Expanding Use of Emergency Arms Authorities Requires More Congressional Oversight

Janet Abou-Elias is a research fellow at the Center for International Policy and co-founder of Women for Weapons Trade Transparency.

In late May, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a quietly damning report on the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) – a statutory tool that allows the president to transfer defense articles and services from U.S. stockpiles to foreign partners without advance congressional approval. The findings show that in the rush to meet wartime needs, the Department of Defense (DoD) has repeatedly neglected basic statutory safeguards intended to protect U.S. force readiness and fiscal discipline.

Yet while the report’s spotlight is on Ukraine, another drawdown mechanism is operating with even less public accountability: the War Reserve Stockpile Allies–Israel (WRSA-I) program. Both PDA and WRSA-I reflect a concerning drift away from the core principles of legislative oversight and budgetary transparency in U.S. security assistance.

The Oversight Shortfalls in PDA

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States has used PDA to transfer more than $31.7 billion in arms to Ukraine, as well as over $1 billion to Taiwan and Haiti. The GAO found that the DoD failed to conduct required Operations and Maintenance (O&M) budget impact assessments for 21 of the fiscal year 2024 PDA packages it reviewed, highlighting a persistent gap in oversight despite the scale of transfers authorized.

These assessments are not optional. They are required under the law to evaluate how pulling from U.S. stockpiles might affect military readiness, sustainment, and operations. The Pentagon has been on notice since at least 2016, when GAO first recommended that military services develop clear guidance for performing such evaluations. Nearly a decade later, that guidance remains nonexistent.

The report also confirms that replacement funding for PDA drawdowns is not guaranteed as it depends on discretionary congressional appropriations. While Congress has so far allocated over $45 billion to replenish what was sent to Ukraine, this process is ad hoc and susceptible to political delays. The absence of required impact assessments means policymakers are often voting on replacement funds without a clear understanding of operational tradeoffs or baseline stockpile metrics.

WRSA-I: A Parallel Drawdown Program with Even Less Scrutiny

While PDA has rightly come under scrutiny, another statutory mechanism has largely escaped public debate: the War Reserve Stockpile Allies–Israel (WRSA-I). Originally intended to pre-position U.S. materiel for contingency use in the Middle East, WRSA-I has, over time, evolved into a quasi-permanent drawdown channel for direct transfers to Israel, especially during military escalations.

Between 2023 and 2024, U.S. officials authorized multiple shipments from WRSA-I to Israel during its military attacks on Gaza. Unlike PDA, which requires at least limited congressional notification, WRSA-I transfers occur with almost no reporting obligations to Congress or the public. As a result, we know very little about what munitions were transferred, how often, and what consequences – logistical, operational, or political – they may have produced.

This lack of transparency is not incidental; it is the product of a decade of statutory dilution. Legislative amendments in the 2014 and 2021 National Defense Authorization Acts have gradually lowered the oversight threshold for WRSA-I by relaxing valuation limits and broadening eligibility for use. These changes were not widely debated and were often embedded in larger omnibus legislation.

The program’s legal scaffolding has shifted in ways that increasingly bypass both congressional oversight and traditional foreign aid processes. While framed as a logistical asset, WRSA-I now functions in practice as an off-budget arms channel – one that, like PDA, circumvents Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and arms export controls that would normally trigger review by congressional committees or the public.

A Broader Institutional Concern

The parallels between Presidential drawdowns and the use of  War Reserve Stockpile for Allies- Israel reflect a broader institutional pattern: U.S. security assistance is increasingly moving through emergency or pre-authorized mechanisms that operate outside of standard deliberative and oversight processes. In both cases, the executive branch has taken advantage of flexible authorities in the name of responsiveness – while neglecting the due diligence, reporting, and budgeting that Congress has required by law.

This is not just a bureaucratic failure. It raises fundamental constitutional concerns about the erosion of Congress’s Article I powers to authorize spending and oversee foreign military engagements. When weapons are transferred through opaque stockpiles or drawn down without proper assessments, it undermines the transparency and accountability that are essential to democratic control of the military.

Recommendations

Congress should act on the GAO’s findings by:

1. Mandating O&M assessments for all PDA drawdowns and requiring public reporting on their outcomes;
   
2. Applying equivalent oversight standards to WRSA-I, including disclosure of drawdown quantities and conditions, and reinstating valuation thresholds;
   
3. Establishing centralized tracking mechanisms across DoD to monitor cumulative impacts on U.S. stockpiles, regardless of the drawdown authority used;
   
4. Codifying replenishment requirements, particularly for frequently used programs, to avoid ad hoc budgeting that undermines strategic planning.
   

Absent these reforms, programs like Presidential Drawdown Authority and War Reserve Stockpile for Allies- Israel risk becoming permanent fixtures of a shadow aid architecture – one that enables short-term arms transfers at the expense of long-term democratic oversight.