Illegality without Consequences? Venezuela, Force, and the Erosion of Legal Constraint

The new year opened to the sound of airstrikes. On January 3rd, the world woke to reports that United States forces had launched a large-scale military operation against Venezuelan territory, an act that instantly sparked public debate, diplomatic channels, and professional legal discourse. The military operation, together with the broader policy choices of the United States, carries consequences extending far beyond Caracas, with profound implications for the future of force, legality, and authority in the international order.

United States forces targeted sites identified by Washington as integral to “state-backed transnational criminal and narcotics networks,” allegedly operating under the protection of the Maduro government. Operation Absolute Resolve was presented by U.S. officials as limited in scope and effect, and described as a lawful exercise of national security powers consistent with international law. The Trump administration relied on a highly controversial 1989 Office of Legal Counsel memorandum asserting that the President is not constitutionally required to comply with the United Nations Charter as a matter of domestic law, a position long regarded as incompatible with the United States’ international obligations.

The strikes, reportedly, achieved their immediate operational objectives and concluded without further escalation. Venezuela denounced the operation as a grave violation of its sovereignty and of the prohibition on the use of force under the United Nations Charter, rejecting the characterization of the strikes as law enforcement and calling for international scrutiny. These sharply opposed official positions crystallized the legal stakes from the outset. Absolute Resolve followed years of sanctions, indictments, and public accusations that steadily reframed force as an available policy instrument, setting the stage for a confrontation in which legality was asserted rather than debated, and consequences were left conspicuously undefined (DOJ; OFAC).

Draw the line, publicly and precisely. Key allies (UK, France, Germany, Australia, Japan, EU) should state clearly whether Absolute Resolve violated Article 2(4) and why, instead of generic “we support international law” language.
Refuse legitimacy through force. Maintain strict non-recognition discipline: do not treat leadership change, “transition authorities,” or “running the country” claims as legally effective if achieved through unlawful force.
Condition cooperation, don’t grandstand. Shift from denunciation to calibrated leverage: narrow intelligence sharing, operational coordination, basing arrangements, joint tasking, or capacity support where it is connected to unlawful uses of force.
Lock in the record at the UN. Push for Security Council debate, General Assembly action if the Council stalls, and formal letters and explanations of vote to prevent normalization through silence.
Reprice risk in trade and investment. Embed legality language in trade and regulatory engagement: heightened due diligence, compliance triggers, and contractual clauses reflecting instability created by unlawful force and occupation-type administration.

Everything turns on a basic rule that the system cannot afford to lose: no State, however powerful, may act as nemo iudex in causa sua; “no one is judge in his own case”. As long as the international rules-based order continues to breathe, however laboured that breath may now be, the legality of State conduct cannot be determined unilaterally by the acting State itself. International law rests on the fundamental premise that legal assessment is external, contestable, and grounded in shared normative frameworks rather than sovereign assertion. It is objective legal analysis, not official narration, that determines whether conduct complies with the prohibition on the use of force and related Charter obligations, and it is that same analysis that exposes the broader systemic implications of violations. When States collapse legality into self-validation, the function of law shifts from authorizing conduct to measuring deviation, allocating responsibility, and structuring the political and institutional costs that follow.

That premise is strained further when a State invokes domestic constitutional authority to displace its international obligations. In the context of the American intervention, the reliance on internal executive legal reasoning to justify action underscores a familiar but consequential disjunction: under international law, a State may not invoke its internal law to justify failure to perform treaty obligations or to excuse a breach of peremptory norms (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 27; Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Article 3). This asymmetry reflects a foundational choice in the international legal order to prevent States from insulating themselves from external scrutiny by recharacterising international constraints as optional or subordinate. 

Error in Genere

Early official explanations from the Trump administration framed the strikes as action taken against a designated terrorist organization, invoking  U.S. national interests and the collective self-defense of other States. Parallel reporting suggested that a classified Justice Department memorandum advanced a similar logic, asserting that certain drug cartels pose an “imminent threat to Americans” sufficient to justify the use of force. This reasoning depends on a crucial legal move: recharacterizing drug trafficking as an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter. In its seminal judgment in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, the Court held:

“An armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces across an international border, but also the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to an armed attack.” (para. 195)

Drug trafficking, however serious and destructive, has never been recognized as an armed attack triggering the right of self-defense. It does not involve the use of force by one State (or non-state armed group) against another State in the sense required by the Charter, nor does it amount to hostilities or combat under any accepted legal framework. International law has consistently rejected such attenuated chains of causation as a basis for self-defense, particularly where the alleged “attack” lacks immediacy, direction, and military character (Oil Platforms, para. 51).

Guard in Venezuela holding a gun at a sovereign rally, posted to the Instagram of José Alejandro Terán, governor of La Guaira.

The argument weakens further when extended from cartels to members of the Venezuelan government. Even assuming the truth of allegations concerning official involvement in drug trafficking, the connection between State conduct and the harms cited remains indirect and parasitic on criminal networks whose primary function is commercial, not military. If drug trafficking by non-state actors cannot plausibly be characterized as an armed attack, the claim that derivative State involvement in such activity triggers a right of self-defense is even less credible. 

Recasting the Venezuela operation as an effort to neutralize narcotics networks by weakening the State institutions allegedly enabling them pushes the legal justification into dangerous territory. Once force is directed at the machinery of government rather than at discrete, imminent threats, it ceases to function as self-defence and begins to resemble intervention aimed at shaping another State’s political authority. The ICJ has treated similar attempts with consistent scepticism. In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, the Court rejected security rationales built on preventative logic and diffuse threat narratives, stressing that the Charter’s self-defence framework does not accommodate open-ended operations designed to stabilize regions, suppress criminal ecosystems, or preempt future risks  (paras 143–147).

Sine Imperio

The strain on legality becomes most visible when the operation is recast as cross-border law enforcement. International law has long treated the extraterritorial exercise of enforcement powers as exceptional and strictly bounded, precisely because such acts cut directly into another State’s sovereign equality. This is especially true where senior State officials are concerned. Sitting heads of state benefit from personal immunity (ratione personae), which functions as a jurisdictional bar to foreign criminal process and to coercive measures such as arrest or detention for the duration of their term of office. The ICJ confirmed this protection as a structural rather than discretionary, reflecting the system’s interest in preserving the independence and equality of States rather than the merits of any particular officeholder or allegation (Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, para. 51).

While States may, in limited circumstances, extend their prescriptive jurisdiction beyond their territory, the physical execution of enforcement measures remains territorially confined unless the territorial State consents. This distinction between prescription and enforcement is among the oldest principles of international law. From the S.S. Lotus in 1927 onward, it has served as a bulwark against unilateral coercion disguised as legal process. The unlawfulness of enforcement without consent does not evaporate because the underlying conduct is egregious, criminal, or universally condemned (S.S. Lotus, page 18).

 President Donald Trump monitors U.S. military operations in Venezuela, from Mar-a-Lago Club in Palm Beach, Florida, on Saturday, January 3, 2026.

Historical practice reinforces the point. Israel’s abduction of Adolf Eichmann from Argentine territory in 1960 was not assessed through the lens of Eichmann’s crimes. Argentina’s complaint before the Security Council was upheld in principle, and the Council warned that repetition of such acts would undermine the foundations of international order and generate insecurity incompatible with peace. This call for reparation (legal redress) underscored a core lesson: even the most compelling enforcement objectives do not license territorial violation (SC Res 138).

As operations expand in scope and ambition, the legal tension sharpens further. Measures that predictably impair governmental functioning, constrain leadership choices, or reconfigure a State’s internal authority strain the concept of proportionality beyond recognition. At that point, the vocabulary of self-defence or law enforcement no longer describes what is occurring. In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, the ICJ treated such conduct as a grave breach of the prohibition on the use of force, particularly where it aligned with efforts to undermine or replace an existing government. The legal classification is a purely objective exercise.

Against this background, the central question shifts. If the operation is unlawful, what follows in a system where judicial avenues are blocked, and coercive enforcement is neither available nor credible? International law rarely secures compliance through immediate compulsion. Its influence is exerted through secondary mechanisms: the attribution of responsibility, the restructuring of institutional relationships, and the long-term recalibration of authority and credibility. When a powerful State acts in open defiance of Charter limits, the absence of courts or sanctions does not empty legality of meaning. It alters the register in which law operates. The inquiry moves from enforcement in the narrow sense to consequence in the systemic sense, asking how illegality constrains future claims, reshapes expectations among allies and adversaries alike, and redistributes who can speak persuasively in the language of law.

Hot and Cold With the Same Breath

A State does not get to sit on two chairs, blowing hot and cold in the same breath. It cannot stretch the law when it suits and then insist on its strict observance when it no longer does. International law is not naïve about this tension, but it is also not vindictive. It is along that line that the estoppel doctrine comes into play. 

Estoppel in international law is a narrow doctrine rooted in good faith. It is not a generalized penalty for inconsistency or illegality. At its core, it operates to prevent a State from departing from a clear and specific representation of fact or law on which another actor has reasonably relied to its detriment. The doctrine is situational and relational. Whether a representation becomes legally binding depends on context and circumstances, and estoppel must be distinguished from mere fluctuations in political or legal rhetoric (Temple of Preah Vihear, pp 23–26). In Nuclear Tests, the ICJ treated unilateral public statements as capable of generating legal effects, but only because they were addressed to a defined audience, conveyed with apparent intent to be bound, and relied upon in good faith (Nuclear Tests, paras 43, 46). Estoppel, properly understood, concerns holding a State to its own word in a concrete setting, not stripping it of the ability to invoke the law because it has breached it elsewhere.

People in Venezuela attend a sovereignnty rally, posted to the Instagram of José Alejandro Terán, governor of La Guaira.

That distinction matters for assessing the systemic consequences of expansive self-defence claims. A State’s unlawful conduct does not confer legal permission on others to act unlawfully in response. The prohibition on the use of force does not operate on a reciprocal or retaliatory logic. Accordingly, another State does not acquire a legal entitlement to disregard Article 2(4) merely because prior practice has stretched or violated it. Illegality remains illegality, assessed independently against the Charter framework and the absence of a valid Article 51 predicate.

Where the analysis does shift is outside estoppel in the technical sense and into the domain of practical credibility. The Charter system depends on a shared willingness to treat the prohibition on the use of force as a genuine constraint rather than a default rule riddled with exceptions. When a leading State advances elastic justifications that reframe armed attack as long-term risk management or diffuse threat suppression, it weakens its capacity to insist on stricter readings when confronting other uses of force. This does not legalize subsequent violations by others, but it alters the terrain on which interpretive disputes unfold. Over time, repeated reliance on expansive self-defence narratives lowers the persuasive force of objections to aggression, accelerates erosion of the armed attack threshold, and complicates collective resistance to unlawful force. The cost is not paid in a single case, but cumulatively, as the language of exception becomes easier to invoke and harder to contest.  

Legal Consequences of War

Irrespective of how Washington framed Absolute Resolve, once force was used by one State against the territory of another, the situation crossed into the domain of international armed conflict as a matter of law. This classification does not depend on political labels, rhetorical minimisation, or unilateral characterisation. Under Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, the existence of an international armed conflict turns on objective facts. Where armed force is employed between States, the law of international armed conflict applies, even if one party denies that a conflict exists or portrays the operation as something else.

This is not a marginal or contested threshold. While international humanitarian law does wrestle with difficult classification questions at the edges, such as indirect involvement, proxy warfare, or support to non-state armed groups, those complexities are beside the point here. The scale, directness, and State-to-State character of the U.S. operations against Venezuelan territory placed them comfortably within the core of Common Article 2. From that moment, the relationship between the two States was governed by the full corpus of the law of armed conflict, not by analogies to law enforcement or counter narcotics cooperation.

Statements by U.S. officials following the operation only reinforced this legal transformation. President Trump described the outcome in terms of administrative control, asserting that the United States would “run the country” pending a future transition. He explicitly linked that role to Venezuela’s oil infrastructure, outlining plans for U.S. companies to enter, repair, and restart production, with costs recouped from extracted resources. Such language matters legally. Where a foreign military power exercises effective control over territory, even temporarily and even without sustained resistance, international humanitarian law classifies the situation as an occupation. Occupation, per se, is neither a bad nor a good thing. It, on the other hand, is not a political designation but a legal condition triggered by facts on the ground.

Most importantly, an occupation carries its own, distinct legal regime. That makes every occupation a hard amalgamation of legal and factual realities. The Hague Regulations of 1907 establish the foundational framework, defining occupation through effective control and characterising the occupier’s authority as provisional and non-sovereign. They strictly limit the exploitation of public property and natural resources and prohibit permanent alterations to the occupied territory’s legal and economic order. The Fourth Geneva Convention complements these rules by detailing obligations toward the civilian population, confirming that its protections apply in all cases of occupation, and imposing duties related to public order, welfare, and the continued functioning of local institutions. The occupier does not acquire ownership, trusteeship, or entitlement to restructure the territory’s economy for its own benefit.

International Criminal Court 2018

The legal consequences extend well beyond questions of governance and resources. Once an international armed conflict exists, the entire targeting framework of the law of armed conflict becomes applicable. Members of the opposing State’s armed forces become lawful military objectives by virtue of their status, wherever they may be found, subject to the spatial limits of the conflict and the rules governing hostilities. At the same time, civilians and civilian objects remain protected against attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. These rules apply symmetrically. Venezuelan forces acquire corresponding rights and obligations vis-à-vis U.S. forces, and the conflict is regulated by the same legal constraints on both sides.

This has immediate implications for the idea that operations against drug-related targets could continue under a law enforcement logic. Once an international armed conflict exists, the permissibility of attacks is no longer assessed through domestic criminal categories or counter-narcotics frameworks. Targets must qualify as military objectives under humanitarian law, and attacks must comply with distinction, proportionality, and precautions. The recharacterization of criminal activity as “combat” does not expand the lawful scope of force; it narrows it. What began as an asserted effort to suppress transnational crime thus triggers a legal regime that imposes far stricter limits on the use of force than those invoked to justify the operation in the first place.

Credibility, Mediation, and Norm Leadership

The deeper impact of unlawful force is rarely found in immediate reactions. It unfolds over time, in the quiet redistribution of authority and influence within the international system. International law does not operate solely through adjudication or enforcement. Much of its constraining force is exercised upstream, through agenda setting, coalition building, and the ability of certain States to frame conduct as lawful or unlawful in ways that resonate with others. Credibility is the currency that enables this function. It is accumulated through consistency in legal argument and restraint in the invocation of exceptions, and it is expended when legal categories are stretched to accommodate immediate policy objectives.

This matters most in contexts where persuasion substitutes for compulsion. Mediation, facilitation, and norm leadership depend on a State’s capacity to invoke shared legal standards without appearing selective or instrumental. When a State advances expansive readings of self-defence or collapses the armed attack threshold into long-term threat management, it weakens its ability to insist on disciplined interpretations when confronting later crises. The effect is not symmetrical. The prohibition on the use of force remains binding on all States. Yet the authority to articulate what the prohibition requires in contested situations becomes more diffusely distributed and more easily challenged.

United Nations Security Council on the United Nations Headquarters in New York City (Per Krohg)

This dynamic is visible in responses to aggression more generally. When violations of Article 2(4) occur elsewhere, their wrongfulness does not hinge on the prior conduct of third States. Russia’s use of force, for example, stands or falls on its own legal merits, assessed against the Charter framework and the absence of a valid Article 51 justification. No amount of inconsistency by others converts that conduct into something lawful. What does shift, however, is the terrain on which condemnation and collective response unfold. Legal arguments grounded in restraint carry greater weight when advanced by actors perceived as having treated the prohibition as a genuine constraint rather than a flexible tool.

The consequence is cumulative. Each instance in which exceptional justifications are normalised makes subsequent invocations easier to contest and harder to police. Norm leadership erodes not because the rule disappears, but because fewer actors can defend it without qualification. In a system already strained by selective compliance, that erosion accelerates the drift from prohibition to permissibility, and from rule to rhetoric.

Signalling Costs Without Enforcement

When formal enforcement is blocked and coercive countermeasures are politically or strategically unrealistic, international law does not fall silent. It operates through indirect but consequential channels that signal costs, recalibrate expectations, and shape future behaviour. These mechanisms are often dismissed as soft or merely political, yet they perform a critical stabilising function in a system where compliance depends as much on credibility and coordination as on compulsion.

One such channel is reputational downgrading, understood not as abstract loss of standing but as a concrete shift in how a State’s legal claims are received. States that repeatedly advance expansive or elastic justifications for the use of force find that their subsequent objections to illegality elsewhere are met with greater scepticism. This does not alter the substantive law, but it affects its traction. Legal arguments that once anchored collective responses become easier to contest, fragmenting alignment among allies and partners. Over time, this erosion raises the transaction costs of coalition building and weakens the ability to mobilise shared legal positions.

A second mechanism lies in institutional distancing and conditional cooperation. Participation in international and regional frameworks often rests on assumptions of reciprocal restraint and respect for baseline norms. Where those assumptions are undermined, cooperation may continue formally while thinning substantively: reduced leadership roles, narrower mandates, greater scrutiny, or the quiet reallocation of agenda-setting authority. These shifts rarely announce themselves as sanctions, yet they register disapproval and constrain influence in ways that are difficult to reverse.

President Donald Trump delivers remarks at a press conference at Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach, Florida, following Operation Absolute Resolve in Venezuela leading to the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, Saturday, January 3, 2026. (Official White House Photo by Molly Riley)

Economic and regulatory relationships provide another vector. Even in the absence of overt retaliation, States and private actors adjust risk assessments in response to perceived legal volatility. Trade, investment, and energy cooperation are sensitive to signals about the reliability of legal commitments and the predictability of State conduct. Where national security is invoked expansively to justify the use of force, counterparties may hedge, diversify, or renegotiate terms to insulate themselves from future disruption. 

Domestic political processes also function as a signalling mechanism. Parliamentary inquiries, litigation strategies, and shifts in political rhetoric do not enforce international law directly, yet they shape how breaches are narrated and remembered. These processes matter because international legality is sustained through repetition and reference. When violations are framed as exceptional, contested, or unresolved rather than absorbed into routine practice, the normative baseline remains visible, even if temporarily displaced.

The Allies’ Burden

Great powers rarely stand alone when they breach foundational rules. What gives such breaches their systemic force is not only the act itself, but the response of those who claim to stand for the law. The United States’ actions in Venezuela arrive against a backdrop of repeated strain on the prohibition on the use of force, visible across multiple theatres and justified through increasingly elastic narratives of necessity and security. 

If the international legal order is to retain any stabilising force, responsibility does not rest with one State alone. U.S. allies with deep investments in the rules-based system, such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Australia, and Japan, play a decisive role in signalling whether foundational norms remain operative constraints or have become discretionary. Their reactions shape not only the diplomatic atmosphere but also the legal expectation. Silence, acquiescence, or purely instrumental alignment communicates tolerance for exceptionalism. Principled distancing, even when costly, preserves the distinction between rule and power.

That burden is particularly heavy for States whose own security depends on the integrity of the prohibition on the use of force. Against this background, remarks by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, suggesting that if the United States knows how to deal with dictators in Venezuela, it may also know where else such methods could be applied, take on significance beyond their immediate political context. Read charitably, the statement reflects frustration and a search for solidarity in a system that has often failed to deliver timely protection. Read legally, however, it gestures toward a line of reasoning international law has deliberately and repeatedly rejected: that the permissibility of force turns on judgments about regime character rather than on objective legal criteria.

Ukraine’s subsequent clarification, delivered by Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, reanchored its position in more orthodox terms, emphasising non-recognition of the Maduro administration and support only for developments consistent with international law. That recalibration matters. It underscores the difference between opposing a government politically and endorsing the use of force against it legally. International law draws that line for a reason. Once assessments of legitimacy or authoritarianism are allowed to substitute for Charter-based limits, the system slides toward outcome-driven justification. History offers no shortage of reminders of where that path leads.

States that rely on the prohibition on the use of force for their own survival have the most to lose from its erosion. Arguments that appear expedient in one context are rarely confined to it. The distortion of the self-defence doctrine by the United States in 2003 was later echoed by Russia to rationalize its aggression against Ukraine. 

This is why demonstrating distance from unlawful uses of force, even at the price of trade friction or economic retaliation, is not an act of disloyalty. It is an investment in systemic stability. Without such signalling, the costs of illegality are externalised, the armed attack threshold continues to erode, and the incentive structure tilts toward replication. What restrains further escalation, by Russia or by others watching closely, is not rhetorical commitment to order, but visible insistence that law continues to matter when it is inconvenient.

In earlier periods, European States could perhaps afford ambiguity. Isolated violations could be treated as aberrations, absorbed with minimal damage in the expectation that equilibrium would return. That assumption no longer holds when expansive interpretations of self-defence and enforcement are not episodic, but articulated as policy. Silence in such circumstances does not preserve flexibility. It signals acceptance.

The temptation to accommodate is understandable. Close alignment with Washington offers security guarantees, economic advantages, and political leverage. Yet accommodation premised on selective legality is a fragile bargain. In a world where power defines spheres of influence and law becomes optional, middle powers cannot rely on favours without paying a price. Recent U.S. strategic documents leave little doubt that loyalty does not insulate allies from coercion when interests diverge.

When Venezuela turned to the United Nations Security Council to denounce the U.S. operation as a blatant violation of the UN Charter and territorial sovereignty, it was a reminder of the foundational promise embedded in that Charter: that no State may lawfully use force against another’s territorial integrity except in the narrowest of circumstances. António Guterres, the UN Secretary-General, underscored this obligation in his remarks to the Council, reaffirming that all States must comply with the Charter and international law, and warning that unilateral military action against a neighbouring sovereign poses grave risks to the peace and security the organisation is mandated to uphold.

NATO soldiers prepare to raise the Finnish flag at the Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.

Among national responses, Spain’s stance offered perhaps the clearest articulation of disciplined non-recognition. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez made a pointed distinction between political non-recognition and legal non-recognition. Madrid has long viewed Nicolás Maduro’s government as lacking democratic legitimacy, yet Sánchez was emphatic that such illegitimacy does not translate into legal license for foreign intervention. Spain will not recognize an intervention that contravenes international law, even if it purports to challenge an undemocratic regime.

This emphasis resists a dangerous slippage common in political discourse, in which illegality is conflated with rightful intervention because the target is unpopular or repressive. Even deeply flawed governments remain objects of legal protection under the Charter; breaches of legitimacy do not erase the prohibition on force. As Spain’s diplomatic statements at the Security Council made clear, respect for sovereignty and peaceful dispute resolution must be sustained “always and everywhere,” rather than deployed selectively in response to convenient ends. Crucially, this position also demonstrated an attempt to anchor state responses in legal categories rather than in transient political alignments. 

Normalization is the Real Danger

The central danger exposed by Absolute Resolve is not confined to the operation itself. It lies in the gradual normalisation of legal exception. When the use of force is justified through elastic concepts, law enforcement reframed as self-defence, armed attack diluted into long-term threat management, and occupation redescribed as temporary administration, the prohibition on the use of force does not collapse outright. It thins. Its edges blur. Over time, what was once exceptional becomes available, and what was once prohibited becomes contestable.

International law has never relied solely on courts or coercive enforcement to survive. Its resilience has always depended on shared discipline in argument, on restraint in invoking exceptions, and on collective insistence that legality continues to matter even when it is inconvenient. That discipline is most tested when powerful States act. If their departures from Charter limits are absorbed without consequence, the system does not simply tolerate a single violation; it recalibrates its baseline.

Increase institutional friction. Reduce agenda-setting privileges, chair roles, and leadership positions in multilateral settings where credibility is the currency, while keeping channels for de-escalation open.
Defend the armed attack threshold. Reaffirm the ICJ gravity standard (Nicaragua; Oil Platforms): drug trafficking, indirect harms, and attenuated causal chains do not qualify as “armed attack” and cannot ground Article 51.
Separate law enforcement from force. Insist that cross-border arrest or “capture” operations without territorial consent breach enforcement jurisdiction rules and, where applicable, violate personal immunity of sitting leaders.
Invest in autonomous restraint capacity. Allies should strengthen independent security and diplomatic capacity, so legality-based positions are sustainable even under pressure.
Make the core warning explicit. State the systemic point: elastic self-defence today becomes someone else’s template tomorrow; normalization accelerates replication.

The effects are cumulative and asymmetric. Each expansive justification lowers the cost of the next. Each failure to signal distance accelerates erosion of the armed attack threshold. The result is not immediate anarchy, but a steady redistribution of legal authority away from rules and toward power. History suggests that once this shift takes hold, it is rarely confined to its point of origin. Arguments migrate. Precedents are repurposed. Exceptionalism travels.

What remains, then, is a choice about friction. The international legal order cannot eliminate unlawful force, but it can make it costly. That cost is not always imposed through sanctions or judgments. More often, it is imposed through credibility loss, institutional distancing, economic repricing, and the narrowing of who can speak persuasively in the name of law. These are imperfect tools, yet they are the only ones available when enforcement is blocked.

Seen in that light, the stakes of Absolute Resolve extend well beyond Venezuela. They concern whether the prohibition on the use of force remains a meaningful organising principle, or whether it becomes a rhetorical reference point invoked selectively and abandoned when inconvenient. Preserving what remains of international stability requires more than condemning violations after the fact. It requires sustained resistance to the quiet transformation of exception into norm.

Davit Khachatryan is an international lawyer and lecturer focusing on the intersection of armed conflict, emerging technologies, and international law. 


Trump’s Venezuela Regime Change Attempt an Illegal Act of War

January 3, 2026 – In response to the United States launching military attacks in Venezuela, Center for International Policy Executive Vice President Matt Duss issued the following statement:

“Donald Trump has launched an illegal and reckless regime change operation in Venezuela. This act of war violates both U.S. and international law, and follows nearly one hundred extrajudicial killings at sea on Trump’s orders.

“None of this use of military force has been authorized by Congress. Lawmakers must assert their constitutional war powers and force the president to remove U.S. armed forces from the hostilities with Venezuela that he has started. They should also seek other possible legislative measures to impose accountability on this administration for its lawless actions.

“Americans across the political spectrum overwhelmingly do not want to fight another war of choice. 70 percent of U.S. voters oppose taking military action in Venezuela.

“Trump was elected on a promise to end wars, not start them. His illegal aggression against Venezuela once again breaks that promise, and threatens to repeat some of the worst moral and strategic failures of past U.S. military adventurism, for which the American people and communities around the world have paid enormous costs.”


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Can Complementary Learning Methods Teach AI the Laws of War?

Davit Khachatryan is an international lawyer and lecturer focusing on the intersection of armed conflict, emerging technologies, and international law. 

The Judge Advocate watched the feed from the tactical operations center alongside her commander. The screens, each attended by systems monitors, showed more than a dozen developments unfolding at once. An artificial intelligence (AI) led drone swarm was closing on the front line through the city, coordinating its movements faster than any human pilot could direct, an artificial flock of mechanical starlings like a cloud on the radar. A civilian aid convoy had stalled on the northern approach. An enemy artillery battery was repositioning south behind a residential block. In the nearby valley, friendly units were maneuvering under fire. All these pieces were in motion, lives and vehicles and weapons. The soldiers’ behavior would be determined by interactions between their commander and AI.

The challenge here is not as simple as claiming that AI cannot comply with the principle of distinction under international humanitarian law (IHL), also known as the law of armed conflict. The fog of war complicates decision-making for both humans and machines, but does so in profoundly different ways.

For a human commander, the chaos of the battlefield is filtered through layers of training, doctrine, experience, and instinct. Even when overwhelmed, a person can weigh incomplete facts against their mental map of the situation, recall comparable past events, and fall back on moral and legal anchors. This does not mean humans do not make mistakes; they do, often with serious consequences. But even in error, their reasoning is shaped by caution, hopefully empathy, and the capacity to interpret ambiguous information in light of their own individual understandings of humanitarian obligations.

AI  processes that same chaos as streams of probabilities. Every sensor reading, target profile, and movement pattern is reduced to statistical likelihoods: how probable it is based on the training data that this object is hostile, how urgent its engagement appears, how likely a given action is to produce the “correct” result as defined in training. In its logic, the most probable option is the correct one. Under extreme operational pressure, the AI focuses on the statistically most plausible, while rare possibilities drop toward statistical zero, far less likely to be considered than they would by a human.

This difference in reasoning is why training environments must be built to include not just the probable, but the improbable: those outlandish, once-in-a-century battlefield events that stretch judgment to its limits. For AI, these scenarios must be constructed, repeated, and reinforced until they occupy a permanent place in the machine’s operational vocabulary.

A credible arms control position would be to prohibit or pause the development of certain autonomous capabilities. Nevertheless, this article proceeds conditionally because much of the stack is already fielded (AI-enabled intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance triage, targeting support, and navigation), and because dual-use diffusion (commercial drones, perception models, planning tools) makes a clean prohibition hard to sustain. If states continue down this path with minimal international instruments the question becomes how to embed legal restraint so that rare, high-stakes judgments are not optimized away. What follows sets minimum safeguards if development and deployment proceed.

How AI Learns

If AI’s logic is built on statistical reasoning, the way it acquires those statistics determines the boundaries of its thinking. This is true for AI in general, whether in a medical diagnostic tool, a financial trading algorithm, or a targeting system on a battlefield. The patterns an AI recognizes, the probabilities it assigns, and the priorities it sets are all downstream from its training.

In the military domain, an AI’s training determines how it operates in relation to the law of armed conflict and the unit’s rules of engagement: what it accepts as positive identification (distinction), how it trades anticipated military advantage against collateral damage estimation (proportionality), when feasible precautions require warning, delay, or abort, and when uncertainty triggers a mandatory hand-off to a human. The two dominant machine learning paradigms, imitation learning and reinforcement learning, can both produce highly capable systems. Yet without deliberate safeguards, neither inherently preserves the kind of rare, high-stakes judgments that human decision-makers sometimes make under the fog of war, moments when they choose to forego an operational advantage to prevent civilian harm. Statistically, those moments are anomalies. 

Imitation Learning: The Apprentice Approach

Imitation learning (IL) is essentially training by demonstration. The AI is shown large datasets of human decision-making, each paired with the information available at the time. In a military targeting context, this might include annotated sensor feeds, mission logs, and after-action reports: strike approved, strike aborted, target reclassified, mission postponed.

The model’s task is to learn the mapping between conditions and human actions. If most commanders in the dataset abort strikes when civilian vehicles enter the target zone, and there are enough entries of this behavior in the dataset to show that, the model will learn to mirror that restraint. 

IL captures the statistical distribution of decisions in the training data. Rare but important choices, such as holding fire in a high-pressure engagement to comply with proportionality, will be underrepresented unless deliberately oversampled. Left uncorrected, the AI may treat those lawful restraint decisions as statistical noise, unlikely to be repeated in practice. Additionally, because much of the data on which machine learning models reflects past military experience, many AI models will echo the implicit bias shown in the past human decisions on which they train.

A Quadrupedal-Unmanned Ground Vehicle (Q-UGV) goes over rehearsals at Red Sands IEC in the CENTCOM AOR Sept. 18, 2024. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Dean John Kd De Dios)

Reinforcement Learning: The Trial-and-Error Arena

Reinforcement learning (RL) works differently. Instead of copying human decisions, the AI is placed in a simulated environment where it can take actions, receive rewards for desirable outcomes, and penalties for undesirable ones. Over thousands or millions of iterations, the AI learns policies, decision rules that maximize its cumulative reward. At scale, this training is highly compute– and energy-intensive. That matters because it concentrates capability in a few well-resourced programs, slows iteration and red teaming, and creates pressure to trim the very rare event scenarios that protect civilians and support compliance, while adding a nontrivial environmental footprint. Programs should, therefore, set minimum scenario coverage and doubt-protocol testing requirements that are not waivable for budgetary reasons.

In a military context, this means an RL agent might repeatedly play through simulated scenarios: neutralizing threats, protecting friendly forces, and avoiding civilian harm. The way those objectives are weighted in the reward function is decisive. If mission success is rewarded heavily and civilian harm only lightly penalized, the AI will statistically favor the course of action that maximizes mission success, even if that means accepting higher risks to civilians.

RL’s strength is adaptability. Its weakness is that low-probability events, rare civilian patterns, and unusual threat behaviors will remain statistically insignificant unless the simulation environment repeatedly forces the AI to confront them. 

IL can pass down the shape of human judgment; RL can provide flexibility in novel situations. But each carries a statistical bias against rare, high-impact decisions, exactly the kinds of decisions that can determine the legality and morality of military action. Only by deliberately elevating those rare cases in training, through curated datasets and stress-test simulations, can either method hope to produce systems that behave lawfully and predictably under the fog of war. On the evidence of deployments to date, achieving this level of end-to-end compliance remains out of reach.

Soldiers don the Integrated Visual Augmentation System Capability Set 3 hardware while mounted in a Stryker in Joint Base Lewis-McCord, WA.

The Simulation Imperative

Actual combat records, produced by soldiers in logs, after-action reports, or targeting databases,  are skewed toward the typical patterns of engagement that happen often enough to warrant recording after the fact. Unprecedented and chaotic situations will strain both the law and the system’s decision-making, yet they appear so rarely in historical data that, in statistical terms, they are almost invisible. An AI, left to its statistical logic, will not prepare for what it has seldom seen. 

This is why simulation is the decisive safeguard1. In imitation learning, rare but critical decisions must be deliberately overrepresented in the dataset, so they carry enough statistical weight to influence the model’s behavior. In reinforcement learning, the simulated environment must be constructed so that “once-in-a-century” scenarios occur often, sometimes in clusters, forcing the system to learn how to navigate them. A humanitarian convoy crossing paths with an enemy armored column, loss of communications during a time-sensitive strike, sensor spoofing that turns friend into apparent foe, these cannot be treated as peripheral edge cases. They must be made routine in training.

The more frequently the AI encounters these manufactured crises in simulation, the more space they occupy in its decision-making horizon. If and when similar scenarios arise in operations, the system’s response should not be improvised.

The Lieber Code in the Age of AI

The concept that, in cases of doubt, the commander should err on the side of humanity is not new. It was codified in 1863, when Francis Lieber drafted the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, better known as the Lieber Code. 

This imperative has repeatedly been encoded under International Humanitarian Law. In the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions2, the obligation to take “all feasible precautions” and to cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent that it would cause excessive civilian harm relative to the anticipated military advantage operationalizes the humane minimum in treaty law. Critically, however, many key decision-making states have not ratified all the precepts articulated in the Additional Protocols. Customary IHL Rule 15 similarly requires constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects, and Rule 19 codifies the requirement to cancel or suspend attacks when doubt or changing circumstances create excessive risk.

Faced with ambiguous intelligence or conflicting imperatives, human commanders can recall a doctrinal anchor and choose that privileges restraint over risk. Even when they err, that error is shaped by a human blend of caution and interpretation of context.

For AI, the same scenario unfolds differently. Without explicit design, there is no natural “humane fallback” in its logic. In the face of uncertainty, an unmodified reinforcement learning policy will still pursue the statistically most rewarding action, and an imitation learning model will default to the most common decision in its dataset. 

This is where simulation and legal doctrine intersect. Embedding the humane minimum into AI means that in every training run, whether through curated historical cases or artificially generated edge scenarios, the option that aligns with humane treatment under uncertainty must be given decisive weight. In imitation learning, that means oversampling “hold fire” or “switch to non-lethal” decisions until they are no longer statistical outliers. In reinforcement learning, it means structuring the reward function so that restraint in doubtful cases earns more cumulative value than aggression, even if aggression sometimes yields short-term operational gains. The aim is not to teach machines to imitate human morality, but to hard-code a structural preference for restraint even and especially when the law is unclear. 

Unmanned Ground Vehicles sketch, The Future Soldier’s Load and the Mobility of the Nation (November 2001), page 7, Gen. Paul F. Gorman, US Army Combined Arms Center
Risks of Omission

Systematic vulnerabilities in decision-making compound in coalition or joint operations. Different states may train their AI systems with different datasets, simulation designs (if any), and legal interpretations. When such systems operate together, the seams between them can become legal blind spots. A particular AI system might abort an engagement that another proceeds with, creating conflicting operational tempos and complicating attribution if civilian harm occurs.

The danger is not limited to catastrophic, one-off mistakes. Over time, small, repeated deviations from IHL in marginal cases, where human commanders might have exercised restraint, can erode the protective function of the law. The result is a slow normalization of riskier behavior, driven not by political decision or doctrinal change, but by the statistical inertia of machine learning models. This is the core paradox: without safeguards, AI systems can become more predictable in some ways, yet less reliable in the moments when unpredictability, when acting against the statistical grain, is essential for lawful conduct.

Finally, military AI does not fail or succeed in complying with IHL by accident. Its behavior is the predictable result of how it is trained, the data it is given, the scenarios it is exposed to, and the rules embedded in its decision logic. How AI functions and the choices it takes is downstream from decisions made by humans in developing, training, and fielding it.

Governance, Audit, and Human Control

Bridging the gap from promising lab results to lawful behavior in the field requires more than good training runs. It needs an end-to-end governance spine that links data, models, code, test harnesses, deployment configurations, operators, and independent oversight into a single chain of accountability. That spine assigns clear decision rights, specifies the artifacts required at each stage, and shows how evidence of compliance is produced and preserved. It starts with curated, documented datasets and explicit problem statements; runs through model specifications, reward functions, and constraint schemas; includes scenario-coverage plans, legal reviews, and red-team evaluations; and culminates in authorization-to-operate, humane control interfaces, and post-incident audits. Every hand-off, data steward to model owner, model owner to system integrator, integrator to unit commander, should be traceable, signed, and reversible. In effect, the system deploys with its own accountability case: a living dossier that ties design choices to legal obligations and links runtime behavior to reviewable logs. Without that spine, even a technically impressive model becomes an orphan in the field, fast, capable, and difficult to supervise precisely when the fog thickens. The pathway from design to deployment rests on a few non-negotiables.

  1. Data governance as policy, not plumbing. If models think with the statistics we give them, then data curation is a legal act as much as a technical one. Training corpora should be versioned and signed; every inclusion and exclusion choice documented; every oversampling decision for restraint labeled with a rationale. That record is what allows commanders, investigators, or courts to see how humane fallbacks were embedded by design rather than inferred after the fact.
  2. Test what you train, and then test against what you didn’t. A system that performs well on its own distribution can still fail in the wild. Beyond standard validation, mandate distribution shift drills: deliberately swap sensor suites, degrade GPS, introduce spoofed friend/foe signals, and remix civilian movement patterns. In each drill, the system should either preserve lawful restraint or trigger a doubt protocol that defers to a human. Where it does neither, the failure should feed back into simulation design and reward shaping.
  3. Non-overridable guardrails in code and command. Constraint layers (identification gates, collateral damage thresholds, no-strike lists) must be technically non-overridable by the model and procedurally difficult to override by humans. If escalation is necessary, require dual-key authorization with automatic logging. The goal is not to box out judgment but to ensure extraordinary actions leave extraordinary traces.
  4. Responsibility matrices are embedded in the system. Every deployed AI component – classifier, tracker, recommender, fire-control interface – should write structured, time-synchronized logs that include model version, data slice identifiers, intermediate confidence values, triggered constraints, and who approved or halted an action. Think of this as a living annex to rules of engagement: not just “what the machine did,” but why it “thought” that was permissible, and who remained on the loop.
  5. Human-on-the-loop that actually has leverage. Meaningful human control is not a checkbox; it is the ability to intervene in time with understanding. Interfaces must surface uncertainty (not just a single confidence score), show near-miss counterfactuals (“if civilians are within X meters, the system will abort”), and offer safe, low-latency actions (pause, shadow/track, switch to non-lethal). If the only human interaction available is “approve” under time pressure, control is nominal, not meaningful.
  6. Coalition interoperability without legal dilution. Joint operations will mix systems trained on different data and doctrines. Interoperability standards should cover not only communications and formats but also minimum legal behaviors: shared constraint schemas, common doubt thresholds, and audit fields. The safest path is least-common-denominator legality: when systems disagree under uncertainty, the coalition default is restraint.
  7. Pre-deployment red teaming and post-incident review. Before fielding, require adversarial evaluations by teams empowered to break things, reward hacking hunts, “blinking target” scenarios, and deception trials. After any incident with potential civilian harm, pull the synchronized logs, reconstruct the model’s decision path, and replay counterfactuals to see whether humane fallbacks would have triggered with slightly different inputs. Treat these reviews like flight-safety boards: technical, blameless, relentlessly corrective.
  8. Make restraint measurable. What we measure, we secure. Track deferred engagements under uncertainty, rate of doubt-protocol activations, guardrail trip frequency, and time-to-human-intervention. Trend them over time and across theaters. If these metrics decay as models “improve,” it’s a warning that optimization is outpacing law.

In combination, these measures transfer human judgment (IL), secure robustness under uncertainty (RL and simulation), and institutionalize restraint via governance, constraint architectures, and independent audit, so that compliance is an engineered property rather than an assumption. The result is a verifiable accountability chain, datasets that show why restraint was learned, reward functions that make it valuable, guardrails that make it non-optional, and logs that make it reviewable. And because what we measure we secure, the system ships with metrics for doubt-protocol activations, deferred engagements, and guardrail trips, so commanders can see whether lawful caution is holding under stress. Only then does lawful behavior become the default under pressure, an engineered property of the system, rather than a hope we place in the gaps between probabilities and intent.

The autonomous system, Origin, prepares for a practice run during the Project Convergence capstone event at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, Aug. 11 – Sept. 18, 2020. Project Convergence is the Army’s campaign of learning to aggressively advance solutions in the areas of people, weapons systems, command and control, information, and terrain; and integrate the Army’s contributions to Joint All Domain Operations. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Carlos Cuebas Fantauzzi, 22nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Growing a Governance Spine

Military AI will not “grow into” compliance with the law of armed conflict. It will do what it is trained, rewarded, permitted, and audited to do. In the fog of war, humans and machines both falter, but in different ways. Human commanders can depart from statistical expectations to privilege restraint; unmodified systems, bound to their learned probabilities, will not. That is why the humane minimum cannot sit at the margins of development. It has to be engineered into the center of learning, testing, and command.

Imitation learning can transmit judgment; reinforcement learning can build adaptability; simulation can force the improbable to be routine. Around that technical core, a governance spine, constraints that do not yield under pressure, doubt protocols that default to caution, signed datasets and reward functions, synchronized logs and metrics, turns legal aspiration into operational behavior. In coalitions, common constraint schemas and reviewable audit trails keep interoperability from becoming a legal blind spot.

At this point, two mistakes will sink this project: treating compliance as a software patch added after performance, or assuming that speed and scale will eventually smooth away edge cases. They will not. The edge cases are where the law does its most important work.

Compliance with the law of armed conflict must be an engineered property of the system: competence built through training, judgment transferred via imitation learning, robustness under uncertainty secured by simulation, and a non-derogable humane floor enforced by constraints and audit. What ultimately matters is evidence, datasets, reward functions, constraint triggers, and synchronized logs, showing that restraint prevailed when uncertainty was greatest. Only on that basis can militaries credibly claim that lawful conduct remains the default under operational pressure.


1Where states choose to pursue development and fielding, simulation is the decisive safeguard. A different policy path is to forgo development or to prohibit particular applications outright.

2Articles 57(2)(a)(ii) and 57(2)(b)).

DOGE’s Gutting Of USAID Weakened Disaster Response

Wesley Cheek is a sociologist of disasters and an assistant professor of emergency management at Massachusetts Maritime Academy. His research focuses on community involvement in post-disaster reconstruction, especially following the 3.11 Triple Disaster in Japan. You can find him on Bluesky @wesinjapan

In 2018, while heroic former Royal Thai Navy SEAL diver Saman Kunan was drowning inside of a cave system in Chiang Rai trying to rescue twelve scared young boys and their soccer coach, billionaire gadfly Elon Musk was busy dropping off an unusable minisub. Musk, who wandered around the rescue camp briefly and then flew back home, would later call Vernon Unsworth, the first experienced cave explorer on the scene and later recipient of the Queen’s Gallantry Medal for his efforts, “a pedo guy”. 

Musk managed to parlay this disastrous ineptitude into being granted the reins of the federal budget when President Trump returned to power in 2025 as the head of the “Department of Government Efficiency” or DOGE. Musk’s dismissive and conspiratorial views towards The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) aligned with the Trump Administration’s disdain for the administrative state, dislike of foreign aid, and contempt for competent expertise. 

As we watched Hurricane Melissa, one of the strongest Atlantic hurricanes on record, make landfall in Jamaica, disaster professionals were left wondering what capacity the United States has to respond to this and other disasters.

From Bretton Woods

USAID emerged from the post-World War Two need to rebuild massive sections of Europe, as well as the capitalist demand to beat back communism, which had managed to beat back the tide of fascism. The emergence of both neoliberalism and international post-disaster reconstruction are fundamentally linked to this period following World War II, and the planning for how to manage its aftermath. The close of the war created the opportunity to set a new global order, part of which involved establishing international development as a mechanism to address global economic inequality. Simultaneously, the international community began to treat major catastrophes, including post-war reconstruction, as crises that required a coordinated global response. That was the role of the Marshall Plan, to rebuild Europe, yes, but also to offer a robustly engaged United States as a viable alternative to Soviet communism. 

This new framework for reconstruction, which separates the modern approach from previous historical methods, was formally established at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference. The Allied Nations sought to prevent future conflicts, which they believed were partly caused by the poorly handled aftermath of World War I, by focusing on a two-pronged strategy: stabilizing global financial markets and undertaking the physical reconstruction of war-torn countries. This led to the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ensure financial stability, and the World Bank to manage reconstruction and development. This model is rooted in the belief that engagement with a globalized, urbanized economy would be the primary stabilizing force, and it continues to be the dominant paradigm for international post-disaster recovery today.

This intertwined relationship meant that as the Global North adopted neoliberalism as its dominant policy and ideology, it also became the prevailing framework for both international development and post-disaster reconstruction efforts. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was born out of this milieu in 1961. Of course there are many issues of colonialism, imperialism, and global inequality wrapped up in the entire enterprise, alongside its nobler and more humanitarian impulses. That paternalistic origin and often enduring institutional perspective is a valid and constant criticism of the development world in general and USAID in particular. It is also worth noting that USAID has frequently, and not entirely blamelessly, been singled out as a CIA cutout. Nevertheless, over the years USAID’s disaster response and relief efforts have been laudable. 

Managing Through Disaster

Development, and through the development framework disaster response and relief, became a tool of soft power by which the two superpowers interacted with the Third World during the Cold War. The 1986 earthquake in El Salvador and the 19881 earthquake in Armenia, both of which occurred in complex political situations, motivated the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance to establish Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) under USAID. The after-action review following the December 1988 Armenia earthquake response highlighted several lessons learned. The most crucial of these was the realization that the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) needed to respond with an established organizational structure where all responders were trained in and understood their specific roles and responsibilities.

These DART teams were heavily influenced by the U.S. Forest Service’s Incident Command System (ICS). In the event of a disaster, USAID could stand up a Response Management Team (RMT). The DART was beta tested during Hurricane Hugo in September/October 1989. The team, with Paul Bell serving as team leader, was operating out of St. John’s, Antigua. The first official—though not quite ready for prime time—DART deployment took place in Northern Iraq in 1991. This is when non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other nations first learned the term “DART” and realized that the team had an accessible budget to use for response efforts. USAID DARTs were active from the 1990s into the 2020s, with one stood up as recently as 2023 to help with refugees in Armenia. 

Three major disasters over the last two decades provide a window on USAID’s capability: the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, the Earthquake/Tsunami/Reactor Meltdown “Triple Disaster” that hit northern Japan on March 11th, 2011, and the response to the 2015 Nepal Earthquake. 

On 12 January 2010, a magnitude 7 earthquake struck Haiti, centered just a short distance away from Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince. By the 13th, USAID DART teams were activated and USAR teams were in action on the 14th, doing urban search and rescue (USAR), logistics, rapid building assessments, and air transport. When the Tōhoku earthquake struck 45 miles off the coast of Japan, it provoked a massive tsunami, whose massive waters in turn flooded backup systems at some of the reactors of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant. In response to the triple disaster,USAID deployed a heavy DART team including nuclear radiation experts and USAR teams the day after the event. The team remained deployed for two months. Hours after the April 2015 Nepal Earthquake, USAID mobilized a 148 person DART team with USAR personnel out of Los Angeles and Fairfax, Virginia. Their RMT also put together logistical assistance, Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) education, and capacity building support from nuclear meltdown mitigation to conflict medicine.

As Trump came into office there were still USAID staff deployed in Gaza. Three staff members were sent to Myanmar to respond to the earthquake in March of 2025, however they were fired once they arrived in the country. 

Into the Woodchipper

Despite this history, Musk was possessed with a belief that USAID was “a viper’s nest of radical-left Marxists who hate America” and imploded the agency and replaced it with, well, nothing really. As Moynihan and Zuppke have suggested, Musk couldn’t understand, or at least acted as if he couldn’t understand, basic numeracy and proposed that USAID spending 10% of its budget on direct payments to local organizations must thereby mean that the other 90% went to shady or frivolous nonsense. (See Bonnifield and Sandefeur for an actual breakdown)

When Elon Musk took over the government in early 2025 he tweeted “We spent the weekend feeding USAID into the wood chipper. Could gone to some great parties. Did that instead.” There is no reason that we should not take Musk at his word. Decades of disaster response and recovery are now gone. However, Musk and the Trump Administration cannot erase the legacy of USAID’s international disaster relief. 

It is hard to say much definitively on the United States’ potential response to any disaster overseas as no one in the profession, as far as I know, has any real clue about what the actual plans are. That in and of itself is a tremendous problem. Disasters will not wait around while we try and sort things out. It is the United States leadership on disasters that has been thrown in the woodchipper.

Rebuilding from the Splinters

All is not hopeless. Every disaster provides a chance to rebuild. If we view the current state of the United States capacity to respond internationally to disasters as a catastrophe, we can also see that it provides us with somewhat of a blank slate. So, to be hopeful, what can we do if the U.S. wants to become an actual leader on the world stage? 

Following are five actions that the United States Government could take as soon as it has the desire to do so. 

Congress should mandate an immediate restoration of USAID, to the baseline capacity it had in 2024
Develop and fund regional and international training programs to build cooperation and capacity for disaster risk reduction (DRR).
Focus on decreasing physical and social vulnerabilities rather than taking a hazards based approach.
When considering economic development, factor in the production of risk.
Develop a robust public service corps where people can serve in disaster mitigation and relief.

Most immediately, the US could restore the previous system, through rehiring, new recruitment, and new protections against future DOGE-like destruction. This would help staunch the loss of specific technical expertise, though by necessity some of that would have to be retrained.

Beyond that baseline, the US could do so much more. To start, the US international development community should move away from viewing the Global South as a subordinate underclass that simply needs more economic development. While certain types of economic development can alleviate vulnerabilities, an ideological commitment to economic development as such does little but construct risk through furthering inequality. For too long the United States has taken a hazards based approach, or a focus on things like fires, earthquakes, hurricanes, and tornadoes. Instead, the US should invest in efforts that try to alleviate the underlying vulnerabilities that make people susceptible to disasters. Disaster researchers have shown that things like wealth inequality, systematic racism, and gender inequality make disasters worse. We can improve outcomes by addressing these vulnerabilities. Part of moving away from the current paradigm would include developing and funding international training programs in disaster risk reduction (DRR) that would create cooperation and build capacity. This can be at the regional and international level. 

There is a great desire amongst many people to work on preventing and responding to disasters. The United States could, and should, create a robust public service program that works on disaster mitigation during blue sky situations and responds to disasters when need be. People want to help each other, and one of the greatest things our country could do is enable that type of pro-social behavior. People have the desire to respond to disasters with solidarity and compassion. A restored disaster response capability could give them the means with which to do so.


1 Former USAID/BHA staff. Also see: Olson, Richard Stuart. “The Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID): A Critical Juncture Analysis, 1964–2003.” Macfadden & Associates (2005): 1-52.

Congress Must Stop Trump’s Covert and Military Action against Venezuela

October 16, 2025 – In response to reports that the Trump Administration has authorized covert Central Intelligence Agency action in Venezuela, Center for International Policy Executive Vice President Matt Duss issued the following statement:

“Reports that the Trump Administration has authorized covert efforts seeking to foment regime change in Venezuela are deeply concerning. These reports follow on the administration’s unlawful and unauthorized use of military force against vessels and their crews in the Caribbean – which constitute extrajudicial killings.

“Using covert or military measures to destabilize or overthrow regimes reminds us of some of the most notorious episodes in American foreign policy, which undermined the human rights and sovereignty of countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. We are still dealing with many of the harmful consequences of these disastrous interventions in today’s challenges with migration and the drug trade. Such interventions rarely lead to democratic or peaceful outcomes. Instead, they exacerbate internal divisions, reinforce authoritarianism, and destabilize societies for generations.

“Trump ran as an anti-war candidate and casts himself as a Nobel Prize-worthy peacemaker, yet he is conducting illegal strikes while threatening to start wars of choice across Latin America and the Caribbean. A majority of Americans oppose US military involvement in Venezuela. Lawmakers must make clear that Trump does not have the American people’s support or Congress’ authorization for the use of force against Venezuela or anywhere else in the region.”



Trump’s Wag The Dog Moment 

Michael Paarlberg is a Senior Non-Resident Fellow at CIP

On September 2, the House Oversight Committee released documents related to Jeffrey Epstein in an attempt to defuse public pressure over the sex trafficking case, and President Trump decided to blow up a boat. 

The boat was somewhere in the Caribbean Sea, and according to the Trump administration, was a drug smuggling vessel containing cocaine bound for the United States and crewed by 11 people who died in the airstrike. This strike followed weeks of a large US military buildup close to Venezuelan waters that included eight warships, an attack submarine, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, and air support. Assuming the official narrative is true, it took one of the largest naval deployments in the history of the Caribbean to take out a single four engine go-fast boat with a cargo hold of 3 tons. 

Was this a counter-narcotics operation? If it was, it wouldn’t have taken an entire fleet and millions of dollars a day to carry it out. Taking out drug vessels is something the US Coast Guard does regularly. They track boats bound for US waters, intercept them, board them – using lethal force if necessary – arrest crews and seize drugs. This is their job and they are good at it. In comparison to the perhaps 3 tons sunk last week, a single US Coast Guard vessel, CGC Hamilton, interdicted and seized 38 tons of drugs in the last two months alone. If the idea was to impose a cost, it is the US that is on the losing end of this equation, not the cartel.

Refocus Coast Guard resources toward shore defense and drug interdiction and away from personal use of Gulfstream aircraft and Coast Guard Commandant housing by DHS Secretary Noem. 

Direct diplomatic efforts at agreements with allied governments in Latin America and the Caribbean to coordinate drug interdiction efforts.

Capture traffickers and build criminal cases against cartels and corrupt government officials in Venezuela and elsewhere.

A holistic drug enforcement policy that takes consumer demand into account.

Release the Epstein files, full and unredacted.

But many things about this operation don’t add up. What cartel was this anyway? The Trump administration claims the vessel and alleged traffickers belonged to the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua. On the face of it, this makes little sense, as TdA is not a cartel as we understand the term. It is not a transnational drug trafficking organization: members engage in street-level dealing, mostly in cities in South America, but they are not known to engage in smuggling shipments of drugs across borders or oceans. They are, fundamentally, a street gang, whose business model is human trafficking and extortion rackets targeting Venezuelan refugees who fled that country’s economic collapse to Colombia, Chile, Brazil and elsewhere, with only a minor presence in the US at best. Indeed, eleven people is a suspiciously large number for smuggling vessels of this size which are normally crewed by three or four because the more people, the more weight and the fewer drugs you can smuggle in one shipment. If it was TdA, they would be more likely to be smuggling migrants, not drugs, making the death count significantly higher. It’s also possible it was just eleven people on a boat.

Blow This Joint

Was this a pretext for regime change? In its naval mobilization, the Trump administration has made reference to another alleged cartel, the Cartel of the Suns. Unlike Tren de Aragua, which is at least a real gang, this isn’t even a formal organization at all, but rather a term used to describe various Venezuelan political and military officials who profit from money laundering and other illicit rackets – much of which are designed to get around US sanctions. Insofar as there is corruption within the Venezuelan regime, this is well known. President Nicolas Maduro has made a show of arresting one of the key figures in this network, former vice president and oil minister Tareck El Aissami, as a means of distracting from the endemic corruption throughout his regime. Most of it is pedestrian in nature: Maduro allegedly got $35 million in bribes from the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht to win Venezuelan public works contracts. Most public corruption looks like Odebrecht, not Tren de Aragua, but procurement fraud isn’t a useful pretext for military action.

But military action doesn’t serve either purpose. If you want to break up a drug cartel, blowing up a boat does little to accomplish that, unless you believe cartels only own one boat. You arrest traffickers, seize evidence, and build cases against them. If you are targeting government officials, you flip your perpetrators to get to the bigger fish at the top. This is what federal prosecutors do, and they are also good at it. The Department of Justice succeeded in putting the former president of Honduras in prison by doing exactly this.

As for stopping drugs, as I and other authors write in a new edited volume on the global cocaine trade, it makes little sense to focus on boats coming from Venezuela at all. Cocaine, famously, comes from just three countries, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, none of which are Venezuela. Most of it goes through Mexico, or maritime routes in the Pacific Ocean. The largest quantities are smuggled on container ships, not speedboats. Venezuela serves as a pass-through for a minor corridor in the Caribbean, but it is one of a number of way-stations starting in Colombia and continuing on to the Dominican Republic and then to Puerto Rico, from which drugs are more easily smuggled into the mainland US. It’s not even certain that the crew of the vessel were Venezuelan at all, as Dominican drug trafficking organizations partner with Colombian and Venezuelan counterparts in this supply chain. And while cocaine production is currently booming, this is being driven by a surge in demand from Europe, not the US. Today, the drug of choice for American consumers is not cocaine but fentanyl, a synthetic drug that doesn’t come from Venezuela, but largely Mexico using precursors from China, and is increasingly produced in the US.

Assassin’s Screed

The reason we don’t conduct airstrikes on China or Puerto Rico is, presumably, extrajudicially assassinating Chinese or US citizens would be a bigger deal than killing Venezuelans. To be clear, this was an illegal act, under US and international law. Assassination is against the law according to the War Crimes Act, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and Executive Order 12333, as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Not that those have stopped the US in the past, or other countries for that matter. Past administrations, Democrat and Republican, have assassinated individuals deemed national security threats, famously Osama bin Laden but also US citizens such as Anwar Al-Awlaki, both ordered by President Obama. Thus there is a precedent, legal or not, for killing accused terrorists in other countries without trial, one which President Trump put into process earlier by designating Tren de Aragua and other criminal gangs to be Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Other countries have adopted similar rationales, including Colombia, which in 2008 killed FARC commander Raul Reyes in neighboring Ecuador.

But as with the US raids in Pakistan and Yemen, and Colombia’s in Ecuador, these had severe political blowbacks that hobbled counter-terrorism efforts afterwards. Pakistan exposed the CIA station chief, and doubled down on backing the Taliban in Afghanistan as insurance. Yemen came to be dominated by the Houthis, a US opponent. Multiple countries cut ties with Colombia. One could argue, as Obama did, that assassinating key terrorist leaders such as Osama bin Laden was worth the blowback.

We may never know who these eleven people were, but it is highly doubtful that any of them were top leaders in either Tren de Aragua or the Maduro regime. Cartel bosses do not sit on boats personally escorting drug shipments, nor do government officials. So the payoff may be low, but the cost may also be low, as the Trump administration sees it: Venezuela is a pariah state already under crippling US sanctions, and Maduro is a corrupt autocrat who stole the last election. But such a strike can only be a blessing for Maduro. It turns what should be a criminal matter into a matter of national sovereignty, something he can use to rally support from neighbors who don’t like him. And those neighbors matter more to the US than Venezuela, such as Brazil. Last year, Lula had been a cautious critic of Maduro, blocking Venezuela’s accession to BRICS in response to the stolen election. It is hard to imagine him taking such a stance today.

The Big Stick-Up

The boat strike will only hasten the decline of US influence in Latin America, where China has already replaced the US as the top trade partner in most of the region even before the Trump tariffs. Countries will have few reasons to cooperate with the US on pressuring rogue actors like Maduro to respect elections or stop jailing opponents. Even Maduro had been playing ball with the US on the issue that matters to Trump the most, immigration, accepting deportation flights from the US. And despite the hostilities, the Trump administration has been quietly making deals with Maduro as well. In July of this year, Trump issued an oil license for Chevron to resume doing business in Venezuela, worth hundreds of millions of dollars a year to the Venezuelan government. It’s not hard to guess what Maduro cares about more, upwards of a billion dollars in oil revenues, or eleven guys in a boat.

In this context then, the boat strike looks more like a negotiating ploy by the Trump administration to put pressure on Maduro to continue making deals, whether to do with deportations, oil, or murkier interests represented by grifters and internet personalities. It’s beneficial to both figures: Maduro rallies his neighbors against a shared threat to the north, and Trump rallies his base with a foreign bogeyman, and shifts the media narrative away from his old friend Epstein. And with other legal cases, such as with MS-13, it’s more convenient for the Trump administration to not have them go through the courts, for fear of what corrupt deals may come out at trial. Of all the defenses of the boat strike on social media, the oddest was the refrain that due process is “woke.” Is it woke to break up cartels and put drug traffickers in prison? The enthusiasm for performative military action betrays a deep distrust in the police, prosecutors, and justice system as a whole. This is the kind of thing that leads to vigilantism, the breakdown of state institutions, and the rise of autocratic regimes like Maduro’s.

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The Danger of Loyalty Tests in U.S. Foreign Policy

Sina Toossi is a senior nonresident fellow at the Center for International Policy.

Shahed Ghoreishi was a career‑level press officer who drafted a single, straightforward line for the State Department press office: “We do not support forced displacement of Palestinians in Gaza.” A short time later his proposed language was cut, and days after that he was fired — an action colleagues told reporters sent a “chilling message” through the building that veering from the administration’s framing could threaten a person’s job.

That is far more than a personnel dispute. It is a window into a deeper pathology in U.S. foreign policy: a system — inside government and across its think tanks, media, and political circles — that too often punishes facts, rewards conformity, and makes it perilous for professionals to tell leaders what they need to hear.

Social scientists have a name for this dynamic: groupthink. Far from being an abstract academic idea, it describes what happens when teams value unity over truth. Psychologist Irving Janis, who coined the term, defined it as “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.”

In other words, the stronger the pull of conformity, the weaker the capacity for independent judgment. The result, Janis warned, is a deterioration of decision-making: mental efficiency declines, reality testing erodes, and moral judgement falters.

Institutionalize dissent: Require leaders to hear alternative analyses, include minority views in the record, and respond directly to objections from skeptics.
Protect public servants: Strengthen whistleblower protections, safeguard career staff from political retribution, and lower the personal cost of speaking inconvenient truths.
Reinforce external checks: Support investigative journalism and congressional oversight as structural safeguards against conformity and executive overreach.

The process is easy to spot: decisions made within small, insulated circles create pressure to conform. Those who disagree either stay silent or are pushed aside, a false sense of consensus emerges, and what Irving Janis called “mindguards” step in—members who shield leaders from uncomfortable information and preserve the illusion of unanimity. The consequences are serious. Scholars of U.S. foreign policy have linked this very pattern to disastrous mistakes, from fatally flawed contingency planning to the manipulation and misuse of intelligence that paved the way for war.

That explains why Ghoreishi’s firing should make us uneasy. It communicates to tens of thousands of public servants that nuance can be dangerous, that raising inconvenient facts is a political liability, and that professional judgment may be judged less on merit than on loyalty to a preferred frame.

Protect honest debate

Public debate only works when people are willing to risk being unpopular in order to correct mistakes. As legal scholar Cass Sunstein has noted, dissenters who bring forward inconvenient facts are “to be prized,” because even one honest voice can puncture a false consensus. But when criticism is immediately treated as a political attack, the cost of speaking rises too high, and people choose silence instead.

When organizations go after people’s motives instead of addressing their arguments, real debate is replaced by character assassination. The Ghoreishi case was not just a routine decision by a manager; it was driven by a political appointee with an ideological agenda, and it was followed by a vicious smear campaign from far-right activist Laura Loomer. The message to career officials was unmistakable: even language consistent with long-standing U.S. policy could end a career. Such a culture silences public servants and leaves leaders deaf to the truth.

The consequences of manufactured consensus are not hypothetical. They were on full display in the run-up to the Iraq war, when insulated teams, reinforced by pressure from the top, narrowed intelligence assessments and sidelined skeptics. It was a textbook case of groupthink. Iraq proved that when dissent is punished, institutions lose the very safeguards that can prevent catastrophe.

Re‑center evidence over ideology

Good foreign policy begins with clear-eyed diagnosis and an honest weighing of costs and alternatives. Too often, though, the language of government cables and committee deliberations favors a politically convenient frame over a messy truth. The result is policy built on selective intelligence, comforting assumptions, and incomplete evidence.

Research on group decision-making shows why this happens. Some cohesion can help teams move faster, but only if dissent is protected and confirmation bias kept low. Once conformity takes hold and critics are silenced, decision quality quickly collapses. As Cass Sunstein warns, that fragile balance breaks down when powerful voices dominate, turning healthy teamwork into conformity, self-censorship, and collective error.

That is why reforming how decisions are made is urgent. Leaders should be required to hear out alternative analyses, include minority views in the record, and respond directly to objections from skeptics. These are not box-checking exercises. They are simple guardrails that make it harder for institutions to ignore inconvenient evidence before locking in a course of action.

Safeguard public servants

If we want honest debate, we must make dissent less costly. The scholarship is blunt: dissent must be rewarded or at least protected, especially when it benefits the public interest. That requires stronger safeguards for career staff and whistleblowers, real channels for internal disagreement, and institutional incentives that value critical review over blind loyalty.

But rules on paper only go so far. Culture ultimately decides whether people speak up or stay silent. In today’s climate, self-censorship is rising. Fear of reputational damage leads many to hold their tongue, and that instinct seeps into elite institutions where insiders are reluctant to challenge prevailing narratives. The Ghoreishi case makes the point: it taught public servants not just what language is permitted, but what truths are too dangerous to even raise.

Ultimately, even the healthiest institutions need outside pressure to stay honest. That is why external checks are indispensable. A free press and a Congress willing to investigate provide the counterweights to executive overreach and groupthink. These mechanisms are not partisan weapons; they are structural safeguards. By forcing leaders to explain their decisions, confront inconvenient facts, and stay accountable, they keep the system honest, and the country safer.

Why defending dissent is patriotic and vital for national security

Dissent is often painted as disloyalty. In reality, the opposite is true: telling leaders uncomfortable truths is a patriotic duty. When analysts, diplomats, or generals speak up, they reduce the chances that the nation will stumble into unnecessary wars, misjudge adversaries, or ignore the human costs of reckless policies.

That is why Shahed Ghoreishi’s firing should alarm anyone who cares about sound statecraft. It signals a climate where loyalty to the script outweighs telling the truth. And when silence becomes the safer career path, the nation loses its best safeguard against small mistakes growing into strategic disasters.

The fixes are not complicated. Institutions can create formal channels for dissent, assign rotating devil’s advocates, test plans against adversarial analysis, and shield career professionals from political retribution. These steps will not prevent every mistake, but they will make policy sturdier and leaders better informed.

History shows that even a single dissenter can break a false consensus and steer a group back toward sound judgment. Protecting those voices is not weakness; it is prudence. It is how democracies learn, adapt, and survive.

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El Salvador’s actions show Human Rights law matters

Anjali Dayal is an associate professor of international politics at Fordham University’s Lincoln Center campus. She is the author of Incredible Commitments: How UN Peacekeeping Failures Shape Peace Processes (Cambridge University Press, 2021). She can be found online at  @anjalikdayal.bsky.social on bluesky.

Under the rule of President Nayib Bukele’s personalist authoritarianism, El Salvador has publicly positioned itself as above critique. Despite this posturing, El Salvador’s government is behaving as though there might be future political, legal, and social consequences for its role in jailing migrants who were kidnapped by the Trump administration, taken to El Salvador’s notorious maximum security CECOT prison, and then returned to Venezuela in violation of their rights under international law. In recently disclosed court filings, El Salvador writes to the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and tries to assign the US government sole responsibility under international law for migrants detained in CECOT.

This response, complete with El Salvador’s officials shifting blame to the US, shows us we don’t yet live in a time of inevitable impunity for human rights violations. Because fears about future accountability for violating human rights remain salient concerns for some violators, they also remain critical sites of mobilization for civil resistance against a fully fascist future. 

Pressure governments to sanction or isolate El Salvador, the US, or both
Call for investigations by multilateral human rights bodies, building a body of evidence that might later help move the levers of international justice.
Demand signatories refer El Salvador to the International Criminal Court
American opposition leaders can and should credibly signal that there will be accountability and consequences for the Trump administration’s human rights abuses
Democratic presidential contenders should promise to join the ICC if they come to power

In these reports, submitted to experts working under the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights and then made public as part of these detainees’ litigation against the US government, El Salvador’s government asserts its own compliance with human rights law, despite what it describes as an agreement with the Trump administration to provide detention facilities for men disappeared from the United States, and carefully specifies that El Salvador itself is upholding international laws that protect people from being snatched off the street by their governments. 

El Salvador’s argument in these documents is particularly striking since the Salvadoran president and other key officials have openly expressed their disdain for human rights law. Instead, claiming compliance with human rights law, as El Salvador’s government does, accords these laws importance and legitimacy even as the government of El Salvador’s actions flout them. We can infer from these documents, then, that the government of El Salvador is writing with an eye to a future where these laws might matter, where violating these laws might have consequences, and where there might be accountability for the crimes committed against migrants to the US. 

As autocratic breakthrough in the US reshapes domestic and international norms and arrangements, all institutions, states, and organizations that confront the Trump administration must make a practical and moral calculation: do they expect this authoritarian period in US politics to endure, or do they anticipate future legal and political accountability for the crimes and injustices now unfolding? Analysts often distinguish between those who fold to authoritarian demands and those who fight them: those betting on a lawless future where accommodating corruption and repression offers protection, and where the future prospect of accountability or reputational damage for legitimatizing lawless behavior are unlikely to matter much, versus those betting on democratic resurgence, with the attendant accountability necessary to a peaceful, pluralist future. In these documents, El Salvador is hedging a bet against the lawless future, not assuming enduring impunity for the Trump administration’s treatment of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. 

If the government of El Salvador believes future accountability is possible, then it sees a future world where the international laws that protect the rights of individuals matter. These laws are meaningful when people believe they matter, and they are meaningless when people don’t believe they matter. What we see in these documents, then, is the political space and possibility for other governments, for activists, for civil society groups, for international organizations, and for the families of the disappeared to help change the stakes of betting on authoritarian future—to push for accountability, to expand and reassert the norms and values that protect people from state violence, and to make it more compelling for people to behave as though the future will include justice and rights, not merely impunity and repression.

Hedging the Bet: Constructing Deniability 

As Chris Geidner reported, lawyers with the ACLU and Democracy Forward presented these documents from El Salvador as support for their argument that the US government “maintains constructive custody over the people it sent to CECOT”—that, contrary to US attorneys’ claims in court, the US government, and not El Salvador, retained ultimate authority over the detention and disposition of CECOT plaintiffs.  

The documents were entered into the court record as part of the original J.G.G. v. Trump litigation before Chief Judge James Boasberg at the D.C. federal court, which challenges the Trump administration’s use of the Alien Enemies Act to send migrants in the US to El Salvador with no due process, while the documents themselves originate from a specific request to El Salvador from the UN’s human rights experts. The UN’s Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances asked El Salvador to provide information about specific individuals flown to CECOT after their families asked the working group for an inquiry. 

The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances is a special procedure of the UN’s Human Rights Council, and like many of the UN’s human rights procedures, it documents and produces information about human rights violations on behalf of victims. 

Enforced disappearance is a state crime: the state or agents acting on behalf of the state take someone, place them outside the law, and hide their whereabouts from their friends, families, and advocates. Victims of enforced disappearances, who include the family and loved ones of the disappeared, can contact the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. The Working Group can in turn serve as a channel of communication between the state on the one hand, and families, civil society, and the legal community on the other, asking states to provide information about the whereabouts and status of disappeared persons.

The reports filed as part of the Alien Enemies cases emerge from this process, and we can accordingly understand them as the narrative the government of El Salvador wanted the UN’s working group and the victims of enforced disappearance in this case to have. The reports they submitted argue that, while the government of El Salvador did facilitate the use of its prison infrastructure by the US, “the jurisdiction and legal responsibility for these persons lie exclusively” with the US. In fact, El Salvador claims that ICE and the US Government are solely responsible for any arrest, detention, or transferring of persons in violation of international law—if enforced disappearance is a crime perpetrated by state agents, then those state agents, they say, are the US’s, not El Salvador’s. Instead of coauthoring these acts, they say, their government merely provided Salvadoran prisons for “the custody of persons detained within the scope of the justice system and law enforcement” of the US via bilateral agreements. 

While legal analysts have noted these bilateral agreements are mere fig leaves on illegal arrangements, El Salvador’s argument to the UN is that it can’t be held responsible for refoulement—returning migrants to a place they fled from in fear—or for violating international law on enforced disappearance since, per these agreements, it simply provided a detention facility for people the US sent them. Because, El Salvador asserts, these persons weren’t under their jurisdiction “at the time of their alleged deprivation of liberty or when they were last seen,” there’s no basis for the working group to request information from them, and the cases should be excluded from their national statistics—in other words, they may have housed the men, but they didn’t kidnap them. The government “reiterates its commitment to complying with its international human rights obligations, including the prevention of enforced disappearances,” and claims they have solid laws and regulations that protect the “rights of persons deprived of liberty, regardless of their nationality.” These documents reveal, then, that government officials in El Salvador want to avoid blame and culpability for the fates of migrants abducted from the US: El Salvador believes it’s in its best interests to say it is complying with human rights law, even when it clearly is not. 

The Purposes of Deniability 

Despite these claims, the eventual release of the detainees to Venezuela in a prisoner swap has revealed the horror of their time at CECOT—their accounts of torture, sexual abuse, and cruelty in the prison indicate the government of El Salvador’s deep disregard for their rights. There were at least two other ways for El Salvador to have approached these reports: government officials could have flouted requests from the Working Group and continued to publicly boast of the torture, pain, and fear inflicted on CECOT’s detainees, or they could have returned blanket denials to the Working Group that did not try to parse their legal responsibility. Instead, they chose to treat the requests as an opportunity to try and mitigate their liability for human rights violations. 

The attempt instead to assign the US sole legal responsibility is particularly notable because neither the US nor El Salvador are state parties to the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, and accordingly neither has explicitly accepted the legal obligations that follow from that agreement. In fact, a different UN body, the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, would be taking the lead if El Salvador were a signatory to the convention. While this distinction may seem academic, the effect is substantive. The convention is a newer human rights agreement—adopted in 2006 and ratified in 2010, it specifically defines enforced disappearance as a crime and a crime against humanity, and today it is one of the nine core human rights instruments under the UN umbrella, with 116 signatories and 77 ratifications. It is binding on all states who have ratified it, meaning that they treat it as law. Each of the nine core instruments also has a treaty body associated with it: committees of experts who consider state parties’ reports, consider individual complaints of violations, and conduct site visits and inquiries, among other tasks. The Committee on Enforced Disappearances serves this task for states that have signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and agreed to accord the agreement the status of law.

The body involved in the El Salvador case, the UN’s Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, on the other hand, was established in 1980, and is one of the older procedures of the Human Rights Council. Its origins date to a time when disappearing people was a calling card of modern dictatorship, but before the adoption of a formal agreement defined explicit state obligations for protecting people against enforced disappearance. Instead, the Working Group has a monitoring and humanitarian mandate anchored in the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which the UN General Assembly adopted in 1992. This makes the Working Group part of an apparatus of “soft law”—it provides guidance to states without the necessity of formal ratification or accession to a treaty. In the specific case of the Working Group, its humanitarian mandate means it assists families in “determining the fate and whereabouts of disappeared relatives” by serving as a channel between victims and states, while its monitoring mandate means it may  send urgent appeals to the relevant minister of foreign affairs when they receive credible allegations that someone has been “arrested, detained, abducted, or otherwise deprived of liberty and has been forcibly disappeared or is at risk of being disappeared,” or whenever it deems it necessary.

Put another way, the Working Group can involve itself in the affairs of any state primarily by offering guidance, or by appealing to states for information on behalf of victims; it has taken the lead in this case because neither El Salvador nor the US have signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

But the Convention, like many human rights agreements, is to some extent redundant—it defines a crime that was already prohibited by broader and overlapping treaties, agreements, and shared norms, and establishes more specific obligations for the states that ratify it. In the case of enforced disappearance, the three core elements of the crime—the deprivation of a person’s liberty, the involvement of the state, and the concealment of the person’s fate and whereabouts—are also prohibited by other bodies of international law. 

Under the Rome Statute that underpins the International Criminal Court, and to which El Salvador is a party, enforced disappearance qualifies as a crime against humanity. The cruel treatment of the disappeared is barred under the Convention Against Torture, which specifies torture as a crime that can be prosecuted with universal jurisdiction. And under customary international law, as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and understood as a baseline for state behavior, no state can abrogate a person’s right to enjoy liberty, security, legal representation, a fair trial, and equal protection under the law, and every person should enjoy freedom from torture. The Refugee Convention’s prohibition against refoulement—returning refugees and asylum seekers to the place they are fleeing from—also applies to the CECOT detainees. With its efforts to minimize its own transgressions of these laws, agreements, and norms, El Salvador is therefore behaving as though it is bound by the nested, overlapping web of norms, laws, and obligations that regulate state treatment of individuals, even as it is clearly violating these norms, laws, and obligations. 

El Salvador is far from the first state to comply with the formal procedures of human rights law while flagrantly violating its core principles. Human rights law is practically weak but rhetorically powerful: it’s enforced by states via their domestic legal codes, and if states violate the rights of people living under their jurisdiction—as they often do—then other states, organizations, groups, and individuals can mostly only try to make them stop via indirect mechanisms, like sanctions, social pressure, boycotts, or slow-moving international litigation. States adopt all international legal obligations voluntarily, and there are no direct or automatic penalties for non-compliance with human rights law; there are also few easy ways to stop a state committed to violating the rights of people who live within its border. But the prevailing norms of the post-WWII international order have framed human rights violations as moral and legal atrocities; the investigative and information-producing powers of multilateral and non-governmental organizations have subjected abusive states to historically unprecedented levels of international scrutiny; and states have until very recently been reluctant to openly own their human rights violations—preferring instead to cloak their deeds in the language of counterterrorism, or issuing denials. This duality incentivizes states to pay lip service to the underlying values of human rights law while facing few consequences for transgressing them, and these efforts have often been understood as a strategy of buying political cover for human rights violations—a strategy that allows allies to frame box-checking as actual compliance. But lip service is still an acknowledgement that the law is meaningful in some way, and that acknowledgment is also an opportunity.

Changing the Stakes 

In this case, El Salvador is voluntarily claiming it’s in compliance with international laws, even though, technically speaking, nothing will happen to El Salvador if it isn’t in compliance with international law, absent significant effort from other states. Paradoxically, this means international law can serve as a critical tool in confronting the global wave of far-right autocracies bent on breaking already-fragile human rights norms: it can serve as a way to change the stakes of violating human rights. 

Pointing to international law as an aide can seem naive at best and maliciously impotent at worst, particularly when stacked against the horror of human rights violations. And framing international law as a pathway to redress harms can seem particularly obtuse when the misplaced faith that legal institutions would serve as the primary bulwark against authoritarianism is, after all, one way we got to the point where an open authoritarian could win the US presidency a second time and build a lawless government. In the domestic context, law is backed by the enforcement of state power, and people often view the existence of laws as automatically regulating behavior or guarding against impunity—but international law is very clearly a specific set of arguments about appropriate, tolerable behavior, with no expectation of automaticity attached to it. In this context, human rights law is a tool, not a weapon—not the sole sword of restitution, but a way to change the calculus people make when they weigh future consequences.

Without the backing of state power or any straightforward paths to enforcement, ironically, human rights law shows us how all law has to be backed by political power and pressure to be meaningful—less an ideal than a straightforward deal.  

El Salvador’s effort to minimize its culpability will not necessarily help its government officials avoid legal culpability for enforced disappearance (since accomplices to enforced disappearance can still be legally responsible for the crime), nor for its crimes against humanity, its torture of detainees, or its refoulment of refugees—if there is political will to hold them accountable. Human rights have usually been indirectly enforced by social mechanisms; prosecutions or threatened prosecutions; and, rarely and at the extreme, military action.  Social mechanisms work by trying to place countries outside the community of “good” states via naming-and-shaming tactics, grassroots pressure and activism from groups inside and outside the offending state. They can escalate to boycotts and sanctions—more coercive measures that strive to cut states off from economic and military benefits in order to shape their behavior. 

These mechanisms work hand-in-hand with the international legal working groups and committees that produce knowledge about human rights violations and direct international scrutiny at violators. International justice can proceed via prosecutions in domestic courts that have ratified human rights agreements; regional courts, like the European Court of Justice or the Inter-American Court of Justice; or via international courts including the International Court of Justice, where states attempt to hold other states to account for violations of international law, and the International Criminal Court, where individuals can be prosecuted for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression. And rarely and controversially, human rights violations can produce joint military action under the Responsibility to Protect. Each one of these responses requires sustained political pressure and mobilization to hold violators accountable. In this context, there are political pathways forward for people who want to uphold human rights, reject impunity, and build accountability—not just for El Salvador’s government (which thinks it might experience consequences), but also for the Trump administration, which is proceeding as though there will never be justice for its crimes against refugees, migrants, and dissidents. International advocates for human rights can build social pressure by building and sustaining pressure on their own governments to sanction or isolate El Salvador, the US, or both. They can work with international experts to open investigations in multilateral human rights bodies, building a body of evidence that might later help move the levers of international justice. And states that believe in human rights can refer El Salvador to the International Criminal Court—El Salvador is a member, so the court has jurisdiction over its crimes against humanity. 

US domestic opposition to the Trump administration can also work to build grassroots pressure on the government via activism—indeed, both the administration’s move to return Kilmar Abrego Garcia to the US and the prisoner swap that ultimately sent the CECOT detainees to Venezuela reveal that the administration is susceptible to domestic political pressure. Critically, American opposition leaders can and should credibly signal that there will be accountability and consequences for the Trump administration’s human rights abuses—that, should they ever return to power, they will not paper over past abuses, as the Obama administration did despite their evidence that the Bush administration “tortured some folks”. One way for leaders to make these promises of accountability credible is to promise they will join the ICC if they come to power, following the lead of other states that have joined the ICC after a period of violence as a way to externalize punishment for abuses, reassuring both international allies and nervous domestic populations that there will be justice even if domestic courts aren’t up to the task. 

None of these measures would be a guarantee, but each one of them would help make a future commitment to justice more plausible, changing the stakes of the decisions that other states, groups, and individuals make in the face of autocratic breakthrough. Actors looking at the current landscape and foreseeing a future of impunity for the Trump administration’s crimes may be tempted to throw their lot in with the administration’s abuses, or at least to implicitly legitimize them. Actors looking at a landscape where pressure for future accountability comes from many directions may instead look at this period in American history as a chapter with an eventual end that will require an answer and an account for abuse. In this sense, El Salvador’s hedged bet shows us how we can stack the deck toward justice. 

Climate Crisis Demands a More Humane Alternative to Mass Deportation  

Kelsey Coolidge (she/her) is the Director of the War Prevention Initiative of the Jubitz Family Foundation. Her work focuses on the intersection of peace and security, climate change, and the environment.   

Mass deportations, the terrorizing of immigrant communities, and the illegal detention of immigrants—whether documented or not—are a defining feature of the second Trump Administration. It was a campaign promise delivered at stunning (and illegal) speed, and one now set to be bolstered by $170 billion in the “Big, Beautiful Bill”. These deportations are underpinned by erroneous claims of disproportionate migrant crime rates1, white supremacist and nationalist narratives, and the scapegoating immigrants as the driver of social ills.  

The national security infrastructure in the U.S. appears uncomfortably primed to engage in mass violence against civilians on its own soil (putting aside, for this paper, the gross violations of civilian rights as part of military operations beyond our borders). Astronomical sums of money are proposed to the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense to thoroughly militarize U.S. immigration policy, while humanitarian and aid programs are totally gutted. The “Big, Beautiful Bill” is ugly for immigrants—Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE) is now the largest federal law enforcement agency (with a budget larger than most of the world’s militaries2) with $45 billion for new “detention centers” to “double immigrant detention capacity” with extremely limited Congressional oversight, according to the Brennan Center for Justice.3 How has the country of “give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free” come to embrace such an anti-immigrant stance?  

Use humanizing language about migrants, to ground this work on shared values of human rights and dignity 
Reinstate previous funding levels to the U.S. State Department and USAID, offering a policy and programmatic approach that supports the human security of migrants to the U.S. while addressing the conditions that drive migrants to flee in the first place.   
Reduce military spending by closing unnecessary global military bases and reducing the military’s global footprint.

There is an unexplored driver of a militarized approach to immigration. Mass deportations and border militarization is a national security priority not only because of President Trump’s racist claims—but also because our country’s national security leaders have deemed it a consequence of a warming world. Climate change, and specifically the Pentagon’s strategic planning for climate change, has justified mass deportations as a national security issue. By securitizing climate change, we have (perhaps unintentionally) securitized migrants, naming people as a security threat of climate change, and thereby undermining their human rights and dignity. 

Academics write about securitization theory as a framework to explain how policy issues become urgent, necessitating extraordinary action beyond what is considered normal. 4 A policy becomes securitized in part by how political elites frame and understand the issue. Immigration has been securitized by military and political elites’ narrative framing of mass immigration as key national security threat of climate change. Rather than pursue strategies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions or increasing collaboration among regional partners, the U.S. has set itself on a crash course of violent, costly, and inefficient responses to both immigration and climate change. An alternative approach is available, grounded in our common humanity with immigrants and a belief that global warming can proactively address through meaningful reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  

SECURITIZING CLIMATE CHANGE 

Climate change has been effectively framed as a security threat by epistemic and national security communities. There were good intentions behind this effort—elevating the risks of climate change as “hard” security was thought to facilitate more urgent action. However, this approach fails to account for the role of militarism in U.S. national security and foreign policy, and the massive environmental toll of military operations. Militarism elevates military solutions as the means to attain safety and security; and with it, an adherence to the use of force, domination, and lethal violence. Climate change cannot be bombed away. 

The very system that produces bombs, ships them, and drops them around the globe is wildly exacerbating the climate crisis through its massive consumption of fossil fuels and GHG emissions. According to the Conflict and Environment Observatory, military GHG emissions are estimated to be around 5.5% of the world’s total emissions making it the fourth largest “country” in terms of total carbon emissions.5 As the largest military spender in the world, the U.S. military emits an extraordinary amount of GHG. According to new estimates by Neta Crawford, “from 1979 to 2023, the Pentagon generated almost 4,000 [metric tons of] CO2e – about the same as the entire 2023 emissions reported by India, a country of 1.4 billion people.”6 The U.S. military is also reported as the world’s largest institutional consumer of oil (and correspondingly the highest institutional emitter of GHG).7   

The unintended consequence of this security framing has diverted away from actions that meaningfully mitigate GHG emissions, increase resilience against climate-related natural disasters, or invest in the necessary green economic transition. Ironically, a security framing of climate change has reaffirmed the centrality of fossil fuels to our national security policy by situating the military as an actor to protect the country against the effects of climate change instead of addressing how military activities themselves contribute to the crisis.  

THE PENTAGON’S APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION 

For decades, the Pentagon has advanced the idea of climate change as a national security threat and detailed plans for an anticipated military response. Corey Payne and Ori Swed conducted a review of Pentagon strategy documents finding that overall, “the military does not see saving the planet from a climate catastrophe as a goal that falls within its mandate,”8 and, “views its job [as] to ensure that the United States will be among the “winners” of the unfolding climate catastrophe.”9  While the majority of these strategy documents detail the ways in which the effects of climate change effect operational readiness and scenario-planning, it is impossible to ignore the frequency of dehumanizing, anti-immigrant language that directly names migrants as a security threat.  

Climate migrants are to be, “approached as a security issue and [met] with a militarized response.”10  In his book All Hell Breaking Loose, Michael T. Klare provides a deeply uncritical but comprehensive review of the Pentagon’s approach to climate change, detailing to extent to which migration has been named and blamed as the security threat stemming from climate change.11 It is almost comical how badly migrants are portrayed in this book, writing about the likelihood of, “massive waves of human migration and help spread infectious disease, producing disarray across the planet,”12 or how, “more privileged states [will be] besieged by waves of desperate “climate refugees.”13    

Throughout the book, Klare references the security threat of migration as a persistent concern emanating from the Pentagon’s plan to address climate change. “Whenever U.S security analysts have considered the risks of climate change, a perpetual concern has been that extreme events and prolonged droughts could trigger a massive flight of desperate people seeking refuge in other locales, provoking chaos and hostility wherever they travel…and it has remained a major theme to the present day.”14  Some references include:  

  • A 2007 CNA Corporation report warned that climate change, “can fuel migrations in less develop countries, and these migrations can lead to international political conflict.”15 Klare writes that the CNA report suggests “the primary security threats to the U.S. arise from the potential demand for humanitarian aid and a likely increase in immigration from neighbor states.”16  
      • A 2015 National Security Implications of Climate-Related Risks and Changing Climate report17 which pulled insights from the military’s six geographic combatant commend centers (Northern, Southern, European, Africa, Central, and IndoPacific) and found “the threat of mass migrations arising from extreme drought, coastal flooding, food scarcity, and state collapse was a recurring theme in several of these reports.”18  

      • In a 2014 report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, General John F. Kelly, “emphasized the importance of taking steps to prevent future climate refugees from entering the United States,” detailing how SouthCom’s exercises modeling the military’s response to a mass migration event used, “Guantanamo Bay to oversee a mock crisis-response mission.”19  

    The underlying logic of the Pentagon’s approach to climate change is based off an assumption that climate change will create clear and predictable “winners” and “losers” on a global scale.20 An early commissioned report from 2003 suggests that “the United State could likely survive shortened growing cycles and harsh weather conditions without catastrophic losses. Borders will be strengthened around the country to hold back unwanted starving immigrants from the Caribbean islands (an especially severe problem), Mexico, and South America.”21 While it is not egregious to suggest that wealthier countries are best suited to withstand the shocks of climate change, it is also naïve to underplay the fundamental ways in which the U.S economy is reliant on imported food and migrant labor.22 Further, the defining feature of climate change is unpredictability. “Unchecked global climate change will disrupt a dynamic ecological equilibrium in ways that are difficult to predict. The new ecosystem is likely to be unstable and in continual flux for decades of longer. Today’s “winner” could be tomorrow’s big-time loser.”23 To create a response based on an assumed, predictable outcome on continued dominance is short-sighted, at best, and at worst wholly underestimates the possible severity of catastrophic outcomes.  

    POLICY PROPOSALS 

    We have, during the second Trump administration, watched Pentagon hypotheticals and training exercises move into actual practice. There was no guarantee that the Pentagon’s preparations for a “mass migration event”, meant enacting such a response at Guantanamo Bay, yet now the base is holding site for mass deportations.24 As the War on Terror transformed the imperial spoils from naval base to infamous extralegal prison, the militarized response to immigration is expanding it yet again into the front line of an undeclared war on refugees. Even if the military’s assistance in Trump’s mass deportation scheme is not directly linked to its views on climate change, it is certainly the vision of the future that the Pentagon is preparing for as climate change accelerates. If anything, the Pentagon is actively refining its approach in front of our eyes.     

    Personally, I cannot subscribe to that vision as the only path forward. Ever the optimist, I believe that we can still mitigate the effects of climate change, bring an end to the era of fossil fuels, and orient our national security, foreign, and immigration policies on shared values of human rights and dignity.  A 2007 joint report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for a New American Security summed on the national security implications of climate change summarized it nicely: “In order to emerge form a period of severe climate change as a civilization with hopes for a better future and with prospects for further human development, the very model of what constitutes happiness must change. Globalization will have to be redirected…This can occur either as the result of the collapse of the present system, or by its purposeful reconfiguration.”25  

    Let us detail what a “purposeful reconfiguration” may look like.  

    A 2021 White House report on climate migration offers a few useful starting points.26 It outlines a dual strategy of supporting the human security of migrants to the U.S. while supporting would-be migrants to “who desire to stay as long and safely as possible in their home areas” through investments in U.S. foreign assistance, humanitarian aid, and legal support services. It states, “the foreign assistance infrastructure brings together a powerful combination of tools [and] partnerships to address many elements of the complex issues of climate change and migration. However, current funding levels, structure, and coordination of U.S. foreign assistance is inadequate to meet the challenge…”27 It is safe to say that current funding levels in 2025 are even more inadequate to address the challenge of climate migrants. The hollowing out of USAID and the State Department is a heavy-handed gut-punch to the possibility of a more humane and dignified migration policy. An easy policy recommendation is to reinstate USAID and State funding at least to the previous level and absolutely oppose a reconciliation package that would revoke $8.3 billion in foreign aid from fiscal years 2024 and 2025.  

    That budget, likely inadequate, is several orders of magnitude smaller than the Pentagon’s outrageous budget of $1 trillion.28 When considering the climate impact of military emissions, we simply cannot expect to mitigate climate change while increasing the military’s budget. Instead of building up the war machine to fight people fleeing drought, starvation, and unlivable heat, the United States could scale down its military, in turn reducing production of greenhouse gases. There are available policy proposals that reduce Pentagon spending and lower the climate impact of the military, actually making the world a much safer place for people and the natural environment.  

    It is possible to create compassionate immigration policies29 paired with robust humanitarian and peacebuilding programs that aim to prevent the disasters that drive people to flee their homes in the first place. These kinds of proposals are inherently less climate-intensive and more dignified than a militarized response to immigration. A starting point is a complete abolition on dehumanizing language about migrants. They are not unwanted “hordes” spreading “disease” and “conflict” wherever they go—they are humans. Centering their humanity should compel us to consider our own complicity in exaggerating the climate crisis and funneling exorbitant amounts of money into a military industrial complex that harms people and the planet. There are a range of policy responses that limit the military’s GHG emissions and reduce harm, namely through military spending cuts and reducing the military’s global footprint. Closing unnecessary global military bases reduces the fossil fuels needed to support such infrastructure while offering the bonus of making it more difficult to carry-out clandestine, climate-intensive, and offensive military activities.30   

    We are not alone. All these efforts are amplified and improved through global cooperation and diplomacy, especially with neighboring states and international governance organizations. The investment in the military has eroded diplomatic channels that cultivated a peaceful world—we must claw back and reaffirm global relationships to see a sustainable, peaceful future.     

    End Notes

      1. Brianna Seid, Rosemary Nidiry, and Ram Subramanian, “Debunking the Myth of the ‘Migrant Crime Wave,’” Brennan Center for Justice, September 26, 2024, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/debunking-myth-migrant-crime-wave.

      1. “ICE Budget Now Bigger than Most of the World’s Militaries,” Newsweek, July 2, 2025, https://www.newsweek.com/immigration-ice-bill-trump-2093456.

      1. Lauren-Brooke Eisen, “Budget Bill Massively Increases Funding for Immigration Detention,” Brennan Center for Justice, March 12, 2025, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/budget-bill-massively-increases-funding-immigration-detention. 

      1. Mikkel Flohr, “Key Concept: Securitization (Copenhagen School),” Critical Legal Thinking (blog), March 31, 2025, https://criticallegalthinking.com/2025/03/31/key-concept-securitization-copenhagen-school/. 

      1. “New Estimate: Global Military Is Responsible for More Emissions than Russia,” CEOBS (blog), November 10, 2022, https://ceobs.org/new-estimate-global-military-is-responsible-for-more-emissions-than-russia/.

      1. Nina Lakhani, “How the US Became the Biggest Military Emitter and Stopped Everyone Finding Out,” The Guardian, May 30, 2025, sec. Environment, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/may/30/donald-trump-geopolitics-could-deepen-planetary-catastrophe-expert-warns. 

      1. Crawford, Neta C., “Pentagon Fuel Use, Climate Change, and the Costs of War” (Costs of War, November 13, 2019), https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/Pentagon%20Fuel%20Use%2C%20Climate%20Change%20and%20the%20Costs%20of%20War%20Revised%20November%202019%20Crawford.pdf. 

      1. Corey R. Payne and Ori Swed, “Disentangling the US Military’s Climate Change Paradox: An Institutional Approach,” Sociology Compass 18, no. 1 (2024): 3, https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.13127. 

      1. Payne and Swed, 7.

      1. Paul J. Smith, “Climate Change, Mass Migration and the Military Response,” Orbis 51, no. 4 (January 1, 2007): 617–33, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2007.08.006.

      1. Michael T. Klare, All Hell Breaking Loose: The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate Change (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2019).

      1. Klare, 33. Emphasis added.  

      1. Klare, 34. Emphasis added. 

      1. Klare, 112. Emphasis added.  

      1. “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change” (CNA Corporation, 2007), 18, https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/national%20security%20and%20the%20threat%20of%20climate%20change.pdf.

      1. Klare, All Hell Breaking Loose, 115.

      1. “Findings from Select Federal Reports: The National Security Implications of a Changing Climate” (The White House, May 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/National_Security_Implications_of_Changing_Climate_Final_051915.pdf.

      1. Klare, All Hell Breaking Loose, 27.

      1. Klare, 115–16. Emphasis added. 

      1. Payne and Swed, “Disentangling the US Military’s Climate Change Paradox.”

      1. Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, “An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security,” n.d. Emphasis added.  

      1. “Mass Deportation,” American Immigration Council (blog), accessed June 24, 2025, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/report/mass-deportation/.

      1. Kurt M Campbell et al., “The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change,” n.d., 8. 

      1. “Trump Preparing to Send Thousands of Immigrants Including Europeans to Guantanamo Military Prison: Reports | The Independent,” accessed June 26, 2025, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-immigrants-guantanamo-bay-prison-b2767628.html.

      1. Campbell et al., “The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change,” 78. 

      1. “Report on the Impact of Climate Change on Migration” (The White House, October 2021), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Report-on-the-Impact-of-Climate-Change-on-Migration.pdf.

      1. “Report on the Impact of Climate Change on Migration” (The White House, October 2021), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Report-on-the-Impact-of-Climate-Change-on-Migration.pdf.

      1. Valerie Insinna, “Trump Administration to Request $1T Defense Budget Using Reconciliation Funds,” Breaking Defense (blog), May 2, 2025, https://breakingdefense.com/2025/05/trump-administration-to-request-1t-defense-budget-using-reconciliation-funds/.

      1. “Compassionate Migration Policies Are Also the Right Call Politically,” CIP (blog), April 12, 2022, https://internationalpolicy.org/publications/compassionate-migration-policies-are-also-the-right-call-politically/.

      1. “Drawdown: Improving U.S. and Global Security Through Military Base Closures Abroad,” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft (blog), September 20, 2021, https://quincyinst.org/research/drawdown-improving-u-s-and-global-security-through-military-base-closures-abroad/. 

State Needs Reorganization, Rubio’s Plan Isn’t It

Cole Donovan is an associate director at the Federation of American Scientists. He previously had international S&T roles in the Biden White House, State Department, and Office of Space Commerce.

On May 29, Secretary of State Marco Rubio sent a Congressional Notification to Congress outlining his proposed changes to the U.S. Department of State as part of President Trump’s chaotic redesign of the U.S. government. This planned reorganization of state alienates foreign diplomats, further undermines foreign assistance, and leaves the State less capable.

There are major issues with the Secretary’s proposal. To foreign partners, the redesign looks like a manifestation of the United States’ worst instincts, focused primarily on telling others how to run their countries while emphasizing our supreme military and economic power. Humanitarians are justifiably shocked at the wholesale demolition of foreign assistance mechanisms, whose remnants are being shifted to regional offices with neither the manpower nor contracting experience to responsibly manage those funds. Anyone familiar with the work necessary to effectively manage the myriad issues State has to tackle is likely to notice the demolition of coordinating mechanisms throughout the Department, which served bureau leadership by sorting through the multitude of disparate and disconnected issues that they might encounter in a single meeting with a foreign principal.


To match the service terms of other foreign ministries, State can slow the tempo and increase the depth of Foreign Service deployments.
State’s humanitarian functions are best supported by reinstating USAID, which had in-house technical and development skill that’s harder to develop within State.
While Rubio’s reorganization is likely aimed at producing splashy headlines for Trump, a thoughtful reorganization would take diplomacy seriously – as well as the actual value that State can bring to the table.

While many of these changes are set to diminish how State functions, there is positive potential in a reorganization designed with the long-term prospects of US diplomacy, rather than the short-term whims of an administration, in mind. The status quo, as well as the general operating model of the Department for the last several decades, is not ideal. The desire for improvement is such that some of Rubio’s changes may well be welcomed, including by officers serving in offices whose responsibilities are being merged or consolidated. 

Over time, the Government has added numerous offices and functions to State with the intent to signal that specific issues are important to the sitting government. Consider State’s technical offices. In addition to an Office of Science and Technology Cooperation (which dates back to the Cold War), you also had an Office of the Science and Technology Advisor to the Secretary of State (established in the early 2000s), a Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology, and a Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy (established under Secretary Blinken). 

Which of these offices manages the International Science and Technology Center? That would be the Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (created in 2005 out of the merger of two other offices). If I were to ask a foreign service officer from one of those four organizations about the Center, I’d likely receive a blank stare (inevitably followed by a flurry of activity as that officer attempts to make sure they are as involved in the Center as they can possibly be). They wouldn’t need to worry for long, though. Soon that officer will rotate to their next assignment and the cycle can begin anew.

Retooling diplomacy for the long haul

That rotational churn creates other issues for American diplomacy. Foreign Service Officers rotate through two-year assignments, making frequent moves and retraining a constant part of their careers. A foreign service officer spends their first six months of a rotation learning how to do their new job and an additional four to five months trying to do the best job that they can. The next five are devoted to finding their next assignment, and the next few are spent trying to maximize their performance reviews before they begin preparations for their next job. One of my deputy directors on the EU desk once told me that he didn’t realize when he joined the government that he would spend the rest of his life searching for a job. This incentivizes managers to wait for foreign service rotations to avoid challenging performance management conversations, creating the risk that poor performers or toxic managers may be able to survive the next promotion cycle. 

Increasing the assignment term to five years (so that American diplomats can demonstrate a similar level of competence in a particular job as their counterparts in other foreign ministries and focus on delivering longer-term results) would be a good place to start. This is particularly important for officers working on issues that have inherently long lead times, like managing U.S. interests related to the EU or China’s seven- and five-year legislative program cycles, respectively. At the very least, it would help the Department spend its language training and relocation dollars more effectively. 

Politicizing the workforce, as this Administration is doing, through actions like Schedule Policy/Career and its free response questions as part of the hiring process, inherently cuts against this capability. If this administration fires its experienced workforce, particularly those performing newly-relocated statutory responsibilities, the Administration will deprive consolidated offices of the experience and expertise necessary to maximize their productivity. The real value lost through consolidating isn’t the name of the office, but pushing out the people who deeply understand the history, context, and nuance of diplomatic interactions. These are not skills that can be easily or responsibly replicated by AI tools. As interesting as a large language model might be, it is less likely to proactively identify key points that might be missing from a foreign partner’s remarks or isolate bloviating on behalf of one’s own government from that person’s in-private, in-person ability to get things done.

Long Timelines Versus Short Headlines

The biggest problem that any reorganization of State needs to address is the fundamental misalignment between what the Department is good at doing with the jobs that it is assigned by its political leadership. As the government’s foreign ministry, State works best when assisting other agencies in accomplishing their objectives overseas or advocating on behalf of U.S. interests in particular domains, like intellectual property or agricultural regulations. Some bureaucratic tension between offices with similar missions is even helpful, allowing the Department to predict tension between promoting and protecting American interests.

Not all offices are as successful, like the recently-formed Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology. The intent of this office was to address the increasing relevance of emerging technology issues in global competition. Among the many activities that the office proposed included the creation of an alliance of like-minded countries on quantum science and technology. There was just one problem: another office at the State Department already organized such a partnership with the White House National Quantum Coordination Office. That group held their first meeting almost a year before the Special Envoy had even been named, leading to an extended back and forth between the White House and competing offices at State on how to manage a new political demand signal that had just been answered

Such follies are a likely predictor of what will happen with Secretary Rubio’s new Bureau of Emerging Threats. It’s not clear exactly what value-add this bureau will provide the U.S. government, especially given the numerous offices throughout the government dealing with dangerous critical and emerging technologies, especially within the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community (let alone those that already exist within the Department). This can cause problems. 

In 2011, Secretary Clinton created the Bureau of Energy and Natural Resources (ENR) given a broad recognition of energy policy’s relevance to international stability and achieving the United State’s broader international objectives. A 2016 OIG Inspection found that the Bureau had great relationships with the rest of the Government–just not the Department of Energy (DOE) with which it most needed to work. The OIG reported numerous problems in ENR reported by foreign service officers in Embassies as well as their DOE colleagues, including competing missions, inadequate communication and coordination, and difficulty promulgating a single U.S. energy message to foreign governments. Similar dynamics are captured in the 2015 documentary “The Diplomat”, which described the struggles between the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan with other parts of the U.S. government, each of which thought itself primarily responsible for Afghan and Pakistan Policy.

Invariably, if new offices struggle to identify opportunities in their defined mission space, they begin to move into areas long-occupied by others (or they discover that other offices have already been working in their assumed domains all along and may even have statutory responsibilities in that space), including in other government agencies. Knowing the lay of the land should be essential before starting any reorganization of State aimed at the long-term viability of the diplomatic apparatus of the United States. 

Any future attempt to reorganize the Department should ask itself the following questions before creating any new body, including the appointment of a new special representative:

  1. Does another government agency or office have the legislative mandate and capability to do this work?
  2. Is this work distributed across many agencies who are in tension with one another, where the Department could negotiate a consolidated U.S. position on the subject (and perhaps in doing so help expedite the resolution of domestic policy disputes)?
  3. Is it better if a foreign policy expert speaks to this subject, or should the face that the United States presents to the world be a recognized expert speaking from a position of authority elsewhere in the government? ie; should negotiations on nuclear enrichment be carried out primarily through State or the Department of Energy?
  4. Is there another coordinating body on the subject in the U.S. government?
  5. What are people in this bureau or office going to do when they show up on the job? Who are they likely to clash with?
  6. Can this body follow through with any promises that it might make to foreign governments?
  7. Are the people who State expects to share their resources willing to provide them to this new body, and for what purposes?
  8. What will the organization’s primary leverage be in achieving whatever goals it sets out to accomplish on behalf of a given administration?

When a new body forms and doesn’t have a clear mission, the answer is usually to schedule as many meetings with foreign governments as possible and try to bend the arms of other government agencies to come forward with major commitments. It drains time and resources available to other government agencies, making it harder for them to accomplish their domestic missions. U.S. efforts are placed in stark relief against those of our allies and competitors, alike

Well-resourced offices that create value, like PEPFAR, have clearly made substantial progress in their respective domains and moved the needle on important global issues. This makes the loss of bureaus like Education and Cultural Affairs, which ran the Fulbright program and numerous visitor programs that exposed foreign audiences to the best elements of America’s people and culture, all the more tragic. When a bureau lacks resources, it is often forced to try to trip up international competitors in order to accomplish a goal, or coax foreign partners to use resources that the U.S. government does not have. Such efforts are usually transparent to foreign partners, who do not always appreciate being caught between the United States and one of its many foreign policy objectives. They may question why the richest and most powerful country in the world isn’t willing to put its own resources behind the effort.

I cannot predict what the State Department will actually look like in 10 months given the current chaos, let alone at the end of this government’s term. Other government bodies–particularly the NSC and other White House Policy Councils–would also do well to embrace these recommendations. What I can say is that future governments will need to do a much better job aligning the resources of the Department with its ability to execute its lofty goals–all of which are critical for ensuring the future of American security.