Dana El Kurd is associate professor of political science at the University of Richmond and senior non-resident fellow at the Arab Center Washington. El Kurd is a researcher of Arab and Palestinian politics, with a focus on authoritarianism and US intervention.
In September 2023, the Middle East Institute in Washington DC held a conference – in partnership with the European Council on Foreign Relations – on the topic of the Oslo Accords. The conference commemorated 30 years since Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization Yasir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the Accords on the White House lawn.
The consensus at the conference, however, was somber. It seemed to most participants and speakers that the Oslo Accords had largely failed, entrenching a one-state reality predicated on Palestinian subjugation. In a discussion of possible solutions, a co-panelist at one point argued that the Palestinians would have to wait 50+ years and democratize the Israeli system slowly, as African-Americans once did in the context of the Jim Crow south. I disagreed; based on the palpable anger and frustration among Palestinians at their deteriorating conditions, and some of the trends I saw in public opinion polls, I argued that the Palestinians would be unlikely to wait and pursue such a strategy.
Two weeks later, Hamas attacked Israel on October 7th. The mass violence that many analysts, including myself, had warned about was unfolding. Since then, the Gaza Strip has been entirely destroyed, with 90% of Gazans displaced, likely over 10% of the population killed, and much of the infrastructure decimated. The UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as well as many other human rights organizations around the world including in Israel, have characterized the Israeli war on Gaza as genocide.
If we are to move forward in a fruitful direction from this horror, any future attempt at an enduring peace must be informed by how the failures of past peace processes led to the tragedies of the present.
Why Oslo Failed
The last two years are proof that the Oslo Accords did indeed fail to prevent violence, improve living conditions, or move towards a two-state resolution to the conflict. There are three main reasons why the Oslo effort failed to this extent.
First, the PLO and Israel were not evenly matched prior to the peace process negotiations. One party was a nuclear-armed state with advanced military capacity; the other a national liberation movement on its last leg, having been driven out of Jordan and Lebanon and reeling from dwindling support. And, most importantly, the asymmetry in their positions was not corrected for in the peace process. The PLO recognized the state of Israel and thus accepted the loss of much of historic Palestine, whereas Israel only had to recognize the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people (a fact already internationally recognized by the UN and other relevant parties).
Thus, as Daniel Kurtzer, the former US Ambassador to Israel, has stated since: “The Oslo agreement was full of holes. The mutual recognition was asymmetrical, and that was to hurt the Palestinian negotiating position for years to come.”
Secondly, because the main mediator in this process was the United States, this asymmetry was exacerbated further. As many involved in the negotiations have since confirmed, the US took the position of “acting as Israel’s lawyer,” thus introducing severe bias in the process of mediation and negotiation.
Thirdly, the Oslo process was predicated on shrinking the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a full discussion of self-determination for all Palestinians with the right of return for refugees down into a diminished discussion of possible statehood in remnants of the occupied Palestinian territories. This was in tension with the fact that the Palestinian liberation movement included the aspirations of all Palestinians – including those who were citizens of Israel, who resided in Jerusalem, and who were scattered in diaspora communities across the globe. Oslo reduced this aspiration, and these constituencies, who were previously represented (albeit imperfectly) in the PLO, were no longer parties to the process.
Oslo’s Impact on Palestinian Politics
The Oslo Accords also led to the creation of the Palestinian Authority, which in principle continued to be subordinate to the PLO as a representative body. In reality, the PA sidelined the PLO’s role entirely and became the main relevant actor in Palestinian politics. Moreover, the structure of the Oslo Accords led to the entrenchment of the Palestinian Authority, especially following the second Palestinian uprising from late 2000 to early 2005. In order to ensure that the security threats and “collapse of order” unleashed by the years-long uprising never could happen again, the US helped to expand the PA’s security sector, reducing their role in the occupied territories as a “subcontractor of occupation” while preventing democratic accountability. As a result, Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been unable to impact their leadership or policy direction since 2007, and political elites have increasingly diverged from the will of the people. Most recently, the international community has supported Mahmoud Abbas in his effort to change election laws in order to prevent opposition, Hamas included, from ever winning office again. Thus every part of the Palestinian political landscape is now afflicted with a crisis of legitimacy.
Polling shows this legitimacy crisis clearly. The Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas has remained president since he was first elected in 2005, supported by the US intent on remaking the Middle East region in the aftermath of 9/11. Since then, he has overstayed his term limits. Today more than 80% of Palestinians want him to resign, according to the latest poll. Furthermore, the approval rate for the Palestinian Authority as a whole is 21%. The Hamas government in Gaza does not fare better. In a poll conducted Oct 6, 2023, only 28% of Palestinians in Gaza chose Hamas as their preferred party.
Why the Palestinian Public Matters
These dynamics should be relevant to policymakers around the world involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and negotiations between the two parties. The reasons are two-fold. First, given the international (and specifically American) role in the construction of the Oslo framework and its maintenance at the expense of Palestinian self-determination, many Palestinians blame this state of affairs on international actors and see this as proof that their aspirations are not taken seriously by the international community. American policy for the past three administrations at least would justify this impression, as both President Trump and President Biden pursued Arab-Israeli normalization deals and left the Palestinian issue to fester.
Secondly, the legitimacy crisis is not an issue confined to internal Palestinian politics but impacts the resolution of the conflict. Palestinian political leadership that is seen as illegitimate will not have the mandate to enter into negotiations with Israel, or compromise on any aspect of the conflict. For this reason there is not a great deal of support for any peace plan – whether two-states or one-state. Although 45% of Palestinians say they support a 2-state solution, 56% believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion and 61% believe that the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are “slim or non-existent.” It is clear from these numbers that no political leadership, Palestinian or international, has been able to articulate a doable and serious vision of future peace.
Palestinians are outraged at the genocide in Gaza that has been allowed to unfold, the mass displacement and ethnic cleansing of parts of the West Bank, and the deteriorating conditions of their everyday life even prior to the latest war, which the international community ignored. And the only Palestinian political leadership that is deemed acceptable by international actors is one that is illegitimate at home and among much of the diaspora, and that has not and cannot articulate a political vision for a just resolution to the conflict.
Lessons from Comparative Examples
There is only one way forward from this stagnate state of affairs: taking Palestinian agency and self-determination seriously. To do so, the international community and all relevant actors to this conflict must apply the lessons of prior peace negotiations, not just in Israel/Palestine but around the world. These lessons are: public input, inclusion, and accountability.
In the case of Northern Ireland, all parties to the conflict were included in the peace process. This included armed groups on both sides of the Protestant-Catholic divide. Most importantly, the peace process took public input into account, ensuring not one but two referendums to garner buy-in and legitimacy for the peace process. Both the people of Northern Ireland and the people of the Republic of Ireland voted to approve the Good Friday Agreement. This public input was crucial in moving the process forward, and ultimately ended the sectarian conflict since 1998.
In scenarios of severe violence and genocide, the international community must also ensure accountability for war crimes. The case of Yugoslavia, and the subsequent conflict in Bosnia & Herzegovina, demonstrates the importance of accountability – as well as what happens when accountability is not guaranteed by the peace process. The Serbian leadership responsible for war crimes following Yugoslavia’s breakdown were held accountable, taken to the Hague to answer for their role in the conflict. The international community in that instance demonstrated a commitment to upholding international law and punishing violations of the Geneva Conventions.
However, in Bosnia & Herzegovina, political groups that launched a genocide against Bosniak Muslims were largely rewarded in the peace process, given a semi-autonomous region within the new state. This region, Republica Srbska, continues to destabilize the country and threatens to upend the fragile peace.
The Way Forward
To ensure a successful and sustainable peace process in the case of Israel-Palestine, the international community cannot afford to ignore these lessons. The Palestinian people must have a say in the process – that means ensuring the leadership that represents them is democratically elected, and that means taking seriously their approval of the final contours of an agreement. Moreover, all parties to the conflict must be included to ensure the legitimacy of the process, including armed groups. The inclusion of armed groups in the Northern Ireland case indeed ensured their disarmament, and avoided the emergence of spoilers that threatened the progress of the negotiations. A similar logic can be applied in this case. Palestinian civil society actors have already articulated what this might look like; the Palestinian National Initiative for instance has generated proposals for the democratic renewal of the PLO. The international community must engage with these initiatives seriously.

Thirdly, given the severity of the violence in Gaza, and the almost complete annihilation of life in the Gaza Strip, the international community must ensure the peace process holds the perpetrators accountable. The UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory found Israeli leaders Prime Minister Netanyahu, President Isaac Herzog, and former defense minister Yoav Gallant directly responsible for genocide. One cannot imagine a peace process having any legitimacy without addressing violations of international law and war crimes of this magnitude. Initiatives such as The Hind Rajab Foundation have pursued legal action against “perpetrators, accomplices, and inciters of violence against Palestinians.” Similar attempts to hold war criminals accountable were used in the Syrian case after the civil war, with activists utilizing universal jurisdiction, in particular in European court systems, to pursue Assad-regime criminals around the world. There should be formal support for accountability by governments, rather than rely on civil society actors to fill this gap alone.
Finally, in the Israel-Palestine case, we can also deduce two additional recommendations. First, given that the power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians is so severe, mediation of the peace process must ensure that this power imbalance is accounted for. In previous attempts at Israeli-Palestinian peace, the US did not act as an unbiased mediator – instead heavily weighting the outcome in Israel’s favor time and time again. We now have irrefutable proof that this dynamic only destroyed the possibility of peace, and increased the level of suffering and violence since. In any future process, the US cannot control the process alone.
Secondly, it is important to address all parties to the conflict, and communities that have been ignored in previous iterations of the peace process. As previously mentioned, this includes Palestinians in the diaspora, Palestinian citizens of Israel, and Palestinians in Jerusalem. Inclusion of these communities not only goes farther in legitimizing the process and addressing the full scope of Palestinian aspirations, but also has the added benefit of engaging with communities with different perspectives on, and relationships to, Israeli society.
Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, especially younger generations, have only ever understood Israeli society through the context of violent occupation. Formally including these communities in the peace process thus also has the potential of generating new policy solutions and forcing changes within the Israeli regime as well.







