end arms sales and other forms of aid to Israel to make clear that it is decisions in Washington, not Tel Aviv, that determine the direction of American policy in the region. As with previous calls, the same provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) apply: namely Section 502B, which dictates that no security assistance may be provided to any country engaging in a “consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” The FAA’s Section 620I, alongside the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), similarly dictate that no assistance may be furnished under these mechanisms to any country prohibiting or restricting U.S. humanitarian assistance. Section 620M of the FAA, known as the “Leahy Laws,” further prohibits U.S. assistance to a foreign security force unit when there is credible information that such unit has committed a “gross violation of human rights.”

Each of these moves are unlikely, however, under one of the most pro-Israel presidents in U.S. history. To be sure, Trump has decoupled U.S. interests from Israeli ones in many unique ways, pressuring Netanyahu in ways unseen under previous presidencies. While notable, these decisions reflect a Trump-first foreign policy as opposed to an America-first foreign policy, with the endgame often reaching American-Israeli alignment anyway. Self-preservation is the name of the game in this White House and should not be confused with a real effort to upend U.S.-Israel relations.

Given this position, Congress could explore other avenues for action, such as blocking arms sales within 30 days notification under the formal review process outlined under the AECA. However, Congress has never successfully done so. Worse, Trump could simply declare an emergency, allowing the immediate issuance of the sale to move forward pending government agency review. Notably, Trump has repeatedly utilized this emergency provision across both of his terms.

Efforts to apply material pressure on Israel for its actions in Lebanon are, therefore, difficult without Executive branch cooperation. Yet while this administration appears unwilling to fully commit to a major reset in U.S.-Israel relations, as dictated by international law, it can at least take marginal steps to keep Israel in check. That includes freezing certain arms sales by delaying transfers to signal that it can and will take unprecedented steps to ensure its MOU with Iran works. It means empowering the Lebanese state to return to the south after a forced Israeli withdrawal from all sovereign Lebanese territory, allowing it to truly work for all its people as opposed to foreign interests. It requires bold, historic decisions that recognize the failures of the past on the part of U.S. administrations to accept the region as it is and not as Israel wants it to be and dictates into reality and failure.

These options are limited under such a reckless administration. Yet as this author has previously argued, the end to the regional war flows through Lebanon. The benefits of ending that war could be monumental, although Israel’s illegal occupation of Palestine still lingers as the true source of regional instability. Yet for now, pragmatism must reign supreme, with deals meant to prevent a return to war crucial as the regional shift continues. Should the Trump administration want to return to a ceasefire, acknowledging how the MOU specifically failed in regard to Lebanon, should inform that push, although placing faith in such an outcome remains shaky at best.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst, the senior editor at DAWN, and a contributing fellow at Defense Priorities. He focuses on U.S. foreign policy, military restraint, and geopolitical developments in the Levant and West Asia.

Israel’s Invasion Seeks To Keep Syria Divided

By Alexander Langlois, a Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities and analyst focused on the Middle East. Follow him on X @langloisajl and BlueSky @langloisajl.bsky.social.

The collapse of former President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 ushered in a generational political transition in Syria. Yet, as the country works to rebuild and heal after nearly 14 years of brutal conflict, Israel appears dead set on malignly stymieing Syria’s transition, territorial integrity and continuity, and basic sovereignty. 

Indeed, Israel is pressuring Syria today under the guise of protecting minority groups in the country. The effort constitutes an extension of Israel’s “periphery doctrine” and “alliance of minorities” strategies – long central components of Israel’s broader regional effort to bolster its security through alliances with potential shared enemies of Sunni majority states. As such, Tel Aviv aims to operationalize real or perceived minority concerns in Syria to justify clear violations of its northern neighbor’s sovereignty, advancing its overarching security interests. Such efforts risk reigniting Syria’s civil conflict and should be rejected by the international community.

Israeli Violations of Syrian Sovereignty     

Less than one day after the Assad regime collapsed on December 8, Israel quickly moved to secure its interests inside Syria. IDF soldiers captured the Syrian side of the disengagement zone along the disputed Israel-Syria border separating the illegally occupied Golan Heights from the rest of Syria. It has since captured and illegally occupied numerous towns in southwest Syria’s Quneitra Governorate – the country’s second-smallest province, which contains the Golan Heights.

Israel’s decision to invade Syria coincided with a sweeping bombing campaign across the country. In an estimated 480 strikes, Israel targeted the former Syrian Arab Army’s military infrastructure and assets, including bases, weapons stockpiles, aircraft and military airports, and supposed chemical weapons sites. The goal of the operation, according to Israeli officials, was to eliminate any Assad regime weapons that could fall into the wrong hands. These strikes continue today.

Yet Israeli officials originally stressed that these operations would be temporary, mindful of both the illegality of their actions and global public opinion against its broader regional operations over the last 16 months. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu then claimed on December 17, 2024, that Israeli forces would remain until an arrangement that “ensures Israel’s security” would be put in place. This announcement reflects a substantially deeper and more nefarious goal, as Tel Aviv couples national security rhetoric with expanding operations over time. 

In this regard, Israeli leaders view Syria’s new rulers – senior leaders from the former Al-Qaeda-affiliated Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – as an immediate threat along their occupied northern border in the Golan. For Israel, the thought of another Islamist militia or armed entity on their border reflected the ongoing threat from Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Lebanon – a threat they largely eradicated in 2024.

That military operation in Lebanon highlights a drastic shift in Israel’s military strategy since the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023. Given the brutal success of Hamas’s operation in breaking through Israel’s security systems that have long blockaded Gaza, the military establishment in Israel adopted a strategy of enhanced border security on a national scale – namely by rejecting the most remote threats along those borders through the use of military force. 

As such, Israel continues to expand its illegal occupation of southern Syria. Israeli Defense Minister Katz announced an indefinite occupation of the newly captured Syrian territory on January 28. Then, on February 23, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded that the southern Syrian governorates of Quneitra, Dara’a, and Suwayda remain demilitarized, threatening the use of force should Damascus deploy in these areas. 

The threat effectively nullifies any sense of Syrian sovereignty while extending the Israeli exception to international law further into Syria and just miles from the capital of Damascus. Israeli officials have amplified ethno-sectarian tensions across the country to bolster those threats, claiming Israel’s self-proclaimed role in protecting Syria’s minority groups – including Alawites, Kurds, Druze, and Christians.

In one particularly telling instance, Israel repeatedly insisted it would use military force to protect the Druze, a major minority group in southern Syria – particularly in Suwayda Governorate. Tel Aviv cited so-called violations against the Druze in Jaramana, a densely populated and ethnically diverse suburb of Damascus with a sizable Druze population. 

Working with small and disparate Druze groups, the Israelis argued that Druze spiritual and political leaders supported an alliance – something that Druze leaders immediately and publicly rejected. Unfortunately, this did not prevent days of violence between Damascus’s new security forces and some of these minor Druze factions, resulting in many deaths.

Understanding the risks, Syrian leaders have criticized Israel’s actions without escalating the situation. This position reflects Damascus’s weakened state. Indeed, it is in no position to challenge Israel or the broader West as it hopes to garner sanctions relief necessary for a successful transitional period. With its military and economy in shambles, it can ill afford a conflict with a rogue Israeli state that will simultaneously eradicate any hope to rebuild the country and provide for its people.

Israel’s Intentions in Syria

Ultimately, Israel’s efforts post-Assad are designed to create facts on the ground that advance their interests now and in the future. Tel Aviv expects some form of negotiations with Damascus that will dictate state-to-state relations for generations should the transition succeed. Thus, the Israeli government is collecting as many bargaining chips as possible ahead of potential talks.

To put it lightly, this approach is dangerous. Israel appears willing to induce ethno-sectarian infighting within Syria to ensure the transition fails to produce a territorially contiguous Syrian state. It is doing so by co-opting minority fears in a country where the previous regime used sectarianism to sow distrust throughout the population in a classic autocratic divide-and-rule strategy that left Syria’s social fabric destroyed.

Israel likely hopes to use this pressure to induce a series of concessions from Damascus under the threat of collapsing the state, resulting in the balkanization of Syria. In this context, the goal is to prevent any serious threat to Israeli interests or territory from inside Syria. As such, Tel Aviv could hope to dangle full recognition as an alternative – an item Assad was previously negotiating alongside a break from Iran in exchange for sanctions relief and a general Western acceptance of his victory in the war.

Given that this so-called victory was anything but real, Israel is hoping to get the same or a similar outcome from Syria’s new rulers at gunpoint. At minimum, they likely hope for Syria’s recognition of Israel’s claim to the Golan Heights. Both goals are non-starters for Damascus, which would not dare risk its limited legitimacy during a highly unstable transition period by recognizing Israel or its illegal occupation and annexation of its territory. 

To be sure, Washington previously made offers their counterparts could not reject under US President Donald Trump’s first term in office – an effort that led to the infamous Abraham Accords. Morocco received US recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara; Sudan was removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list; and the UAE received numerous preferential deals. It is not unrealistic to assume Washington could bolster Israeli efforts to induce a false “peace” between Syria and Israel, especially given the former’s listing on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list since 1979. 

Still, Syria could turn to other countries for support – namely Russia and Turkey. The latter is particularly important as it represents Israel’s other major concern in Syria. Ankara directly and strongly backed the opposition during Syria’s civil war, aggressively demanding Assad’s ouster and positioning itself well in today’s post-Assad Syria as a result. Given the total collapse of Israel-Turkey relations today, both view Syria as a battleground in their growing competition for regional power and influence. 

Israel is working to ensure Turkey cannot realize its military goals in Syria. Ankara hopes to build multiple military bases in the country – something Tel Aviv worries could re-ignite Syria’s long-running role as a resistance front to its illegal occupation of Palestine and neighboring lands. 

In line with the Israeli goal to not allow real or perceived threats on its borders, it is working to prevent this potential future. Yet, just as its military operations could inadvertently produce a new rival state in Syria, Israel’s efforts to weaken the country will likely force Damascus to rely more heavily on Ankara. Thus, the short-sighted nature of Israel’s strategy comes into full focus.

Preventing a Disaster     

The international community cannot allow any regional actor to thwart or distort Syria’s transition in ways that could either upend the country or permanently tear it apart. Indeed, efforts should be focused on ensuring Syrians can lead their transition with minimal to no impediments – especially those that would harm Syria for another entity’s political gain. Washington can play a central role in this regard while retaining a light-touch approach to any post-Assad transition.

The Trump administration should temper Israeli actions in Syria, overtly and covertly pressing them to forego illegal military operations within and illegal occupation of Syria’s sovereign territory. This can be framed as supporting Israeli security – namely that occupying a neighboring country’s land creates long-term strife that could produce a Hezbollah-equivalent entity in Syria. Stressing that Syria is not interested in competition or conflict with Israel, and that Washington and Israel can work with regional partners to ensure that reality is sustained, should be central to this approach.

Washington should also coordinate with regional actors – particularly Turkey – to further ensure Syria does not remain a playground for regional and international actors to compete. Guaranteeing and supporting positive role for Ankara that does not use Syria to raise tensions with Israel is crucial in this regard as Israel views Turkish influence in the country with suspicion, if not hostility. Such efforts can bolster the parallel goal of reigning in Israel.

Finally, Washington should work with the new Syrian government to disincentivize any potential response that could escalate the situation and produce further Israeli encroachment on their territory. The United States still holds economic and diplomatic tools that can lightly steer the Caretaker Government in the best direction for Syria’s transition to succeed. Of course, this approach must reject micromanaged nation-building or any heavy-handed approach to Syria’s transition. Officials can openly back the Damascus government and gradually provide terror designation relief to reinforce this effort.

Ultimately, all states should support Syria’s political transition given the country’s geographic positioning as the “Heart of the Middle East” and out of respect for its people’s resilience and democratic aspirations after 14 years of war. Preventing unhelpful and short-sighted policies that harm that transition should be central to any actor with a stake in Syria today. Bargaining Syrian security for one of its neighbors will only produce more of the same instability that has plagued the Middle East for decades – a scenario no administration in Washington should promote or accept as pre-determined.

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