Trump Executive Order on Defense Sales

The actions outlined Executive Order “Reforming Defense Sales to Improve Speed and Accountability,” issued April 9, 2025, will further obscure a vast portion of the arms trade from public and congressional oversight, undermine Congress’ legally mandated authority over arms sales, and increase the flow of U.S. weapons to actors in armed conflicts and criminal groups without adequate end-use monitoring measures.

Obscuring the arms trade from Congress by raising thresholds for notification:

 

Section 3(a)(iii) of the Executive Order dictates that the Executive “submit a joint letter to the Congress proposing an update to statutory congressional certification (also known as congressional notification) thresholds of proposed sales under the FMS and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) programs in the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).”

 

• At present, under the Arms Export Control Act, arms sales that reach a certain financial value require congressional notification and review. The transaction value triggering notification and the duration of the review period vary depending on the proposed recipient and weapons system in question. 

• These notifications provide lawmakers an opportunity to weigh in on arms transfers and act as de facto transparency mechanisms in an otherwise opaque enterprise, facilitating public engagement and inter-branch negotiation on security assistance decisions which have massive impact on U.S. grand strategy and public image, as well as human rights and civilian protection.

• Already, an enormous number of arms sales pass below this notification threshold. Between 2017 and 2020, the Department of State’s Office of the Inspector General found that more than 4,211 below-threshold arms transfers, worth roughly $11 billion, were made to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as they bombed Yemen. Raising notification thresholds would increase the number of arms transfers that proceed without congressional review, warping the political risk calculus for sales and incentivizing even more permissive and less restrained practices. 

 

Undermining congressional authority regarding arms sales:

 

Section 3(a)(iii) of the Executive Order further dictates that “The Secretary of State shall also work with the Congress to review congressional notification processes to ensure the timely adjudication of notified FMS and DCS cases.”

 

• This is likely a reference to eliminating the “tiered review process,” one of the few tools Congress has to exert authority over the transfer of defense articles and services.

• As the State Department Office of the Inspector General explains “the Department has by longstanding practice submitted a preliminary or informal notification of prospective major arms transfers in advance of their formal notification to the congressional committees of jurisdiction.” This process allows for Congress to ask questions or raise concerns prior to formal notification confidentially with the administration.

• Because Congress has never successfully passed Joint Resolution of Disapproval to entirely block an arms sale, this is de facto the only opportunity for Congress to exercise its Constitutional oversight role in matters of foreign relations. Since 95% of arms sales are approved by the State Department within 48 hours, this tiered review process only impacts transfers which pose a significant risk to U.S. national security or violations of international law.

 

Increasing the flow of arms to conflict zones, while risking U.S. proprietary information:

 

Section 3(c)(ii) orders “The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall review and update the list of defense items that can only be purchased through the FMS process (the FMS-Only List).”

• The United States restricts the sale of some items, including those with advanced capabilities and proprietary defense information, to the FMS (Foreign Military Sales) government-to-government process. Among these defense articles are autonomous weapons systems, intelligence libraries, and select electronic warfare items. Allowing these sensitive weapons to be sold through the Direct Commercial Sales process cuts public oversight, while raising the risk of unauthorized transfer or diversion.

Section 3(a)(ii) similarly orders the Executive to “Reevaluate restrictions imposed by the Missile Technology Control Regime on Category I items and consider supplying certain partners with specific Category I items, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce.”

• The Missile Technology Control Regime is an international agreement which seeks to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and limit the risk of related items reaching violent or destabilizing groups.

• Undermining the MTCR not only risks the greater proliferation of the equipment that enables the use of weapons of mass destruction, but means other parties to the MCTR, including Russia, Turkey, and India, may follow suit and make the transfer of these risky technologies to U.S. adversaries more likely.

 

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