Region: Europe and Eurasia

Security Dilemma – Ari Tolany on Arms Sales and Oversight

What kind of relationships does the United States build when it gives or sells arms to countries abroad is a big question, one that sits at the heart of day-to-day foreign policy. Ari Tolany, Director of CIP’s Security Assistance Technology, and the Arms Trade (SAM) program, recently went on the Security Dilemma podcast to talk about arms transfers, transparency, and what it means to attempt to build friendships through the promise of weapons.

Said Tolany:

“Basically we’re losing a lot of transparency and granularity in our reporting, and I know it seems wonky, and it seems technically, but fundamentally, the way that so many people engage with the United States is not with our soft power or the various aspects of American culture we like to think of as promoting a US brand around the world, it’s at the barrel of a gun. When we have less information about that, we are less able to conduct effective oversight or check-in on concerning issues around defense companies like graft and corruption.”

The episode, hosted by AJ Manuzzi and John Allen Gay of the John Quincy Adams Society, walks through popular arguments and counter-arguments to arms transparency, the way arms sales make the US a participant in the wars of partners and allies, and what happens when the US tries to tie arms sales to respect for human rights, without ever threatening to withhold sales should weapons be used to violate human rights.

Tolany also discusses the shallow fear that the US not selling a country arms means irreparably harming that country’s relationship with the United States. Says Tolany:

“The notion that arms transfers are a solid foundation for international partnership building is flawed. If a partner can just as easily turn to China and Russia, I would argue that arms transfers are only papering over a relationship that is fundamentally misaligned.” 

Listen to Ari Tolany on Arms Sales and Oversight at the Security Dilemma podcast.

Maintaining Transparency in US Security Assistance to Ukraine

Patrick Bodovitz is a Security Assistance Monitor intern at CIP

From February 24th, 2022 to September 27th of this year, the United States has provided $61.3 billion in military assistance to Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s war. This figure leaves out the non-military aid to Ukraine from the US, and it excludes the tens of billions of aid provided to the country since Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014. This is a staggering amount of assistance to a country that the United States did not have a close military relationship with before Russia’s annexation of Crimea. While the sheer amount of aid has caused political disputes in Washington, it has been a relatively successful program so far. The ongoing conflict remains confined to Russia and Ukraine, avoiding greater escalation, regional conflagration, or great power war. There is also little evidence that US-supplied munitions have been used in war crimes by Ukrainian forces, apart from one unit of foreign volunteers mentioned in the New York Times. Lastly, there has not been any evidence of weapons going to Ukraine being diverted elsewhere as a result of criminal activity, although this problem could emerge if and when combat ceases. Other US arms shipments have gone to countries where this has proved a systemic problem. 

If the US government succeeds in helping Ukraine defend its territory without the arms being diverted to forces outside Ukraine, or used by Ukrainian forces in acts in violation of international humanitarian law, it could emerge as a useful precedent for promoting transparency in U.S. arms transfers, informing procedures and policies for future transfers.

US Security Assistance to Ukraine

Since 2015, the United States government has trained and equipped the Ukrainian military through Operation Atlantic Resolve. In August 2021, the Biden Administration began accelerated deliveries through the presidential drawdown authority (PDA). Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and on March 15th, Congress approved the first major supplemental bills that set aside funding for the White House to purchase military gear for the Ukrainian military. Drawdowns and supplemental bills have become the main methods to appropriate funds for Ukrainian assistance, including humanitarian aid. 

Initially, the US supplied light weapons and small arms, like Javelin anti-tank missiles, and has since expanded to include artillery, tanks, and long-range ordinance like the Army Tactical Missile. These weapons helped Ukrainian forces to keep fighting. While Ukraine has managed to win back some of its territory, it remains locked in heavy combat, and Russia shows no sign yet of coming to the negotiation table. With an incursion into Russia’s European territory, Ukraine has expanded the battlefield to include both legally Ukrainian and Russian soil.

Since the Trump Administration, the United States government has been more transparent about security assistance to Ukraine than arms shipments to other countries. In the 1990s, Ukraine’s government had horrific corruption scandals in its defense industry, such as false production numbers and illegal weapons sales. In September 2002, the State Department announced that two years prior, Ukraine’s president Leonid Kuchma illegally sold missiles to Iraq, and in light of this, the US put a hold on a portion of its aid to the country. Scandals like this, in addition to Ukraine’s political instability, meant the US government was reluctant to provide military aid to the country. After 2014 and the events of Euromaidan, officials in Kyiv promised to crack down on corruption throughout society, including in its defense sector. 

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the US government has been caught between three competing demands: surging defense articles and services to Ukraine, ensuring accountability for US arms shipments, and managing escalation risks. On September 13th, 2023, the Pentagon agreed to set up an inspection team inside Ukraine to better track equipment moving through the country. This team publishes reports to Congress through the Office of the Inspector General that analyze what is happening to the aid sent through the PDA. Much of this has been a demand by Republicans in Congress, many of whom are skeptical of US aid to Ukraine to begin with and have demanded more oversight. 

An enormous amount of aid has been sent by Ukraine’s backers. The United States alone has sent $61.3 billion since February 2022, raising concerns about how the considerable quantity of weapons will be used and what will happen with the weapons after the war. Jordan Cohen, a defense analyst at CATO, told CNN “the biggest danger surrounding the flood of weapons being funneled into Ukraine is what happens to them when the war ends or transitions into some kind of protracted stalemate.” Besides arms from the United States, many former Warsaw Pact states have transferred their Soviet-origin arms to Ukraine due to their interoperability with the Ukrainian Army.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy, president of Ukraine, receives a demonstration of tactical equipment during a visit to the California Air National Guard’s 129th Rescue Wing at Moffett Air National Guard Base, California, Sept. 2, 2021. The California National Guard and Ukraine State Partnership Program was established in 1993 through the Department of Defense as a means to develop and strengthen the strategic partnership between the U.S. and Ukraine. (U.S. Air National Guard photo by Senior Airman Duane Ramos)
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, president of Ukraine, receives a demonstration of tactical equipment during a visit to the California Air National Guard’s 129th Rescue Wing at Moffett Air National Guard Base, California, Sept. 2, 2021. (U.S. Air National Guard photo by Senior Airman Duane Ramos)

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) issued a full report on weapons diversion cases in Ukraine and what the Ukrainian government has been doing to address cases of missing weapons. The monitor employed by GI-TOC in Ukraine found that there was no systemic organized smuggling of weapons outside the country. The report also mentioned that any instances where criminal gangs tried to smuggle weapons involved Soviet-era weaponry, not US-origin equipment. This report is the most in-depth analysis done to date on weapons trafficking in Ukraine and validates the assertion that the Ukrainian National Police and Prosecutor’s Office has been closely monitoring the flow of weaponry in the country. 

Some obstacles to transparency persist under the existing regime of monitoring and inspections. In August, the Government Accountability Office found that the State Department and the Pentagon have not always communicated on how to properly ensure that end-use monitoring is being implemented. According to the report, “DOD officials are often unaware of [third-party-transfers] authorized by State until they are identified upon entry to Ukraine, if at all.” While the DOD Inspector General stated that he saw no evidence of weapons diversion of US-supplied defense articles, he concurred that increased inspection was needed.

There are some other challenges that the US now faces in monitoring US-supplied equipment in Ukraine, like the difficulty in monitoring the end use of US-supplied munitions inside Russian territory following Ukraine’s decision to launch an offensive into Russia. While end-use monitoring traditionally has been successful in monitoring the transfer of weapons, it has not been as successful in monitoring the use of said weapons. This is no exception in Ukraine, where the rate of expenditure is very high. Nonetheless, the decision to increase monitoring and publicly release reports about US-supplied weapons in Ukraine is promising and shows that the Pentagon takes seriously concerns about weapons diversion in this war. The monitoring is likely to continue after the war ends to prevent arms being smuggled in the post-war period. 

Recommendations for going forward

Due to the war’s intensity and longevity, the United States is likely to supply Ukraine with arms as long as political will endures. The good news is that the United States government has increased oversight of the flow of weapons into the country. The return of the US embassy has helped by allowing OIG personnel to be based permanently in Ukraine. Additionally, the Ukrainian government knows that it is under intense scrutiny to ensure proper management of its arsenal and is incentivized to comply to ensure the continued transfer of munitions The need for weapons at the front has made it so that people are far less likely to smuggle weapons. Lastly, outside of areas occupied by Russia, Ukraine’s government retains the monopoly of force in the country. It folded volunteer units created in 2014 into the Army and National Guard as part of their reforms undertaken with the intention to eventually join NATO. This is designed to guarantee clear command and control, which is essential for monitoring arms flows. 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr O. Zelenskyy observes the completion of the rough turn process for 155mm rounds while at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in Scranton, Pa., Sept. 22, 2024. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Curt Loter)

Nevertheless, there are further actions the US government can take to ensure that weapons flows to Ukraine do not run into any of the risks that have plagued other efforts to arm partners. One major action the US can take is to push Ukraine to modernize its military justice system. The UAF still relies on protocols dating back to before they began to reform their forces. This includes a lack of enforcement authority for the Military Law Enforcement Service and the shortage of military courts. This can affect accountability, although there is little evidence of Ukrainian leadership sanctioning war crimes, making violations of international law easier to remediate. The United States can provide additional funding and specialists to assist with this effort, such as increasing funding for a greater portion of Ukrainian military officers and civilian personnel to undergo training at the  Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS). It can also condition portions of the aid provided on the Ukrainian government agreeing to modernize its military justice protocols, in a similar fashion to the European Union conditioning membership on Ukraine making necessary changes to its governance. 

The United States should also consider stationing more personnel in Ukraine to help monitor the flow of weapons. Before the war, the embassy in Kyiv employed close to 800 personnel. Now, there are around 100-200 staffers and the military and civilian staff are overwhelmed. While there has been an effort to increase staffing, it has stalled in the face of intransigence from the White House. Russian attacks on the country pose a risk to personnel stationed there, but most staff work in cities protected by air defense systems. If the United States wants effective monitoring of arms flows into the country and other anti-corruption efforts, it will need more staff on the ground to increase transparency. These staff could be under the mandate of the Office of the Inspector General, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense.

Bottom Line

The United States has a responsibility to ensure that arms it sells or provides to its partners are not re-transferred without authorization, nor used in violation of U.S. and international law. The war in Ukraine has become the latest test of if and how the United States can provide massive amounts of arms to another country without risking fueling arms trafficking or violations of the Foreign Assistance Act. Should the United States continue to emphasize transparency and accountability in transfers to Ukraine, these lessons learned can be applied to other contexts to allow for better monitoring and evaluation of the provision of U.S. security cooperation and assistance. The United States has improved monitoring of the transfer of weapons to Ukraine and also ensured that Ukraine’s government has maintained effective command and control over its armed forces. At the same time, room for improvement remains. The U.S. end-use monitoring system must be reformed more broadly to better assess violations of U.S. and international law, and the United States should condition further aid on the modernization of Ukraine’s military justice system. If the US government succeeds in this, Ukraine will be a useful case study of how the US can train and equip partners without sacrificing transparency, promoting diversion or arms trafficking, and facilitating violations of U.S. and international law.

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After a surprise victory, can France’s left plot a course to 2027?

Alexandre Khadivi was until recently the foreign policy adviser to the “La France Insoumise” group in the French National Assembly. 

On 7 July, the second round of the snap legislative elections called by Emmanuel Macron a month earlier delivered startling results. As voters went to the polls, most observers agreed that Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally (RN) would obtain a majority.

In the end, the left-wing New Popular Front (NFP) coalition came out on top with 182 seats, followed by Macron’s centrist bloc with 168 seats, the far-right in third with 143, and finally the legacy centre-right group with 46.

As of writing, and with no bloc having an absolute majority, a new government has yet to form. Despite his gamble failing spectacularly, Macron obstinately refuses to nominate the NFP candidate as prime minister, hoping to find a “consensual,” centrist head of government instead.
 

How parliamentary elections work in France

Since a constitutional amendment in 2000, presidential and legislative terms align for a period of five years. As a result, once the president is elected, the legislative elections a few weeks later usually grant them an absolute majority out of 577 seats, preventing the sort of “cohabitation” impasses of the past whereby the head of state and head of government were from opposing groups.

Both presidential and parliamentary elections have two rounds. In the latter, this usually means a second-round runoff between the top two candidates. In some cases, the runoff can include additional candidates as anyone with at least 12.5% of registered electors’ votes also qualifies.
 

Why Macron dissolved Parliament

Since he was first elected in 2017, Macron has consistently played a dangerous balancing act by slowly and carefully propping up the far-right to weaken the left as much as possible. It’s a well-worn strategy in which left-wing voters have no alternative but to support the “centrist” bloc in runoffs to defeat the RN. As in 2002 and 2017, when the far-right candidate also reached the second round of the presidential elections, in 2022 a “republican front” led to Le Pen’s defeat.

Yet a few weeks later, Macron’s bloc failed to gain an absolute majority in parliament, as both the brittle left-wing New Ecological and Social People’s Union (NUPES) coalition and the RN made inroads, illustrating the population’s increasing discontent with the president’s social policies and authoritarian tendencies.

The lack of a clear majority in parliament hindered his legislative agenda and democratic legitimacy for the next two years. This frustration led him to call a snap election right after the European parliamentary elections on 9 June, in which the RN came first with 31%. The various left-wing groups had failed to form a coalition prior to the vote, contrary to 2022.
 

Macron’s cynical calculus, and how pollsters got it wrong (but not entirely)

Macron bet on three things:

  1. The left-wing groups – whose NUPES coalition had fallen apart since 2022 due to infighting – would not be a threat;
  2. As in elections past, most voters would be rational enough to not vote en masse for the far-right either, potentially giving Macron a new majority;
  3. Even if the far-right did gain a majority and formed a government, their incompetence until the next presidential elections in 2027 would turn the population against them.

Most pollsters predicted more than 230 seats for the far-right, based on numbers showing around 35% support for the bloc. Macron’s Ensemble movement would come in second, with the divided left-wing groups at a distance.

But within two hours of Macron’s announcement, the four main left-wing parties – Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise (LFI), The Greens, the Socialist Party (PS), and the Communists (PCF) – formed the NFP coalition. This included the decisive provision that, in each constituency, only one NFP candidate would run to avoid diluting the left-wing vote and increase chances of participating in the runoff.

Without getting into too much detail, the implicit instructions prior to the second round were:

  1. In case of a runoff involving a far-right candidate, the “republican front” would ideally vote for the opponent, e.g.: Macron supporters would vote for the NFP and vice-versa;
  2. In case of a three- or four-person runoff, depending on the first-round results of the specific constituency, the “republican front” candidates would decide on which of them would drop out to decrease chances of the far-right candidate winning.

Therein lie the surprises in the final results. In effect, the absolute numbers were correct:

  1. 400 National Rally candidates reached the runoffs;
  2. Voter turnout jumped from 46% in 2022 to an astounding 64% (the highest since 1981), indicating increasing dissatisfaction with Macron among swathes of the population;
  3. The far-right bloc garnered 37% of the votes, the left-wing bloc 25%, and Macron’s bloc 23%.

Yet the left became the marginally dominant force in parliament.
 

The left moving forward

With the gradual neoliberalisation of French politics since at least the turn of the millennium, Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise movement has steadily become the dominant force on the left.

Macron’s election in 2017 shattered most of the simmering contradictions and tensions in the country’s politics, centralising the neoliberal wings of the centre-left and centre-right under his rule. On the left, the legacy Socialist Party became a shell of its former self.

However, ego clashes, the PS’ comfortable insularity, and LFI’s uncompromising style on fundamental issues have made it difficult for the left to create a homogenous bloc with a long-term strategy.

It took more than three weeks of acrimonious negotiations to settle on a candidate for prime minister. Lucie Castets is a civil society nominee who ticks the right boxes: a 37-year-old woman with the “requisite” academic background, familiar with the intricacies of government, and who has fought her entire career in defence of public services and against neoliberal reforms.

Beyond the short-term, however, the numbers confirm the seemingly irrepressible rise of the RN leading up to the 2027 presidential elections.

In the event of an NFP government, the coalition should therefore lay its cards on the table from day one with two instantly impactful measures: repealing Macron’s undemocratic and wildly unpopular pension reform of 2023, and circumventing the market by fixing energy prices to alleviate the population’s financial distress.
 
 

Without an outright majority, it must therefore be bold, not limit itself to endless parliamentary infighting, and act through decrees when necessary.

In the longer term, tax reform, wage increases, investment in public health and education, and the necessary (socially minded) modernisation of the pension system must be addressed. The NFP’s programme clearly outlines these prescriptions. Without an outright majority, it must therefore be bold, not limit itself to endless parliamentary infighting, and act through decrees when necessary.

The final point is the most contentious: identity politics. Like most Western liberal democracies, these issues have become a lightning rod exploited by both neoliberals and the far-right. A large majority of the parochial Parisian media and political elites have eagerly fed what has essentially become a rabid form of islamophobia in the country. An extensive sociological literature shows that a majority of far-right voters are influenced by this even though their most pressing priorities are economic and social in nature, for which the RN has no proposals.

The left must not shy away from serenely addressing issues such as immigration, religion, and other similarly contentious matters. However, major divisions within the NFP must be overcome, particularly on the question of battling bigotry in all its forms. So far, only LFI has consistently called out islamophobia in a country where religion is an extremely awkward and taboo subject.
 

Foreign policy implications and the left’s divisions

Since the advent of the Fifth Republic, the conduct of foreign policy has been the near-exclusive remit of the head of state.

Barring some acrimonious and mostly “Franco-French” point-scoring over LFI’s unremitting condemnation of Israel’s brutal campaign in Gaza, foreign policy was largely absent from the election debates. The focus should therefore be on the 2027 presidential elections.

A large spectrum of French polity understands that a more balanced, less blindly Atlanticist (read: “neo-Gaullian”) foreign policy is needed, considering the major geopolitical shifts taking place and the United States’ quasi-existential political crises of the past few years. The extent to and the manner in which this should happen are where the major fault lines lie.

Macron’s approach has been scattergun and, all too often, improvised. His first major foreign policy pronouncements explicitly denounced neoconservatism and famously declared that NATO was in a state of “brain death.” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine upended this. He has entirely followed the maximalist NATO script on the issue and even overstepped the mark by publicly opining in May on the possibility of sending French troops directly into the theatre of operations, earning immediate rebukes from Washington, London, Berlin, and Brussels. He also came into office deriding the notion of a European defence pact before suggesting a debate on its feasibility in April, including the potential deployment of continent-wide nuclear deterrence capabilities.
 
 

Macron’s approach has been scattergun and, all too often, improvised.

Paradoxically, the NFP’s primary divisions lie precisely on the different groups’ geopolitical outlooks, with two distinct blocs: LFI and the PCF vs. PS and the Greens.

LFI and the PCF have the same broad sensibilities, the former being more vocal and explicit in its pronouncements. They share an anti-imperialist vision and are critical of NATO, Western military interventions, and neocolonialism.

They both propose leaving NATO, which they consider an aggressive military alliance that has contributed to the destabilisation of Eastern Europe. LFI in particular has consistently criticised NATO’s expansion towards Russia’s borders, warning of the risk of a full-blown conflict as far back as 2014. However, it explicitly condemned Russia’s invasion and supported tactical military aid to Ukraine, while calling for diplomacy and de-escalation rather than an increased military response.

LFI is also fairly radical in its prescriptions and strategy vis-à-vis the EU, which it considers an instrument of domination by the major economic powers (notably Germany). It calls for disobedience to European treaties deemed neoliberal and anti-social and is sceptical of the EU’s entirely market-based approach towards issues such as climate change, agriculture, and energy prices.

A similar dynamic is at play on Israel/Palestine where both parties are aligned but LFI is much more outspoken and insistent, thus bearing the brunt of establishment criticism. It was severely derided for choosing to call Hamas’ attack on 7 October a “war crime” rather than an act of terrorism and refusing to label it as “antisemitic.” It was also the first to explicitly call Israel’s actions in Gaza a genocide and has long supported the boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movements.
 
 

Moving forward, for the NFP to display a unified front and reach some level of consensus on foreign policy will require a delicate balancing act.

While immediately condemning Hamas’ attack as illegal, immoral, and entirely unjustifiable, LFI’s candid but clumsy attempts to situate it within the context of Israel’s brutal, decades-long occupation of Palestine invited controversy. The deafening noise and extreme emotions that the attack unleashed in France (which has both the largest Muslim and Jewish populations in Europe) rendered any attempt at a critical analysis of the situation near impossible, especially in the immediate aftermath of 7 October. Facile accusations of antisemitism have been particularly virulent, especially from establishment circles.

Finally, on the “Global South,” both parties advocate for a profound reshaping of France’s relations, particularly in Africa, where they strongly criticise its neocolonial policies (e.g. support for “friendly” dictators, a decade-long and ultimately failed military presence in the Sahel). They call for an end to military and economic cooperation agreements detrimental to local populations and for the promotion of relations based on equality and respect for sovereignty. In LFI’s view especially, this is the first step towards tackling the root causes of migration.

The PS and the Greens are much more Europhilic, the former also carrying a traditionally Atlanticist bent. Neither of them considers leaving NATO and both fully support unconditional military and economic aid to Ukraine. The PS also supports the suspension of arms sales to Israel and targeted sanctions against West Bank settlers but has so far stopped short of calling for general economic sanctions against the country.

Segments of the more assertive anti-imperialist left argue that, while the PS’ and the Greens’ priorities are generally sound, some of their methods and policy positions betray a lack of historical outlook, long-term strategic thinking, and understanding of balance of power. For instance, they view the two parties’ efforts to reform the EU from within as quixotic and argue that the United States’ often “aggressive” and “domineering” conduct in world affairs barely figures in their thinking.

Moving forward, for the NFP to display a unified front and reach some level of consensus on foreign policy will require a delicate balancing act. This will prove difficult because of ideological differences, divergent strategic priorities, historical rivalries, vast and accelerating shifts in global politics, and internal and external pressures.

To subsist until the 2027 presidential election, where its only hope of winning rests on presenting a single candidate, the NFP will need to develop robust internal mechanisms for dialogue and compromise, while respecting the sensitivities and priorities of each group. This will require periodic reassessments of agreements to maintain unity and, most importantly, avoid the French left’s cardinal sin: its self-defeating proclivity for airing dirty laundry in public.
 

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In the U.K. and France, There Was a Gaza Vote. And in the U.S.?

Today, Matt Duss of CIP and Daniel Levy of the U.S. / Middle East Project have an article in The New Republic arguing that a Gaza voting block helped the left in France and cost Labour votes in the U.K., and will likely play a pivotal role in the 2024 Presidential election in the United States.

Describing the UK experience, they write:

Among Muslim voters and a slew of progressive and younger voters, positions on Gaza had translated into electoral choices. That had never happened before in U.K. politics. While some of it may have been a luxury vote, assuming an inevitable Labour win, Britain’s governing party is well aware of the consequences for maintaining its rule if this trend cannot be reversed. In sum, the evidence suggests that the narrative that Labour’s aggressively distancing itself from Corbyn-era criticism of Israel by aligning with the Sunak government on Gaza was an essential element of its success was not only wrong but precisely wrong, with that shift acting as a drag on the party in the current circumstances.

Read the full piece here.

The US and EU can build a more democratic world with sports diplomacy

Raül Romeva i Rueda is currently Professor of Global Politics and Sport Diplomacy, as well as the President of the Irla Foundation, a catalan think tank which promotes studies on politics, democracy, fundamental rights and civic republicanism. He is also a former Member of the European Parliament and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Institutional Relations, and Transparency in the Catalan Government.

In the span of my career, from the corridors of the European Parliament and the meeting rooms of the Catalan Government, to the classes of Sports Development and Diplomacy at the University, I have witnessed the ebb and flow of international relations. Today, as we navigate a world fraught with rising populism, the resurgence of the extreme right, and the looming shadow of the climate emergency, the need for a robust partnership between the United States and the European Union has never been more urgent. This transatlantic alliance, founded on shared democratic values, holds the promise not only of addressing immediate threats but also of paving the way towards a more just, inclusive, and sustainable global order.

The Rise of Populism and Extremism 

In the heart of Europe and across the Atlantic, the specter of populism and extreme right-wing ideologies threatens the very fabric of our societies. Twenty years ago we already perceived these movements, often born from disenfranchisement and fear, capitalize on division and discord. Unfortunately, we didn’t care much about them. Too many people thought they were anecdotal. Obviously this perception was wrong.

Nowadays, we have to confront that reality. The transatlantic bond must be a bulwark against this tide, through coordinated policies and shared intelligence that preemptively address the roots of extremism.

Joint public diplomacy initiatives can counter misinformation and promote democratic values. By fostering a culture of critical thinking and resilience, we can inoculate our societies against the lure of simplistic, divisive rhetoric. According to my experience, sports, guided appropriately, can be an extraordinary tool to that end. Let’s see how, with some examples.

Tackling the Climate Emergency: sports sector must take its responsibilities

The climate crisis is a global challenge that transcends borders and ideologies. The US and the EU, as major global players, have a moral and practical obligation to lead by example. Strengthening commitments to the Paris Agreement and setting more ambitious, actionable targets is imperative.

Investment in green technologies and renewable energy must be a cornerstone of this alliance. Collaborative efforts in research and development can accelerate the transition to a sustainable economy. By sharing technological advancements and best practices, the transatlantic partnership can drive a global green revolution, fostering economic growth while safeguarding our planet for future generations.

As a concrete example I’d like to mention the significant responsibility of the sports sector, in general, and football, in particular, both in the US and the EU, in addressing its climate footprint, due to the vast resources consumed and the environmental impacts associated with sports events, facilities, and related activities. Just to name some of them: resource consumption, waste generation, transportation emissions, land use and biodiversity impact, facility construction and maintenance practices. In that regard, collaborative efforts can lead to the widespread adoption of energy-efficient design and technology in new and existing sports facilities, promoting sustainability and setting a standard for the industry.

Good examples of that cooperation would be the Mercedes-Benz Stadium in Atlanta, USA, and the Spotify Camp Nou (the Futbol Club Barcelona Stadium), in Barcelona, Catalonia.

Both are examples of how green technologies can be applied to sports facilities, given the fact that both projects have integrated solar panels, rainwater harvesting systems, and energy-efficient lighting. By sharing these best practices and technologies, sports facilities across the US and EU can reduce their carbon footprint and operational costs.

Strengthening Democratic Institutions, through Sport partnerships

Democracy is indeed the foundation of the transatlantic partnership and again the sports sector (and institutions) have a unique role to play in promoting democratic values, combating corruption, and protecting human rights.

By leveraging their influence and reach, sports organizations can help strengthen democratic institutions both within the US and Europe and extend these efforts to neighboring regions.

There are several ways this can be achieved. For instance, Promoting International Sports Diplomacy, Supporting Grassroots Programs in Neighboring Regions, Hosting International Conferences and Workshops, establishing transparency and accountability programs (Initiatives like FIFA’s compliance program aim to ensure ethical conduct within football organizations), supporting human rights campaigns (UEFA’s “Respect” campaign promotes inclusion, diversity, and respect in football, tackling discrimination and promoting human rights), or, finally, collaborating with Anti-Corruption Bodies (as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) collaborates with INTERPOL to fight corruption and match-fixing in sports).

In sum, policymakers and sports institutions can work together to develop policy frameworks that integrate sports into broader democratic and human rights initiatives. This integration can ensure that sports contribute to the resilience of democratic institutions and the promotion of justice and equality. By taking these steps, sports institutions can play a pivotal role in strengthening democratic institutions, combating corruption, and protecting human rights, both within the US and Europe and beyond.

A Path Forward

As we stand at the precipice of an uncertain future, the transatlantic partnership offers a beacon of hope. By leveraging our shared values and pooling our strengths, we can confront the challenges of our time and build a more democratic, fair, and inclusive global order. This alliance is not merely a strategic necessity but a moral imperative. It calls for visionary leadership, unwavering commitment, and the courage to act in the face of adversity. Together, the United States and the European Union can forge a path forward, turning crisis into opportunities and ensuring that the future we bequeath to our children is brighter, more just, and more sustainable. And what is more universal than the language of sports?

As someone who has navigated the intricacies of international relations firsthand, I remain hopeful. The challenges are great, but so too is our capacity for cooperation and innovation. In the words of the poet Antonio Machado, “Caminante, no hay camino, se hace camino al andar” – “Traveler, there is no path, the path is made by walking.” Let us walk, or run, this path together, forging a future that reflects the best of our shared humanity.

Bearing all this in mind, my impression is clearly that a more pro-democracy United States administration in 2017 might have been a better friend than the Trump administration was. What we can expect from the future is in the people’s hands.

Popular Fronts can defeat reactionaries in Europe

Andrea Venzon & Colombe Cahen-Salvador are the co-founders of Atlas, the global political party uniting people for survival. They previously co-founded Volt Europa, the European federalist political party.

For progressives around the world, recent months have been filled with anger, disbelief and hopelessness. In addition to devastating international wars on Ukraine and Gaza, the threats for global reproductive freedom, and the ongoing climate crisis, the electoral rise of right-wingers globally –evidenced most recently in the European Parliament election– is fueling despair.

Yet, beneath the surface of these alarming results lies a critical, often forgotten truth about any political landscape experiencing an extremist surge: unity among progressive forces can save the day.
 

The Rise of the Right in Europe

Earlier this month, the European Parliament election saw around 60 million Europeans, 30% of voters, chose a far-right party.

These European elections bore a stark resemblance to the 1930s: the far-right is gaining traction in Europe amidst inflation, geopolitical tensions, and hatred; and no one seems to have a recipe to stop them.

June 2024 is hardly the first time the far right has threatened the European continent since the end of World War II. 2016 was a formative year: following Brexit, many extremist political parties grew in power across Europe. For example,  France, Italy, and Germany saw parties with roots in fascism take hold of the electorate. It didn’t happen suddenly, but divisions, hatred, and mistrust of others settled in amidst the solidification of the era of perma-crises.
 

Building the Progressive Infrastructure to Change Course

We both witnessed the fast rise of far-right parties and felt it was time to act. We first founded Volt Europa, a progressive, Eurofederalist party that today sits in the EU parliament. Powered by the energies of young people across the continent, the party has recently won more than a million votes, mainly in Germany and the Netherlands, on a platform of pro-European integration vis-a-vis the right wing, nationalist wave that stormed Europe.

However, global problems need global solutions; climate change, warfare, populism, and new disruptive technologies can not—nor should be—solved from a continent representing less than 10% of the global population. We thus decided to build Atlas: a global political movement building electoral power to promote equitable policies and defeat authoritarianism. Since its founding in 2020, Atlas has grown to include over 25,000 people in more than 134 countries and is getting ready to run candidates for office from India to Italy. Through our work, we have proof that uniting beyond borders, differences, religions and backgrounds is clearly possible.

Those recent elections raised the question: why can’t political parties focus on the bigger picture and what might bring them together? The 2024 European elections have been catastrophic. The Parliament is more conservative than ever before, with the European Parliament Party (EPP) — a party that until recently counted amongst its ranks Hungary’s Orban’s party—playing queenmaker, again.
 

United We Stand, Divided We Fall

As the European Parliament elections showed, a key lesson that progressives must accept before running out of time is that we must be diligent about building coalitions with the political power necessary to succeed.

In Italy, the governing party Fratelli d’Italia (FdI), which has roots in fascist ideologies, secured 29% of the vote, its best electoral result yet. The main opposition party, with 24%, could have combined with the Italian Greens or even two small centrist coalitions, to easily surpass this figure together. This fragmented approach among progressive factions has proven to be a critical weakness, allowing the far-right to come out on top and strengthen its governing position. Italian politics is no stranger to this kind of miscalculation: in 1921, amid rising fascist sentiments, the socialist party won the national popular vote but struggled to build a coalition with centrist or other progressive forces to govern. Hence the conservative bloc, of which Mussolini was part, took over, and three years from that moment, Italy became a one-party dictatorship.

France offers a similar narrative. The far-right, represented by Le Pen’s Rassemblement National and Zemmour’s Reconquête, achieved a record-breaking 37% of the vote, their highest ever. Despite this, the three main left-wing parties, if united, would have garnered 30% of the vote. While this would not have outstripped the far-right entirely, it would have represented a formidable opposition and a platform upon which to build.

Contrary to the tragic Italian example, pre-WW2 France provides a good playbook. On the 11th of June 1934, 90 years before the latest European elections, the leaders of the socialist and communist parties met to build a popular front (le Front Populaire). Although it did not last long, the Front Populaire succeeded in keeping at bay violent right-wing factions and uplifted French workers with era-defining protections, such as the right to strike and paid leave. As we write this, a second Front Populaire is being built to keep Le Pen and her allies at bay in the French national elections.

The path to overcoming the rise of the far-right in Europe and beyond lies in our ability to unite.

Germany’s election results also reflect the same pattern. Here, the poorly performing Scholz Socialists, if they had combined forces with other leftist and Green parties, would have emerged as the leading political force, topping the Christian Social Union (CSU)’s 30%.

In this year’s Indian elections, in which almost a billion people voted, the I.N.D.I.A. coalition thwarted Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s autocratic ambitions, blocked the highly anticipated Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s outright majority, and forced the party to govern through a coalition.

At this critical juncture, the call to action is unequivocal. It is not enough to merely oppose the far-right in rhetoric or through just marginally better solutions. When faced with a potential neo-fascist state, concrete steps must be taken to build electoral coalitions, globally and locally, that can effectively challenge its growing influence. The path to overcoming the rise of the far-right in Europe and beyond lies in our ability to unite. Let us heed the lessons of history and the present, coming together to forge a coalition for progress.

To all who share this vision, Atlas, the radically progressive global political party we are building, is open for exactly this, everywhere across the planet. Reach out, connect, and let’s build the future we all believe in.

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Inside Armenia’s geopolitical shift to the West

Omar Hamed Beato is a visual journalist based in the Middle East covering conflict, climate change, migration, and social issues. You can find him on Instagram and follow his work here.

Protesters march across Yerevan the night before the commemoration of the Armenian genocide on the 23rd of April. Manifestations like this are often used by political parties to foster nationalism. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Protesters march across Yerevan the night before the commemoration of the Armenian genocide on the 23rd of April. Manifestations like this are often used by political parties to foster nationalism. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

As the sun sets over Yerevan –Armenia’s capital– on the verge of the 109th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, thousands of people flock to Republic Square to remember past and current struggles with neighboring Turkey and Azerbaijan. This genocide, often referred to as the first of the 20th century, claimed the lives of as many as 1.2 million Orthodox Armenians in the Anatolian peninsula during World War I. Over one hundred years later, the wounds of war and mass displacement remain wide open in the minds of the Armenian people. Continuous wars with neighboring Azerbaijan over the majority Armenian-populated territory of Nagorno-Karabakh in the 1990s and recent years have only exacerbated militaristic and nationalist sentiments within Armenian society. The territory,  known by locals as Artsakh, is a self-proclaimed republic within the borders of internationally recognized Azerbaijan. A mix of anger, sadness, and worry can be felt in the ambient – it’s been only seven months since the latest chapter in the war came to a close. Nagorno-Karabakh was completely taken over by Azeri forces prompting almost its entire population of 120,000 to flee to Armenia.

“In the second decade of the 21st century, the Armenian nation has been subjected to genocide once again,” said a speaker at a political rally in Yerevan the day before the commemoration of the genocide on April 24th –a cry that attracted the attention of attendees. “Genocide is the policy of the Turkish state [referring to Turkey and Azerbaijan], the enemy wants to destroy us. One part of Armenia [from Karabakh] was displaced from its homeland of thousands of years.”

Every year, Turkish and Azerbaijani flags are publicly burned in Republic Square, Yerevan. This is the portrayal of a society that is deeply hurt and humiliated after decades of conflict. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Every year, Turkish and Azerbaijani flags are publicly burned in Republic Square, Yerevan. This is the portrayal of a society that is deeply hurt and humiliated after decades of conflict. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Yet, despite all the nationalistic sentiment, not everyone at the manifestation agrees on a way forward for Armenia.  Mariam, a young Armenian woman who took part in the event, whose real name is being withheld due to the sensitive nature of the topic in the country, sees it as simple rhetoric rather than a realistic possibility. “I think this gathering is quite populist,” she says while crowds prepare to march across the city. “Don’t get me wrong, I would like Armenia to retake Nagorno-Karabakh to allow everyone to go back home but I don’t think it is possible, Azerbaijan has more power,” Mariam says before the interview gets abruptly interrupted by other people overhearing it from the crowd.

Many in Armenia have lost loved ones to the different wars between these two neighbors since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, a collapse that reignited the dispute over the territory that remained relatively calm when Armenia and Azerbaijan were coexisting within the Soviet umbrella. For a while, Russia, as Armenia’s historical security guarantor and main economic partner, prevented Azerbaijan from escalating the conflict into a full-out war.

During the 2020 war –when Azerbaijan conquered adjacent territories of Nagorno-Karabakh that Armenia took in the 1990s– Russia played an important role in brokering a peace deal between both states. However, things changed in February 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Unable to divert resources from the war effort, Russia was in no position to defend Karabakh from any incoming Azeri invasion. This was put to a test when Azerbaijan began the 10-month-long blockade of Artsakh in December 2022, rationing medicine, food, and fuel, practically isolating this territory from the rest of the world.

Russia’s inaction to the blockade triggered the belief in Baku that there would be no Russian intervention if it decided to go ahead with a complete takeover. Almost a year later, in September 2023, Azeri troops began to hit Karabakh with artillery and drone strikes making Armenians lay down arms within the first 24 hours of the incursion. The mass exodus of the population to Armenia began in September 2023, and on January 1st 2024 Azerbaijan forced the dissolution of the self-proclaimed republic.
 

Coping with a humanitarian crisis on its own

Despite a strong post-pandemic economic recovery, Armenia is still, by many means, a developing economy. According to a 2022 World Food Program report, about one-fourth of Armenians suffers from food insecurity and one in three lives below the poverty line of USD 115 per month.

Hence, since the fall of Karabakh, refugees have been struggling to start anew. The government has promised benefits to the newcomers: a one-off payment of $250 to every adult and a monthly allowance of $125, or about 65 per cent of the minimum wage in Armenia, to cover rent and other basic needs. Yet many refugees complain the much-anticipated money is stuck in bureaucratic backlog. Due to the global focus on the crises in Palestine and Ukraine, only 47 per cent of the $97 million pledged by the United Nations for the emergency phase of the crisis has been raised.

This has affected refugees like Andranik, 47, and his family. Like most displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh, they are living in a small village on the outskirts of Yerevan. He is living with his wife, mother, and three other children –all of whom complain about the lack of aid coming from the government since they arrived in Armenia.

Andranik in front of his house in Yerevan. During the 2020 war –which also claimed the lives of his nephew and younger brother– he was hit by Azeri bullets three times, which has hampered his mobility and consequently, hurt his prospects of finding employment. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Andranik in front of his house in Yerevan. During the 2020 war –which also claimed the lives of his nephew and younger brother– he was hit by Azeri bullets three times, which has hampered his mobility and consequently, hurt his prospects of finding employment. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

He claims to only be receiving a $50 stipend for his disability –for some reason, he stopped receiving the $125 monthly allowance in February –which is insufficient for a large family like his to survive in Yerevan. “Our economic situation is very bad,” he explains. “We are not expecting any support from the government… [our only hope] is going back to Artsakh one day.”

Due to their economic situation, his family can barely afford any food or essential medicine for his aging mother. They rely on food donations to support their subsistence. “My friends support our family; time to time bring some wood, some food etc. My old friends from Armenia who served in [the military] in Artsakh supported us many times,” Andranik laments while speaking in front of his family. “I am cultivating the land of this rental house to support ourselves [with] some food. We grow some greens, onions, and potatoes. We [are also] keeping some chickens and turkeys as well.”

Andrianik’s mother, Nina, 86, shedding tears when talking about her home in Artsakh. Due to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, she has been forcibly displaced four times in her life, having to start from zero on every occasion. Humanitarian workers comment refugees haven’t received proper psychological support since they were displaced to Armenia. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Andranik’s mother, Nina, 86, shedding tears when talking about her home in Artsakh. Due to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, she has been forcibly displaced four times in her life, having to start from zero on every occasion. Humanitarian workers comment refugees haven’t received proper psychological support since they were displaced to Armenia. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Difficult living conditions and lack of job opportunities across rural areas in Armenia have prompted about three out of four refugees to settle in Yerevan and adjacent provinces.

“The situation for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians is really bad” says Benyamin Poghosyan, a senior research fellow at the Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia –an independent Armenian think tank. “They lack housing and many of them have no jobs. What the government is paying is barely enough to rent an apartment, especially in Yerevan.”

Beyond the Armenians displaced from Artsakh, the country has seen a significant influx of Russians opposing the regime since the war in Ukraine broke out. These recent arrivals en masse mean that the Armenian labor market is struggling to absorb all these new workers –especially as the country has historically been characterized by high unemployment amongst the most vulnerable.  A December 2023 report by the International Monetary Fund estimates these influxes to account for a 3.5 per cent increase in the labor force relative to 2021. Figures show a grim outlook for Karabakh Armenians –it will take until at least 2028 for them to be fully integrated into the job market.

Adella, 65, and her son Radik, 41, are examples of this. Once considered well-off in Karabakh, now they find themselves living in a warehouse in the town of Masis, some 30 minutes away by car from Yerevan. Since they moved here, they have struggled to find jobs – they are only able to generate some extra income when they sporadically sell on the streets some shipments of perfume sent by their relatives living in the UK and Russia.

“I would like to find a job, any kind of job. I will do heavy jobs if necessary,” explains Radik. “[Unfortunately], there are no jobs here.”

Lack of jobs and aid means mother and son live in an unhygienic house with no running water or electricity. “There’s no furniture inside the house –they just gave me a blanket. It’s just cold at night. [We have a] heater but it is not powerful enough,” says Adella as she gazes at Mount Ararat in the background. Due to inadequate infrastructure at home, Adella and Radik have to visit their relative’s house two to three times a week to shower.

Life on pause. Adella video calling one of her relatives living in Russia inside the warehouse where she lives. Due to her age, she is struggling to find work as employers prefer younger workers. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Life on pause. Adella video calling one of her relatives living in Russia inside the warehouse where she lives. Due to her age, she is struggling to find work as employers prefer younger workers. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

To address the housing issue, the government initiated a program aimed at assisting Karabakh refugees in securing permanent housing. However, this initiative has encountered opposition within the refugee community. The government offers up to $13,000 for families to construct or purchase homes in sparsely populated areas, where employment opportunities are scarce, and $5,000 in areas near Yerevan. Benyamin argues that “this scheme only allows Nagorno-Karabakh refugees to buy old Soviet-era houses on the borders of Armenia,” where they do not want to live.

Anna, 45, together with another family from Artsakh, currently rents a house for $390 a month in the surrounding areas of Yerevan. She works at a tobacco factory six days a week, while her husband, Artur, 59, works in the land. They express concern that the government is failing to acknowledge the refugees’ apprehensions about living near Azerbaijan. “We are not prepared to endure another displacement disaster,” Anna laments, humorously remarking that the pledged funds would only enable them to afford “half a house.”

Portrait of Ararat, Anna’s relative who died during the 2020 war against Azerbaijan. Most families from Artsakh and Armenia have relatives who have died fighting in the last few years. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Portrait of Ararat, Anna’s relative who died during the 2020 war against Azerbaijan. Most families from Artsakh and Armenia have relatives who have died fighting in the last few years. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Greta, Anna’s 80-year-old mother-in-law, adamantly rejects the idea of purchasing a house in Armenia. Her thoughts are fixated on returning to her home in Artsakh –where she lived her entire life until September 2023. “I would love to return if the Azeris were not present. I long to visit the graves of my son and husband, and to see my house and everything again”, Greta emotionally expresses, wiping away tears. “During the day, I am in Armenia, but at night, my heart is in Artsakh.”

Greta next to the window in her rental house. Due to the inability to afford rent individually, many families have joined together, residing in crowded accommodations. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Greta next to the window in her rental house. Due to the inability to afford rent individually, many families have joined together, residing in crowded accommodations. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.
 

Is the West the answer to Armenia’s woes?

Unable to handle the humanitarian crisis on its own and with its security constantly under threat of further Azerbaijani attacks, Armenia has –in recent months– begun diversifying its alliances’ portfolio by mainly decoupling from Russia and looking to Western partners for economic aid and security assistance.

Since the fall of Nagorno-Karabakh, repeated meetings have been taking place –in Yerevan and Western capitals alike– between Armenian officials and their Western counterparts looking to establish new economic partnerships. This culminated in a meeting between Ursula Von Der Leyen, Josep Borrell, Anthony Blinken, and Armenia’s Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, in Brussels on April 5th leading to a $293 million aid package from the EU over the next four years and another further  $65 million coming from the US.

“This shows that the European Union and Armenia are increasingly aligned in values and interests,” commented Von der Leyen during the press conference that followed the meeting. “The humanitarian situation of refugees in Armenia remains a priority…we’re ready to do more to support the long-term integration of refugees.”

In a recent meeting between US and Armenian officials in Yerevan on June 11th, the US reiterated its commitment to support ongoing efforts to accommodate refugees. “The United States acknowledges the ongoing economic and social challenges Armenia faces in supporting displaced persons and refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh and intends to continue to assist the Government of Armenia’s efforts in this regard,” reads  the press release. “The United States praised Armenia’s efforts to shelter displaced persons and refugees, and Armenia offered appreciation for the more than $21 million in humanitarian assistance the United States has provided to support displaced persons and refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh since September 2020.”

To avoid repeating history and the events of the last years and decades, Armenia is not only seeking new economic partnerships and aid, it’s also modernizing its defense capabilities. For instance, since 2020, Armenia has purchased artillery, radar, and missile systems from India and last November, France began supplying precision rifles, radars, and armored vehicles to the Armenian armed forces. “For Armenia, enhancing military capabilities is the least it can do because they can’t trust Russia anymore,” says Marylia Hushcha, a southern Caucasus and eastern Europe researcher at International Institute for Peace, a Vienna-based NGO promoting peaceful conflict resolution across the world.

Praying for a better tomorrow. Armenian youth has embraced Western values more than any other generation in the country. Despite the desire to pivot West, many feel uncertain about how, and if, this will be achieved. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Praying for a better tomorrow. Armenian youth has embraced Western values more than any other generation in the country. Despite the desire to pivot West, many feel uncertain about how, and if, this will be achieved. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

“There is this fear in Armenia that Azerbaijan may attack again in the future, especially in the south,” she continues, referring to the dispute over the Zangezur corridor, a narrow strip of land connecting Azerbaijan proper to its western region of Nakhchivan and Turkey alongside the Armenian-Iranian border.

“The decision of the Soviet government to separate West Zangezur, our historical land, from Azerbaijan and hand it over to Armenia led to the geographical separation of the Turkic world,” posted Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s president, on X (formerly known as Twitter). “We will implement the Zangezur corridor, whether Armenia wants it or not,” he threatened back in 2021.

The geographical location of Armenia has made finding security all the more difficult. To the East and West, it is surrounded by adversaries Azerbaijan and Turkey. To the south, it borders Iran –which despite its historically strong ties with Armenia is increasingly cooperating with Azerbaijan on a variety of infrastructure projects like the recently inaugurated Qiz Qalasi dam. “Armenia has no allies in the region whereas Azerbaijan feels secure because it has its own military power but also it has the support of Turkey,” adds Marylia via video call. “Armenia has had a military alliance with Russia which isn’t working and Azerbaijan has an alliance with Turkey that is working”. An example of this close cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey, Turkish-made drones supplied to the Azeri armed forces played a major role in the 2020 war and the subsequent takeover of territories surrounding Artsakh, as did the provision of arms by Israel.

“You need two armies with similar power not to start a war. By acquiring more weapons from the West, Armenia is, to some extent, trying to counter Azerbaijan’s military advantage on the battlefield and enhance its security,” Marylia tells the Center for International Policy.
 

Armenia’s Russia problem

While Armenia has been taking concrete steps to decouple from Russia, the high degree of interconnectedness between them means there is still a long way ahead before the vision of the Armenian government becomes reality.

While former Soviet republics such as Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia –all of which are now candidates to join the EU– took concrete steps in the 2010s to get closer to the West, Armenia’s government at the time decided to strengthen its cooperation with Russia. In 2013, Armenia announced it would join the Eurasian Customs Union, a free trade zone comprised of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and Armenia. To this day, Armenia is officially still part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a security alliance akin to NATO formed of ex-Soviet states –although the government claims their membership is now on pause.

Graffiti showing resentment towards Russia. it reads "no water can wash the blood off putin's hands"

Graffiti showing resentment towards Russia. Many in Armenia blame Russia for leaving them vulnerable against Azerbaijan. Negative feelings against Russia will likely last for decades if not generations. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Historically, Russia has been the biggest arms exporter in the region –to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Given Armenia’s lack of indigenous military Industry, in the 2010s, 94 per cent of all the weapon imports came from Russia. This has served Moscow’s purpose of enhancing profits for its military industry and destabilizing the region. Achieving a quick modernization of its armed forces with Western equipment seems unlikely after decades of investments in Russian-manufactured gear. “The EU is not a military power and the US is unlikely to fill the gap to substitute Russia as a major weapons exporter to Armenia, especially as both are focused on Ukraine and Gaza,” Marylia comments.

Furthermore, Armenia’s former imperial power maintains control over all energy infrastructure in the country, along with key transportation systems like railways, where it continues to maintain approximately 3,000 soldiers until at least 2044. “Russia’s presence in Armenia is very strong”, explains Marylia. “Armenia is trying to reach out and connect with the West but practically it is very difficult –quite impossible I would say. It is unlikely Russia would not intervene if Armenia goes against Russian interests.”

According to Benyamin, the feasibility of this shift depends on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. “If Russia doesn’t lose the war, it will have more resources to look into other neighborhoods like the South Caucasus. Russia will say ‘ok guys, games are over and you were dreaming or making some steps against Russia. I am back and you will do whatever I want’. [This will happen] regardless of who is Prime Minister in Armenia.”
 

The road towards peace

The Armenian government has been signaling that it is ready to make concessions to Azerbaijan in order to reach a permanent settlement to the conflict. There have been no indications from PM Nikol Pashinyan and his environment suggesting any military action against Azerbaijan.

On the contrary, in January, the Armenian government launched the so-called ‘Crossroads for Peace’ initiative with the intention of enhancing “diplomatic initiatives, dialogue, and cultural exchange” in the South Caucasus. In an article by Armenia’s President Vahagn Khachaturyan published in the World Economic Forum, he wrote “Armenia is committed to turning the aftermath of the crisis into an opportunity for building lasting peace and promoting regional cooperation.”

“There is a belief in the Armenian government that Armenia cannot develop without normal relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. [They think] Armenia should pay whatever price to get this normalization,” adds Benyamin. Hence, in April, the Armenian government gave up four villages to Azerbaijan in the Tavush region, located in Armenian’s north, villages it had conquered from Azerbaijan during war in the 1990s.

Yerablur military cemetery in Yerevan. Many families visit graveyards of soldiers on a weekly basis –mandatory military service in Armenia means many of these fallen soldiers were 20 years old or younger –a painful reality still highly present for many. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Yerablur military cemetery in Yerevan. Many families visit graveyards of soldiers on a weekly basis –mandatory military service in Armenia means many of these fallen soldiers were 20 years old or younger –a painful reality still highly present for many. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Yet despite the government’s good intentions, it is unlikely it will sail through smooth waters. The transfer of these border villages has sparked widespread protests around the country demanding the government revert this decision. The fall of Karabakh has created a sense of humiliation in Armenian society. It is unlikely that a peace deal –signed on Azerbaijan’s terms– will provide the much anticipated lasting peace to the region.

“At the end of the day, one day there will be a new government which may want to take some of the losses back. This [one-sided deal] will be the recipe for the next Armenia-Azerbaijan war,” says Benyamin.

Center for International Policy contacted the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and Armenia requesting comments on their respective views on the peace process. However, no responses have been received by the time of publication.

Armenia is in a weaker position than Azerbaijan militarily and politically speaking. Arguably, it needs the peace treaty more than Azerbaijan. Marylia believes the Armenian government is caught between a rock and a hard place as its approach to peace faces “resistance from the public and Azerbaijan is not the easiest negotiating partner.”

The shift to the West may try to provide the Armenian people with some economic relief and a renewed sense of security. However, it will take many decades until peace can be achieved, not only between governments but between societies, allowing cultural communication, trade, shared infrastructure, etc. “The EU [and the US] don’t have enough leverage over Azerbaijan to make it more accommodating with Armenia,” she adds. The West’s ambition is “to act as a mediator but their attempts have not worked.”

CIP Analysis of New Congressional Ukraine and Israel Aid Proposals

We are hopeful that Congress will finally provide long overdue aid to help the people of Ukraine repel Russia’s illegal invasion. With Ukraine’s financial and critical military resources nearly exhausted, this US assistance is vital to preventing Vladimir Putin from achieving his goal of destroying Ukrainian independence and democracy.

In contrast to Ukraine’s demonstrated need for funds to counter conquest and occupation by an expansionist nuclear power, the effort to provide billions of dollars in new American taxpayer funding for weapons to Israel to use in its devastating campaign in Gaza is not militarily, financially or strategically justified.

While Israel has the right and responsibility to defend its people and take military action in response to Hamas’ horrific October 7, 2023 attack, Israel’s campaign in Gaza is failing to achieve its own stated objectives of rescuing the Israelis taken hostage or “eliminating” Hamas from the territory. Instead, Israel’s disproportionate bombardment and siege of the territory with US weapons has resulted in more than 30,000 deaths – two-thirds of which Israel itself estimates are civilians – nearly half of them children.

Despite calls by American lawmakers for meaningful conditions on US military assistance to prevent Israel’s continued use of US arms in a manner that President Biden himself has twice called “indiscriminate,” the stand-alone Israel aid bill being considered by the House of Representatives not only fails to include any such safeguards, but would reduce already insufficient opportunities for Congressional oversight of weapons sales to Israel under federal law. The White House’s issuance of National Security Memorandum 20 (NSM-20) requiring foreign military aid recipients like Israel to adhere to relevant international humanitarian and US law was a step in the right direction, but not a sufficient replacement for durable, statutorily binding safeguards – especially in light of the Biden administration’s resistance to enforcing either existing law or, thus far, NSM-20 with regard to Israel.

With a per capita GDP greater than that of the UK, Canada and Japan – and more than twelve times that of Ukraine — Israel has not made the case to Congress or American taxpayers that it will be unable to carry out essential, legitimate defense activities without the level of financial assistance specified in the bill. Such extraordinary additional subsidization is especially inappropriate in light of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government continuing to spend Israel’s own funds in connection with accelerating efforts to seize and permanently control territory in the occupied West Bank, including the largest expropriation of Palestinian land in the 30 years since the Oslo Accords. Helping Israel finance missile and air defense systems if it was unable to pay for them itself would be entirely reasonable. But providing ever-increasing amounts to fund the deadly munitions and other weapons Israel is deploying in Gaza is not. While Israel openly rejects US requests to use such arms appropriately, desist from violations of Palestinian rights in the West Bank, and refrain from further escalations with Iran, increasing US financing rewards rather than disincentivizes such Israeli actions that run counter to American interests.

Additionally, as Gaza’s civilian population faces a crisis of starvation and disease, the Israel aid bill unconscionably reinforces the recently legislated prohibition on US contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) – the main provider of lifesaving aid and services in the territory — even as it provides a welcome increase in global humanitarian aid. UNRWA has already fired the 12 low-level staff alleged to have participated in the October 7 attacks and has committed to helping hold them fully accountable if the ongoing investigation confirms the allegations. Lawmakers should work urgently to reverse the funding cutoff as nearly all US partner countries have, rather than continuing to collectively punish millions of Palestinians who rely on UNRWA services, including the hundreds of thousands on the brink of famine in Gaza.

Far from addressing the growing threat to American and regional security that the war and humanitarian crisis in Gaza represent, the stand-alone Israel aid bill would cruelly exacerbate it at the very moment further Israeli escalation with Iran risks drawing the United States even deeper into another costly and avoidable quagmire in the Middle East. At this dangerous moment, lawmakers could best keep Israelis, Palestinians and others in the region — including US personnel — safe by pushing for a Gaza ceasefire that allows for massive humanitarian relief and the release of all hostages, while emphasizing the need for de-escalation in tensions with Iran.

To defeat oligarchy, Ukraine needs strong labor protections. The US can help.

Vladyslav Starodubtsev is a Ukrainian social-democratic, human rights, and social activist and historian of Central and Eastern Europe and Ukrainian left-wing movements.

Every Ukrainian government since independence in 1991 has shared the goal of implementing austerity. In pursuit of an economy organized by neo-Thatcherite principles, each successive government has sought to limit the social and labor rights of Ukrainians. From the Russian invasion in 2014, this has meant prioritizing the oligarchy’s sectoral interests and anti-social business practices over promoting social cohesion and national unity.

Ukrainian labor was already under attack before the 2022 invasion. A 2020 report by the US State Department on the state of human rights, including labor rights in Ukraine, mentioned acts of violence against trade unionists as well as pressure against workers who were acting against corruption in their workplace. In addition, State reported discrimination in the workplace; lack of worker safety and undermining the safety regulations; dangerous work conditions; and delays in payment of wages (essentially a “theft” of wages).

Still, only since Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has the full extent of the consequences of such policies become clear. One can see overworked nurses toiling in hospitals that lack capacities and equipment, facing a huge number of wounded while understaffed and underpaid, for often no more than 130-150 dollars a month – well below the $175 monthly minimum wage (and earning at most a maximum of 300 dollars/month). Construction workers labor without proper safety standards, working under constant threat of rocket and drone strikes. At the same time, the government has implemented tax cuts for businesses, and further benefited employers at the expense of workers by easing the process of firing an employee. All of this came at the moment when stability for most people became non-existent.

Ukraine’s labor standards were already worsening before February 2022, but instead of easing the burdens on workers and capital equally in the face of the war, labor standards have instead been actively degraded by new laws.

Capital Gains

In March 2022 the least balanced labor law in Ukraine since independence, Law 2136, came into effect. It allowed employers to fire workers without the consent of trade unions and during sick leave. It became possible to increase the work week to 60 hours, and the inviolability of the right to pay was abolished. Employers were able to dismiss employees due to disagreements regarding the continuation of work under new working conditions without waiting for 2 months.The biggest imbalance was caused by the procedure for suspending employment contracts, which employers abused, putting employees on the edge of survival with impunity

Law 2136 also canceled holidays during wartime. This could be justified under some circumstances, but in effect, labor bore the brunt of the hardships, while employers were largely unaffected. Before the full-scale invasion, if work could not continue due to objective factors, workers were able to receive compensation while finding a new job, allowing them to find a better job without compromising their dignity by immediately accepting worse employment.

Under the new law, employers could stop employment contracts without firing an employee and without paying them. This meant that people could no longer register as unemployed while finding work and therefore could not get unemployment benefits. This has not always worked out to the employers’ benefit, though it often does. Since Law 2136’s introduction, in some cases courts sided with employees if an employer did not specify a reason for stopping work.

Law 2136 also introduced the possibility of moving workers onto 1-hour working days, with proportional lowering of wages. If employees disagree, they could be fired without any compensation. Employers were only required to provide 2 days of notice before implementing such decisions, thus depriving them of the possibility to save money or find alternative employment.

With Law 2136, Ukraine enabled employers to avoid paying maternity leave, compensation for pregnant workers, and other benefits.

In July 2022, the Law on Simplifying the Regulation of Labor Relations (Law 2434) was adopted. It introduced parts of the Civil Codex into the labor Codex, providing further opportunities to undermine the labor Codex by allowing looser contracts between employees and employers. The main “innovation” of this law was the introduction of the possibility of firing workers easily.

In August 2022, the Ukrainian government introduced Law 2421, one of the worst-regulated laws on zero-hour contracts in the world. Precarious work, which elsewhere increasingly trends towards greater regulation, is instead becoming even more precarious in Ukraine. Law 2421 establishes zero-hour contracts without any additional security for workers agreeing to such a precarious arrangement. Employers can enter into collective labor agreements with no obligation to provide employees with work, but can offer it as they need. Payment is made only for completed work. After receiving an offer from an employer, an employee must accept it within the terms established by the contract and start work; in case of refusal, they may face disciplinary action. If the duration of work is less than 32 hours per month, the monthly salary is paid for 32 working hours. In effect, the law practically cancels the requirements for a minimum wage.

The new law introduces the possibility of calling an employee at any time and forcing disciplinary action if an employee doesn’t respond. It introduces the possibility of paying less than a minimum wage for work, as well as the possibility of overtime work without compensation. This law undermines the right to private life and poses severe threats to the mental health and well-being of employees.

In its latest statement, the second biggest trade union of Ukraine directly calls the new labor Codex (planned to be accepted in 2024) that the government is now working on, “enslavement.” The statement reads; “Enslavement of employees is foreseen, and employers are given the right to apply overtime hours almost without restrictions (at their discretion).”

Labor Struggles

Even after this attack on labor rights, Ukrainian labor security formally could be seen as at least comparatively average. But in reality, this could not be further from the truth, as the law has power to protect workers only when it is enforced. Undermining workers’ rights illegally is now an incredibly widespread and normalized practice, one aided by the government’s introduction of a moratorium on labor inspections.

The International Labor Organization has concluded, drawing on the examples of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, that any moratorium on labor inspections “would substantially undermine the inherent functioning of the labor inspection system” and that to adhere to the norms of labor regulations, “the Government [should] take prompt measures to ensure that labor inspectors are empowered to make visits to workplaces liable to inspection without previous notice and to undertake labor inspections as often and as thoroughly as is necessary to ensure the effective application of the legal provisions.” 

In 2023 labor inspections were reintroduced under the pressure of the EU, but with severe limitations that effectively undermine inspections.

These new labor standards were not in any way communicated with the population, and did not receive adequate debate or discussion before adoption. Most people are not well educated on labor law, and the country lacks a strong pool of labor lawyers who can educate and empower workers to find weaknesses in the law and defend their rights.

While it has become somewhat difficult to criticize Ukraine’s government during wartime, the same criticisms have long been made by Ukrainian trade unions, preceding the war: the country is in dire need of a good system of inspections and labor security to enforce standards of labor law.

Furthermore, there has been a constant effort to nationalize trade union property, pursuing the legal argument that trade union property in the USSR was the property of the state and thus, after more than 30 years of independence, it should be inherited by the Ukrainian state, which is viewed as the successor to the Ukrainian SSR, not by trade unions. This argument is used as both an instrument of intimidation to achieve trade union loyalty and as a tool to undermine trade unions’ means for realizing their role in civil society.

In 2022, the government introduced a number of reforms that severely and disproportionately weakened Ukrainian labor rights. Meanwhile, capital has seen its privileges expand, damaging the social contract between workers and businesses by fully siding with business. Tripartism between the state, capital, and labor is practically no more.

None of these reforms helped the economy. They also weakened the human potential, well-being, and physical and mental state of employees, as well as artificially creating highly precarious conditions.

The lack of jobs and extremely low, and usually not-enforceable, minimum wage, which sometimes was ignored outright – even some state enterprises have jobs with less than the $175 monthly minimum wage, with some employees earning only $150 – worsens the situation on the labor market, since fewer qualified workers want to work in Ukraine at a time when the Ukrainian labor market faces serious shortages.

New labor laws have weakened trade unions, thus limiting the voice of civil society and weakening social dialogue between different social groups. This lack of communication also has an economic effect, since cooperation between labor and capital is weak, as is motivation. This lowers productivity and flexibility.

A huge number of workers are working in the shadows. Tax police ignore the problem, and the government tries to normalize this state of affairs. These anti-labor reforms also strengthen the shadow sector, as official employment no longer provides sufficient guarantees. Meanwhile, the government does little to force business out of “the shadow economy.”

Mobilization efforts are hampered by inequality and the refusal of the government to make capital to pay their fair, equal share, together with labor. New labor laws, while rhetorically trying to “move away” from the Soviet legacy, have retained the mindset towards labor inherited from the USSR: a denial of the value and dignity of employees.

Solidarity and the US

How can the US help Ukrainians to limit the harms of oligarchy and regressive reforms, while providing social security for workers ?

In light of such reforms, which are made only for pursuing very narrow sectoral interests instead of the common good, one should understand Ukrainian society and group interests as diverse and complex. We still, unfortunately, retain the strong influence of the old Soviet elite, which became the Ukrainian oligarchy, and we suffer from Thatcherite-like reforms that created a new group of powerful and unchecked influences on politics and the economy. At the same time, Ukraine has a robust civil society, the largest part of which is made up of trade-unions. There are a great number of problems that need to be tackled to ensure basic fairness and justice, which is even more important in the context of full-scale war. Society should feel connected, united, strong, and not undermined and divided by social, political and economic conditions.

Biden’s foreign policy towards Ukraine can be understood in a number of ways. Despite modest beginnings, there have been steady improvements. I expect that this tendency will continue if Biden wins another term. This is the case especially with labor rights, where we hope to see the US taking a greater role in protecting Ukrainian labor.

In 2022, the American Federation of Teachers sent a letter to Secretary Blinken, asking him to look into the Ukrainians government’s actions to undermine the Ukrainian trade union movement and limit worker’s rights. The letter states: “Overall, these new laws, if signed by President Zelensky, will eliminate most collective bargaining rights, reduce worker protections, and allow the state to confiscate property owned by unions and currently used to shelter war refugees.”

The letter was made after a call for solidarity by Ukrainian trade unions against attacks on workers’ rights when they couldn’t be defended, as people were fully concentrated on winning the war.

The AFL-CIO also provided strong backing for Ukrainian trade unions and made sure that Ukrainian trade union voices were heard. It raised awareness in the US government and motivated the adoption of policies to act on Ukrainian society’s demands.

In 2023, Julie Su, the US acting Secretary of Labor, organized a meeting with Ukrainian medical workers to highlight the issues that they are facing, during which Ukrainians discussed the horrible labor conditions in the country.

Some US grants came with conditions that targeted the strengthening of labor, and USAID actively finances trade union events and organizations focused on the promotion of labor rights, such as Labor Initiatives.

The US constantly provides support for the Ukrainian government’s social spending. To make sure that this money would be spent beneficially to the majority of Ukrainians, the US set limitations to the categories on which money could be spent. This is despite the Ukrainian government’s Ministry of Social Policies (which also deals with labor related questions) policy to introduce as many social cuts as possible. This policy was described explicitly: “destroy all social.” The mentioned motivation was to promote the “self-sufficiency” of internally displaced people and others facing extreme pressure so they wouldn’t “get used” to government help. This plan was extensively criticized by Ukrainian social policy researchers.

Active sabotage by some officials and downplaying of the role of the trade unions undermines the majority of Ukrainian society, which in turn produces corruption, unchecked power, lack of stability, and poverty for the majority of Ukrainians. The question of winning the war thus becomes a question of organizing an equal share of responsibility, feeling of community, and common solidarity, which is incompatible with the pursuit of the sectoral economic interests of a powerful few at the cost of the rest of Ukrainian society.

What should be done?

While US policymakers have made efforts to help Ukrainian labor, these efforts are often undermined. For example, medical workers had praised a US grant of $1.25 billion for wages to state-employed workers, but voiced concern with real allocations, especially after Ukraine’s cabinet authorized wage cuts for these same workers. This is just one example where US help has been allocated to help labor, but is subsequently misspent by government schemes or solely allocated for higher management, which already enjoys relatively high wages by Ukrainian standards.

To answer that problem, the US needs to change its priority from securing Ukrainian labor through the help of the government to a multiplicity approach that recognizes the conflicting interests of different parts of Ukrainian society. This might mean helping the national government in one regard while helping the trade unions and local government in others, sometimes, even at the expense of national government interests.

I call that approach poly-archic: recognizing different groups, their positions and roles in society, and the goals that they can achieve. In that sense, the Ukrainian government has a strong pro-oligarchic bias but has a talent for organization of military production and guiding construction efforts. It should be supported in achieving those goals, and trade unions and labor should be supported for the goals of fighting poverty, better social cohesion, tripartism and, importantly, for the effort to battle corruption and oligarchic influence in the political sense: limiting possibilities for unchecked government actions, promotion of group interests; and rigorously controlling government actions towards labor.

Diversifying funds and other means of help towards different agents in Ukrainian society could be a great benefit. Such diversification will strengthen democracy and human rights, promote deliberation, stabilize Ukrainian society, make it more resilient, and indirectly strengthen the Ukrainian war effort. All of this while making the Ukrainian government more transparent and effective.

This is important not only in Ukraine but also in the US. It can create dialogue and cooperation between US trade unions and the US government, combining the skills and knowledge of both to provide strong common support for Ukrainian labor.

With that said, Ukrainian labor will need  substantial international support  to help contain trade union inefficiencies and corruption where those exist. This is a cheap investment, from a financial standpoint, that can boost anti-corruption, democratic, and anti-poverty efforts dramatically.

Conditions for financial aid in terms of labor security could also be stronger. Together with empowering trade unions, it could be enough to help Ukrainians pressure their government when it engages in wrongdoings. Minimum demands would need to include a fair minimum wage, security from firing, promoting social-oriented practices of business, and the introduction of pro-active labor inspection.

Implementing new, even modest, measures towards empowering labor and civil society as a whole will improve democracy and political participation, social cohesion and Ukraine’s economic growth. Ukraine’s victory will be that much closer if Ukrainian labor has a strong voice.

When Will Peace Talks Become an Option in the Russia-Ukraine War?

Eventually, Russia’s war on Ukraine will end. The form of that end will reflect, in large part, the reality on the ground, the political realities and lines that soldiers fought for years to shape and hold. The end of the war will also reflect the willingness of the parties to the conflict, primarily political leadership in Russia and Ukraine, to decide when the slaughter has been enough, to find the terms for peace after violence.

As Dr. Joanna Rozpedowski, senior non resident fellow at CIP, writes for The Geopolitics:

One thing is certain, the world cannot sanction and bomb its way out of serious foreign policy conundrums. One day the guns will fall silent and as with wars of the past, the victors and the vanquished will marvel at a simple gesture of a pen affixing signatures to the peace treaty and wonder, after tallying its dead and wounded, why it took this long. In the nuclear age, this is what advanced societies ought to have the humility and courage to do.

Nuclear weapons form a bounding constraint on the court of the conflict. Russia’s arsenal, the largest in the world, limits in absolute terms the involvement of other nations in the conflict, and carries the menace of a catastrophically high price for any attempt by arms to dissolve the Russian government or state. While not explicitly named, the three nuclear armed members of NATO, including the United States with an arsenal at parity with Russia, constrain the ways in which Russia can conduct war beyond Ukraine, which it has already invaded.

To name these constraints is to acknowledge the reality of the war, and to make open the possibility for considering the way a negotiated settlement might resolve the conflict.

Continues Rozpedowski:

An international peace conference presents itself as a potential avenue for de-escalation. By convening key stakeholders—including Ukraine, Russia, EU, NATO, U.S., and relevant regional actors—such a forum could provide a platform for a much-overdue constructive and frank exchange of grievances and remedies. A rich diplomatic history of peace congresses exists, which not only gave rise to laws, declarations, conventions, and treaties but through dialogue laid out a foundation for a more humane international order and transcendence of the psychology of dominance among once enemy nations. In an era of boisterous punditry and vocal expertise from all sectors of society, when it comes to peace, why do we remain so afraid to talk?

Read more from Rozpedowski about the role of dialog in bringing an end to conflict.