At MSNBC, Chief Editor Kelsey D. Atherton walks through how Trump’s recent announcement of a “Golden Dome” missile defense system is an expensive investment in insecurity.
“If missile defense works as promised,” writes Atherton, “it creates an opportunity for the leadership of the protected country to launch nuclear strikes without fear of suffering nuclear retaliation in return. This is true even if missile defense does not actually work as a defense, because overcoming planned defenses means building a larger arsenal and possibly taking a gamble on launching a nuclear first strike, rather than forever losing that deterrent effect.”
Joe Mayall is a Denver-based labor activist and writer whose work has appeared in Jacobin, PRISM, and The Progressive Magazine. He writes theJoeWrote newsletter, and you can follow him onBlue Sky(@joemayall.bsky.social) andX(@joemayall).
During his second inaugural address, President Donald Trump stated he would enact his campaign promise to “tariff and tax foreign countries to enrich our citizens.” To the surprise and horror of many, including members of Trump’s inner circle, the President has followed through with his chaotic plans. With shifting country-specific rates and conflicting statements from press briefings and Truth Social, the president’s trade policy has upturned financial markets and left everyone from world leaders to small business owners scratching their heads.
As for why these tariffs were enacted, Occam’s razor points to a mix of ignorance and corruption. The president claims they are closing trade deficits, which he misunderstands as the amount a foreign nation is “stealing” from America. Trump boasted about how much he and his friends made manipulating the market, so one can’t discount that the tariffs are a means to personal enrichment.
The absurd rationale and design of the tariffs were only outdone by their implementation. Economists quickly deduced the administration was using an incorrect formula to produce the country-specific tariff rates. However, they’re changing so rapidly that it might not matter.
Just four days after the tariffs went into effect, the White House announced a ninety-day pause. China was the lone exception, receiving a 125% tariff, which was then increased to 145% to include tariffs for fentanyl, an illegal drug rarely disclosed at ports. Predictably, this has caused a trade war, with nations pledging retaliatory tariffs ranging from 25% to 125%.
As the public’s frustration builds with every point their 401(k)s fall, many wonder what the point of tariffs is and whether they can be used for good at all. UAW President Shawn Fain and Congressman Chris Deluzio—neither a fan of Trump—have praised some tariffs as necessary to protect American workers. While oppositional politics have Democrats condemning Trump’s plan, politicians from both parties would be wise not to overcorrect into anti-tariff absolutism.
Instead, they should propose a calculated trade policy that avoids the turmoil of Trump’s tariffs while fostering a dignified life for workers within and outside the United States.
Pair Tariffs with Domestic Investment
For most of the 20th century, Democrats favored tariffs to deter offshoring production to countries with lower wages and lax labor protections.
Before the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the United States tariffed the “value-added” on products shipped abroad for assembly and then re-imported for sale. This artificial cost cut into corporations’ profit margins, motivating companies to keep production in America.
During the 1970s, a typical American automotive assembly plant used parts from over a thousand producers. But when NAFTA removed tariffs in 1994, production was consolidated in maquiladoras, foreign-owned factories in Mexico. By the turn of the millennium, American automotive plants only used between seven and eight hundred part producers, contributing to the estimated 850,000 American manufacturing jobs lost by NAFTA.
While targeted tariffs like those implemented before NAFTA are beneficial, Trump’s decision to tariff entire countries offers no advantage for workers. As the President’s plan taxes everything from the affected country, American consumers will have to pay higher prices for imported products, even if there is no American alternative worth protecting. Coffee is the foremost example of this problem.
As coffee grows in tropical climates, only 1% of the coffee Americans drink is domestic. The rest is imported. As our leading coffee suppliers (Brazil, Colombia, and Vietnam) are now under heavy tariffs, Americans will be forced to pay higher prices, as there is not enough non-taxed domestic-grown coffee to go around. Here, Trump’s tariffs hurt American consumers as well as domestic and foreign coffee producers, who will see demand fall.
That’s why tariffs should be surgical, implemented only when the net benefit outweighs the costs. However, the U.S. can’t rely only on discouraging the consumption of foreign-made products. Washington must pair tariffs with domestic investments to create an effective trade policy that benefits workers and consumers alike. Fortunately, this concept is not novel, so policymakers don’t need to start from scratch.
A good example of the tariff-and-invest strategy is America’s current tariffs on Asian solar panels, which were paired with the Inflation Reduction Act’s (IRA) $60 billion investment in green energy manufacturing.
In 2018, President Trump placed a tariff on Asian solar imports, which Biden preserved when he took office. Combined with the IRA’s benefits, the tariffs motivated the South Korean solar panel manufacturer Qcells (and its parent company Hanwha) to move production out of China and into the U.S. In 2023, Qcells expanded its plant in Dalton, GA, with another plant scheduled to open in nearby Cartersville later this year.
While the full impact of the IRA funding and solar tariffs will take time to materialize, they provide a sound foundation for a labor-friendly trade policy. To ensure future investments benefit workers as much as capitalists, Congress could require any company that receives public investments to have a unionized workforce and ban them from buying back stock. Washington could even emulate the German Codetermination Act of 1976, mandating that companies benefiting from public policy give workers a say in managerial decisions through board seats and supervisory councils.
A Leahy Law for Labor
Whenever tariffs are suggested, many critics claim that while they may protect American workers, they harm laborers in the developing world by keeping jobs in the U.S. Even when made in good faith, this critique misunderstands that reasonable trade policy protects all workers, foreign and domestic. Once again, NAFTA serves as an adequate example.
Prior to implementation, free trade advocates argued the deal would improve the quality of life for foreign workers, specifically Mexicans. In reality, NAFTA harmed workers on both sides of the Rio Grande.
After two decades of free trade, Mexico’s real wages remained stagnant at 1994 levels. While discussions about NAFTA frequently center auto and manufacturing workers, they weren’t the only victims. With Mexico’s tariffs no longer in effect, American-subsidized corn flooded the country’s food markets, wiping out approximately 1.9 million Mexican agricultural jobs and driving undocumented immigration.
As American companies are known to offshore manufacturing to take advantage of easily exploitable laborers, Congress should pass a Leahy Law for labor. Just as the Vermont Senator’s namesake legislation bars weapons sales to human rights abusers, the United States should set a standard for ethical labor and place punitive tariffs on any company that violates it. This would apply upward pressure on global labor standards and eliminate the cost-cutting benefit of offshoring manufacturing, incentivizing companies to keep production in the U.S. Again, Washington would not have to devise such a policy from scratch.
For over a century, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has published recommended labor standards designed to help world leaders implement trade policy that respects the international working class. Recently updated in 2019, the ILO’s handbook provides guidance on everything from child labor (no dangerous work for anyone under eighteen) to appropriate wages (no company vouchers or coupons). There are even tailored recommendations for specific industries (fishers, dockworkers, etc.) and marginalized groups such as migrants, pregnant people, and indigenous communities.
With the intent to uplift the quality of life for American and foreign workers, adopting these standards and setting substantial, punitive tariffs for companies that violate them would benefit both American workers and their foreign counterparts. With companies deterred from offshoring to employ cheap, vulnerable labor, the American working class can rest assured that exercising their collective bargaining rights won’t result in their employer shipping their jobs overseas.
While Trump’s chaotic tariff plan warrants condemnation, politicians should avoid slipping into anti-tariff absolutism. Not only are tariffs an effective tool in the trade policy toolbox, but domestic politics demands addressing the consequences of free trade. Those willing to throw the baby out with the bathwater and expel tariffs for good would be wise to remember that Donald Trump’s opposition to NAFTA made him popular with working-class communities that were once reliable Democratic voters. Running on a full return to the lost free trade regime of the past might temporarily thwart Trump, but it will not end the social and economic frustration that birthed his reactionary movement.
Matt, welcome back to Democracy Now! Talk about what you understand at this point. At the time of this broadcast, the meeting between Zelensky and Trump has not taken place at the White House yet.
MATTDUSS: Right. Well, what we understand — what I understand right now is that a few weeks ago this deal on rare earth minerals actually originated with the Ukrainians in the hopes that this would be a way to entice Donald Trump into offering U.S. security guarantees. They understand, I think quite rightly, that Donald Trump is always interested in how he can profit, how he can — how he can cut deals. And the hope was that an exchange for some claim to Ukraine’s rare earth mineral wealth, this would translate into real military security guarantees from the United States to Ukraine’s security.
Donald Trump responded to that by saying, “I love this idea. I’m not going to give you any real security guarantees.” However, he does seem to imply that by giving the United States a stake in the future — in future profits in Ukraine, this, in itself, could translate into a form of security guarantee. He has talked about U.S. workers being present doing this work in Ukraine as a form of a guarantee, but believing that would also mean that Donald Trump, the United States would respond militarily to an attack by Russia that endangered those Americans. So, this is still unclear, as are the actual details of this minerals deal.
AMYGOODMAN: So, I mean, it’s very interesting, because you’d think the person who’s most concerned about this — I mean, Zelensky, for reasons of just how much of the rare earth minerals they would be promising to the U.S. — but the person who would be most concerned about this is the president of Russia, is Putin.
MATTDUSS: I mean, I think that’s right. You know, he obviously does not want the United States and Ukraine to be drawing into a closer relationship. So, again, this is why I say we really do need to wait and see the actual details of this deal. As of right now, it has Ukraine promising to invest some portion of their mineral wealth into a shared fund between Ukraine and the United States, and which would also be reinvested in Ukraine, although U.S. companies would be the ones developing this. Donald Trump sees this as a way of getting the United States, quote, “paid back” for its support for Ukraine’s defense. But you’re right: Anything that draws the U.S. and Ukraine closer is something that can’t make Vladimir Putin very happy.
AMYGOODMAN: During his first Cabinet meeting this week, President Trump was asked by reporters about tariffs on the European Union. And I’m asking you this as Trump just met, of course, with the British Prime Minister Starmer. They also talked about Ukraine. But this is particularly interesting, what he said, what Trump said about the European Union.
PRESIDENTDONALDTRUMP: I mean, look, let’s be honest: The European Union was formed in order to screw the United States. That’s the purpose of it. And they’ve done a good job of it. But now I’m president.
AMYGOODMAN: Can you talk about the history and what Trump is talking about?
MATTDUSS: From his perspective, he clearly sees the EU as a way to just form a larger economic bloc that could compete with and possibly, as he said it, screw the United States. But, obviously, it’s much more complicated than that. Economic competition is part of it. I mean, coming out of World War II, there was a huge security and political component of this, Europe trying to draw together to coordinate and to talk more effectively to avoid a third round. We went through two world wars, you know, driven by European economic and military competition. So it was a real effort to avoid that. But Donald Trump simply sees it as a way, as he said, to screw the United States by separate European countries drawing together into one large economic formation that could make joint economic decisions.
AMYGOODMAN: And so, now President Trump is threatening tariffs, starting Tuesday, on Mexico, on Canada, increased tariffs on China, and threatening to tariff the whole European Union.
MATTDUSS: Right. I mean, he did this in his first term. You know, he sees tariffs as yet another way to extract concessions. It’s hard to know exactly how far he’s going to go, as we saw in his comments just now about Zelensky. Last week, he was calling Zelensky a dictator; this week, he can’t believe he said that. You know, frankly, I can’t believe he said that, either. So we’ll have to wait and see what he actually does.
I think what’s interesting about all these meetings we’ve been seeing from European leaders — Macron last week and Starmer just yesterday, and I’m sure we’ll see this from Zelensky today — is that they all understand that they do not want to be in public spats with Donald Trump. They are seeking ways to flatter him. They’re seeking ways to demonstrate that he can profit from a better relationship with their countries.
AMYGOODMAN: In your recent piece for The Guardian, where you talk about “What are we to make of Trump’s Ukraine policy?” you talk about discussions between the U.S. and Moscow in deciding the future of Ukraine. You also compare this to U.S.-Israel relations as both nations plan the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Gaza. So, if you can talk about, in both cases, the first, leaving out Ukraine — though he’s meeting with Zelensky today and denying he said — of course, he did say that Zelensky is a dictator — but leaving out Ukraine and leaving out the Palestinians when it comes to their fate?
MATTDUSS: Right. I mean, I see a great deal of similarity, you know, a consistency to Trump’s approach. He sees the global order as one in which great powers, powerful countries make the decisions, and less powerful countries, less powerful communities and peoples simply have to live with the consequences. We saw that in the negotiation between the United States and Russia, hosted by Saudi Arabia, where Russia and the United States were essentially determining the future of Ukraine. We saw this in the appearance at the White House with Benjamin Netanyahu a few weeks ago, where he announced his proposal for the removal — essentially, the ethnic cleansing — of Gaza, a decision with huge consequences for the Palestinian people and for the region made without a Palestinian in sight. So, again, I think this is how Trump sees the world. The United States, by dint of its enormous economic and military power, sits with other great powers and simply determines the rules of the road, and weaker countries and other peoples who aren’t in the room have to deal with it.
AMYGOODMAN: Finally, you saw this video, AI-generated video, that President Trump retweeted on his social media, on Truth Social, this horrific video about Gaza.
MATTDUSS: Yeah.
AMYGOODMAN: And it has Trump Gaza, a huge hotel. It has a gold statue of President Trump. It has Elon Musk walking down the streets. And it has Netanyahu and Trump sitting on beach chairs on the ocean with their cocktails. And finally, it has Trump dancing with an almost completely naked, her bottom naked, woman. What is this?
MATTDUSS: I don’t have a good answer for you. I don’t know who dropped acid and made that video. But, you know, it really —
AMYGOODMAN: The point isn’t who made it. The point is he tweeted it.
MATTDUSS: That’s right. No, that’s right. You know, clearly, that appealed to him. But, I mean, we saw this from his comments with Netanyahu, is that he sees the redevelopment, as he would say it, of Gaza as a source of potential profit, just as he sees this deal on rare earth minerals with Ukraine as a source of potential profit. In both of these cases, you always have to follow the money. You know, the thing to ask about every decision Donald Trump makes is: How does this translate into money in Donald Trump’s pocket? So, he clearly sees some advantage into this garish redevelopment of Gaza into, you know, one big Trump casino and golf course — of course, without any consideration for the people who actually live there right now.
It’s been quite a week for US foreign policy. Following a phone call last week between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, US and Russian delegates met in Saudi Arabia to smooth relations between the two countries and discuss possible paths to ending the war in Ukraine.
Ukraine was not invited to the talks. Quite reasonably, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said his country would not be bound by decisions taken without their participation. Trump responded to this by falsely claiming that Ukraine had started the war, and sought to undermine Zelenskyy’s legitimacy by claiming in a Truth Social post that he “refuses to have Elections, is very low in Ukrainian Polls … A Dictator without Elections.”
In reality, Zelenskyy’s current approval rating is more than 50%, which is higher than Trump’s. And while it’s fair to ask whether Ukraine should have elections during the war, only a total rube would believe that Trump is bringing this up because he cares about democracy.
In terms of optics, the talks themselves are a clear victory for Putin, a validation of his well-known aspiration to restore the great power status to which he believes Russia is historically entitled. In this view, the future of Ukraine, and of Europe, is something to be determined by the United States and Russia irrespective of the populations involved.
For Trump’s part, it fits neatly with his modus operandi that Russia and the United States would get to make those decisions. Just as with the spectacle of the US president and Israeli prime minister a few weeks ago determining the future of the Palestinians who weren’t even in the room, in Trump’s jungle the powerful make decisions that the weak must simply accept, international law and human rights be damned.
You can say this for Trump: at least he’s consistent. The previous administration’s approach to two major wars – Ukraine and Gaza – was characterized by a glaring double standard in which Russia’s blatant violations of the laws of war were rightly condemned, while Israel’s commission of the same were shamefully excused and supported. The rights of the Ukrainian people to freedom and self-determination were treated as unquestionable, while those same rights for the Palestinian people were considered negotiable, if considered at all.
Trump now appears to be resolving this tension by throwing the Ukrainians under the bus along with the Palestinians. And as with his forced-displacement proposal for Gaza, he seems to see Russian talks over Ukraine as primarily a business venture, with the state department readout of the meeting highlighting possible new “investment opportunities” in warming US-Russia relations. (This shows again how wildly off the mark the Washington establishment’s “isolationist” criticisms of Trump have been. In truth, Trump is much more an old-school imperialist, always looking for new spoils to be enjoyed. The amount of time and energy devoted to the idea that Trump is a “Russian asset” obscured the more prosaic homegrown danger posed by his predatory authoritarian capitalism.)
That said, it’s important not to overreact to these talks by dismissing the notion of diplomacy to end the war, nor lose sight of the larger problem in what Trump is doing and how these foreign policy moves tie into his broader agenda. While Trump’s comments indicate a troubling direction of travel and a propaganda victory for Putin, that in and of itself is not enough reason not to avoid negotiations. We should be talking to our adversaries more, not less. The question is what we get from them. And if this initial dialogue helps lead to a durable end to the war, that’s positive. The details will matter.
As will Ukrainian buy-in. There’s some evidence that Ukrainians could support an agreement that comes short of total victory. According to a November Gallup poll, 52% of Ukrainians would like to see their country negotiate an end to the war as soon as possible. According to the same poll, more than half of this group (52%) believe that Ukraine should be open to making some territorial concessions as part of such an agreement.
But for any such agreement to be more than just a temporary halt to conflict, it will need to ensure Ukraine’s security and sovereignty. Simply imposing an agreement that returns Ukraine to Russian vassal state status is not only unjust, but it will also not work. No people would accept decisions about their fate made over their heads, nor should they be expected to. The Ukrainians won’t, just as the Palestinians won’t.
European allies have responded with understandable alarm to Trump’s abrupt policy shift, even if they have no excuse not to have seen it coming. Europeans can no more be cut out of negotiations over the future of their region than Ukraine can be excised from talks over its own fate. If this latest shock finally, at long last, spurs our European allies to take greater responsibility for their own region’s security, that would be a positive outcome. But given how quickly the urgency of past “turning points” has faded, we shouldn’t hold our breath.
The tone and choice of location for this week’s talks in Riyadh (itself a propaganda victory for the Saudi regime) are just one piece of a larger picture in which the United States is now aligning itself more fully with the global forces of ethnonationalism, authoritarianism and oligarchy. As the Trump administration draws closer to rightwing autocrats internationally, it is also hard at work here at home dismantling the administrative state and divvying up the spoils among its own oligarch allies.
Until Democrats are willing to look more honestly and critically at the influence that wealthy interests have on their own party and their governing choices, they won’t be able to offer a compelling and convincing alternative.
In response to President Trump’s comments suggesting denuclearization and reducing defense spending in line with Russia and China, Center for International Policy executive vice-president Matt Duss issued the following statement:
“If Trump is serious about significantly reducing nuclear arsenals and Pentagon spending in step with Russia and China — lawmakers and civil society should stand ready to help do it right, thereby improving national security and human security in the US and globally.
There is no good reason to continue our current trajectory of proliferating nuclear weapons and ever-increasing defense budgets, half of which goes to giant defense contractors like Lockheed Martin and Boeing, with minimal transparency or accountability. This practice has raised numerous concerns regarding waste and corruption. It is primarily greed, self-interest and a lack of political will that propagates the nearly $1 trillion –half of our discretionary budget—that goes annually to these programs. These spending levels make us less, not more, secure by making conflict more likely and fueling the flawed strategy of American hegemony behind so many of the costly US foreign policy boondoggles of the 21st century and the nuclear near-misses of the last 80 years.
The Trump administration has not always made good on past pledges –including a similar suggestion in his first term— and many of the promises upon which he’s acted do great damage, but this is a promise he should keep for the good of Americans and people around the world.”
Alex Thurston is Associate Professor in the University of Cincinnati’s School of Public and International Affairs.
The foreign policy establishment has been famously cast as a bipartisan “Blob” with monolithic views. Yet if the Blob is bipartisan, the Democratic foreign policy network has become the core of the Blob today. Democratic foreign policy hands view themselves as the keepers of order within American foreign policy, the crew that cleans up Republican foreign policy disasters. Democrats stand as reliable defenders of an American imperial order, the party tasked with winding down unwinnable wars (Iraq under Barack Obama, Afghanistan under Joe Biden) while prosecuting wars where the U.S. is ostensibly not a front-line combatant (Libya, Syria, Ukraine, Gaza). Serious reforms to status quo American foreign policy have been fleeting. As vice president, Kamala Harris has championed the Democratic foreign policy status quo; at the insider-heavy Munich Security Conference in February 2024, she offered up the party’s mantras about American leadership, “international rules and norms,” and the importance of alliances with Europe and beyond. As the new nominee and through her choice of Tim Walz as vice president, Harris has stirred some hope that she will prove less militaristic than Biden and that her advisers will listen more to dissenting views.
The Democratic foreign policy elite sometimes tinkers with the status quo, but in relatively superficial and fleeting ways. Obama’s team showed imagination on Iran and Cuba, and Biden’s team promised a “new Washington consensus.” Yet Trump easily undermined Obama’s reforms, especially on Iran, and Biden’s team did not fight back vigorously once Democrats were back in power. Nor did Biden’s team undo Trump decisions such as moving the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. As on many domestic issues, Democrats portray themselves as the adults while mostly letting Republicans shape the playing field. Democrats’ defense of the status quo, moreover, often brings both criticism from the non-governmental players in the Blob (the think tank set and the editorial pages of East Coast newspapers) and fallout among their own base; in different ways, Ukraine and Gaza both exemplify how Democrats act out the preferred policies of the Blob, take elite criticism for not being hawkish enough, and simultaneously lose ground with Democratic activists and core voters.
As on many domestic issues, Democrats portray themselves as the adults while mostly letting Republicans shape the playing field.
A more progressive foreign policy would need a different kind of executive, but also a different cadre of people to implement it. If the National Security Council-led “Process Makes Perfect” when it comes to debating foreign policy in the White House – a dubious claim, actually – then that “process” also involves not just selecting among options but constructing those options for the principals. The people who steer the process matter.
Yet pathways into the Democratic foreign policy establishment remain narrow. One is to be a politician whose brand revolves partly or heavily around supposed foreign policy expertise, for example Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, or John Kerry. Another path is to be a career political appointee, in the mold of Antony Blinken, Jake Sullivan, or Susan Rice – and, one could add, in the mold of Harris’ top two foreign policy advisors, Philip Gordon and Rebecca Lissner. A third path is to rise through the civil service (especially the Foreign Service or the CIA) and then convert bureaucratic capital into political capital, in the mold of Bill Burns or Linda Thomas-Greenfield. More complex pathways are possible too, involving careers in journalism, the NGO world, academia, or other sectors – Samantha Power came out of journalism and academia, for example. These pathways have some commonalities, however: they are all highly dependent on mentor-mentee relationships, and at the highest levels of a presidential administration, the representatives of different pathways tend to talk and sound the same.
Pathways into Power
Senior policymakers in the Biden administration today, mostly born in the 1960s and 1970s, represent the third or fourth generation to 1) steer the national security state, itself a relatively recent creation that dates to the end of World World II, the National Security Act of 1947, and the advent of the Cold War; and 2) manage the “liberal world order,” also a WWII-era phenomenon centered upon the Bretton Woods institutions, the United Nations, and NATO.
Aside from the handful of Senators to brand themselves as foreign policy experts, the Democratic Party’s foreign policy professionals have no political constituency of their own; few of them are household names. Being a career political appointee requires close relationships with elected politicians and with more senior members of the foreign policy elite. Moreover, power within any given administration can manifest in different ways; the author James Mann, for example, argues that during Obama’s first term, the cabinet (Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, etc.) had less direct presidential access and empowerment than did members of Obama’s inner circle, such as Ben Rhodes and Denis McDonough. In Biden’s administration, in contrast, levels of formal and informal power sometimes seem to align, as with Blinken’s appointment as Secretary of State.
For career political appointees, the path into power often involves academic accomplishment (a Rhodes Scholarship, and/or an Ivy League J.D. or Ph.D.), then work for a Senator, then a senior post in a Democratic administration, followed by a cabinet-level post. Vetting and selection mechanisms kick in early; it is not that working-class Americans are completely frozen out, but attending a state school, or missing out on the mentorship that prepares one for major fellowship competitions, acts as a major brake on early access to the network. And if the foreign policy elite is becoming more diverse over time by gender and race, it nonetheless continues to skew male and white. Even more subtle, meanwhile, are the homogenizing effects of the selection mechanisms when it comes to ideological diversity, or lack thereof; the Ivies, the elite fellowships, and the early career opportunities in government or at top publications can all act as screening devices for junior applicants to the Blob.
the Ivies, the elite fellowships, and the early career opportunities in government or at top publications can all act as screening devices for junior applicants to the Blob.
To take a few examples of career political appointees, a 30-year-old Blinken served on Bill Clinton’s National Security Council in a mid-level role from 1994 to 2001, then became a key aide to then-Senator Biden on the Foreign Relations Committee. Blinken followed Biden into the Obama administration and, in 2021, was tapped as Secretary of State. Sullivan, a Yale-educated lawyer, worked for Minnesota Senator Amy Klobuchar. That role opened the door to a 31-year old Sullivan joining Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaigns in 2008 and 2016. When Clinton became Secretary of State, Sullivan served in two key posts – Director of Policy Planning at State, and then as National Security Advisor to then-Vice President Biden. Had Clinton won the 2016 presidential election, Sullivan likely would have become National Security Advisor, one of the youngest ever. He eventually did take on that role in the Biden administration (2021-present).
For career bureaucrats, meanwhile, the Foreign Service and the intelligence community offer structured, hierarchal paths to advancement. If the bureaucrat rises high enough, he/she becomes visible to the politicos in the White House. A post such as Assistant Secretary can offer an audition for even more politically important jobs in a subsequent administration. One representative of the bureaucratic path is Bill Burns. The son of a major general, he won a Marshall Scholarship to Oxford in 1978, completed his Ph.D. there, and then joined the Foreign Service in 1982. He served in the offices of both of Bill Clinton’s Secretaries of State and then, starting at 42 took up high-profile posts as Ambassador to Jordan (1998-2001), Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (2001-2005), Ambassador to Russia (2005-2008), Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (2008-2011), and Deputy Secretary of State (2011-2014). Burns’ rise proceeded under Democratic and Republican presidents alike, but his post-Foreign Service career has seen him gravitate towards the Democratic establishment, serving as president of the liberal think tank the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2014-2021) before accepting the directorship of the CIA under Biden.
Bureaucrats-turned-elites are major assets to any administration – these bureaucrats bring substantial government experience to the table, as well as long-practiced diplomatic skills. If there is an American “Deep State,” then Burns personifies it; indeed, some post-October 7 coverage suggests that it is Burns, rather than Blinken, who is the real voice of American negotiations in the Middle East.
Power, finally, and lesser-known figures such as Richard Stengel, exemplify paths that run through journalism or other sectors. Power, a war correspondent, joined Harvard in 1998 to establish the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy; she earned fame, and a Pulitzer, for her 2003 book on genocide, A Problem from Hell. She then became a key advisor to Barack Obama, eventually serving, starting at 42, as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations during his second term and returning to the White House under Biden as director of the United States Agency for International Development.
Pathways When Out of Power
One important facet of such figures’ careers is what they do when Democrats are out of power. The typical moves are to think tanks, universities (again, especially Ivy Leagues), or consulting firms. Such roles can keep foreign policy professionals visible (through speaking engagements, appearances in the media, and/or participating in policy reports and high-level working groups) and can help them maintain and expand their networks. Consulting firms are, obviously, lucrative ways to leverage government experience and political connections, but are also important parts of the foreign policy infrastructure, again allowing out-of-power elites to stay connected to key contacts at home and abroad, and also to create professional perches for peers and proteges. When out of power, top figures not only often find prestigious and lucrative perches but also combine multiple roles – as think tankers and consultants, for example – to burnish their images as serious thinkers while simultaneously cashing in.
Key pipelines into the Biden administration included two consulting firms: Albright Stonebridge Group (an outgrowth of former Clinton secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s consulting firm, founded in 2001, which merged in 2009 with Stonebridge International, a firm launched by Albright’s fellow Clinton administration alumnus Sandy Berger, who had served as National Security Advisor from 1997-2001); and WestExec Advisors (founded in 2017 by Blinken and several other top Obama officials). Although such firms are substantially smaller than Wall Street giants such as Goldman Sachs and Citigroup, they play a broadly similar function in the revolving door of Washington, allowing the kind of zig-zagging career mobility (and profitability) for the foreign policy elite that major investment banks and corporations have allowed for the financial elite. WestExec has been criticized for the opacity of its client list, and for the ways in which the firm leveraged promises of “face time” with once-and-future officials as a selling point for clients.
Another way that out-of-power Democrats occupy themselves is, of course, with planning how to get back into power. A key venue between the Obama and Biden administrations was National Security Action, a 501(c)(4) advocacy group. Co-chaired by Rhodes and Sullivan, the group included Blinken, Burns, Thomas-Greenfield, and a host of other familiar faces, many of whom joined the Biden administration. Various institutions, then, allow the Democratic foreign policy elite to bide their time and stay in the game while between White Houses. It may also be time out of power, moreover, that reinforces the network’s cohesion even more than time in power; the shared experience of opposing a Republican president, planning lines of attack and promises for the future, and engaging in shared consulting and corporate work likely also serve to bind a diverse elite more closely together.
Worldviews and Goals of the Democratic Foreign Policy Establishment
What do the Democratic foreign policy elites want and believe? From their writings and statements, many senior members of this club exhibit a generic liberal view of America’s place in the world, tinged with elements of progressivism.
There are no specific values that one could permanently associate with Blinken or Sullivan, for example. While out of power, Democratic foreign policy elites – as with top candidates for office – gesture towards the imperative to uphold “our values” and restore a perceived normalcy in American life and foreign policy. National Security Action, for example, “work[ed] to ensure that America endures as a beacon of opportunity, dignity, and hope to people around the world.” The group declared, “We reject the false choice between welcoming immigrants and refugees and ensuring our security” and also said that “enabling or excusing oppression abroad today only fuels the injustices and instability that endanger us all tomorrow.” Back in office, however, the Biden administration proved more than willing to crack down on immigrants, and even more willing to double down on alliances with autocrats around the world.
Similar promises from Sullivan and others that U.S. foreign policy under Biden would “work better for the middle class” had relatively little substance and were soon abandoned. The policy paper Sullivan helped organize in 2020 recommended, among other items, to “shift some defense spending toward research and development (R&D) and technological workforce development to protect the U.S. innovative edge and enhance long-term readiness,” but the defense budget has instead grown each year under Biden.
When called upon to articulate a view of America’s role in the world, the top Democratic strategists are often vague. In October 2023, Sullivan penned an article for Foreign Affairs called “The Sources of America Power.” The article became infamous for Sullivan’s boast that “although the Middle East remains beset with perennial challenges, the region is quieter than it has been for decades” – lines written and spoken before Hamas’ attack on October 7, 2023 and the ensuing genocidal response by Israel, but naïve nonetheless. More telling of Sullivan’s worldview, however, was this sentence: “The essence of President Biden’s foreign policy is to lay a new foundation of American strength so that the country is best positioned to shape the new era in a way that protects its interests and values and advances the common good.” Such sentiments amount to little more than an argument that America is inherently good, so therefore it should lead the world, and therefore America must be “strong.” This is less a foreign policy than it is a vague, all-purpose justification for ad hoc decisions.
Such sentiments amount to little more than an argument that America is inherently good, so therefore it should lead the world, and therefore America must be “strong.”
Harris’ advisors are clearly reflective – Gordon published a book in 2020 called Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East – yet there are limits to their introspection. If Gordon is a reformist, as some have argued, he is a moderate one at most. Gordon’s thinking in Losing the Long Game revolves around cost-benefit analysis in a framework that still assumes and extols American primacy, rather than a wider set of questions about how, for example, U.S. failures in the Middle East could provide impetus for a fundamentally different approach to the region and the world. And reflection can turn into overcorrection; among various troubling notes in the book, Gordon portrays Obama’s (very reluctant) support for Egyptian protesters in 2011 as a form of “regime change” gone wrong, collapsing U.S. rhetorical support for largely non-violent Egyptian protests with the more aggressive U.S. interventions in Syria and Libya. And despite Gordon’s reflections when out of power, Biden himself has appeared to call for regime change in Russia and, depending on how one parses his statements, Iran. Biden’s statements could be seen as gaffes, but the instinct to push for regime change in adversaries runs deep, and no senior staff resigned over either remark. Meanwhile, Lissner co-authored a book in 2020 called An Open World: How America Can Win the Contest for 21st Century Order. Endorsed by Henry Kissinger, the book’s call for openness is welcome – but is the key question facing the U.S. really how to “win”?
Even those individuals who do enter the foreign policy elite with a more recognizable set of values (or, more cynically, a “brand”) typically end up becoming defenders rather than reformers of existing policy frameworks; the ultimate example is Samantha Power, an ostensible critic of U.S. inaction in the face of genocide but, while in senior posts under the Obama and Biden administrations, a rather conventional liberal hawk.
There are also no specific policies that Democratic elites consistently defend. Many of the top officials in Biden’s administration, for example, were involved in negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the “Iran Deal”) under Obama, but showed little hunger to restore the deal under Biden. Some fixtures of Democratic White Houses are more associated with specific policies – Middle East hand Rob Malley, for example, is seen as a leading Democratic expert on Iran and a proponent of easing tensions – but those associations can in fact become professional liabilities, and Malley was subjected to an extended barrage of criticisms in the press before being placed on leave in June 2023 under unclear circumstances concerning his security clearance.
Democratic foreign policy elites will sometimes innovate, but more often they default to defending the status quo of the moment, while invoking 1945 and 1989-1991 as idealized moments of supposed “order” in a U.S.-centric worldview. The goals of any given moment – for example, the administration’s reported push for a “grand bargain” between Saudi Arabia and Israel as a purported path for ending the Gaza war – often appear predicated on a hunger for “normalcy” and an eye to what would play well with establishment media, rather than on introspection about America’s changing place in the world or about why the status quo might be a problem rather than a destination. It is striking, meanwhile, how often Democratic foreign policy elites invoke George H.W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, and James Baker as foreign policy hands they admire – a Republican-lite foreign policy sometimes appears to be the horizon of imagination for today’s top Democrats.
a Republican-lite foreign policy sometimes appears to be the horizon of imagination for today’s top Democrats.
If ideological vagueness, a belief in American greatness, and a preference for the status quo are all interwoven with a hierarchical, elite, and difficult to permeate network, then it is little surprise that the Democratic foreign policy establishment is largely self-perpetuating and unfriendly to genuine reformers. New entrants to the establishment are almost invariably proteges of existing members, and/or the senior campaign staff of winning presidential campaigns. Meanwhile, surviving and rising in that world requires intricate knowledge of the government’s inner workings as well as a sophisticated mental rolodex of who is who in Washington. If one is working sixteen-hour days at the National Security Council attempting to plan foreign trips and write talking points for a frazzled boss all while running “sub-IPC” meetings and plotting one’s next career move, what time is left to question whether American foreign policy is heading in the right direction?
Opportunities for Reform – or Revolution?
The reproduction mechanisms of the Democratic foreign policy elite are strong. From one’s undergraduate years on, access to opportunities relies heavily on connections to top mentors, who are overwhelmingly likely to prefer people with worldviews similar to their own – or at least malleable ones. The rewards for ideological and professional conformity are huge: proximity to power when Democrats are in office and, when out of office, lucrative positions within consulting firms and/or prestigious perches within universities and think tanks. All of this adds up for considerable longevity, over decades, for people who make it into the foreign policy elite. Whether or not Harris wins in November, and whoever the next Democratic president is, Biden administration figures such as Blinken, Sullivan, and their close proteges are likely to continue shaping Democratic executives’ foreign policy for years to come. One can also look ahead to key incubators for upcomers – the State Department’s Policy Planning unit, for example, or the National Security Council’s myriad senior directorships – to get a sense of what the next cadre of senior policymakers will look like.
The rewards for ideological and professional conformity are huge
Is such a system impenetrable to change? For would-be reformers, one exciting prospect would be a presidential candidate who bypasses the foreign policy establishment and brings genuinely fresh perspectives into senior levels of government. As the 2016 and 2020 Democratic primaries showed, however, the obstacles to such a scenario are massive. The 2008 election is another cautionary tale, in fact; a president whom many perceived as a reformer ended up welcoming numerous upholders of the status quo into his administration.
Another potential prospect is reform from without – in other words, building up an alternative cadre of foreign policy experts. To some extent, that alternative cadre already exists, just not in a cohesive way; people with progressive foreign policy visions are already distributed throughout academia, think tanks, NGOs, and the wider society. Yet their empowerment would, again, be predicated on appointments to key positions, which in turn depends upon access to powerful elected politicians. And appointments to such positions are no guarantee against the ensuing pressures for ideological conformity and malleability.
an “inside-outside” strategy appears most promising
For the time being, an “inside-outside” strategy appears most promising. Reformists can and should cut their teeth in the existing Democratic foreign policy world, resigning when morally imperative but gleaning knowledge of how things work when possible. Critics can and should challenge the Democratic foreign policy elite and worldview, and not just issue by issue but in a holistic way that lays bare the vacuity of appeals to American power, greatness, and leadership. Ultimately, more creative and broad-reaching coalitions will be key to transformation – it is not the pens of academics and unconventional analysts that will give Harris pause on Gaza, but the tens of thousands of uncommitted votes cast in primaries. Biden’s team has claimed to be implementing a foreign policy for the middle class, but they have largely spoken for the middle class rather than with it or through it, and listening efforts have been token and performative.
For progressives and leftists, a mass working-class base, involved directly in the articulation and advocacy of an alternative foreign policy, is one key to achieving change. Such an effort, already underway in tentative forms, would involve connecting the cadres of an alternative foreign policy team more directly and intensively to the workers unionizing Amazon and Starbucks, as well as to the mostly domestically-focused organizers pursuing single-issue campaigns at the state level. To make those connections stronger and more powerful will take new and more robust institutions, as well as a great deal of listening from the reformists currently embedded in the offices of progressive members of Congress, NGOs, and academia. It is unlikely that status quo-minded Democrats could be dislodged from the foreign policy ladder simply by being out-argued; the challenge is instead to make the foreign policy elite more answerable and vulnerable to mass politics.
As a candidate, Vice President Kamala Harris is signalling her rejection of a corporatist neoliberalism in favor of progressive, worker-first policies at home. Such a policy would build on the existing pro-labor success of the Biden administration, but it also presents an opportunity to move towards a more pro-worker foreign policy, without getting caught in great power competition.
Writes Matt Duss:
The United States can build a more equitable global order, or it can frantically try to maintain global primacy, but it can’t do both. The Harris-Walz team has an important task and a big opportunity to diminish this contradiction and complete this transformation. Just as the neoliberal era proved that giving carte blanche to big corporations—whether they’re car companies or weapons manufacturers—is not a means for achieving broad economic progress or security, the past 20 years of the “war on terror” showed that a heavily militarized foreign policy feeds global insecurity and shreds the fabric of international norms.
As outlined by Trump and Vance, the Republican vision is essentially zero-sum: The United States and its workers only win by others losing, and vice versa. The Harris-Walz team can offer a vision of contrasting solidarity, which doesn’t seek to build political consensus by vilifying the foreign enemy of the moment but rather seeks ways to uplifts workers and their communities in every country.
As Kamala Harris prepares to formally accept her party’s nomination at the Democratic Convention in Chicago, CIP senior non-resident fellow María José Espinosa Carillo discussed what a Harris presidency would mean for Latin America in a Q&A with Latin America Advisor (a daily publication of The Dialogue) explaining:
“A Harris presidency could bring a renewed, forward-looking vision for U.S. relations with the Americas, focusing on contemporary issues critical to the region. Her track record as vice president, senator and California’s attorney general, particularly her commitment to justice and human rights, aligns closely with the challenges facing Latin America and the Caribbean—a region deeply intertwined with U.S. interests.
In migration policy, the focus will likely be on promoting regional cooperation, as demonstrated by the Biden-Harris administration through the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection. This framework has already facilitated regional collaboration on migration management. Given the strain on resources and infrastructure caused by unprecedented migration flows in the Americas, a Harris presidency will need to capitalize on and expand these efforts to strengthen stabilization and integration of migrants and asylum seekers across the continent.
Harris’ approach to U.S. leadership emphasizes close collaboration with allies and partners, actively listening to their needs and working together on solutions. This is evident in her unprecedented work with Caribbean nations, particularly on climate action. Her commitment to addressing the climate crisis aligns with the region’s pressing needs, where climate change threatens agriculture, infrastructure and coastal communities. Her leadership, including historic investments in climate initiatives, could drive collaboration on renewable energy, conservation and sustainable development, aligning U.S. policies with regional efforts.
As women’s rights become central to policy and female politicians break the mold in Latin America, a Harris presidency would continue to advocate for these rights, including access to abortion, health care, combating gender-based violence and promoting women’s economic empowerment.”
Lillian Mauldin and Janet Abou-Elias are co-founders of Women for Weapons Trade Transparency and research fellows at the Center for International Policy. Liv Owens, Mekedas Belayneh, and Rosie Khan are all researchers with Women for Weapons Trade Transparency and, respectively, a doctoral candidate at City St. George’s University of London, an economic master’s candidate at John Jay College, and an environmental policy master’s candidate at Duke University.
For the past ten months, the world has watched the devastating Israeli assault on Gaza in which more than 38,000 Palestinians in Gaza have been killed, 70% of them women and children. Protestors internationally have drawn public attention to the mass civilian casualties and unprecedented destruction. Student protests and encampments across the United States erupted in response to the ongoing genocide in Gaza, only to be met with increasingly violent and militarized responses from law enforcement.
Equipped with riot gear, tear gas, and rubber bullets, police forces have swiftly and aggressively dismantled peaceful demonstrations. Columbia University police used crowd control weapons and riot squads to break up encampments and deployed surveillance drones to monitor protester activity. Indiana University authorized state police to set up snipers aimed at protestors from the top of the student union building. At UCLA, the only pause the police took from throwing stun grenades at the encampments was during the hours-long attack from violent counter protesters. For this, police opted to stand aside and watch. At the University of Arizona, police confronted peaceful protestors with MRAP-style armored vehicles called Lenco BearCats. Then they deployed chemical agents against the crowd.
As defense contractors and weapons manufacturers seek new markets, they find lucrative opportunities in selling military style equipment to domestic police forces.
The military-industrial complex plays a significant role in encouraging increasingly militarized responses by law enforcement agencies against civilians in the United States. As defense contractors and weapons manufacturers seek new markets, they find lucrative opportunities in selling military style equipment to domestic police forces. Programs such as the Department of Defense’s 1033 and 1122 federal surplus programs facilitate easier access to weapons and tactical gear designed for warfare.
This normalization of military style tools in police arsenals creates a mindset that views civilian protests as combat situations requiring aggressive force. Consequently, police departments equipped with advanced weaponry and armored vehicles are more likely to resort to brutalization and violent tactics, even in situations involving peaceful demonstrations. This not only escalates tensions and leads to excessive use of force but also undermines the principle of policing by consent, transforming community protectors into warriors prepared for battle.
What is the 1122 Program?
The 1122 program is one way excess military equipment from the bloated Pentagon budget is offloaded to police departments, bringing militarization abroad back home. Established in 1994, the 1122 Program is managed by the Defense Logistics Agency, the Army, and the General Services Administration to allow law enforcement agencies to purchase discounted military equipment for counter-drug, homeland security, and emergency response activities. These discounts are meant to encourage local police departments to purchase equipment from the DOD inventory and contractors, propping up the same military-industrial companies that profit off of war abroad and police violence at home.
Federal agencies responsible for the program have failed to track, audit, or account for the weapons and gear that are transferred or sold through it.
The excess production of military equipment by these companies justifies the need for DOD programs that sell accumulating surplus equipment to various law enforcement agencies. Since the program primarily gives ownership of equipment to police departments, there is very little tracking of the military equipment that is sold to them. The 1122 Program does not have an audit mechanism; therefore, its sale of secondhand military weapons and other equipment, such as surveillance gear, does not have any safeguards to protect against its improper use. Currently, the program has no centralized database of purchases so there is no mechanism for public accountability or awareness of the distribution and use of military equipment by police. Federal agencies responsible for the program have failed to track, audit, or account for the weapons and gear that are transferred or sold through it. Meanwhile, police brutalization and use of excess force is ever present. With military equipment in the hands of police, there are dangers of significant misuse and harm going unchecked.
Missing records, no audits, and dangerous by design
Throughout Women for Weapons Trade Transparency’s investigation into the program starting in 2021, we sought clarity on the program’s record-keeping processes, departmental oversight, and typical purchases. We encountered unclear purchase record-keeping procedures that varied by state, agencies that were uncooperative and violated their obligations to open records law, and state points of contact who had little or no information about the operations of the program in their state. When we attempted to confirm which law enforcement agencies were enrolled and which state agencies managed them, our inquiries frequently yielded no certain answers.
Despite filing open records requests with dozens of local and state agencies in states that participate in the 1122 Program, we were only able to acquire centralized, organized spreadsheets of purchases from Colorado, California, and Massachusetts. Most state agencies denied or ignored our requests. When government staff responded to our requests, they would commonly misdirect us to other agencies, misinterpret our requests, or reject our requests without valid explanation.
A lack of record keeping on 1122 Program procurements creates a risk of military style equipment being unaccounted for in police inventory. When asked if purchases from the 1122 program are audited after procurement, a Texas official responsible for administering the program in the state commented: “Once the items are received, our office does not inventory, account or audit.” A New York point of contact commented that “[my] responsibilities and duties end at the approval of the purchase. I do collect Contract Usage forms. The NYS 1122 Program does contain language in that the ultimate responsibility lies with the customer.” A Colorado point of contact confirmed separately: “We verify that purchases are made by state and local governments in support of counter-drug, homeland security and emergency response activities prior to procurement of vehicles. We do not trace purchased vehicles after they are received by the state and local agencies. Vehicles become property of the agency once received…”
Without state or federal level end use monitoring, the 1122 Program fails to create safeguards to protect against violence perpetrated by equipment
What’s more, the federal government does not require any oversight to monitor an agency’s compliance with counter drug, homeland security, and emergency response purposes. Without state or federal level end use monitoring, the 1122 Program fails to create safeguards to protect against violence perpetrated by equipment and against diversion into the wrong hands. After months of FOIA request correspondence with the Defense Logistics Agency, we finally acquired federal level data on 1122 Program transfers. Unfortunately, the data was incomplete, accounting only for purchases through the program after 2017, and moreover, missing item identifications for years prior to 2020. The total 1122 Program acquisition value for years 2017–2021 was given as just $379,473. However, this number contradicts data we received on the state level. A Colorado point of contact estimated that the state had purchased $1 million in vehicles in one year through the program, a number far greater than what was reported by the DLA for total nationwide purchases.
The inconsistent data across local, state, and national levels uncovers a disturbing reality that 1122 Program transfers are largely unaccounted for. It is clear from the harms that occur as a result of this gross negligence and inconsistency that the 1122 Program should be sunsetted by Congress.
Connecting the dots to increasing criminalization
In June 2024, the Supreme Court ruled that unhoused people could be arrested for sleeping in public spaces, overturning a previous rule that cities could not do so if there was insufficient shelter space in the city. With U.S. law enforcement agencies over-funded and relied on to tackle issues of U.S. infrastructure, lack of social services, and public health crises, these already vulnerable populations are exposed to an even higher risk of encountering unlawful violence from militarized police forces.
Criminalization of unhoused people has long perpetuated cycles of poverty and injustice. But as federal programs like 1122 continue to equip police with dangerous military style weapons and vehicles, and this criminalization of unhoused people is legalized nationwide, the threats to life and safety of Americans without homes becomes even greater and widespread. Police have historically ignored the constitutional rights of vulnerable populations during interactions and arrests. The U.S. Department of Justice issued a report on the Phoenix Police Department in June of this year after an almost three-year investigation. It found that Phoenix police routinely violated the rights of unhoused people “by unlawfully detaining, citing and arresting them and unlawfully disposing of their belongings.” Further, the report found that over a third of all “arrests in Phoenix from 2016 to 2022 were of people experiencing homelessness” and that many of these arrests were unconstitutional. The DOJ — the highest law enforcement authority in the country — has confirmed that these police committed crimes against the very individuals they are sworn to serve. And because Arizona is enrolled in the 1122 Program, these same agencies have the ability to purchase military style equipment and weapons.
In response to the report, Ann Oliva, CEO of the National Alliance to End Homelessness, commented: “Criminalization doesn’t end anybody’s homelessness. The way to resolve homelessness for people is to provide housing and the supportive services that people want and need… we need investments at the federal level to address the affordable housing crisis and shortage that is impacting not just Arizona but communities across the country.”
The pathological warrior-cop mentality, the violations of unhoused people’s rights committed by police, and the brutal repression of domestic political protests are manifestations of the imperial boomerang – inevitable consequences of the U.S.’s foreign policy
The aforementioned increasingly violent and militarized responses from law enforcement in response to protests since April also highlight a larger trend of repression and criminalization of protest and free speech that is aided and abetted by military equipment transferred through the 1122 Program. A recent analysis of police misconduct lawsuits filed during the 2020 protests in response to the murder of George Floyd revealed that the police response to many protests broke laws and violated rights. Many of these lawsuits also resulted in police reforms, including restrictions on the use of “less lethal” weapons, such as rubber bullets, pepper balls, and tear gas that have long been used to crush dissent in the United States around the world. If weapons such as these are being scrutinized and restricted, military style equipment purchased through the 1122 Program such as MRAPs and BearCats should be too.
Furthermore, studies have found that additional force by police leads to increased violence and a positive feedback loop of escalation from both protesters and police forces. Additionally, empirical analysis of the correlations between police militarization through the 1122 Program’s sister 1033 Program and police violence revealed “a positive and statistically significant relationship between 1033 transfers and fatalities from officer-involved shootings.” The pathological warrior-cop mentality, the violations of unhoused people’s rights committed by police, and the brutal repression of domestic political protests are manifestations of the imperial boomerang – inevitable consequences of the U.S.’s foreign policy.
Intertwined international and domestic militarization
“The means of defense against foreign danger have been always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people.”
― James Madison, speech at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia
Investigative scrutiny, such as Government Accountability Office reports on DOD’s Section 333 Train and Equip programs, highlights how U.S. military resources are not only allocated for foreign allies’ military forces but also integrated into their law enforcement agencies. Programs such as Worldwide Warehouse Redistribution Services (WWRS), DOD’s Section 333 Authority to Build Capacity, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s Excess Defense Articles (EDA) showcase how the US operates a durable system for distributing weapons and other military equipment to the local and federal level forces of other nations. These programs are not isolated: they demonstrate a U.S. strategy of distributing military-grade equipment internationally through numerous channels, which has far-reaching harms for civilians policed by both military and law enforcement forces.
The 1122 Program’s impacts on domestic militarization and other programs like EDA and WWRS paint a picture of the broader landscape of militarization. While the 1122 Program enables states and local governments in the United States to access federal equipment and discounts for domestic use, EDA and WWRS enable the redistribution of surplus U.S. military equipment to international customers. This common mechanism of reallocating excess military resources demonstrates the similar causes and effects of domestic and international militarization: inflated defense budgets beget greater civilian harm. In these ways, the repurposing of military equipment raises concerns about the budgetary and human security implications of such programs.
This common mechanism of reallocating excess military resources demonstrates the similar causes and effects of domestic and international militarization: inflated defense budgets beget greater civilian harm.
WWRS exemplifies the complexity and opacity of U.S. military transfer programs. This program facilitates the transfer of articles acquired under the U.S. Arms Export Control Act through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases or Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) purchases. Essentially, WWRS operates as a global redistribution center for excess U.S. military equipment. U.S. Government organizations are eligible to be WWRS buyers as well as foreign FMS customers. The anonymity maintained for both buyers and sellers within this program raises concerns about its lack of transparency and oversight, much like that of the 1122 Program. As such, both programs display larger trends of a lack of end use monitoring of U.S. supplied weaponry, leading to their potential misuse.
EDA repurposes surplus U.S. military equipment to foreign governments and international organizations with the primary goal of modernizing U.S. ally forces in line with U.S. foreign policy objectives. This program underscores the similarities between international militarization and domestic militarization practices. The equipment provided through EDA is often the same equipment that could be accessed domestically through programs like the 1122 Program, such as armored vehicles, MRAPs, and surveillance gear. Clearly, the line between military forces abroad and law enforcement agencies at home has been blurred. DOD’s Section 333 Train and Equip Programs similarly militarize foreign security forces and have funded police abroad in their counter terrorism and drug trafficking activities, which directly mirrors the purposes and mechanisms of the 1122 Program in the United States.
The parallels between international and domestic militarization practices raise concerns about the lack of accountability and oversight of these transfer and security cooperation programs. The redistribution of military-style equipment, whether to international allies or domestic agencies, can lead to the misuse and diversion of such equipment. For instance, there is a risk that this equipment could be used to suppress democratic protests or other forms of civil unrest, both abroad and at home. The opaque nature of these transfers obscures the end-uses of such equipment, thus eroding public trust and posing threats to civilian safety.
there is a risk that this equipment could be used to suppress democratic protests or other forms of civil unrest, both abroad and at home
After drawdowns from conflicts such as that in Afghanistan, the U.S. has often repurposed military equipment by transferring it to domestic law enforcement agencies. This process is in addition to the over $7.1 billion in U.S.-funded military weapons left in Afghanistan, which face a high risk of diversion in the region and have already appeared in conflicts such as in the disputed South Asian region of Kashmir. Following the U.S. drawdown, CENTCOM reported that “984 C-17 loads of material” had been transported out of Afghanistan. Among this material, the DOD declared 17,074 pieces of equipment as federal excess personal property, which was sent to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) for disposition. Contrary to some media reports equating “disposition” with “destruction,” most of this equipment is unlikely to be destroyed. Instead, it often finds its way into the hands of local police through programs like the DOD’s 1033 Program. These transfers have resulted in police departments acquiring surplus military gear, including armored vehicles and tactical equipment. This raises an important question: how often do military drawdowns and other foreign engagements lead to spikes in the transfer of military equipment to domestic law enforcement agencies?
The linkage between military drawdowns abroad and upturns in 1033 transfers at home is evident in the data. Stephen Semler, co-founder of Security Policy Reform Institute, observed that there was a significant uptick in the transfers of surplus military equipment to domestic law enforcement agencies as the U.S. military pulled out of Iraq. This pattern is particularly clear from the flow of MRAPs (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles), which were produced in large numbers to protect troops from improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. As military operations decreased, these vehicles, along with other excess equipment, were funneled into the 1033 Program, flooding police departments with gear intended for war zones. The surge in military budgets during this period also contributed to an abundance of surplus equipment, further fueling the transfers. This trend underscores the direct relationship between overseas drawdowns and the increased militarization of police forces at home. If this pattern holds true for the 1033 Program, then it is likely that a similar trend of cyclical militarization occurs with the 1122 Program.
The Solution
The 1122 Program’s lack of oversight and inconsistent data collection practices obscure public and policymaker understanding, hindering effective civilian and governmental scrutiny. This scrutiny is crucial, as the transfer of military equipment to local police forces blurs the line between military and civilian roles. It encourages a warrior-cop mentality, leading to a more aggressive and confrontational style of policing inappropriate for community-based law enforcement. Increased surveillance and excessive force suppresses dissent through intimidation and violence, threatening First Amendment freedoms of speech and demonstration.
Sunsetting the 1122 Program would have three main benefits.
First, sunsetting the 1122 Program would address critical issues in U.S. foreign policy by curbing the overproduction of military equipment that contributes to domestic and international militarization and surveillance. By reducing the domestic demand for such equipment, the incentive for manufacturing and exporting militarization would diminish. The aggressive posture that currently drives U.S. foreign policy is unsustainable and deadly – and it should be divested from. This shift is essential, as it not only promotes a restraint and peace-oriented foreign policy but also counters the normalization of using military-style weaponry against civilians.
Second, discontinuing the 1122 Program would significantly reduce the demand for the mass production of military-style equipment, thereby lessening the environmental impact from the extraction of resources needed for its production. The consumption of fuel and energy involved in the manufacture and deployment of this equipment exacerbates environmental degradation both domestically and internationally. Directing funding away from militarization would not only mitigate these environmental harms but also support global efforts to avoid conflict stemming from resource extraction. This realignment would reflect a strong commitment to responsible governance and international cooperation, fostering a more sustainable and peaceful global landscape.
Third,redirecting funds from the acquisition of excess military equipment to the provision of social programs can address the root causes of crime and improve overall community safety and health, creating a more just and equitable society. At a time when communities across the United States face significant challenges such as poverty, public health crises, and inadequate social services, it is imperative to prioritize funding for programs that directly benefit the well-being of residents. State and local governments have much more finite budgets than the Pentagon and the federal government, and yet, they still inevitably subsidize the DOD and weapons manufacturers through the 1122 Program. Sunsetting the 1122 Program would free up these dollars to be used for much needed social and infrastructure projects and will foster a more transparent, accountable, and humane approach to both national security and international relations.
* This publication was made possible in part by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
