In April, U.S. prosecutors indicted the sitting governor of Sinaloa state in Mexico along with nine other current and former officials for colluding with the Sinaloa Cartel to traffic fentanyl and other narcotics into the United States, and for violence carried out by cartel gunmen armed with machineguns and other firearms. Two of the officials have since turned themselves in to U.S. authorities – presumably to turn state’s evidence – while the rest remain in Mexico. The Trump administration declared the cartel as a foreign terrorist organization last year, so the indictment charges Mexican officials with colluding with terrorists.
During 2017 through 2020, the years that some of those same Sinaloa officials were allegedly colluding with the cartel, the United States licensed gun companies to legally export weapons that went to the Sinaloa police forces the officials ran – licenses that were approved or extended by the State Department during Trump’s first term.
Sig Sauer, Inc., based in New Hampshire, exported at least 243 firearms to Sinaloa state and municipal police from 2016 to 2020. During that time, José Antonio Dionisio Hipolito was Director of Sinaloa State Police and is accused in the indictment issued in April of being on the cartel monthly payroll.
Sig Sauer and Glock were founded and are still owned by Europeans. Sig Sauer’s CEO, Ron Cohen, was arrested in Germany in 2018 after firearms produced in that country for export to the United States were re-exported to Colombia, without a German export license to do so. (He was later released.) Since then, Sig has moved all of its production to New Hampshire. Glock is Austrian, but beginning in 2022, it began exporting thousands of firearms to Mexico from its U.S. production location in Georgia, according to Arms Trade Treaty records.
Glock exported 11,125 handguns to Mexico in 2022-2023. At least 58 of these firearms were sold to Sinaloa state and local police agencies during those two years, according to receipts for these transfers obtained through a public records request to the Mexican army.
During 2022-2023, according to the indictment, Dionisio Hipolito as well as other state and local police officials in Sinaloa were colluding with the cartel in exchange for bribes.
Mexico legally imports, by far, more firearms from the United States than any other Latin American country, in some years nearly as much as the rest of the region combined. The growth of such U.S. gun exports began with the Mérida Initiative in 2008, a U.S. assistance plan modeled on the militarized approach of Plan Colombia, but these sales continued after military and police assistance declined in 2010. It just meant that Mexico bought the weapons and other gear from U.S. companies, instead of having them paid for by U.S. taxpayers.
In some respects, this reflects an arms race of the Mexican military with criminal organizations, which have nearly unlimited access to military-grade weaponry in the U.S. retail gun market, and plenty of cash. But the acquisition of ever great amounts of weaponry by the state also assumes that the most effective means of weakening these criminal organizations, whose raison d’etre is to make money, is through military force. This turns out not to be true.
Since the declaration of the drug war in 2007 in Mexico, there have been more than 450,000 homicides and over 120,000 disappearances, most carried out by or against criminal groups, although many victims were simply in the wrong place, or fell to armed misogyny or conflicts between individuals.
Enter Trumpian hubris. Its peculiarity is to believe that going after the heads – of states or criminal groups – will eliminate the structural problems that lead to their behaviors. The current version builds on the kingpin strategy, in place for decades, by which the United States arrests or kills leaders of narcotics traffickers, who are then replaced through bloody succession battles.
Guns R Us
Even more U.S. weapons flow through the illicit trade to the Sinaloa Cartel and others in Mexico from retail gun shops and private sales in southwestern states. Between 70% and 80% of firearms seized in Mexico and submitted for tracing came from the United States. According to an investigation published in 2023 by N+, when one of the sons of cartel capo ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán was arrested earlier that year, dozens of weapons recovered during the operation were traced to gun purchasers in Arizona and Texas who illicitly trafficked them directly to his faction of the Sinaloa Cartel – the same faction that the Justice Department is now accusing of bribing state government officials in Sinaloa.
The pipeline of weapons trafficked from Arizona to Sinaloa has only gotten worse since then, according to data obtained from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). In 2024, an intra-cartel war erupted in Sinaloa after one of its leaders, ‘El Mayo’ Zambada, was betrayed by a competitor and shipped to the United States. Last year, the Mexican army seized more than twice as many crime guns in Sinaloa as in any other Mexican state.
In 2024, according to ATF data, most crime guns trafficked to Mexico with a short “time to crime” – the time between purchase and confiscation in Mexico, a key indicator of deliberate trafficking – came from one state. 62% of U.S.-sourced guns with a time-to-crime of a year or less were procured from Arizona. In fact, a majority of these firearms were purchased in a single county – Maricopa County, where Phoenix is located. Arizona and Texas, even more than most states, have enormous, permissive and militarized retail gun markets. There, if you have the cash, it is easy to purchase a .50 caliber Barrett rifle that can penetrate armor and shoot down helicopters. It can even be done without a background check.
In other words, U.S. weapons go both from U.S. retail gun shops to the cartel that the U.S. has designated a foreign terrorist organization, and through licensed exports to police forces that the U.S. Department of Justice says collude with the cartel.
The Trump administration is beholden, politically and ideologically, to the firearms industry, whose vision of peace is no-holds-barred on weapons commerce. The ATF recently announced over 30 changes to firearms regulations that will make it easier to traffic weapons over the border to cartels in Mexico.
Still, if the administration has political will to weaken the hold of violent cartels in Mexico, it can effectively address its means of violence by focused efforts to reduce the illicit traffic of weapons to them from gun retailers. In March, the DOJ indicted an Arizona gun dealer for selling weapons to cartel operatives and materially supporting a foreign terrorist organization. It could do more by deploying the ATF to inspect gun dealers instead of removing their enforcement authorities.
It should also control the end use for legally exported U.S. firearms to exclude police and military forces credibly documented to collude with criminal groups or violate human rights. The administration could accomplish this through policy or support for congressional passage of the ARMAS Act, which would establish stronger transparency and accountability for the export of U.S. firearms, while also increasing interagency coordination and international incentives to disrupt firearms trafficking.
Finally, the federal government should prohibit the retail sale to civilians of .50 caliber rifles highly desired by cartels through passage of the Stop Arming Cartels Act.
U.S. firearms enable a wide range of violence in Mexico and the United States – narcotics trafficking, violent conflict between criminal groups and state forces, homicides, forced disappearances, extortion, femicides, and control of migration routes. Any strategy seeking to reduce these harms must address the guns that make them possible. Reducing the illicit flow of firearms and working to keep those weapons – both licit and illicit – from those who would further the harm will benefit many thousands of families, on both sides of the border.
John Lindsay-Poland is coordinator of Stop US Arms to Mexico, a project of Global Exchange.
In November 2025, the US State Department approved a $93 million arms sale to India that included Javelin anti-tank missile systems and Excalibur precision-guided artillery munitions. While the deal is a relatively modest one in financial terms, it reveals the evolution of Washington’s security assistance strategy in South Asia.
This Foreign Military Sales (FMS) package is designed to enhance India’s precision strike capabilities and battlefield effectiveness, while reinforcing interoperability with US-origin systems already in service, such as the M777 howitzer. Unlike earlier high-profile deals focused on major platforms — maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, or transport fleets — this sale prioritizes precision, integration, and sustainment, signaling a strategic shift in US thinking about how best to support India’s military modernization.
The timing of the sale is equally important. It comes after both signed the 2025 Framework for the US-India Major Defense Partnership and amid a broader push by Washington to deepen defense ties with India as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy, even as political frictions persistover trade, India’s relationship with Russia, and “strategic autonomy.” US officials framed the deal as supporting India’s role as a “major defense partner” and contributing to regional stability, especially in regard to countering China.
The US has also signed a new $686 million package arms sales deal with Pakistan that the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency approved in December 2025, and which is almost entirely focused on upgrading and sustaining Pakistan’s F-16 fighter jet fleet rather than providing new weapons systems. The inclusion of Link-16 enhances coordination with US and allied forces, particularly in joint operations and counterterrorism missions. Washington emphasized that the deal with Pakistan would not alter the region’s balance, where India maintains its military muscle.
Globally, the United States remains the dominant arms exporter, accounting for roughly 42 percent of total global arms exports in 2021–25, far ahead of competitors. This dominance gives Washington unmatched leverage — but that leverage is unevenly distributed across regions. South Asia is not the largest destination for US arms, but it is among the most strategically sensitive. Asia and Oceania account for roughly one-third of global arms transfers, with India and Pakistan consistently among the top importers. India alone has remained one of the world’s largest arms importers for decades, while Pakistan’s imports have surged in recent years. Data from the Security Assistance Monitor (SAM) at the Center for International Policy, which tracks US security assistance dating back to 2000, complements this picture. SAM data demonstrates that US involvement in South Asia extends beyond major weapons systems to include FMS, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), training programs, and counterterrorism assistance. This broader ecosystem of assistance matters because it fosters relationships, builds interoperability, and shapes the military doctrines of both India and Pakistan.
Yet, what does the United States want to achieve by these arms sales to India and Pakistan? SAM data reveals a pattern: US arms sales are not simply about equipping India and Pakistan, but also influencing the regional order. However, India’s diversification and Pakistan’s pivot to China indicate that US influence through arms transfers is constrained, as it cannot change either state’s behavior. To remain relevant, US policy must shift from transactional arms sales to a more integrated approach that prioritizes systems, crisis management, and political strategy.
India: The Selective Customer
The US–India defense relationship transformed dramatically since the early 2000s. Arms transfers outline the shape of this shift, but they do not tell the whole story.
US arms sales to India are best understood in terms of the capabilities they enable rather than the platforms themselves. From SAM Data, across maritime, air, and land domains, US transfers strengthened India’s maritime surveillance and anti-submarine warfare capabilities through systems such as the P-8I and naval helicopters, while also enhancingprecision-strike capabilitieswith guided munitions such as Excalibur artillery rounds and Javelin missiles. At the same time, heavy-lift aircraft such as the C-17 and C-130 expanded India’s strategic mobility and logistics reach, particularly for high-altitude and rapid-deployment operations. More recent acquisitions—including drones and data-linked systems—underscore a shift toward networked warfare, where sensors, shooters, and decision-making are increasingly integrated in real time. Taken together, these sales indicate that the United States is not simply supplying hardware but helping India build a more integrated force.
Yet, India remains a selective buyer, not a dependent client. Historically, Russia has been India’s greatest supplier of arms, a persistent thorn in US–India defense relationships across administrations. Despite increasing diversification among suppliers and growing US sales — including transport aircraft, helicopters, and surveillance platforms — Russia continues to supply the most arms to India, followed by France and Israel. The efforts at diversification reflect a deliberate strategy rooted in strategic autonomy. India has reduced its reliance on Russia—from roughly 70 percent of imports in the early 2010s to around 40 percent more recently—but has not replaced that dependence with a US monopoly. Instead, it has created a multi-vendor procurement model.
For Washington, this creates both opportunity and limitation. Arms sales remain a key pillar of the broader strategic partnership, reinforcing initiatives such as interoperability agreements and maritime cooperation. Yet, the US cannot fully shape India’s military posture through arms transfers alone. Also, focusing only on the mix of arms suppliers overlooks the other dominant trend governing India’s military spending. India’s growing domestic defense industry is gradually reducing its reliance on imports altogether. This trend suggests that US arms sales to India may plateau—not because of political friction, but because of structural shifts in India’s defense economy.
Pakistan: The Uncertain Partner
SAM data highlights the cyclical nature of US assistance to Pakistan. In recent years, US arms transfers to Pakistan increasingly focused on maintenance, sustainment, and counterterrorism, rather than new high-end capabilities. During the post-9/11 period, Pakistan was a major recipient of US military aid, including aircraft, helicopters, and counterterrorism support. However, since the mid-2010s, US assistance has declined sharply, reflecting growing mistrust and shifting priorities. Two incidents in 2011 forced Washington to view Pakistan through a critical lens, especially in the realm of counterterrorism: the raid in Abbottabad that killed Osama bin Laden and the Salala incident where NATO airstrikes killed Pakistani soldiers near the Afghanistan border. In addition to these high-profile incidents, the formal conclusion of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2014, the US combat mission in Afghanistan, reduced the strategic rationale for expensive military aid to Pakistan. The Resolute Support Mission, which succeeded Enduring Freedom, simply did not have the capacity to provide Pakistan with a high level of US military aid.
Figure: Deliveries of US Arms To Pakistan, 2009 – 2017
The relationship also drew negative political attention, prompting pushback from Members of Congress. In May 2016, a State Department spokesperson cited congressional opposition as the main reason why the Obama administration had decided not to provide FMF, or in other words, US taxpayer-provided money, to Pakistan for purchasing F-16s. Instead, the US welcomed Pakistan to raise its own funds for the jets. Since Pakistan was unable to raise the funds, the deal was eventually scuttled.
As US security assistance waned, Pakistan deepened its defense relationship with China, which now accounts for roughly 80 percent of its arms imports. Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied arsenalemphasizes advanced airpower and air combat dominance, anchored by platforms like the JF-17 (jointly developed) and J-10C fighters, along with long-range air-to-air missiles and supporting radar systems. These are complemented by integrated air defense capabilities, including systems like the HQ-9 and LY-80 surface-to-air missiles, which provide layered protection against aircraft and drones. China also significantly strengthened Pakistan’s naval and maritime warfare capabilities, including the transfer of modern frigates (such as Type 054A vessels) and submarine technologies, enabling better sea control and anti-access operations in the Arabian Sea.
The result is a bifurcated regional landscape. The United States is a major—but not dominant—supplier to India, and a declining—though still relevant—supplier to Pakistan. China, by contrast, is becoming Pakistan’s primary external defense partner, reinforcing a broader geopolitical alignment.
How Arms Transfers Fuel the India–Pakistan Rivalry
The most enduring driver of arms transfers in South Asia remains the India–Pakistan rivalry. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data consistently identifies both countries among the world’s largest arms importers, with their competition serving as a central driver of regional militarization. US arms sales have played a complex role in this dynamic. On one level, Washington has sought to maintain a degree of balance, historically supplying both India and Pakistan at different times. On another level, US policy has increasingly tilted toward India, reflecting broader Indo-Pacific priorities.
Figure: Comparison of US Arms Sales Capabilities: India vs. Pakistan
This shift has implications for strategic stability. While US arms transfers to India are often framed as part of a broader effort to counter China, they inevitably affect the India–Pakistan balance as well. Pakistan, in turn, responds through its own procurement — largely from China — creating a triangular arms dynamic. The nature of the arms transfers also matters. As the May 2025 crisis indicated, modern warfare is focused on networks, long-range precision-strike capabilities, and airpower integration, as well as beyond-visual-range engagement. These trends suggest that arms transfers are no longer about platforms alone but about systems integration — something that US assistance is particularly well-suited to provide.
Compared to China and other major sellers, US arms transfers come with end-use monitoring, congressional oversight, and political expectations attached to security assistance. While these tools often fall short of meaningful restraint, they nonetheless introduce political considerations into the transfer process. Also, unlike private defense firms in the United States that remain institutionally separate from the state, and where US arms manufacturers compete for the same contracts, Chinese firms operate within a political framework that allows the state to direct or integrate commercial innovation into national security objectives. As a result, Pakistan is not simply buying weapons from China but is becoming integrated into China’s technologyarchitecture, which could accelerate elements like military adaptation, networked warfare, and AI-enabled decision-making in future crises with India. This also complicates traditional confidence-building measures in South Asia, which were designed around visible state-controlled military systems rather than commercially enabled, dual-use technologies.
At the strategic level, US arms transfers operate within the constraints of nuclear deterrence. Both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons, and their rivalry is structured around mutual vulnerability, which relies on two presuppositions. First, conventional arms transfers do not fundamentally alter the deterrence balance. They may shift tactical or operational dynamics, but they do not change the underlying strategic equilibrium. The US Arms Export Control Act acknowledges the role that conventional arms transfers can play in overall stability by requiring that export control decisions “take into account whether the export of an article would contribute to an arms race, aid in the development of weapons of mass destruction…or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control or nonproliferation agreements.”
The second assumption of US deterrence policy is that external actors have a limited ability to shape escalation pathways. The most critical decisions in a crisis — whether to escalate, de-escalate, or signal restraint — are made in New Delhi and Islamabad, not Washington or Beijing. SAM data reinforces this point indirectly. It shows that arms transfers fluctuate with political relationships, but regional crises persist regardless of those fluctuations. In other words, arms sales are not a stabilizing force in themselves.
Policy Prescriptions: From Transactions to Strategy
If US arms transfers to South Asia generate access but not control, the policy challenge is to convert access into meaningful strategic impact. Four concrete steps can help achieve this shift.
Prioritize Restraint-Oriented Systems Over Offensive Platform Sales: Rather than emphasizing additional platform sales that risk fueling regional arms competition, US policy should focus on capabilities that enhance transparency, situational awareness, and crisis management, such as ISR, maritime domain awareness, secure communications, and data-sharing architectures. These systems align with the evolving character of warfare while also supporting restraint by improving early warning, reducing uncertainty, and strengthening command-and-control reliability during crises. Instead of measuring influence through the volume of hardware transferred, Washington should prioritize embedding itself within partner militaries’ operational networks in ways that encourage information-sharing, escalation management, and responsible military modernization.
Link Arms Transfers to Crisis Management Mechanisms: Arms sales should be tied to the development and reinforcement of crisis management tools. This includes supporting nuclear confidence-building measures that are already in place, such as missile pre-notification agreements, strengthening military hotlines, and conducting joint simulations. The goal is not just to enhance capability, but to shape how that capability is used under stress—particularly in a nuclearized environment.
Re-engage Pakistan at a Functional Level: While a full restoration of US–Pakistan defense ties is unlikely, a complete disengagement is strategically counterproductive. The United States should maintain targeted cooperation in areas such as aviation safety, disaster response, and nuclear risk reduction. This approach will not reverse Pakistan’s alignment with China, but it can preserve limited channels of influence and reduce the risk of strategic miscalculation.
Integrate Arms Transfers into a Broader Regional Strategy: Finally, US arms sales must be embedded within a broader political and diplomatic strategy for South Asia. Defense cooperation with India cannot substitute for regional engagement that includes crisis diplomacy, economic ties, and multilateral coordination. In other words, arms transfers should support—not substitute for—a coherent regional policy.
Arms and Ends
US arms sales and transfers to South Asia are best understood not as a standalone policy tool, but as part of a broader strategic framework. They are used to build partnerships, signal commitment, and shape regional dynamics, but they cannot, on their own, determine outcomes.
SAM data underscores this point. It shows that US security assistance is deeply embedded in political relationships and that its effectiveness depends on alignment, trust, and shared strategic objectives. In South Asia, those conditions are uneven. India is a partner but not an ally while Pakistan is a partner of convenience, increasingly aligned elsewhere. Both countries are nuclear-armed, domestically capable, and strategically autonomous.
For US policymakers, the lesson is not that arms sales are irrelevant, but that they are insufficient. Used wisely, they can reinforce relationships, enhance interoperability, and support stability. Used in isolation, they risk becoming an expensive substitute for strategy. In South Asia’s nuclearized and increasingly multipolar landscape, the United States must move beyond the illusion that arms transfers alone can deliver influence. The challenge is not to sell more, but to think more strategically about what those sales are meant to achieve.
Sahar Khan is a 2026 nonresident fellow at the Institute of Global Affairs and a co-host of a new podcast focused on South Asia in the new nuclear age called “Beyond the Lines of Control.” Previously, she served as the deputy director and senior fellow of the South Asia program at the Stimson Center, a research fellow in Defense and Foreign Policy at the Cato Institute, and managing editor of Inkstick Media. Her research focuses on restraint, deterrence, and South Asian regional security and politics.
Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) may soon gain access to USXports, a database of US-made defense items for export, a potentially massive conflict of interest, Ari Tolany tells Zeteo News’ Spencer Ackerman:
“USX often contains sensitive business information, including technical data, contracts information, and blueprints, including [on] SpaceX and its competitors,” says Ari Tolany, who directs the Security Assistance Monitor at the Center for International Policy.
“Corporate interests too often dictate US government policy through the revolving door between government and industry. One corporation having privileged access above others is yet another example of the bald-faced corruption characterizing the intrusions of an unelected billionaire into government decision-making.”
Any pressure for Israel to accept the terms is good, but likely to be accompanied by full-throttle support for West Bank annexation, Security Assistance Technology & Arms Trade Director Ari Tolany tells Voice of America Indonesia:
“I think it is likely that Biden still wants to get some degree of credit for this ceasefire still happening on his watch, even though it does seem from speaking to a range from sources both in Israel, Arab states and Palestinian groups that pressure from the incoming Trump administration was really what moved the needle with the Netanyahu administration.”
“They [the first Trump administration] moved the United States embassy to Jerusalem. They did a lot of inflammatory actions including backing Israel’s annexation of territory in the West Bank. And so, while I think the ceasefire is a good thing and I think Trump’s willingness to use the leverage that he does have with Netanyahu is a good thing, I remain pessimistic for what the Trump administration is going to look like vis-a-vis Palestinian affairs.”
Security Assistance Monitor (SAM) is the first and only public resource to comprehensively collect, organize, and house all available federal data on U.S. weapons sales and transfers in one place, making it easily searchable by year or country on its website.
ProPublica’s Brett Murphy reports on the Biden administration’s violation of arms transfer law:
In late May, the International Court of Justice ordered Israel to stop its assault on the city, citing the Geneva Conventions. Behind the scenes, State Department lawyers scrambled to come up with a legal basis on which Israel could continue smaller attacks in Rafah. “There is room to argue that more scaled back/targeted operations, combined with better humanitarian efforts, would not meet that threshold,” the lawyers said in a May 24 email. While it’s not unreasonable for government lawyers to defend a close ally, critics say the cable illustrates the extreme deference the U.S. affords Israel.
“The State Department has a whole raft of highly paid, very good lawyers to explain, ‘Actually this is not illegal,’ when in fact it is,” said Ari Tolany, an arms trade authority and director at the Center for International Policy, a Washington-based think tank. “Rules for thee and not for me.”
Security Assistance Monitor (SAM) is the first and only public resource to comprehensively collect, organize, and house all available federal data on U.S. weapons sales and transfers in one place, making it easily searchable by year or country on its website.
In response to the Biden administration’s decision last week to send anti-personnel landmines to Ukraine, Security Assistance Monitor (SAM) director Ari Tolany issued the following statement:
“The Biden administration’s decision to violate its own landmine policy by exporting anti-personnel landmines to Ukraine —a state party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, popularly called the Ottawa Convention— is the latest action by the United States to undermine international law and global norms to protect non-combatants. The decision to send first cluster munitions and now anti-personnel landmines will have devastating impacts on civilians for decades to come, raising the risk of blast injury in large swaths of Ukraine, contaminating arable land, and eroding the efficacy of the Convention.
The United States proudly advertises itself as the “world’s single largest financial supporter of steps to mitigate the harmful consequences of landmines.” Yet the United States cannot effectively engage in land clearance of explosive remnants of war and support mine victims while continuing to refuse to accede to the Ottawa Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The continued stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions shows the Biden administration’s uneven and selective enforcement of both its own policies and the law.
Rather than using its last months in office to further undermine international norms, the Biden administration should take immediate steps to accede to the Ottawa Convention and join the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In accordance with those treaties, it should cease the transfer of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions to all states, including both Ukraine and the Republic of Korea. It should also begin to destroy its own stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines and stop the manufacture of new cluster munitions. Arms control can be effective only when the world’s largest manufacturer of weapons upholds international law and applies its standards consistently to all parties, including allies, partners and itself.”
What kind of relationships does the United States build when it gives or sells arms to countries abroad is a big question, one that sits at the heart of day-to-day foreign policy. Ari Tolany, Director of CIP’s Security Assistance Technology, and the Arms Trade (SAM) program, recently went on the Security Dilemma podcast to talk about arms transfers, transparency, and what it means to attempt to build friendships through the promise of weapons.
Said Tolany:
“Basically we’re losing a lot of transparency and granularity in our reporting, and I know it seems wonky, and it seems technically, but fundamentally, the way that so many people engage with the United States is not with our soft power or the various aspects of American culture we like to think of as promoting a US brand around the world, it’s at the barrel of a gun. When we have less information about that, we are less able to conduct effective oversight or check-in on concerning issues around defense companies like graft and corruption.”
The episode, hosted by AJ Manuzzi and John Allen Gay of the John Quincy Adams Society, walks through popular arguments and counter-arguments to arms transparency, the way arms sales make the US a participant in the wars of partners and allies, and what happens when the US tries to tie arms sales to respect for human rights, without ever threatening to withhold sales should weapons be used to violate human rights.
Tolany also discusses the shallow fear that the US not selling a country arms means irreparably harming that country’s relationship with the United States. Says Tolany:
“The notion that arms transfers are a solid foundation for international partnership building is flawed. If a partner can just as easily turn to China and Russia, I would argue that arms transfers are only papering over a relationship that is fundamentally misaligned.”
In response to the Biden administration’s decision on Wednesday to release the full tranche of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to Egypt despite ongoing human rights violations, Security Assistance Monitor (SAM) director Ari Tolany issued the following statement:
“The Biden administration’s decision to grant Egypt a staggering $1.3 billion in military aid with no human rights restrictions undermines the administration’s own human rights reporting, which found there has been ‘no significant change in the human rights situation in Egypt,’ and defies concerns rightly expressed by Senators Chris Van Hollen, Chris Murphy and their colleagues.
“Consistent gross violations of human rights remain widespread, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearance, and torture. The government’s broad refusal to investigate or prosecute reported human rights abuses makes remediation for victims impossible.
“Secretary Blinken reports that he is waiving the human rights conditions in the ‘national security interest,’ but using unrestricted taxpayer dollars to subsidize the brutal, autocratic el-Sisi regime doesn’t make Americans—or the world—safer. U.S. appeals to international order will continue ring hollow so long as the United States refuses to hold its allies, not just its rivals, accountable for violations of international law.”
WASHINGTON, D.C. – In response to reports that the Biden Administration sought to bypass congressional review and accompanying public scrutiny of massive arms transfers to Israel by dividing them into more than 100 smaller deliveries that individually fell under the threshold for mandatory notification to Congress under U.S. law, Ari Tolany, the Center for International Policy’s Security Assistance Monitor (SAM) director, issued the following statement:
“This doesn’t just seem like an attempt to avoid technical compliance with U.S. arms export law, it’s an extremely troubling way to avoid transparency and accountability on a high-profile issue.
“These arms laws and notification requirements exist precisely so that American lawmakers and taxpayers can evaluate the appropriateness of transferring U.S. weapons systems to a context like the devastating conflict in Gaza. Providing assistance to an active conflict should raise our standards of transparency and accountability, not diminish them. The fact that this glut of deadly arms has enabled massive civilian suffering in a bombardment that President Biden has himself called ‘indiscriminate,’ and that these transfers have continued despite the administration’s acknowledgement that Israel is blocking U.S. humanitarian aid, makes this move all the more disturbing.”
“Congress needs to step in immediately and demand a suspension in arms transfers to Israel until it can be sure such transfers can be conducted in full compliance with all relevant U.S. law – as well as our related obligations under international humanitarian law.”
Center for International Policy President and CEO Nancy Okail released the following statement:
Sixty days after Hamas’ horrific attack against Israel and the beginning of Israel’s now two month-long assault on the Gaza Strip, it is clear that only a renewed and sustained ceasefire can avert a further humanitarian catastrophe. We welcome the United Nations Secretary-General’s extraordinary use of Article 99 of the UN Charter to convene a Security Council meeting toward urgently achieving that and related objectives like the delivery of desperately needed aid to the people of Gaza and the release of all hostages.
We reiterate our condemnation of Hamas’ war crimes against civilians. With more than 1,200 Israelis murdered, hundreds subjected to unspeakable atrocities, and dozens more still held hostage, Israel has the right and duty to protect its people.
It is also clear that Israel’s largely indiscriminate bombing of the long-blockaded Gaza Strip in response has violated the laws of war and resulted in the deaths of well over 15,000 Palestinians, two-thirds of which Israel itself estimates are non-combatants, most of them women and children. Israel’s siege of the territory– variably loosened and tightened but never allowing anywhere near an adequate amount of water, fuel, food and medicine into Gaza– risks the spread of further deprivation and disease which could take even more Palestinian lives.
Deadly attacks in the West Bank that have claimed the lives of Palestinian and Israeli civilians, multiple acts of forcible displacement of Palestinian communities in Area C, exchanges of fire on the Israel-Lebanon border, and attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and commercial shipping in the Red Sea all risk spreading the conflict even further.
The international community must make every effort to stop the bloodshed and prevent further escalation in the region. The United States should not only be at the fore of such diplomacy, but ensure that its Security Council veto, as well as its arms and aid to Israel, are not used to deepen and drag out this humanitarian disaster. If another ceasefire is reached, the United States must also not squander the opportunity to guarantee the lasting human security of Israelis and Palestinians alike through a serious effort to finally achieve a just, negotiated end to the underlying Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
