The U.S.-Iran War Cannot End Without U.S. Pressure on Israel in Lebanon

When the United States and Iran published the initial Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) meant to halt the months-long war initiated by the U.S. and Israel, its first article called for a “permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon.” It was a term acceptable to the Trump Administration, but not its co-belligerents in the conflict. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz summed up this dynamic on June 24, proclaiming that “we are not retreating” from Lebanon, “even if there is an American demand.” Such statements, while geared toward Israel’s hawkish voting base months before its parliamentary elections, reflect an unfortunate reality: Israel’s political leadership believes it can skirt the demands of its patron, even when its decisions go against U.S. interests. The reality, however, is that Washington can and should materially pressure Tel Aviv to end its military operations in Lebanon, especially if it wants already floundering talks with Iran to succeed.

That agreement explicitly demands a cessation of hostilities across the Middle East between the United States and Israel, on the one hand, and Iran and its allies, on the other. Indeed, it constitutes the first point of the framework for talks between Washington and Tehran, highlighting the importance they place on this component and their understanding of its potential to derail negotiations. The Islamic Republic risked collapsing talks with the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump to connect Lebanon and the region to the MOU, whereas the White House seems to understand that it cannot seriously reject this stance.

Israel, however, has other plans. Since the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, Israel’s genocide of the Gaza Strip, and its subsequent assault on most of its neighbors, it has worked to establish buffer zones of control beyond its borders in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. It claims to view Lebanese Hezbollah as an existential threat, which it views as justifying its forced displacement of at least 1.3 million Lebanese from the country’s south, razing of cities along the disputed border, destruction of civilian infrastructure, poisoning of the land, and refusal to allow any return to the area in what would amount to the war crime of unlawful transfer and ethnic cleansing.

As a result, both Israel and Hezbollah have continued to trade strikes, albeit to a lesser degree. The former has conducted a significant majority of those strikes, with Hezbollah almost entirely responding to them. Both, in turn, accuse each other of violating the ceasefire. For Israel, these developments are the goal, as it hopes to spoil the MOU and renew full, direct hostilities with Iran and continue its unchecked aggression against Lebanon and its neighbors. For a country predicated on land seizure, occupation, and apartheid, it should not be surprising that its only solution to real or perceived security threats was always indefinite and creeping land seizure and occupation.

Spoiling for a fight

Whether or not Trump’s supposed interjection into the situation, reportedly berating the Israeli prime minister in private calls while certainly doing so publicly, plays a role in what appears to be a significant slowdown in hostilities in Lebanon remains unclear. Vice President JD Vance is leading the overall MOU effort in what could be a realization by Trump that the war was not going his way ahead of midterms in November. Vance’s public appearances have focused heavily on selling the deal at home, including relatively historic criticisms of Israel’s political leadership over what he correctly assesses is their role in making his negotiating track more difficult.

Those developments could suggest that there is real and sustainable rhetorical pressure occurring in U.S.-Israel diplomatic engagements, although clear competition with Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the Middle East file suggests a bumpy road ahead. The so-called “historic” trilateral framework agreement between the United States, Israel, and Lebanon could operate as a competing effort designed to disconnect Lebanon from the broader regional file given its direct contradictions with the MOU related to Israeli military operations and withdrawal in and from Lebanon.

Rhetoric alone will not effectively prevent Israel from playing its spoiler role in Lebanon or elsewhere, nor do harsh words suggest real U.S. pressure on the Israeli state. As Israel’s genocide in Gaza highlights, public and private statements against proposed or actual Israeli actions have, at best, only delayed those actions. U.S. President Joe Biden and his team would strategically leak to the press that they were preventing Netanyahu from worsening the situation, just for the Israeli government to commit to that action down the road anyway. Its May 2024 invasion and razing of Rafah in Gaza’s south offers one such example, just as Israel’s late-2024 bombing campaign and invasion of Lebanon represents another.

It is crucial to note that in both instances, efforts existed to end the conflict at the time. That recurring trend cannot be discounted, as Israel has opted to escalate at key moments over the last two and a half years exactly when real opportunities to lower the regional temperature were gaining momentum. It has repeatedly used its military actions in Lebanon and Gaza as a springboard for escalation elsewhere, understanding how its actions would elicit a response that would bolster its calls for continued war – especially in talks with Washington.

Blank checks and balances

While the White House appears to recognize this dynamic, it has not yet taken the step of placing material consequences on its junior partner for actions that go against its interests. This time can and should be different. A real debate is underway in the U.S. Congress over reshaping American military aid to Israel – one admittedly dominated by positions that would dangerously tie both militaries closer together amid growing pushback and during a time of major upheaval in a region Washington should be pulling away from. While substantial support for amendments from figures like outgoing Congressman Thomas Massie to annual funding bills dictating foreign military aid represent pressure points on Israel, the defeat of these amendments on July 15 represent an ongoing, if faltering, rejection by a bipartisan majority in Congress of any policy moves that would seek to pressure Israel. While that fight is far from over, the Trump administration may have even more leverage over Israel than past presidencies to act on its own.

It can and should use its executive authority to end arms sales and other forms of aid to Israel to make clear that it is decisions in Washington, not Tel Aviv, that determine the direction of American policy in the region. As with previous calls, the same provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) apply: namely Section 502B, which dictates that no security assistance may be provided to any country engaging in a “consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” The FAA’s Section 620I, alongside the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), similarly dictate that no assistance may be furnished under these mechanisms to any country prohibiting or restricting U.S. humanitarian assistance. Section 620M of the FAA, known as the “Leahy Laws,” further prohibits U.S. assistance to a foreign security force unit when there is credible information that such unit has committed a “gross violation of human rights.”

Each of these moves are unlikely, however, under one of the most pro-Israel presidents in U.S. history. To be sure, Trump has decoupled U.S. interests from Israeli ones in many unique ways, pressuring Netanyahu in ways unseen under previous presidencies. While notable, these decisions reflect a Trump-first foreign policy as opposed to an America-first foreign policy, with the endgame often reaching American-Israeli alignment anyway. Self-preservation is the name of the game in this White House and should not be confused with a real effort to upend U.S.-Israel relations.

Given this position, Congress could explore other avenues for action, such as blocking arms sales within 30 days notification under the formal review process outlined under the AECA. However, Congress has never successfully done so. Worse, Trump could simply declare an emergency, allowing the immediate issuance of the sale to move forward pending government agency review. Notably, Trump has repeatedly utilized this emergency provision across both of his terms.

Efforts to apply material pressure on Israel for its actions in Lebanon are, therefore, difficult without Executive branch cooperation. Yet while this administration appears unwilling to fully commit to a major reset in U.S.-Israel relations, as dictated by international law, it can at least take marginal steps to keep Israel in check. That includes freezing certain arms sales by delaying transfers to signal that it can and will take unprecedented steps to ensure its MOU with Iran works. It means empowering the Lebanese state to return to the south after a forced Israeli withdrawal from all sovereign Lebanese territory, allowing it to truly work for all its people as opposed to foreign interests. It requires bold, historic decisions that recognize the failures of the past on the part of U.S. administrations to accept the region as it is and not as Israel wants it to be and dictates into reality and failure.

These options are limited under such a reckless administration. Yet as this author has previously argued, the end to the regional war flows through Lebanon. The benefits of ending that war could be monumental, although Israel’s illegal occupation of Palestine still lingers as the true source of regional instability. Yet for now, pragmatism must reign supreme, with deals meant to prevent a return to war crucial as the regional shift continues. Should the Trump administration want to return to a ceasefire, acknowledging how the MOU specifically failed in regard to Lebanon, should inform that push, although placing faith in such an outcome remains shaky at best.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst, the senior editor at DAWN, and a contributing fellow at Defense Priorities. He focuses on U.S. foreign policy, military restraint, and geopolitical developments in the Levant and West Asia.

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