A Reading of the Ceasefire Agreement Between Israel and Hamas – Dimensions and Challenges
Omar Shaban is the founder and director of Palthink for Strategic Studies and the inaugural Leahy Fellow at the Center for International Policy.
On January 19, 2025, Israel and Hamas announced a ceasefire, with the goal of ending a devastating round of conflict in Gaza that lasted nearly 15 months, amid complex international and regional contexts and conflicting interests. As of publication, the two sides are set to discuss the terms for implementing phases two and three of the agreement, though without guarantee of success or long-term enforcement. While the agreement has been described as a step towards calm, it does not yet represent a definitive solution to the conflict. Rather, it may be part of a long-term strategy that seeks to reshape the political and military landscape in Gaza and the region.
Successive official statements by international parties and mediators show that the agreement still contains ambiguity in its terms, raising questions about its viability and prospects for implementation.
The objectives of the agreement and its undeclared dimensions
American statements indicate the war is not over yet: Despite the announcement of the agreement as a first step towards calm, statements from the forthcoming Trump administration representing Israeli intentions reveal hidden goals beyond the ceasefire, for example statements by Trump’s new National Security Adviser Michael Waltz. He said that the complete demilitarization of Gaza and the destruction of Hamas remained goals, and that war could resume once Israeli and American hostages were released. He went even further by declaring, “If Hamas violates this agreement, we will support Israel 100 percent to return to war.”
Ambiguity about the fate of military leaders: The ceasefire’s clauses on medical treatment, which refer to the daily departure of 50 wounded soldiers with three escorts through the Rafah crossing, with the approval of Israel and Egypt, will need to be monitored closely and transparently, as it could potentially serve as a cover for the deportation of Hamas military and political leaders from the Gaza Strip.
This condition has already been put forward by Israel and the United States as part of any settlement. In the absence of transparency, it appears that the agreement may include secret arrangements that preserve Hamas’s face while serving Israeli and U.S. strategic goals. This raises the question of the various powers’ ability to impose such a clause on Hamas inside the Gaza Strip, which has made successive statements about its refusal to leave the Gaza Strip under any justification.
Last Minute Consensuses: Mutual Concessions or Interim Tactic? The announcement of a series of last-minute resolutions of differences between Israel and Hamas, and the imminent meeting of the Israeli cabinet to approve the deal, indicate intense regional and international pressure to ensure the implementation of the agreement. But the nature of these concessions is unclear, fueling speculation that some of the undeclared clauses may be more influential than those announced.
The main challenges in the agreement
Ambiguity in later stages: The agreement is divided into multiple phases, but the details of the second and third phases (such as reconstruction, full withdrawal, and final ceasefire) remain vague and subject to further negotiations. This opens the way for postponing these essential items, if all of these are subject to the ability of Hamas to implement everything contained in the provisions of the first phase, i.e. there is a severe test for Hamas to gain the confidence of mediators, especially the United States, in the first phase. The second and third phases are also fraught with many obstacles, with fundamental differences in perception between Israel and Hamas.
Israel makes it clear that, as part of the phase II negotiations, it will be possible to end the war only under the following conditions:
Release all abductees.
Hamas leadership agrees to exile (via safe exit) to a third country.
Agreeing to dismantle its military capabilities.
Avoid any active political participation in the form of Hamas in Gaza “the next day.”
According to Israeli officials, if Hamas agrees to these terms, Israel will not have to return to fighting, but if it refuses — and in Israel they estimate that Hamas will refuse — there is a high probability of resuming fighting.
Lack of real guarantees: The agreement lacks genuine and binding oversight mechanisms to ensure its transparent implementation, making it vulnerable to violations by the stronger party. US-Israeli statements linking the continuation of the truce to Hamas’s commitment reflect a reliance on the balance of power rather than a clear international or legal framework. This lack of guarantees opens the way for Israel to interpret the terms of the agreement in a way that serves its security and strategic interests, as happened in previous experiences such as the Oslo Accords.
Exclusion of the Palestinian Authority: The exclusion of the Palestinian Authority deepens the internal Palestinian division and makes the agreement a solely bilateral one between the Israelis and Hamas. This deprives the agreement of any overall national legitimacy and weakens the chances of turning it into a genuine political settlement.
Internal Israeli politics: Israel’s internal differences are currently felt strongly between Netanyahu and the right-wing led by Smotrich and Ben Gvir, the latter of whom resigned over the signing of the agreement between Hamas and Israel and stipulated that the return to the government is primarily contingent on Netanyahu’s commitment to return to fighting in Gaza after the first phase.
This calls into question Netanyahu’s ability to retain the government. Although there is consideration of the opposition’s promises to secure a safety net in the event that the far right withdraws from the government, Netanyahu is well aware that the opposition bloc led by Yair Lapid will work to save the government only until the deal is completed, and then it will withdraw at the first opportunity so as to collapse the Netanyahu government. The opposition is also seeking power in its own right and to do so must collapse the government in order to go to elections and compete for the parliamentary majority. These dynamics show that domestic politics may play a decisive role in determining the future of an agreement. Netanyahu may resort to disrupting or reinterpreting the agreement as a way to strengthen his domestic political position.
Other weakness of the agreement
The current agreement is more akin to a declaration of principles than to a permanent settlement, as its continuation depends on the commitment of the parties to implement the first phase smoothly. It is only the first step in a series of mysterious stages. Which is perceived as an unfinished frame.
The agreement lacks clear implementation guarantees and effective international oversight mechanisms. This reflects Israel’s continued policy of exploiting agreements as tools to manage negotiations and conflict, not resolve it.
The exclusion of other Palestinian parties threatens to turn the agreement into a “temporary truce” and the lack of any overarching national dimension makes it more difficult to achieve sustainable peace.
The announcement of the agreement from Doha and not Cairo reflects a regional competition between mediators, especially competition for the expected regional role in the US strategy for the region, which may exclude the party that does not seem to have much influence in imposing its conditions or influence on Hamas. This rivalry may weaken coordination and increase the fragility of the agreement, especially with the possibility of undeclared clauses and the ambiguity of the second and third phases, which may reflect differences in interests between regional parties.
Trump’s recent comments about the future of the Gaza Strip, both in regards to who should have political control over it and the fate of the Palestinians of Gaza during reconstruction, could undermine the implementation of the agreement in its later stages. It could also cause a crisis in neighboring countries like Jordan and Egypt, essential stakeholders in seeing de-escalation happen.
Opportunities and motives for the continuation of the agreement
Feeling the American determination and the role of the Trump administration and Baden in drafting the agreement through: – The balance between the two US administrations The agreement is not the product of the efforts of one administration but a combination of multiple factors, including international pressure on Israel after the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, and the role of regional mediators such as Qatar and Egypt. – Biden: Quiet diplomacy The Biden administration has worked to continue efforts through diplomatic channels, taking advantage of relations with mediators (Qatar and Egypt). Biden’s statements about the continuation of the ceasefire during the second and third stages of negotiations, even if the duration of the first phase exceeds the specified time, shows the administration’s desire to avoid the collapse of the agreement.
Trump: Maximum pressure policy
Trump relies on a “big stick” policy, as his statements and those of his advisers show unlimited support for Israel in the event of renewed war. But on the other hand, it was indirect pressure that pushed the parties to the agreement, and Trump himself is proud that his presence is what prompted this agreement to crystallize, not to mention his personal determination to the demands of calm in the Middle East, and that he has broader projects in the region, which are projects subject to strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and normalization with Israel, in order to devote himself to the great economic project and compete with the next China, which is the main goal that he does not manage in the coming stages, and he has no time to drain America, financially or militarily, in any future wars, economic peace depends on calm in the Middle East. Versus China’s competition.
As the agreement is not the product of the efforts of just one administration but a combination of multiple factors, including international pressure on Israel after the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, and the role of regional mediators such as Qatar and Egypt. That means the ceasefire agreement is most likely to sustain. The ceasefire agreement has regional and international back up.
Biden’s quiet diplomacy: Biden administration has worked to continue efforts through diplomatic channels, taking advantage of relations with mediators (Qatar and Egypt). Biden’s statements about the continuation of the ceasefire during the second and third stages of negotiations, even if the duration of the first phase exceeds the specified time, shows the administration’s desire to avoid the collapse of the agreement.
Trump’s Maximum pressure policy: Trump relies on a “big stick” policy, as his statements and those of his advisers show unlimited support for Israel in the event of renewed war. But on the other hand, it was indirect pressure that pushed the parties to the agreement, and Trump himself is proud that his presence is what prompted this agreement to crystallize, not to mention his personal interests and determination to the demands of calm in the Middle East, and that he has broader projects in the region, which are projects subject to strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. There is also the prospect of further Arab normalization with Israel, which he has repeatedly affirmed he has interest in building upon.
The Trump administration’s desire for the return of the Palestinian Authority: News reports have suggested that Trump will restore the Palestinian National Authority to run the Gaza Strip despite Israel’s opposition. Palestinian Authority officials said that President Trump asked the PA to control the crossings in the Gaza Strip, in a conversation with the Director General of the Crossings in the Palestinian Authority, Nazmi Muhanna, and the Attorney General of the Ministry of Civil Affairs in the Palestinian Authority, Ayman Qandil, who went to Cairo at Trump’s request, in order to close the details of this file and prevent Hamas or any other party from control, and this means that Trump has a vision about the future of any agreement with Saudi Arabia, which conditions normalization on the understanding of the solution of the Palestinian state and the need for its control over the Gaza Strip as part of any upcoming agreement.
However, political arrangements at the Rafah crossing remain dependent on Israel’s statements about maintaining a security presence in the Philadelphia axis, raising questions about its intentions towards a complete withdrawal or easing of the blockade of Gaza. Where control of the crossing may remain controversial, issues related to humanitarian aid are subject to the possibility of being used as leverage in later stages. At the same time, Trump’s ambiguous and incendiary comments about US control over the Gaza Strip could also embolden the Israeli government and undermine the Authority’s bid to reassume governance in the enclave.
Positions of key regional mediators:
While the announcement of the agreement was made in Doha instead of Cairo, despite the vital Egyptian role, there are differences between the two governments’ positions. Qatar has a great interest in ensuring this agreement by any means, as this is its first experience with regard to stopping a war in the Gaza Strip, which gives it an important place in any future Middle Eastern arrangement.
The Palestinian file historically represents an important issue for Egypt, especially through previous strategic interventions in this file, as it is an Egyptian national security file. This is especially true for the Gaza Strip, not to mention its real desire to stop the war in any way, in order to restore its economic losses and the return of navigation in the Suez Canal, which was severely affected by the support for the Palestinian people that was approved by Ansar Allah (Houthis) in Yemen, which targeted ships in the Red Sea, affected navigation in the canal, and in turn affected the canal’s revenues dramatically. Egypt has been able to prove that it is still an influential and strong player in this file through the Rafah land crossing, which is the only exit to the Gaza Strip and controlled by Egypt, where one of the conditions of the ceasefire agreement was to return to the management of the Rafah crossing through Egyptian supervision, and that Israel has the right to supervise the lists of injured military travelers who are required to be treated outside the Gaza Strip.
Hopeful recommendations
Future moves by Israel and the United States will determine whether the subsequent phases bring about a real calm, or be used as a cover for re-escalation. The following are recommendations that, if they were implemented, could be used to sustain the ceasefire and provide a framework for long-term peace.
Involve all Palestinian parties: The PA and the PLO should be included in any future negotiations to ensure the inclusiveness of the agreement. In the longer term, PA reform and new elections are essential for the PA to be seen as legitimate and effective.
Establishment of an international monitoring mechanism: the need for an impartial international body to supervise the implementation of the terms of the agreement and prevent violations.
Strengthening regional coordination: Push Qatar and Egypt to coordinate their efforts to avoid competition and achieve real stability in mediation.
Rebuilding international trust: engaging the United Nations and international actors to ensure a transparent and sustainable negotiating framework.
Affirm the territorial integrity of the whole of Palestinian territory including the Gaza Strip as part of a future Palestinian state.
Is the agreement the beginning of a solution or a temporary break?
While the agreement is seen as an opportunity to stop the bloodshed in Gaza, the ambiguity of its terms and the continued Israeli and American goals in reshaping the Palestinian landscape keep it within the framework of the temporary truce. The absence of international guarantees and the deepening of Palestinian and regional divisions make the future of the agreement dependent on complex political balances that could return the region to the cycle of escalation at any moment.
