Labor unions going global for workers rights

Wouter van de Klippe is a freelance journalist and Public Policy graduate based in Europe. He’s particularly interested in organized labor, economic, social, and environmental justice, and social welfare states.
 

Boiling in Amazon’s warehouses

The city boiled as the unrelenting sun cooked Manesar in India’s northern state of Haryana. Temperatures soared to 50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit) in some areas of India on May 16th this year as a deadly heat wave swept the region.

At 4:30pm, a manager inside of Amazon’s Manesar warehouse called a meeting. The meeting was, according to the manager, intended to motivate the workers to push their efforts and increase productivity despite the heat. To accomplish this, a worker testified in The Independent, the manager asked the warehouse workers to make a pledge: workers “will not take any breaks, we will not stop to drink water or go to the bathroom until we meet our targets.”

The inhumane pledge came as the same worker reported shifts of organizing products for 10 hours a day with only two breaks of 30 minutes to rest. While the facility has been outfitted with fans and coolers, she said that their impact is “negligible”, “walk just 10 steps away and you can barely feel any difference. The areas where we work are typically between 30-35C on any given day.”

Amazon has since said that the pledge was an “unfortunate and isolated incident”, but the case has catalyzed a renewed discussion of the brutal labor conditions in Amazon warehouses.

These conditions were brought to the attention of India’s National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) by the Amazon India Workers Association (AIWA), established in 2022 and supported by UNI Global Union, a global union federation for service sector workers. AIWA is one of over 80 organizations across the globe fighting to improve the often brutal conditions faced by Amazon under the banner of the Make Amazon Pay campaign.

AIWA, with the help of UNI, was able to document and raise awareness of the conditions experienced by Amazon warehouse workers, ultimately resulting in the NHRC taking action at what the commission stated could potentially “raise a serious issue of the human rights of workers.”

Now, UNI Global union is campaigning to demand that Amazon provide safe working conditions – especially in light of the climate crisis. Amazon’s warehouses in India are not alone in unsafe temperatures – the Teamsters union in the US is mobilizing for better protections in the Northeast, and back in 2022 workers reported scorching temperatures during the 2022 California heatwave.

These campaigns and others like are one example of a burgeoning wave of global labor solidarity that is rising as unions seek out new strategies to confront global capital.

Especially in the United States, unions are experiencing a renaissance of public attention and support. Less well-known is that union victories in the United States could have the consequence of pushing union victories around the world.
 
 

Less well-known is that union victories in the United States could have the consequence of pushing union victories around the world.

On the last Friday of the groundbreaking United Auto Workers (UAW) walkout that led to a historic victory, Tesla servicing workers went on strike in Sweden. It was the first attempt ever to get Tesla to sign a collective bargaining agreement and the action benefited from the momentum of the UAW actions to organize auto workers.

Unions that are pushing the envelope of labor organizing in the United States could spearhead efforts around the world, especially when it comes to global efforts at US-based multinationals such as Amazon.

For Nick Rudikoff, UNI’s campaign director and coordinator of the Make Amazon Pay campaign, “only a global labor movement can transform Amazon into a responsible employer.”

“You have such a multisectoral company that transcends sectors and geographies, it’s the largest logistics and commerce company in the world.”

The Make Amazon Pay campaign was launched four years ago and has coordinated growing days of strike action each year – most notably during Amazon’s (in)famous Black Friday sales.

Last year’s Black Friday strike mobilized workers in over 30 countries and, according to Rudikoff, received more press coverage than the sales themselves. “The fact that the Make Amazon Pay strikes and actions received so much support shows just how much solidarity there is for workers wanting a union.”

A representative from AIWA told me that coordinating with UNI Global and the Make Amazon Pay campaign “shows that the poor working conditions at Amazon are similar everywhere across the world. We are fighting for the right cause, not only in India. We are fighting everywhere across the world, and we are learning from each other.”

New campaigns seeking to organize workers the world over within multinationals are one of the many ways that unions have responded to globalization and increasingly spread supply chains.
 

Globalization and International Framework Agreements

Labor unions have had to be nimble in response to contemporary capitalism. Historically, the labor union’s bread and butter way to improve working conditions has been to represent workers by negotiating collective bargaining agreements. When employers are unwilling to come to the bargaining table and negotiate these agreements, unions demonstrate their power through organizing strikes and collective actions.

Globalization and outsourcing put pressure on the ability of workers to do this – first, by companies threatening to move operations abroad in response to pressure from workers; second, by companies increasingly moving operations to countries with less-robust unions and fewer legal protections for workers and organizing.

In a report written by Astrid Kaag, policy advisor for the largest Dutch trade union confederation FNV, Kaag notes that “the most important tool we have, the collective labor agreement, means little in such situations.”
 
 

The heart of Union action has always been at the shop-floor between workers in a shared space.

The heart of Union action has always been at the shop-floor between workers in a shared space. As the threads of global capitalism weave increasingly international distances, the process of building worker power and manifesting it at the local level has come under threat.

To adapt, and strengthen international worker solidarity, unions developed a new tool to fight for improvements in working conditions called “Global Framework Agreements” (GFA). Essentially, these are agreements made between unions (most often global union confederations) and multinational companies that set a baseline of working conditions for the companies’ employees and suppliers.

One of the most impactful GFAs that have been signed to date was in response to one of the greatest worker tragedies in recent memory – the Rena Plaza disaster.
 

“The International Accord”

In April of 2013, an eight story commercial building containing several garment factories in Dhaka Bangladesh called the Rena Plaza collapsed, killing 1,138 garment workers. Companies that sourced clothing from the building included C&A (Belgium), Carrefour (France), El Corte Inglés (Spain), Benetton (Italy), and J.C. Penny (U.S).

The disaster catalyzed a response from workers, trade unions, and NGO’s that resulted in the creation of a legally binding framework agreement – first called the Bangladesh Accord and more recently transforming into the “International Accord for Health and Safety in the Garment and Textile Industry”, or more commonly just “The International Accord .”

The International Accord was signed and negotiated by IndustriALL Global Union and UNI Global union, alongside several NGOs. According to the accord’s dedicated website, it has resulted in over 2 million workers across Bangladesh being trained in workplace safety, over 56,000 factory inspections, and over 1,000 resolved complaints.

The accord’s first legal test came when in 2016 UNI Global and IndustriALL won a lawsuit against brands that had failed to live up to the requirements stipulated in the accord. In 2018, the two global union confederations won the court case and the brands were forced to pay over $2 million to remedy the accord violations at their suppliers.

Despite this victory, there are real limits for what workers can secure relying on GFAs. A study recently showed that while GFAs have indeed resulted in significant material improvements in some cases, they are largely dependent on the goodwill of management at a company’s headquarters.

Other studies have been less sanguine about the impacts of GFAs. In a report by the German foundation the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, it was shown that in many cases in the United States, the agreements were essentially ignored – either intentionally, or due to the fact that local managers didn’t even know of their existence. Between 1998 and 2018, the International Labour Organization estimates that over 300 GFAs were signed – and yet, many of these global agreements have failed to secure the workers rights that they call for.
 
 

despite the International Accord being lauded as a major victory, workers trying to organize in Bangladesh are consistently repressed, and in some cases, murdered.

At worst, GFAs can serve as opportunities for multinational companies to boast their corporate social responsibility while continuing the longstanding abuse of workers. This is especially the case when GFAs are not legally binding and do not contain dedicated ways to assess, monitor, and intervene on violations of the agreements by independent bodies.

In Bangladesh, although The Accord has led to changes in factories and successful legal battles for unions, worker abuses are still common in the country and garment workers are still paid very low wages. Many companies have yet to sign The Accord, especially those from the United States such as Walmart, Amazon, and Target. In fact, these corporations created their own, non-legally binding organization called ‘Nirapon’ which NGOs have described as being self-regulating and entirely opaque.

A key part of these agreements is to make companies agree to remain neutral when workers decide to unionize. Yet, despite the International Accord being lauded as a major victory, workers trying to organize in Bangladesh are consistently repressed, and in some cases, murdered. For example, Shahidul Islam, a prominent union organizer for the Bangladesh Garment and Industrial Workers Federation, was murdered on the 25th of April, 2023, after attempting to resolve a dispute over wages at a factory in Gazipur.

Not only has globalization put significant pressure on the ability of unions to organize. Political hostility to workers and unions have resulted in working conditions degrading in many places across the world.
 

Labor is under pressure the world over

The world’s largest trade union confederation, the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), releases an annual report that describes the status of labor rights all over the world and provides ratings for each countries’ respect for workers rights.

This year’s results were bleak.

The ITUC’s 2024 report found that globally, workers were denied the right to strike in 9 out of 10 countries. In 49% of countries, trade union members were either arbitrarily arrested or detained. Only two countries’ ratings improved year on year (Brazil and Romania), whereas 13 countries saw their ratings fall.

An outlier can be found in the United States, where the Biden administration’s impressive support for organized labor has undoubtedly strengthened the movement in the country after decades of anti-union political leadership. Consider UAW’s successful amd ambitious campaign to organize non-union autoworkers. Surveys show that the US public is currently more supportive of labor unions than at any time in the past 60 years.

Alongside Biden’s formal political support has come new legitimacy within public discourse – although reactionaries have sought to disguise their intentions under a veneer of worker-friendly rhetoric.
 
 

reactionaries have sought to disguise their intentions under a veneer of worker-friendly rhetoric

Consider that the notoriously anti-union Republican party is attempting to rebrand itself as being pro-worker by, for example, inviting Teamster’s union president Sean O’Brien to the Republican National Convention.

Many of Europe’s far-right populists are similarly, and deceitfully, claiming an allegiance to the continent’s working class as well. The far-right Finnish Finn’s party has allegedly referred to itself as the “worker’s party without socialism”. Marine le Pen’s Rassemblement National is consistently attempting to present itself as the party of France’s working class.

In practice, these parties consistently implement policies hostile to organized labor. In the United States, the Republican party is blocking pro-union legislation and plans on rolling back labor protections for the working class when in power. In Finland, the Finns helped the center-conservative party slash worker and union protections.

Unions the world over are countering the far-right’s pseudo-allegiance to the working class by coming together.
 

Unions for Democracy

IndustriALL’s Walton Pantland wrote in 2019 that now, more than ever, there is a need for international union solidarity. He argues that the increasingly global and interconnected nature of contemporary capitalism requires new forms of worker movements.

“Labor is on the back foot. Jobs are becoming more precarious. Fewer workers have good pensions. Inequality is growing. The balance of power between capital and labor has tilted heavily in favor of capital.”

This year, the ITUC has been organizing a campaign “For Democracy” and warns that there are concerning anti-democratic movements in every continent that would have devastating consequences for workers’ rights.

For the ITUC, this gradual erosion of democracy presents an existential risk to the trade union movement. According to the ITUC’s For Democracy campaign, unions are forges for democracy. “Generations of trade unionists have fought and died, been tried and executed to advance democratic rights. Today, hundreds of trade unionists sit in jail, under house arrest or on trial as they continue to defend it.”

Wooing the labor vote has been a central part of the 2024 US presidential election and the outcome will have serious consequences on organized labor around the world. The stronger the labor movement becomes in the United States, the more pressure and momentum can be developed internationally. Just this year, Amazon workers in Coventry nearly succeeded in a vote for union recognition.

Amazon workers on strike in Coventry nearly won union recognition in a vote earlier this year. Image provided by UNI Global Union.
 
Labor organizers in the United States must take advantage of the current momentum and fight for legislative changes that will support organizing in the long-term. For example, campaigns must be centered around garnering support for the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) act which would empower worker organizing through new legal protections.

There are also legislative victories that can be fought at the global level. Take actions like the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) which requires companies based in the EU to make sure that there are no labor and environmental abuses in their supply chains. Yes, the act has significant shortcomings and has been made significantly weaker through lobbying, but it is a good starting point that unions can organize around to fight for legal due diligence requirements at the global scale.

Another battleground could be union campaigns pressuring legislators to ensure that trade agreements contain clauses to protect the right for workers to unionize and requirements for participating in collective bargaining agreements.

The global fight for workers rights is a struggle contested on a cornucopia of battlegrounds – from legislation and presidential politics to local actions.

The Make Amazon Pay campaign represents one the many different ways that unions are fighting the world over to secure workers’ rights.

When asked on whether unions should be focusing at the global level, the local level, via old union confederations or new unions such as the Amazon Labor Union in the U.S., Rudikoff replies “every worker organizing drive at Amazon inspires dozens more – in other cities, in other states, and in other countries.”

“As a progressive movement we’re all in this together.”

CIP Logo Wordless Transparent

The Democratization of Foreign Policy in India’s Election

Mahika Khosla is a Research Assistant with the Stimson Center’s South Asia Program, and Associate Editor of its online policy platform, South Asian Voices.

In April, just before the beginning of the world’s largest and longest national election, a campaign video released by India’s incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) claimed that Prime Minister Narendra Modi personally halted Russia’s war in Ukraine to allow for the evacuation of Indian students. Later, in a campaign rally, PM Modi said, “Today the world is witnessing how much India’s reputation and status have grown in just ten years…Modi has not done it, you have done it. Your vote has done it.” Most recently, PM Modi said in a TV interview that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stopped bombing Gaza during the month of Ramadan on India’s advice.

Anecdotally, India’s rise on the world stage has become part of daily public and private discourse like never before. This highlights two significant patterns within the context of India’s ongoing general election, slated to end on June 4, 2024. First, debates on foreign policy under the BJP government have moved out of the drawing rooms of New Delhi elites to the streets. By domesticizing and even democratizing the consumption of foreign policy, the Modi government has metaphorically placed it on the ballot for the 2024 election. And second, this foreign policy rhetoric has created misguided and hubristic notions of India’s global standing within the Indian public that may not entirely align with global perceptions of the same. In a likely Modi third term, this dissonance could result in a more assertive and adventuristic foreign policy approach that is domestically backed, with both regional and international implications.
 

Foreign (Policy) and Domestic (Politics): Blurring the Lines

It is commonly understood in Indian political science scholarship that foreign policy has historically been contained to the realm of elite issues, discussed and decided upon within academic, policy, and military circles. With exceptions where Indian interests are directly affected, such as vis-à-vis Pakistan or China, public discourse around foreign policy has been sparse. As Devesh Kapur finds, it has been reserved for the upper classes in urban centers with access to international travel, culture, and technology. Foreign policy has also actively steered clear of partisan politics, as the ‘national interest’ has most often surpassed party lines. Therefore, on the demand side of the equation, the masses or the aam aadmi, have historically been unconcerned with foreign policy and more focused on tangible domestic issues of unemployment, development, and the economy. This trend is not distinct from other democracies – in the United States too, the importance of foreign policy issues in public opinion polls tends to be low during peacetime. For instance, prior to the ongoing genocide in Gaza, just five percent of American adults expressed interest in U.S. involvement overseas.

This trend is further reiterated when examining the production of electoral rhetoric in India over the years. Past Indian Prime Ministers have rarely used their foreign policy successes as electoral currency, with exceptions being during crises and threats to national security. India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, a staunch internationalist, anti-colonial leader, and founder of the eminent Non-Aligned Movement rarely mentioned foreign policy in his electoral strategy across three elections, despite its strategic importance under his administration. His successor Indira Gandhi’s use of foreign policy in elections did not extend beyond expected tributes to her achievements in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. Later Prime Ministers like Rajiv Gandhi, P.V. Narasimha Rao, and Manmohan Singh, despite initiating significant initiatives like the Look East Policy and the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Deal, privileged domestic economic issues and did not integrate foreign policy into their election strategies. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India’s only other Prime Minister from the incumbent ruling party, presents an exception. India’s 1998 nuclear tests which occurred under his leadership were emphasized in his election campaigns. However, this too was presented more through the lens of technological nationalism and national security rather than as a unique foreign policy achievement with global implications.

​​Prime Minister Modi’s election in 2014 marked a distinct shift in the role of foreign policy in electoral discourse. Beginning early in his incumbency, he made a spectacle of high-level visits and bilateral and multilateral meetings, while regularly engaging with his voter base on issues of foreign policy significance. He is known for his significant focus on enhancing India’s regional and global role and has utilized the digital age to engage in novel forms of ‘public’ or ‘twitter diplomacy’. Notably, of the 110 episodes of his radio show ‘Mann ki Baat’, through which he creates a personal line of communication between him and his voter base, 29 percent of the episodes include mentions of foreign policy. These mentions range from benign proclamations of International Day of Yoga being celebrated across France, Australia, and the United States and interviews with foreign presidents, to more hostile assertions about adversaries like Pakistan during times of national crises. Furthermore, foreign policy mentions across the eight seasons of the radio show have gradually increased over time, peaking in 2023 during the year of India’s G20 presidency, and reflecting the increasing importance of foreign policy in the Indian public domain.

Indeed, the months leading up to India’s hosting of the G20 summit in September 2023 demonstrated the most palpable democratization of foreign policy. Bus stands, airports, taxis, public parks, and just about every public surface in cities and even small towns were plastered with advertisements, murals, and graffiti about India’s G20 presidency and its key goals. Surprisingly, the government also invited the public to give inputs on India’s G20 agenda, and information sessions were held to engage students in public universities as well. Marketed as Prime Minister Modi’s personal moment of glory, India’s G20 presidency enabled the BJP and right-wing media to cast him not only as India’s leader, but a world leader who has substantially improved India’s stature on the world stage. The BJP’s 2024 general election manifesto contains more than nine pages dedicated to foreign policy achievements and aims; a substantial increase from six and three pages in the 2019 and 2014 manifestos respectively.

While the BJP alluded briefly to PM Modi’s international outreach in the 2014 elections and relied more heavily on anti-Pakistan rhetoric in the 2019 elections following the Pulwama/Balakot strikes, foreign policy rhetoric in the 2024 elections has a distinct populist flavor. Marked by an emphasis on the quest – and even the achievement – of glorious global stature, the ongoing foreign policy election rhetoric is also imbued with a tinge of Hindu nationalism. Both during the G20 summit and in the ongoing six-week election, India’s global vision is articulated through Sanskrit phrases and Hindu civilizational motifs. The ruling party now refers to ‘India’ by its Hindi term ‘Bharat’, and the media frequently employs terms like ‘vishwaguru’ (world leader) to refer to PM Modi’s personal entanglement with reviving India’s civilizational power. This confirms Johannes Plagemann and Sandra Destradi’s assertion that “populists in power will pursue policies that reflect their mandate across a range of issue areas, including foreign policy.”
 

Factors at Play: Why Now?

There are several possible factors that contribute to increasing public interest in foreign policy. First, the exponential rise of China and its ongoing aggression on India’s northeastern border since 2020 have led to increasing Indian threat perceptions of China. Given the large power differential, India recognizes that partnerships with major powers like the United States are among the best tools to counter Beijing’s influence and strengthen its own capabilities. Foreign policy and diplomacy have therefore become more central to Indian debates on national security, which have naturally always been of public interest. It is no surprise then that India’s incumbent party would seek buy-in from its voter base on enhancing Indian global stature, particularly when it implicates India’s own national security. Simultaneously, the United States is increasingly looking to India as a key strategic partner to counter Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific, given India’s large population and fast-growing economy. Expectedly, this urgent geopolitical paradigm shift and India’s subsequent global importance is being felt on the ground.

Second, as India becomes a larger stakeholder in global affairs, it may face pressure to take certain actions in the foreign policy domain that leaders may not be comfortable with. Historical precedent reveals that in such cases, manufacturing domestic opposition from the masses can aid in resisting such pressure, particularly from Western partners. For instance, Indian public opinion seemed to have played a conclusive role in India’s lack of participation in the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Pressure was mounting from Washington on then-Prime Minister Vajpayee to provide refueling facilities and 20,000 troops on the ground, but his domestic campaigns created public aversion to the same. Vajpayee was able to deny U.S. pressure on these grounds, citing public aversion and the democratic imperative to tend to his electorate. The Indian parliament passed a unanimous resolution on April 7, 2003 which stated, “Reflecting national sentiment, this House (Lok Sabha) deplores the military action by the coalition forces led by the USA against a sovereign Iraq.”

The public display of India’s foreign policy maneuvering today evokes Vajpayee’s strategies. India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar often incites public distaste towards Western media, and PM Modi even recently accused foreign powers of interfering in India’s election.​​ While the U.S.-India relationship is at its peak, India’s principle of multi-alignment and its strategic autonomy in foreign affairs remains of paramount importance. Some of New Delhi’s recent actions have been condemned by Western allies, such as the continuation of its relationship with Russia amidst the ongoing war in Ukraine and the alleged attempted assassination of Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, a U.S. citizen and advocate of the Khalistani separatist movement. By using electoral messaging and the pliant right-wing media as a mouthpiece, the government instills strong domestic sentiment that aligns with its foreign policy priorities, allowing it to fall back on ‘national sentiment’ when pressured by democratic partners.

What is essential to note too is that the foreign policy rhetoric used by the ruling party and the media ecosystem supporting it has labeled India’s rise as a matter of national, religious, and personal pride. The BJP’s foreign policy is distinct in this sense; it imbues its conception and account of statecraft and diplomacy with Hindu nationalism, an ideology with deep cultural and emotional appeal in India’s Hindi heartland. Foreign Minister Jaishankar, for instance, explains Indian foreign policy in his two books using characters and teachings from the Mahabharata and Ramayana, two of the most prominent Hindu mythological texts.

Indeed, what makes public investment in India’s global aspirations more intelligible is the fact that – as with Prime Minister Nehru’s international statesmanship – it has an affective face. PM Modi is presented not just as a Prime Minister but as the sole actor responsible for India’s global rise; as “one part king, one part high priest, and one part Mister Rogers” as Mihir Sharma sardonically writes.

There are also material factors to consider. Today, 52.4 percent of the population has access to the internet compared to 13.5 percent in 2014. Furthermore, India’s young middle class comprises 31 percent of India’s growing population and has been on a steady rise,driving a majority of India’s economic growth. With high economic aspiration, transnational business and foreign investment opportunities, and access to both travel and technology, the middle class is contributing to a more globalized and geopolitically attuned electorate. Furthermore, with 2.5 million Indians emigrating annually and the number of Indians giving up their citizenship increasing exponentially each year, more Indian residents are globally connected to family and business networks abroad. A rapidly growing Indian diaspora may well contribute to a growing concern of foreign affairs domestically.
 

Unclear Consequences

The electoral salience of foreign policy undoubtedly has mixed consequences and has been the subject of much IR theory and debate. Within democratic systems like the United States and India, deeper public concern for foreign policy issues would theoretically result in better mechanisms for democratic accountability on the country’s international role. In India, Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland found that accountability over foreign policy decisions has varied over time according to the type of issue, leading to varied policy consequences. Pakistan-related issues typically receive the most public interest and clearest clarity of responsibility, resulting in higher democratic accountability. China-related and defense acquisition issues receive some public interest and are opaquer, leading to less democratic accountability.

In theory, greater democratic accountability is a positive outcome of increased  foreign policy discussion in election rhetoric. For instance, the government’s emphasis on India being a net security provider in South Asia has manifested in positive examples of leadership, such as India’s support of Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring and its disaster relief assistance to the Maldives, Bangladesh, and Nepal. However, the foreign policy touchpoints in the ongoing election may have further unclear consequences, particularly if their framing is inaccurate. The often exaggerated rhetoric on India’s rising global status risks creating a misguided electorate with distorted and hubristic notions of Indian economic and military capability.

Given the virulence of the BJP and the state-aligned media in propagating this narrative, it is no surprise then that there is a chasm between the Indian voter’s perception of India’s global standing and international perceptions of the same. A poll published by the India Today Group revealed that ranked just below the consecration of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya, the second greatest achievement of PM Modi as seen by 35,000 respondents is the ‘rise of India’s global stature’. Paradoxically, a brand-new study called ‘Modi Mirage’ suggests that a majority of respondents across the UK, US, and Europe view India as less favorable than 10 years ago as a result of PM Modi’s leadership. Similarly, a 2023 Pew Research Center survey conducted prior to India’s hosting of the G20 summit reveals that while seven in ten Indians believe India is becoming more globally influential, only 28 percent of respondents across 19 countries agreed with this claim.

Nationalistic foreign policy discourse has more severe consequences on military and economic perceptions of India, within India. A 2022 survey conducted by CVoter and the Center for Policy Research revealed economic and diplomatic hubris; 33 percent of Indians believe that India holds the most influence in Asia, followed by the United States at a mere 15 percent and China at 14 percent. However, in contrast, India’s relationships with its neighbors, according to expert analysis, are in steady decline, as highlighted in recent diplomatic skirmishes with smaller South Asian states. Meanwhile, China is gaining a greater foothold in its place and Indian denial may not serve its geopolitical and strategic ends.

Most concerningly, a 2022 Stimson Center survey revealed that 72 percent of Indians think that India could defeat China in a war, with more BJP-supporters than not overconfident about India’s military capabilities. This sentiment mirrors political and military rhetoric that downplays the China threat and is evidently shaped by a media that frequently uses nationalism synonymously with undue military strength. However, by most expert accounts, this perception is worryingly inaccurate. China’s defense budget is more than three times greater than that of India’s, while China has significantly more advanced technology and production capacity. Given the blatant capabilities gap and recent Chinese encroachments into Indian territory, this disparity between public perception and reality could lead to public pressure on Indian leaders to escalate without the capabilities to match.

There is precedent for this caution too. Historical record suggests that in 1962, then-Prime Minister Nehru’s decision to go to war with China was significantly impacted by public opinion. Nationalist fervor and miscalculated public notions of Indian military capabilities at the time – propagated by the media and opposition parties – put undue pressure on Nehru to take urgent and assertive action in a war that India decisively lost. Indeed, Nehru himself shaped much of Indian public opinion of the Chinese bogey in the 1950s, but later Chinese aggression led to the Indian public’s hard stance against any concessions to China. As Kapur highlights, “While leadership can shape public opinion, this can backfire and hobble its room for maneuver.”
 

Looking Ahead to Modi 3.0

While much of the foreign policy promises in the BJP’s 2024 election manifesto are benign and related to India’s soft power diplomacy, this may likely be because much of its priorities and postures depend on the outcome of the U.S. general election in November. Beyond Indian foreign policy staples such as ensuring permanent UNSC membership and fighting terrorism, the manifesto commits to expanding Indian civilizational influence globally through cultural centers and bringing home stolen artifacts from abroad. Notably, Pakistan and China are barely mentioned in the document.

Indeed, each election in the last decade of the BJP’s incumbency has exposed a more nationalist voter base. While the domestic implications of this sentiment have been made clear with the treatment of religious minorities, the more obtrusive foreign policy implications are unclear but may be felt both regionally and internationally. Once considered the ‘big brother’ of South Asia, India is now leveraging its growing global status in minor diplomatic rows with neighboring countries. From PM Modi bringing up old tensions with Sri Lanka over Katchatheevu to win Tamil votes to Foreign Minister Jaishankar using India’s relative size and status to challenge the Maldives, there is a growing perception that India is now a ‘big bully’ in the region. Indian overconfidence in the coming term – manufactured for and bolstered by the electorate – risks damaging New Delhi’s relationships with its neighbors.  If India’s foreign policy goals are to de-hyphenate from Pakistan and rise above South Asia to gain a global standing, it needs peace in its neighborhood first. An aggressive foreign policy driven by a nationalist public may achieve just the opposite.

On the international front, heightened public perceptions and expectations of India’s global position are driving a more assertive foreign policy, which might pose challenges for democratic partners navigating these tides. The Pannun assassination allegation is a prominent example where, despite the potential violation of international law and its strain on the burgeoning U.S.-India partnership, Indians anecdotally support possible Indian action abroad and are disgruntled by western criticism of the same. While anti-West rhetoric may play well domestically, it could alienate India’s partners and complicate efforts to cooperate to build its own capabilities.

Looking ahead, while Modi’s popularity will likely only be strengthened by a more nationalist foreign policy, diplomatic partners should pay attention to this shifting public sentiment when navigating their relationships with India over the next five years. Given Washington’s track record of intervention and the weakening of a rules-based international order with the ongoing genocide in Gaza, public criticism of India by the United States will not bode well domestically and will only be weaponized to further strengthen Indian nationalist sentiment. Instead, the United States should use private backchannels to raise the government’s treatment of minorities and by extension, its Hindu nationalist foreign policy approach.

India’s rise should not be on the West’s terms but indeed should be calculated with the interests of important partners in mind. The Indian government should use its domestic support to further balance against superpowers by representing the voice of the Global South. But in the quest for a well-earned seat at the proverbial table, India should be wary that it does not exemplify the same attitudes it condemns its partners for.