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Can We Prevent Nuclear Catastrophe during the Trump Administration?

Joe Cirincione is the vice-chair of the Center for International Policy’s board of directors and the author of Nuclear Nightmares: Securing the World Before It Is Too Late.

During the 80 years of the nuclear age, even with the best leadership, the world has avoided nuclear catastrophe by “sheer luck,” as the late Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara often said. The second election of Donald Trump as president introduces new risks into an already volatile mix of geopolitical rivalries, human fallibility and rapid nuclear launch capabilities. This new reality requires new thinking.

First, we must re-orient ourselves. A new nuclear arms race has begun. Those favoring global stability and nuclear risk reductions are in strategic retreat. Our goals must be to minimize our losses and prevent the very worst from happening. With skill — and luck — we can do that and prepare policies for when we may be able to return to the policy offensive. Perhaps in two years, perhaps in four.

Second, the challenges are not in one or two areas, but across the board. Outdated doctrines, out-of-control budgets, and entrenched nuclear bureaucracies and unstable leaders are among them. We live in a period where global and domestic restraint mechanisms are disappearing, including the arms control regime painstakingly built by conservatives and liberals over the decades. New leadership in the Department of Defense is likely to be more ideological and less experienced than at any time in the nuclear age.

Solutions, Distilled: Can We Prevent Nuclear Catastrophe during the Trump Administration? by Joseph Cirincione The New Nuclear Arms Race is here. From the end of bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements to an expensive recapitalization and expansion of nuclear weapon arsenals, we’re in a dangerous time. Arms control was how we escaped the last nuclear arms race. Treaties from the second half of the Cold War through 2015 set limits, reduced stockpiles, and created safety. We need a new approach to win arms control again. Advocating for new arms control means revitalizing the field in light of present realities.

Third, the experts and advocates who have tried to shape and implement responsible nuclear policies in this century must confront our collective failure. There has not been a meaningful step to reduce nuclear dangers in a decade, since the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement – and even that was short-lived. The nuclear arms control and disarmament organizations and institutes are weak and growing weaker. There is little reason to expect this enfeebled civil society to have measurable impact in the future without a frank assessment of what has gone wrong, followed by serious reorganization and reorientation.

Fourth, we must face the unique nuclear risks Donald Trump presents. His plans for a massive nuclear build up, combined with his likely weakness in the face of Russian aggression and his ambivalence around the status of Taiwan, could encourage the acquisition or use of nuclear weapons by one or more countries. His withdrawal from American global leadership will undermine the credibility of the U.S. pledge to defend its allies with all its military resources, including nuclear weapons, encouraging these allies and others to develop their own nuclear arsenals. There remains the chance that a beleaguered, unstable Donald Trump could use nuclear weapons, acting on the many nuclear threats he made in his first term in office.

While all of these risks indicate the peril of Trump once again gaining control over the U.S. nuclear arsenal, they only compound the risk posed by the considerable funding Congress has already appropriated for duplicative nuclear weapons.

The New Nuclear Arms Race

B-21 Raider, Edwards Air Force Base, California. (Giancarlo Casem, 412th Test Wing) — *The B-21 Raider, the new long-range strike bomber. (Giancarlo Casem, 412th Test Wing)*

Even before the election of Trump, nuclear arms controls were undergoing an extinction event.

Every year, agreements that stood for decades as guardrails preventing nuclear war are weakened or killed. Every year, more organizations that have championed these agreements disappear. There is little prospect that anything can be done to reverse this trend in the near term. While it is possible that Trump could arrive at some new agreements (as he almost did with North Korea during his first term in office), it is more likely that he will appoint to key positions those opposed to any limits on U.S. nuclear forces, and those that will seek an expansion of nuclear arms.

These sentiments are not new. The desire to build more and bigger bombs began even as scientists were developing the first atomic weapons in the Manhattan Project. That experience, and the subsequent use of atomic bombs on Japan, also catalyzed urgent efforts to control and eliminate these weapons. Scientists from Los Alamos launched several groups still active today, warning the public about the grave nuclear dangers, including the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Federation of American Scientists.

Most organizations working to prevent nuclear war, however, trace their origins to the 1960s or 1980s. During these decades there were global events that stirred publics to action – and encouraged governments to more urgently pursue limitations on the most deadly weapons ever invented.

Most prominently, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, with its close escape from global thermonuclear war and spike in public fears, helped launch a wave of negotiations culminating in the 1968 NuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 1972 SALT treaty. Similarly, the US-Soviet nuclear build ups in the early 1980s brought millions of people to the streets of Western capitals, creating political pressures that yielded the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987, the START treaties of 1991 and 1993, and almost led to the elimination of all nuclear weapons at the 1987 Reykjavik Summit between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Michel Gorbachev.

Indeed, most of the agreements, treaties and technology controls limiting or eliminating nuclear weapons evolved during these periods. They are dying off today, however, like the trilobites that once dominated the planet but could not survive the steady acidification of the ocean in the Permian extinction, 300 million years ago.

The most recently endangered treaty is the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 which bans nuclear weapons in space. U.S. officials suspect that Russia is now developing precisely this capability. Deploying such a weapon would threaten hundreds of satellites in space and the 57-year old treaty. It would be just the latest loss in the web of agreements that make up the arms control regime.

This is happening even though the arms control regime, although imperfect, works. Arms agreements have helped prevent nuclear war and dramatically reduced the nuclear arsenals that menaced the world throughout the twentieth century. Today, weapon stockpiles are down some 88 percent from their Cold War peaks. Whereas President John F. Kennedy feared that some 15 or 20 nations could acquire nuclear weapons, there are still just nine nuclear-armed nations in the world, even though dozens more have the ability to make these weapons.

The very success of arms control and disarmament stirred two dangerous beliefs: one was that the agreements were no longer needed; the other was that they had gone too far and the U.S. needed to rebuild its arsenal.

The Arms Control Extinction Event

The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) weapon system intercepts a threat-representative intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) target during Flight Test THAAD (FTT)-18 on July 11, 2017. (Leah Garton, MDA) — The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) weapon system intercepts a threat-representative intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) target during Flight Test THAAD (FTT)-18 on July 11, 2017 (Leah Garton, Missile Defense Agency)

The die-off of nuclear arms control agreements began in December 2001. That is when President George W. Bush listened to long-time nuclear hawks, particularly John Bolton, and abandoned President Richard Nixon’s 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had negotiated this accord with the Soviet Union as part of the SALT treaty, the first agreement that limited nuclear arms. They understood that limiting so-called “offensive weapons” required limiting defensive weapons, since the easiest and most obvious way to overcome an opponent’s defense is to overwhelm it with offense.

Bolton and Bush rejected this logic. Bush withdrew the country from the ABM treaty, using the 9/11 attack as justification for a crash program to build a national missile defense system.

Russian President Vladimir Putin acquiesced but opposed the withdrawal, arguing that it would compel Russia to develop new weapons. Even if the defenses didn’t work, Russia would have to assume they might work and build weapons to overcome them.

The promised defenses did not work, do not work, and are unlikely to work in the future. Twenty-three years later, there is still no effective national missile defense nor any prospect of one in the foreseeable future, despite annual budgets of almost $30 billion for missile defense and defeat programs.

The weapons triggered by the killing of the treaty, however, do work. New Russian weapons are now coming on line, including powerful new missiles that can carry multiple warheads to overcome defenses, as well as exotic long-range cruise missiles, hypervelocity missiles and even nuclear-armed underwater drones that could theoretically evade any conceivable defense. Net result: no defense; greater offense.

The ABM Treaty was just the first to die. Bolton also convinced Bush in 2003 to leave the Agreed Framework with North Korea that had frozen that country’s nuclear program. He promised that pressure, not agreements, would bring North Korea to its knees. That, too, backfired. North Korea tested a nuclear weapon in 2006 and now has a small arsenal that it could launch against America on a growing fleet of long-range, highly-capable ballistic missiles. There is no defense that can stop them.

Over the past few years, Putin warmed to the idea of killing arms control. During the Trump administration, Putin and Trump withdrew from Reagan’s Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty (allowing each side to fly aircraft over the other’s territory to confirm compliance with military force reductions), treaties limiting conventional forces (the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty and the Vienna Documents), and, most recently, Putin has suspended Russia’s compliance with the New START treaty, negotiated by President Barack Obama as the successor to Ronald Reagan’s START treaties that began the sharp reductions in U.S. and Russian arsenals.

Destroying agreements that limit or eliminate weapons has consequences. The mutual withdrawals from the INF treaty allowed first the United States and now Russia to field new medium and intermediate-range missile systems. Russia in late November attacked Ukraine using a conventionally armed version of an intermediate-range ballistic missile that would have been prohibited by the treaty. Both countries plan to deploy such dual-capable systems in Europe in a revival of the Euro-missile crisis of the 1980s.

“There is no question that we are in a situation where the security system that was so laboriously built up in the Cold War years is being shredded,” says Rose Gottemoeller, who was the lead U.S. negotiator for New START.

This security system is an interlocking network of treaties, export restrictions and security guarantees. This gives it great strength and global resiliency. It is also a weakness.

Proliferation abhors a vacuum

Senior Airman Zachary Kasuboski, 90th Civil Engineer Squadron firefighter, repels a rescue harness down the personnel access shaft, Dec. 11, 2021, at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming. This demonstration was to inform and display procedures to mutual aid departments. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Cody Dowell) — *Practicing missile silo rescue training.* *(Cody Dowell, 90th Missile Wing)*

As treaties are discarded and commitments withdrawn like pieces of a Jenga tower, the structure wobbles. The removal of just one critical accord could bring the entire regime crashing down.

That piece could be the New START treaty. It is the last remaining treaty limiting the long-range nuclear weapons of Russia and the US, the two largest nuclear-armed states by far. The accord will expire in 2026. There are no talks between the two countries to replace the treaty. When it dies, the era of limiting and reducing strategic nuclear weapons that began in 1972 will come to an end.

The death of New Start could accelerate the destruction of the entire regime, including barriers to new nuclear-armed nations.

The centerpiece of the regime is the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed by all but four nations in the world. At its core is the pledge by the nuclear-armed states “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” Non-nuclear nations, in turn, promise not to develop nuclear weapons while those with the weapons move steadily to eliminate their stockpiles.

Break that deal, and the treaty could collapse. First slowly, and then in a cascade of new programs in many nations.

Swept away, too, would be the nuclear test ban treaty, which since 1994 has largely blocked the testing of new weapons. (The only nation to test a nuclear weapon in this century is North Korea.) Former Trump officials have already proposed in their Project 2025 manifesto that the nation must formally reject the test ban treaty and prepare to resume nuclear testing. China, having conducted only 50 nuclear tests compared to the over 1,000 conducted by the U.S., would relish the opportunity to test new designs. With renewed testing, the new arms race would explode, figuratively and literally.

The race has already begun. The United States leads the way with a sweeping replacement of all its weapons constructed during the 1980s. Over the next decade, America will spend over $750 billion on brand new nuclear-armed submarines, bombers, missiles and warheads. That is just a down payment on programs that will cost trillions of dollars over the next thirty years.

Russia and China are racing to keep up. Each nation sees the others as the problem. U.S. security leaders, for example, refer to China as “the pacing threat” as they urge the production of more nuclear weapons. China sees it as the other way around. Three nuclear armed states border in South Asia, where India and Pakistan have their own regional arms race. Each of the nine nuclear-armed states is building more and newer nuclear weapons.

Trump’s Project 2025 recommendations would substantially increase these risks and costs. Unlike other generalized calls for more weapons, this is a detailed plan for how to implement an apocalyptic vision and minimize any opposition. It is a far more specific design than any before it. If these recommendations are implemented they will result in a sharp decline in American security and a dramatic increase in the risk of regional and global conflict.

The Decline of the Arms Control Movement

Secretary Kerry Straightens Papers at Hotel in Austria After Signing Documents to Lift Sanctions Following Implementation of Plan Controlling Iran's Nuclear Program

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry straightens a stack of papers at the Palais Coburg Hotel in Vienna, Austria, on January 16, 2016, after signing certificates and waivers to lift sanctions against Iran after the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action outlining the shape of that country's nuclear program. [State Department Photo/Public Domain] — *Secretary Kerry Straightens Papers at Hotel in Austria After Signing Documents to Lift Sanctions Following Implementation of Plan Controlling Iran’s Nuclear Program. (State Department)*

One might imagine that as the crisis in arms control worsens, groups promoting arms control would flourish. But the opposite is happening.

Last year, one of the largest organizations in the field, Global Zero, collapsed. The year before, one of the veterans of the 1980s, Women’s Action for New Direction, closed its doors. Others will follow. It is difficult to find any American arms control organization that is growing. Most are small and contracting. It is difficult to point to any success that even the largest have achieved in over a decade. The field is in a death spiral.

The reasons are threefold: lack of funding, lack of public support, and the failure of the organizations to sustain a change in nuclear policy.

Last year, the MacArthur Foundation withdrew from the field, cutting in half the foundation funding available to limit and eliminate nuclear weapons. Philanthropies provided a meager $23 million in grants for the entire field in 2023, according to the Peace and Security Funders Group which tracks such giving. This is a fraction of the estimated $8 to 12 billion donated in 2022 to address the climate crisis.

Donors appear skeptical that non-government organizations can motivate meaningful change in nuclear postures. Why give money to groups that cannot show any impact?

Indeed, in this century, there have been only three successful campaigns that significantly impacted nuclear policy. They are the coalition effort that encouraged the successful negotiation and adoption of the New Start treaty in 2010; a similar coalition that supported the agreement rolling back and freezing Iran’s nuclear program in 2014, and the global effort that produced the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017.

The first of these agreements, as noted, is on life-support. The Iran Deal is dead after President Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018. The nuclear weapons ban treaty, while signed by 93 nations, has been ignored and vilified by most of the nine nuclear-armed states.

These failures are not for lack of trying. The nuclear field has some of the brightest, hardest-working experts, advocates and communicators in the business. For decades, they have worked to reverse the arms race, often recruiting nuclear weapons advocates to the cause.

The Reagan nuclear build-up, for example, was guided by the relentless advocacy of a network of nuclear hawks organized into The Committee on the Present Danger. Founded in 1976, these experts preached that the opening of a “window of vulnerability” would soon allow the Soviet Union to launch a devastating first strike on the United States that would eliminate our ability to respond. The answer, they said, was a massive new nuclear build up.

The Nuclear Freeze movement was born in response to this nuclear hysteria. Mass movements, expert analysis and congressional opposition to new nuclear weapons programs combined to convince President Reagan to reverse course. Arms control worked so well that by 1994, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the founding members of the Committee, Paul Nitze, advocated the step-by-step elimination of the weapons he once championed. “The idea that the future peace and well being of the world should rest upon the threat of nuclear annihilation of large numbers of noncombatants is, in the long run, unacceptable,” he wrote.

As arsenals continued to decline, it became possible to see this vision as a practical path. In January 2007, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn wrote the first of several op-eds calling for “a world free of nuclear weapons.” Former Committee on a Present Danger leader Max Kampleman joined the effort, forcefully arguing for “zero nuclear weapons” in talks around the world.

Two major NGO efforts were launched to help realize this goal. The first, built around the work of the four statesmen and their op-ed, was the Nuclear Threat Initiative begun by former Senator Sam Nunn and CNN founder Ted Turner. The second was Global Zero, a U.S.-based group led by former Minuteman control officer Bruce Blair, that convened hundreds of former officials and experts in high-level summits around the world.

Both produced detailed reports, had dozens of experts testify before government bodies, convened scores of impactful conferences and workshops and generated hundreds of articles, videos and even films, such as Countdown to Zero. President Barack Obama and his 2008 opponent Senator John McCain, both embraced the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the first global security speech Obama gave as president was devoted to articulating this vision and a practical path to realize it.

Both efforts failed. There has never been an “after action” report analyzing why they failed. But the failure is clear. In hindsight, we can mark the Senate approval of the New START treaty in December 2010 as the high water mark of the nuclear abolition movements. There have not been any negotiated reductions in global arsenals since. The 2016 election of President Trump brought open nuclear hawks back in control of U.S. policy. President Joe Biden did nothing to change these policies.

Twilight Struggle

Shown is an illustration of the LGM-35A Sentinel launch silo, the Air Force’s newest weapon system known as the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent. The Air Force determined the LGM-35A Sentinel would provide continuity in strategic deterrence and cost less than extending the life of the current intercontinental ballistic missile fleet, comprised of the aging Minuteman III. Replacing the 1970s-era missile modernizes the ground-based leg of the nuclear triad and brings the Minuteman’s more than 50 years of service to a close. (U.S. Air Force illustration) — *An illustration of the LGM-35A Sentinel launch silo, the Air Force’s newest weapon system known as the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent. (USAF)*

While in office, Biden fully funded all the new nuclear weapons programs. Almost all are now severely behind schedule and over-budget. He leaves office with no new agreements in sight. No official has paid any cost for these demonstrable failures.

At best, we have a glimmer of hope that, before he leaves, President Biden could use his executive power to end the Cold War practice of “sole authority.” Biden could prevent Donald Trump or any future president from starting a nuclear war “without other senior officials being directly involved in a decision to use America’s most powerful weapons,” as Jon Wolfsthal, former National Security Council senior director for arms control under President Barack Obama, urged in The Washington Post last December. This would bring attention to the threat inherent in the existence of these weapons (and potentially prevent a crazed president from unilaterally destroying human civilization.)

Ploughshares Fund Executive Director Liz Warner summarizes the components of this new nuclear crisis in a video prepared by her foundation:

At the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons stockpiles were quickly declining after a high point of 70,000 nuclear warheads…This was the result of treaties that greatly reduced global nuclear arsenals…This new trend showed the promise of a new day. A future free of nuclear weapons seemed like a real possibility. We enjoy decades of a world where it felt like the wheel of progress was turning. Today, all of this progress is under threat.

•Russia has walked away from negotiating new treaties as the last one is about to expire. This, after the country used the threat of nuclear weapons in their invasion of Ukraine.
•After years of maintaining a modest nuclear force, China is now significantly expanding its arsenal, possibly to as many as 1500 warheads by 2035.
•Tensions in the Middle East continue to boil over with the looming threat of nuclear weapons lurking in the background. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons if the conflict expands. Having seen the collapse of the Iran nuclear deal, Tehran may make a strategic decision to develop them.
•North Korea, once the new kid on the nuclear block, has now been a nuclear armed state for nearly 20 years. Its unconstrained program continues to advance, aided by regular and highly public missile tests.
•In the West, distressing numbers of elected officials are embracing a new proliferation of nuclear weapons as an inevitability.
•We are in a new nuclear arms race. Our planet is on the wrong trajectory.

Might President Trump reverse this slide towards disaster? It is possible that Trump, who has pledged to slash government spending, may look for savings by slowing down or eliminating some of these weapon programs.

He would have support from many in Congress. Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD) this year requested a study from the Congressional Budget Office detailing alternatives to the massively expensive nuclear programs, citing fears “about the effects of a buildup on both arms-race and crisis stability and counseling for more efforts at preserving or reestablishing arms control.”

It is also possible that Trump could negotiate new arms limitation agreements. He came close to a break-through deal with North Korea, but at the last minute foolishly listened to John Bolton’s advice at the 2019 Hanoi summit instead of negotiator Steve Biegun. Trump scuttled the step-by-step reduction plan worked out by Biegun, in favor of Bolton’s demand that North Korea give up all its weapons in exchange for vague US promises. North Korea (aware of how that kind of deal worked out for Libya) walked away and has now built up its arsenal and forged closer ties with Russia.

Still, Trump might work out some arrangement with Iran or agree with Putin that after the death of New START, both sides could increase their deployed forces but stay within some informal limit of, say, 2500 weapons each, up from the current 1550 limit in New START.

The more likely scenario is that nuclear hawks and large corporations will continue to dominate policy making in the Defense Department, pushing for more weapon programs. The military budget, now at about $870 billion, is likely to break the $1 trillion barrier for the first time in American history. As long as the pie is growing, defense leaders are likely to divide the spoils so that each grouping, including the Strategic Command, gets a large slice. Annual spending for nuclear weapons and related programs will likely soar past the $100 billion mark.

Strategies to Reduce Nuclear Dangers

Ambassador Malloy Witnesses the Elimination of the Last Soviet Short-Range Missiles Under the INF Treaty

Ambassador Eileen Malloy, chief of the arms control unit at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Russia, is pictured at the destruction site in Saryozek, (former Soviet Union) Kazakhstan, where the last Soviet short-range missiles under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty were eliminated in spring 1990. With the passage of the Rogers Act establishing the current merit-based, professional Foreign Service, the modern Foreign Service was created on May 24, 1924. On May 22, 2014, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry delivered remarks at an event celebrating the 90th anniversary of the U.S. Foreign Service. [American Foreign Service Association photo] — *Ambassador Malloy Witnesses the Elimination of the Last Soviet Short-Range Missiles Under the INF Treaty (American Foreign Service Association photo)*

The very first step in avoiding extinction is simply to be aware of the threat.

A re-elected Trump will likely put nuclear weapons programs on steroids, trash the remaining U.S. participation in the global arms control regime, and trigger discussion of new nuclear weapons programs in more other states than we have seen since the early 1960s. Indeed, Trump’s election has intensified talks in some countries that, in a period of uncertain American leadership and growing threats from Russia and China, they need to develop their own nuclear weapons. This is not just adversaries like Iran, but allies like South Korea where a growing majority of the public already favors developing nuclear weapons.

It is unlikely that in their present state, the existing pro-arms control organizations and research programs can have a meaningful impact on Trump’s nuclear policies. Nor is a mass anti-nuclear movement likely to emerge, as it did in the 1980s. There are, however, several possibilities that could develop measurable influence over nuclear policy.

The first and easiest is for the existing groups to merge. As it stands, they are simply too weak to have any discernible political impact, but united they might. There are a few that could continue on their current budgets and funding streams. Most will, at best, limp along as funding grows more constricted. If just a few of the groups could agree to merge efforts, it could snowball. Mergers would increase their size, visibility and clout while reducing administrative overhead.

Similarly, research programs and academic institutes could agree to cooperate on substantive reports documenting the current crisis, its root causes and plans for preserving and modernizing nuclear security agreements. While a report from projects at Stanford, Harvard and Princeton is always valuable, a combined report would generate more interest and produce more impact on policy makers. The same is true for research projects at think tanks, such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace or the Brookings Institution.

The recently formed Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation and U.S. National Security is a recent example of such an approach. This centrist group is the result of a collaboration among Harvard University’s Belfer Center, the Carnegie Endowment and the Nuclear Threat Initiative. They hope to issue a report in mid-2025 “with policy recommendations to guide the future of U.S. national security policy.” Whether the Trump White House will listen to such a group is an open question, but it could help develop a consensus among those outside the extremes represented by the incoming administration.

The relative rarity of such cooperation is a testament to the strong institutional reluctance and competition for recognition that motivates most organizations in the field. Another approach could be for major donors to encourage coordination by funding a new campaign. Several large donors could agree to fund such a campaign headquartered in a single institute (perhaps one not associated with previous efforts), providing grants to experts, advocates and communications mavens conditioned on their participation in a joint effort.

This was the model successfully developed and deployed in the New Start campaign and the Iran Deal coalition in the 2010s. These two campaigns built on the success of similar campaigns in the 1980s to extend and strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to negotiate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. Those, in turn, learned from the successful campaign to Save the ABM Treaty in the 1980s.

These formal, cooperative, jointly-funded campaigns are the only ones that have worked absent the kind of mass mobilizations represented by the Nuclear Freeze movement.

All these efforts were three-legged stools, relying on the work and cooperation of experts, who develop and validate alternative nuclear policy; advocates, who work with government officials in the executive and legislative branches to advance the policies; and messengers, who build public support for the policies through sustained media engagement.

Another possible method is for donors to provide grants to add a nuclear weapons or Pentagon budget component to larger, established expert and advocacy groups. This could fit in well with groups looking to protect social programs from Trump’s budget ax, providing an alternative source of budget savings. Stand alone efforts have failed, but an integrated approach may have a better chance of success. This technique worked well for the Iran campaign, bringing in groups such as MoveOn, Indivisible, Vote Vets and J Street who otherwise may not have had the resources to work on the issue.

If none of the above approaches prove feasible, or if Trump’s hammerlock on the executive and legislative branches is judged too powerful to overcome, a campaign based primarily on communications might work.

Media and Mass Movements

Donors often look to duplicate the impact of the ABC movie event, The Day After. It was one of the most dramatic communications events of the 1990s, said to have even moved President Reagan towards nuclear abolition.

*November 19, 1983. Doug Scott and John Cullum of the ABC TV-movie “The Day After.” (Jim Ellwanger, (CC BY-NC 2.0))*

It is possible that one or more such movies could reawaken public concern about nuclear risks. Annie Jacobson’s brilliant 2024 novel, Nuclear War: A Scenario, for example, could be such an event. Dune director Denis Villeneuve has purchased the film rights to the book. “The expectation is that Villeneuve would take this one as another giant project after he completes Dune: Messiah, which he and Legendary are developing as the conclusion of the trilogy,” reports the Hollywood publication, Deadline.

Many thought that the award-winning film, Oppenheimer, could play such a role. While it had a huge impact on audiences, however, it had no such corresponding impact on policy. Nor did it spontaneously generate a new anti-nuclear movement.

The lesson may be that a movie or show has to be part of an existing movement rather than relying on it to instigate such a movement. The Day After aired in 1983 during the Nuclear Freeze movement that had already generated one million people to demonstrate at a rally in Central Park in 1982. Films can validate the concerns of thousands of people already in motion but not generate momentum where none exist.

Absent a mass movement, the value of such a movie could best be realized by coalitions of experts and groups prepared and funded to amplify its message as part of a multi-faceted campaign.

“It’s vital that we use media technology to reverse the direction that we seem to be headed in again,” says David Craig, author of Apocalypse Television: How The Day After Helped End the Cold War. “I don’t think that it’ll be in the form of a one-off Hollywood narrative. It would need to be dozens coming together and letting communities know that this is something that we can’t afford to ignore.”

Alternatively, a big-event film or series could help generate collective action if it came out during a period of heightened media concern over nuclear dangers. Starved of funds, many news organizations could benefit from generous grants to support their investigation of the growing nuclear risks. The Outrider Foundation is engaged in such a strategy with its no-strings grants to The New York Times, the Associated Press and others. The foundation does not dictate the content of the reporting, its grants merely allow journalists to pursue their own analysis.

Conclusion

We are at a critical crossroads. The path forward is not clear. This article is intended to stimulate discussion; it is not meant to be the final word. It is the author’s hope that others will contribute articles correcting this analysis, offering their own, or deepening particular points raised. Others may want to explore why past efforts failed, drawing lessons for future work.

We must start by recognizing that we are in a deep hole. It will take sustained, collective work to get us out and to chart a new course.

More About the Author

Joseph Cirincione was president of Ploughshares Fund for 12 years. He was previously the vice president for national security and international policy at the Center for American Progress; the director of nuclear non-proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and a senior fellow and director of the Committee on Nuclear Policy, the Campaign to Reduce Nuclear Dangers and the Campaign for the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the Stimson Center. He worked for nine years on the professional staff of the House Armed Services Committee and the Government Operations Committee. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the author or editor of seven books and over a thousand articles on nuclear policy and national security.

Cooled Prospects for Gender Justice from COP29

Anmol Irfan is a Muslim-Pakistani freelance journalist and editor. Her work aims at exploring marginalized narratives in the Global South with a key focus on gender, climate and tech. She tweets @anmolirfan22

For years, gender activists have been trying to draw attention to the disproportionate ways in which the climate crisis has been affecting women and girls. Studies show that by 2050, climate change may push 158 million more women and girls into poverty, which is 16 million more women and girls at risk than men and boys at the same level. For gender activists, there were small victories at this year’s United Nations COP29 climate change conference, held in Baku, Azerbaijan, but overall morale seems low as many find progress within this arena slow and tiring.

COP 29 participants described the discussions as slow in many ways – and the intersection of gender and climate has been one of them. Following the conclusion of the conference, some of the victories recognized with the gender justice space have included the extension of the Enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender, for 10 years which will help hold governments accountable as they implement their climate policies. There was also an acknowledgement of gender within climate finance goals and an increase in participation of women at the conference, though it was late in the conference. With COP29 wrapped up in Baku this year, gender activists leave Azerbaijan fatigued and unsure about the future of their work.

“I’ve been to so many COPs and this was one of the hardest ones” says Elise Buckle, founder of Climate Bridges and SHE builds bridges, when talking about what it was like to be in the room when gender just policies and solutions to climate change were being discussed and proposed at this years COP29 in Baku. “ We thought we wouldn’t have any texts, and then at the last minute we got it [extension of the Lima Work Programme ] so it gives me hope that this can be a floor not a ceiling”, she adds.

Despite pushing for gender just solutions for decades, many have called this COP a “disappointment” and questions remain about whose responsibility it really is to accommodate the needs of women and girls within climate justice.

What Went Wrong?

Lorena Aguilar, Executive Director at the Kaschak Institute for Social Justice for Women and Girls, describes the conversation around gender justice as constantly being in motion between success and failure. “When you talk about women rights and when you talk about gender equality , it’s like a pendulum, sometimes they [leaders] ignore, sometimes they accept and that’s what is happening with the UNFCCC,” she says.

At Baku, it seems the pendulum swung the wrong way. As one of the nine stakeholder groups of the United Nations Framework Convention For Climate Change (UNFCCC) the Women and Gender Constituency was one of the main groups leading the call for more focus on gender-just initiatives during the conference. Environmental lawyer, researcher and activist Claudia Rubio Giraldo, who was one of the co-coordinators of the Gender Working Groups and the WGC’s representative in the room for many of the gender related negotiations, expected parties to move onto negotiations that built on red lines set by previous discussions.The Women and Gender Constituency typically divides areas around which red lines are often established into three groups: finance and implementation, language, and praxis. Rather than start from this point, Rubio says that backtracking on many previous discussions [by many countries who had an issue with the language around gender] made it tough to be in the room. She points out that despite parameters being set in forums before COP, many parties wanted to re-negotiate boundaries which meant actual action plans didn’t go forward till much later.

“There was a backtracking of previously agreed human rights language,” Rubio says. She’s talking about how the use of the term “women in all their diversity” became an issue at this year’s conference, as many other gender advocates also pointed out.

Much of the contention came from conservative countries, led by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Russia and the Vatican, who felt that the use of the word ‘diversity’ within gender related language meant supporting LGBTQ communities, which is a topic many of those governments still have issues with. But while it’s sometimes easier to pass the burden of this thinking onto more ‘conservative’ countries, Imali Ngusale, founder of the African Center for Health, Climate and Gender Justice Alliance, also adds that there had been speculation that the US was supporting Saudi Arabia, which many believe was for personal gain.

“In the past 2 weeks we saw how parties stepped forward to accommodate women “women in all their diversity”, and other countries opposed this. There’s significant language that remains bracketed around diversity. There’s a war around narratives and that’s how we’re coming to see how different countries and different parties receive lang around it,” says Natalie Sifuma, founder of Sisters in Climate.

Another barrier that gender justice groups faced was the lack of women within decision making and leadership positions. “In terms of the lack of women representation at the highest level of leadership, that’s the same, that hasn’t improved. Only 8% women were represented in the world leaders summit,” Buckle says, adding “ So in a way Cop29 is a mirror of the world. And it’s true there is a backlash on women’s rights in many countries around the world, like the issue of abortion rights in the US, or the more serious situation in Afghanistan.”

She connects the overall backlash against women’s rights in many places across the world – including the US, as many feel has been demonstrated by the recent election – to the backtracking of gender justice in the climate space.

Ngusale also further points out that the lack of gender diversity in leadership is amplified by the fact that women are burdened with unpaid care work across the world, making it difficult for them to also take up leadership positions because they “ cannot be in two places at one time.”

Not A Monolith

But even as we talk about women’s rights across the globe, Aguilar points out that the “women of the world” as it’s often termed, are not all the same. “They try to put all women in the same bag, we need to understand the knots of gender inequality, which can be very different for different women, such as the way that our countries allow us to have control, or how we can have agency,” she says.

This is also what makes it far more complicated for groups like the WGC to advocate for the different needs of women and girls across the world, because they already find themselves fighting for space in these discussions which can make advocating for all the diversity in a nuanced way very difficult.

One example is how cultural norms manifest into gender restrictions differently across the world in ways other cultures or countries may not understand. Mobility restrictions on women due to religious and cultural norms in Kyengeza, Uganda, mean that men are twice as likely as women to travel to purchase improved seeds or visit markets, both of which are crucial factors to agricultural productivity and climate adaptation. This means if the solution international platforms are implementing is something like drought-resilient seeds, women on ground are probably not benefiting from it even if documents say that they should be.

With gender and climate often being an afterthought in policy drafts and papers, it doesn’t leave a lot of room to go into further “knots” around class, access, ethnicity and much more. Aguilar also shares one instance of how a group of low-income women on the coast of Honduras were affected by disaster.

“There were women in Honduras who were told winds of 260 km comings but they didn’t know what that meant, whether that was fast or slow, and so they continued to be on the coast and one of them lost two of her kids,” she says adding that when an NGO came to help them rebuild their house which had also been destroyed, they asked them for land property rights papers which these women didn’t have.

“That’s a group of women that need to be supported,” Aguilar says.

Implementing the Policies

But agreeing that women should be supported is one thing and actually implementing policies that work in the aftermath of discussions at spaces like COP becomes a whole other hurdle.

Some of the biggest barriers within implementation are a lack of accountability and climate financing.

“We want funds that are more liberating. Most of the funds given are not even sufficient to reach the grassroots, so there needs to be a scaling up of global finance in climate action,” Ngusale says, adding that it is crucial that these funds are scaled up in a way that directly funds locally led grassroots level action so the most vulnerable groups of women and girls can be affected.

Unfortunately a big area of contention at this year’s COP – and previous conferences – has been that receiving countries have thought the finance pledges were too low and givers thought it was too high.

But what many activists like Aguilar and Sifuma point out in different ways is that until countries like the US, and international bodies that have undeniable influence over global action – and in this case are also being called to account with regards to climate financing – don’t design implementable policies that take gender into account, nothing will change on ground.

Aguilar shares that many countries being called on for climate finance keep sidelining gender because “they have bigger fish to fry.”

“To which I always ask which fish and how are you frying them,” she says. She adds “You can’t leave half of the population behind. Disregarding the potential of half the world’s population is not logical, it’s absurd.”

Biden-Harris’s Gaza policy abandoned American workers

Abdelhalim Abdelrahman is a Palestinian-American political analyst and writer advocating for a restrained U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East centered around American laws and respect for Palestinian human rights.

When Vice President Kamala Harris lost to President-elect Donald Trump on November 5th, she did so without carrying any of the seven battleground states. Armchair post-mortems of her defeat by pundits across the nation have identified many issues as possible culprits for Harris’ defeat, from the disillusionment of working-class Americans after a period of inflation to lack of enthusiasm for both candidates, and of course ongoing support from the Biden-Harris administration for Israel’s actions in Gaza. Pundits have been quick to label Gaza, and especially the U.S. role in allowing Israel to facilitate likely war crimes with U.S.-made weapons, as a phenomenon that only impacted Michigan’s Arab American community. While Gaza was a significant factor in why Kamala Harris lost the state, labeling Gaza as a problem unique only to Michigan’s Arab American is disingenuous.

U.S. labor unions in swing states, working class Americans and younger voters all played a significant role in protesting the onslaught in Gaza, and they represent an overlooked demographic within the anti-war bloc over the last year. Gaza hit home with America’s labor unions and youth, marking foreign policy not as a separate issue from domestic issues but one intimately bound up in them. The inability of Democrats to enforce U.S. law, adopt a restrained foreign policy, and focus on working class issues at home contributed in overlapping ways to Kamala Harris’ defeat.

U.S. Labor Unions Spearheaded Anti-Genocide Protest Efforts

Early signs of this split could be seen in the organs of workplace democracy. Major labor unions across the United States threatened to withhold endorsing Kamala Harris unless she broke with President Biden and his unwavering commitment to Israeli security. Such a sentiment was widespread amongst local labor unions in key swing states such as Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin–the proverbial “blue wall” that Democrats have heavily relied upon in past elections. However, this time around, the “blue wall,” containing nearly 1.5 million labor union workers (530,000 in Michigan, 730,000 in Pennsylvania, and 205,000 in Wisconsin), crumbled.

The National Labor Network for a Ceasefire spearheaded a campaign for a ceasefire in Gaza and an arms embargo on Israel. The seven unions in the network represent 9 million workers, and on July 23 they made public a letter to the Biden administration in which the labor network called for a ceasefire and a halt on military aid to Israel. While most major labor unions went on to endorse Kamala Harris, not all of them were quick to do so. Shawn Fein, president of the United Auto Workers Union (UAW), held out on endorsing Ms. Harris initially. While Fein and the UAW did endorse Harris, he and the UAW remained relentless in calling for a ceasefire.

Throughout the last year, labor union workers across the United States told reporters how they saw themselves in Gaza, indicating that the issue impacted more Americans than pundits may have realized.“Workers are always being attacked by companies or being exploited,” said labor union worker Marcie Pedraza in an interview with The Nation back in December. Pedraza continued, “Why wouldn’t this same concept apply to people being targeted in a lethal military campaign in another part of the world, who are suffering unimaginable levels of persecution and loss?”

UAW Region 9A Director Brandon Mancilla similarly told In These Times, “The amount of political backing, arms resources we supply to the State of Israel is astronomical… we spend so much on defense, military spending in lieu of actually trying to solve deep social crisis in this country, of inequality of healthcare, of food access, education, the things you need to survive in this country.” UAW’s Region 9A encompasses 34 local unions across eastern all six New England states plus eastern New York and Puerto Rico. While Trump did not win any of these states, he improved on his 2020 performance in New York State, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island.

Pedraza and Mancilla’s comments highlight how as workers they’ve connected the struggle of working class Americans to the harms of spending money on the military of other nations, especially when that spending is accepted as an unquestioned part of bipartisan consensus politics.

It is clear to American workers that a foreign policy that runs counter to American interests has a detrimental impact on their living conditions. And while Gaza was not the sole reason for Kamala Harris’ failure earlier this month, it at least serves as a contributing factor as to Democrats’ loss of credibility amongst America’s working class.

Embargoing Arms To Israel Is A Popular Position Democrats Refused to Embrace

An arms embargo on Israel is not just a specific focus of the working class and labor unions, it was and remains a popular position for most Americans, again demonstrating that Gaza was not an issue relegated solely to Arab-Americans. According to the Institute for Middle Eastern Understanding (IMEU) Policy Project, pledging to impose an arms embargo would have given Kamala Harris an edge in Arizona, Georgia, and Pennsylvania, states Harris lost. The IMEU study found that 35% of Democrats and Independents polled in Arizona said they would be more likely to vote for Harris had she embraced an arms embargo, versus 5% who said they would be less likely. The figures were similar in Georgia (39% versus 5%) and Pennsylvania (34% versus 7%).

Polling in other groups paints a similar picture. A poll conducted by CBS in June 2024 showed that 61% of Americans (including 77% of Democrats) were against sending aid to Israel. Additionally, studies conducted by CIRCLE at Tufts University in January 2024 showed that 38% of youth ages 18-34, including 56% of those who identify as Democratic or lean Democratic, thought Israel’s military operation was going “too far.” CIRCLE also noted that that 49% of youth voters believed there was a genocide happening in Gaza.

Had Harris embraced this popular position with American voters, she would have been in a much better position to win the election. However, by ignoring calls for an arms embargo on Israel and a ceasefire in Gaza, Harris and the Democrats at large undermined the notion that American foreign policy is for the middle class. Instead, it signaled that the U.S. is perfectly willing to bend its own rules against arming human rights violaters, and will do it over the objections and needs of young voters and working class Americans.

Internationale Laws

Going forward, progressives must communicate effectively how recalibrating America’s foreign policy is beneficial to Americans, especially young people and union workers. For example, despite credible evidence from human rights observers indicating that Israel has U.S. weapons to facilitate war crimes in Gaza and block aid from coming into the enclave –both blatant violations of the United States’s Leahy Law and Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act–, Biden and Harris continued to provide Israel with unconditional arm shipments.

To re-engage the youth, working class and labor union workers, the United States must demonstrate a commitment to enforcing U.S. laws against human rights violators. That starts with enforcing the Leahy Law and Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act. Another crucial step is showing hard-working Americans that the United States is committed to a foreign policy rooted in restraint and rule of law.

In 2024, unions and workers showed politicians how they understand solidarity with workers across the world. Bringing them back into the “big tent” means treating their analysis as honest, their qualms as real, and their goals as legitimate aims. If the U.S. can carve out special rules for favored allies, what’s to stop presidents from playing favorites with bosses over workers? Either we have a system of international laws that applies to everybody, or we don’t. Workers saw that. Maybe by 2028, presidential candidates will too.

The Danger of Viewing Iran as Enemy Number One

Sina Toossi is a senior non-resident fellow at the Center for International Policy

In a recent “60 Minutes Overtime” interview, Vice President Kamala Harris called Iran the United States’ “greatest adversary.” Her comments, no doubt influenced by the toxic political climate and the ongoing conflict between Israel, Hamas, and Hezbollah, were likely shaped by the recent Iranian missile attack on Israel. While Harris may have been responding to the immediate crisis, her statement invites a deeper examination of U.S. policy toward Iran. It underscores the urgent need for a more forward-thinking approach—one that draws on lessons from past mistakes and focuses on resolving the real, yet peacefully addressable, challenges Iran presents in the Middle East while safeguarding U.S. interests.

In approaching Iran and the broader Middle East tinderbox, Harris has the advantage of relying on her experienced national security advisor, Phil Gordon. Gordon has long focused on the region and helped negotiate the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This agreement successfully blocked Iran’s pathways to developing a nuclear bomb through diplomacy, offering a rare example of de-escalation since the 1979 Iranian revolution and the ensuing U.S.-Iran hostilities.

Unfortunately, the diplomatic success of the JCPOA was short-lived. The agreement was implemented in January 2016, but that same year, Donald Trump was elected President after campaigning on a promise to dismantle it. True to his word, he withdrew the U.S. from the deal in 2018 and launched a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. As a result, Iran never saw meaningful economic benefits from the JCPOA, and tensions began to escalate rapidly.

No Great Powers, No Great Satans

Since Trump set the U.S. on this confrontational path, we’ve seen a dangerous cycle of escalations between Iran, the U.S., and Israel, with each action met by a counteraction, driving the region deeper into instability. This tit-for-tat dynamic has steadily intensified tensions, leading to the precarious situation we now face, where the threat of all-out war looms larger than ever.

As Gordon warned in a 2018 article criticizing Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, “It starts with exiting the nuclear deal without a plan, and it could end with a messy, violent, and unnecessary conflict.” He echoed this concern in a May 2019 piece, noting, “Predictably, Iran has responded not by caving to U.S. demands (let alone collapsing) but with a pressure campaign of its own.” Gordon also explored the dangers of U.S. interventions in his 2020 book, Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East, which highlights the self-defeating nature of America’s regime change interventions abroad.

Gordon’s work underscores that while Iran does present challenges to U.S. interests, framing it as America’s greatest adversary ignores broader strategic realities and risks exacerbating the very tensions a Harris administration would aim to reduce. Reflexive hostility toward Iran has often blinded Washington to the high costs of such an approach. The notion of Iran being the U.S.’s “greatest adversary”—ahead of powers like China, Russia, or existential threats like climate change—threatens to perpetuate this cycle, driving the U.S. further down a path of conflict that undermines both its national security and stability in the Middle East and beyond.

A Moment for Military Realism

It’s important to recognize that Iran is far weaker in terms of conventional military strength than the U.S. and its key regional allies, Israel and the Arab Gulf states. Iran’s military spending and capabilities are dwarfed by these powers. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the U.S. and its Middle Eastern allies outspend Iran on defense by more than 50 to 1. Iran’s military is largely made up of outdated equipment, and its air force and navy are no match for the advanced capabilities of Israel or the U.S. Furthermore, with a population only a quarter the size of the U.S. and an economy just 2% of America’s, Iran simply lacks the resources to be a meaningful strategic competitor to the United States.

Yet Washington’s fixation on Iran has led to exaggerated threat assessments. Trump’s hyperfocus on Iran was especially driven by “political incentives and intensified lobbying by Israel and Saudi Arabia,” according to Daniel Benjamin, former Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U.S. State Department, and Steven Simon, who served on the National Security Council in the Clinton and Obama administrations.

Benjamin and Simon emphasized that this hostility comes at a high cost for the U.S., increasing the risk of armed conflict, alienating allies, and undermining regional stability. According to them, the U.S. has a compelling interest in finding a “modus vivendi” with Iran, much like it did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, by creating incentives for Iranian cooperation. Writing in 2019, they urged the “next administration to, at long last, give sustained engagement a try.”

Unfortunately, the Biden administration’s early signals to Tehran only deepened mistrust. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, along with other officials like Avril Haines and Jen Psaki, insisted that Iran fully comply with the JCPOA before the U.S. would return to its sanctions relief obligations under the deal, while also demanding additional concessions on regional issues and Iran’s missile program. This approach reinforced Tehran’s perception that the U.S. remained an unreliable partner, further undermining the chances for renewed diplomacy.

Unreliable Partners Make Bad Negotiators

For decades, Iran has experienced disappointment in negotiations with the U.S., with former President Hassan Rouhani’s JCPOA arguably the most egregious example of a moderate Iranian leader undermined by U.S. backtracking. The subsequent years would bear out that the Biden administration’s early belief that Trump’s “maximum pressure” provided leverage was a major miscalculation, missing the opportunity to revive the JCPOA under Rouhani’s government and instead pushing for unrealistic concessions.

By the time nuclear talks resumed in April 2021, Israel sabotaged negotiations with an attack on Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility, prompting Tehran to increase uranium enrichment to 60%. Iran, wary of U.S. intentions, demanded guarantees of sanctions relief before agreeing to scale back its nuclear program. By June 2021, with the hardline government taking power in Iran, trust further eroded, leading to 15 months of stalled negotiations, with Tehran’s skepticism of U.S. commitment at the heart of the impasse.

However, the situation has since shifted dramatically again, offering a new opening for diplomacy. Kamala Harris, if elected, will have a significant opportunity to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough with Iran. The death of conservative Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi last April triggered a major shift in Iranian politics, culminating in the election of Masoud Pezeshkian, a heart surgeon and former parliamentarian, as Iran’s first reformist president since 2005. Pezeshkian ran on a platform emphasizing diplomacy emphasizing diplomacy to resolve Iran’s foreign tensions and has consistently advocated for the revival of a nuclear agreement to lift sanctions. In a notable move, he reinstated much of Iran’s original nuclear negotiating team, including former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif as Vice President for Strategic Affairs.

Pezeshkian’s outreach faced an immediate test when, on the day of his inauguration, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran. Despite expectations of swift retaliation, Iran showed restraint for two months, allowing Pezeshkian to attend the UN General Assembly, where he emphasized Iran’s desire for de-escalation and called for the U.S. to seize the opportunity for broader diplomacy. However, the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and the lack of progress on a Israel-Hamas ceasefire led Iran to launch a large missile attack on Israel.

Re-Engaging With Iran During The Lame Duck

If Kamala Harris wins the presidency, the lame-duck period and her remaining tenure as vice president will be crucial for setting the stage for broader diplomatic de-escalation with Iran. During this transition, Harris should work with the Biden team to prioritize immediately reducing tensions. A key step would be restoring the informal de-escalatory informal de-escalatory agreement reached in August 2023, which saw Iran freeze its nuclear program’s expansion, release dual-national American prisoners, and restrain its regional allies from attacking U.S. interests in exchange for access to frozen Iranian funds in South Korean banks, which were transferred to Qatar for humanitarian purchases.

This agreement was pivotal because it sought to cap Iran’s nuclear progress, particularly its accumulation of 60% enriched uranium, while also connecting nuclear restrictions to regional security concerns for the first time. Although the deal unraveled after the October 7 Hamas attack, it provides a blueprint for Harris and the Biden team to revive. By offering Iran access to the funds still frozen in Qatar, in exchange for halting its nuclear expansion and committing to regional de-escalation, Harris can lay the foundation for broader diplomacy. Crucially, this should be linked to securing a Gaza ceasefire, which would help reduce tensions in Lebanon and Yemen as well.

Establishing this groundwork would position Harris to engage in serious negotiations with Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, early in her presidency. A new nuclear deal, built on the JCPOA framework, could eliminate the threat of Iran’s nuclear weaponization and stand as a major foreign policy achievement for her administration.

Now, the U.S. and Iran stand at a critical crossroads. The stakes have never been higher, with the specter of total war in the Middle East—along with its far-reaching ramifications, particularly for the global economy—looming large. In this moment, Harris must send the right signals to steer the situation back from the brink. If elected, she must learn from past U.S. failures with Iran, revitalize a diplomatic approach grounded in mutual compromise, and focus on securing core U.S. security interests in dealing with a middling power like Iran.

Maintaining Transparency in US Security Assistance to Ukraine

Patrick Bodovitz is a Security Assistance Monitor intern at CIP

From February 24th, 2022 to September 27th of this year, the United States has provided $61.3 billion in military assistance to Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s war. This figure leaves out the non-military aid to Ukraine from the US, and it excludes the tens of billions of aid provided to the country since Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014. This is a staggering amount of assistance to a country that the United States did not have a close military relationship with before Russia’s annexation of Crimea. While the sheer amount of aid has caused political disputes in Washington, it has been a relatively successful program so far. The ongoing conflict remains confined to Russia and Ukraine, avoiding greater escalation, regional conflagration, or great power war. There is also little evidence that US-supplied munitions have been used in war crimes by Ukrainian forces, apart from one unit of foreign volunteers mentioned in the New York Times. Lastly, there has not been any evidence of weapons going to Ukraine being diverted elsewhere as a result of criminal activity, although this problem could emerge if and when combat ceases. Other US arms shipments have gone to countries where this has proved a systemic problem.

If the US government succeeds in helping Ukraine defend its territory without the arms being diverted to forces outside Ukraine, or used by Ukrainian forces in acts in violation of international humanitarian law, it could emerge as a useful precedent for promoting transparency in U.S. arms transfers, informing procedures and policies for future transfers.

US Security Assistance to Ukraine

Since 2015, the United States government has trained and equipped the Ukrainian military through Operation Atlantic Resolve. In August 2021, the Biden Administration began accelerated deliveries through the presidential drawdown authority (PDA). Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and on March 15th, Congress approved the first major supplemental bills that set aside funding for the White House to purchase military gear for the Ukrainian military. Drawdowns and supplemental bills have become the main methods to appropriate funds for Ukrainian assistance, including humanitarian aid.

Initially, the US supplied light weapons and small arms, like Javelin anti-tank missiles, and has since expanded to include artillery, tanks, and long-range ordinance like the Army Tactical Missile. These weapons helped Ukrainian forces to keep fighting. While Ukraine has managed to win back some of its territory, it remains locked in heavy combat, and Russia shows no sign yet of coming to the negotiation table. With an incursion into Russia’s European territory, Ukraine has expanded the battlefield to include both legally Ukrainian and Russian soil.

Since the Trump Administration, the United States government has been more transparent about security assistance to Ukraine than arms shipments to other countries. In the 1990s, Ukraine’s government had horrific corruption scandals in its defense industry, such as false production numbers and illegal weapons sales. In September 2002, the State Department announced that two years prior, Ukraine’s president Leonid Kuchma illegally sold missiles to Iraq, and in light of this, the US put a hold on a portion of its aid to the country. Scandals like this, in addition to Ukraine’s political instability, meant the US government was reluctant to provide military aid to the country. After 2014 and the events of Euromaidan, officials in Kyiv promised to crack down on corruption throughout society, including in its defense sector.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the US government has been caught between three competing demands: surging defense articles and services to Ukraine, ensuring accountability for US arms shipments, and managing escalation risks. On September 13th, 2023, the Pentagon agreed to set up an inspection team inside Ukraine to better track equipment moving through the country. This team publishes reports to Congress through the Office of the Inspector General that analyze what is happening to the aid sent through the PDA. Much of this has been a demand by Republicans in Congress, many of whom are skeptical of US aid to Ukraine to begin with and have demanded more oversight.

An enormous amount of aid has been sent by Ukraine’s backers. The United States alone has sent $61.3 billion since February 2022, raising concerns about how the considerable quantity of weapons will be used and what will happen with the weapons after the war. Jordan Cohen, a defense analyst at CATO, told CNN “the biggest danger surrounding the flood of weapons being funneled into Ukraine is what happens to them when the war ends or transitions into some kind of protracted stalemate.” Besides arms from the United States, many former Warsaw Pact states have transferred their Soviet-origin arms to Ukraine due to their interoperability with the Ukrainian Army.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy, president of Ukraine, receives a demonstration of tactical equipment during a visit to the California Air National Guard’s 129th Rescue Wing at Moffett Air National Guard Base, California, Sept. 2, 2021. The California National Guard and Ukraine State Partnership Program was established in 1993 through the Department of Defense as a means to develop and strengthen the strategic partnership between the U.S. and Ukraine. (U.S. Air National Guard photo by Senior Airman Duane Ramos) — Volodymyr Zelenskyy, president of Ukraine, receives a demonstration of tactical equipment during a visit to the California Air National Guard’s 129th Rescue Wing at Moffett Air National Guard Base, California, Sept. 2, 2021. (U.S. Air National Guard photo by Senior Airman Duane Ramos)

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) issued a full report on weapons diversion cases in Ukraine and what the Ukrainian government has been doing to address cases of missing weapons. The monitor employed by GI-TOC in Ukraine found that there was no systemic organized smuggling of weapons outside the country. The report also mentioned that any instances where criminal gangs tried to smuggle weapons involved Soviet-era weaponry, not US-origin equipment. This report is the most in-depth analysis done to date on weapons trafficking in Ukraine and validates the assertion that the Ukrainian National Police and Prosecutor’s Office has been closely monitoring the flow of weaponry in the country.

Some obstacles to transparency persist under the existing regime of monitoring and inspections. In August, the Government Accountability Office found that the State Department and the Pentagon have not always communicated on how to properly ensure that end-use monitoring is being implemented. According to the report, “DOD officials are often unaware of [third-party-transfers] authorized by State until they are identified upon entry to Ukraine, if at all.” While the DOD Inspector General stated that he saw no evidence of weapons diversion of US-supplied defense articles, he concurred that increased inspection was needed.

There are some other challenges that the US now faces in monitoring US-supplied equipment in Ukraine, like the difficulty in monitoring the end use of US-supplied munitions inside Russian territory following Ukraine’s decision to launch an offensive into Russia. While end-use monitoring traditionally has been successful in monitoring the transfer of weapons, it has not been as successful in monitoring the use of said weapons. This is no exception in Ukraine, where the rate of expenditure is very high. Nonetheless, the decision to increase monitoring and publicly release reports about US-supplied weapons in Ukraine is promising and shows that the Pentagon takes seriously concerns about weapons diversion in this war. The monitoring is likely to continue after the war ends to prevent arms being smuggled in the post-war period.

Recommendations for going forward

Due to the war’s intensity and longevity, the United States is likely to supply Ukraine with arms as long as political will endures. The good news is that the United States government has increased oversight of the flow of weapons into the country. The return of the US embassy has helped by allowing OIG personnel to be based permanently in Ukraine. Additionally, the Ukrainian government knows that it is under intense scrutiny to ensure proper management of its arsenal and is incentivized to comply to ensure the continued transfer of munitions The need for weapons at the front has made it so that people are far less likely to smuggle weapons. Lastly, outside of areas occupied by Russia, Ukraine’s government retains the monopoly of force in the country. It folded volunteer units created in 2014 into the Army and National Guard as part of their reforms undertaken with the intention to eventually join NATO. This is designed to guarantee clear command and control, which is essential for monitoring arms flows.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr O. Zelenskyy observes the completion of the rough turn process for 155mm rounds while at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in Scranton, Pa., Sept. 22, 2024. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Curt Loter)

Nevertheless, there are further actions the US government can take to ensure that weapons flows to Ukraine do not run into any of the risks that have plagued other efforts to arm partners. One major action the US can take is to push Ukraine to modernize its military justice system. The UAF still relies on protocols dating back to before they began to reform their forces. This includes a lack of enforcement authority for the Military Law Enforcement Service and the shortage of military courts. This can affect accountability, although there is little evidence of Ukrainian leadership sanctioning war crimes, making violations of international law easier to remediate. The United States can provide additional funding and specialists to assist with this effort, such as increasing funding for a greater portion of Ukrainian military officers and civilian personnel to undergo training at the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS). It can also condition portions of the aid provided on the Ukrainian government agreeing to modernize its military justice protocols, in a similar fashion to the European Union conditioning membership on Ukraine making necessary changes to its governance.

The United States should also consider stationing more personnel in Ukraine to help monitor the flow of weapons. Before the war, the embassy in Kyiv employed close to 800 personnel. Now, there are around 100-200 staffers and the military and civilian staff are overwhelmed. While there has been an effort to increase staffing, it has stalled in the face of intransigence from the White House. Russian attacks on the country pose a risk to personnel stationed there, but most staff work in cities protected by air defense systems. If the United States wants effective monitoring of arms flows into the country and other anti-corruption efforts, it will need more staff on the ground to increase transparency. These staff could be under the mandate of the Office of the Inspector General, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense.

Bottom Line

The United States has a responsibility to ensure that arms it sells or provides to its partners are not re-transferred without authorization, nor used in violation of U.S. and international law. The war in Ukraine has become the latest test of if and how the United States can provide massive amounts of arms to another country without risking fueling arms trafficking or violations of the Foreign Assistance Act. Should the United States continue to emphasize transparency and accountability in transfers to Ukraine, these lessons learned can be applied to other contexts to allow for better monitoring and evaluation of the provision of U.S. security cooperation and assistance. The United States has improved monitoring of the transfer of weapons to Ukraine and also ensured that Ukraine’s government has maintained effective command and control over its armed forces. At the same time, room for improvement remains. The U.S. end-use monitoring system must be reformed more broadly to better assess violations of U.S. and international law, and the United States should condition further aid on the modernization of Ukraine’s military justice system. If the US government succeeds in this, Ukraine will be a useful case study of how the US can train and equip partners without sacrificing transparency, promoting diversion or arms trafficking, and facilitating violations of U.S. and international law.

When Pagers Became Bombs: The New Reality of Psychological Warfare

Janet Abou-Elias is a research fellow at the Center for International Policy and co-founder of Women for Weapons Trade Transparency.

The Lebanese Health Ministry announced Wednesday that the death toll from Israeli attacks on Lebanon has risen to 2,119, with another 10,019 since October 8, 2023. At least 50 paramedics have been killed in Lebanon over the last three weeks. With over a million people – a fifth of the population – displaced by Israeli bombings of Beirut and Southern Lebanon and ongoing ground invasion, the existing humanitarian crisis has deepened. This latest surge of violence, coupled with covert operations like the pager and walkie talkie explosions, threatens to further destabilize the country.

The pager and walkie talkie explosions, unprecedented in scope, have raised serious questions about the involvement of Israel’s military apparatus in covert operations, especially in the context of its ongoing assault on Gaza. This is no ordinary cyber attack– reports suggest these explosions stem from a covert supply chain infiltration rather than software manipulation, marking a significant escalation in an already volatile situation. According to the Lebanese Health Ministry, the pager explosions killed twelve people, including a ten-year-old girl and a young boy, and injured thousands. Just days later, a wave of walkie talkie explosions killed 20 and left 450 people injured.

Sources indicate that the affected pagers were recently acquired by Hezbollah in a new shipment from Taiwan-based electronic manufacturer Gold Apollo. The Lebanese government spokesman said Israel is responsible for the pager explosions, deeming it a violation of Lebanese sovereignty. If this is correct, it points to an operation in which the IDF targeted essential communication equipment at the procurement level, thereby weaponizing the supply chain.

What happens when any object can become a bomb?

This attack sets a deeply disturbing precedent—the weaponization of ordinary, essential technology in public spaces. The idea that these devices were compromised before even reaching Hezbollah underscores the growing sophistication of covert warfare. This tactic targets not just military infrastructure but also civilian life and infrastructure. Pagers, used by medical personnel, businesses, and citizens across Lebanon, have been weaponized. The normalization of such attacks creates a terrifying new reality where everyday objects can become deadly weapons, unraveling the fabric of daily life and instilling anxiety and paranoia at every level. Lebanese civilians– and civilians of the world– are now second-guessing the safety and security of tools and machines they use daily.

The psychological impact of these attacks cannot be understated. The normalization of exploding communication devices introduces a new form of psychological warfare, creating an atmosphere of pervasive fear and distrust. As Israeli jets send sonic booms over Beirut, Lebanese civilians, already grappling with political instability and economic collapse, are now faced with the chilling possibility that ordinary objects—pagers, phones, and even medical equipment—can become weapons. The result is an atmosphere of pervasive fear, where public spaces and everyday items are fraught with danger. Public spaces become ticking time bombs, and the very infrastructure meant to support society becomes a weapon against it.

The result is an atmosphere of pervasive fear, where public spaces and everyday items are fraught with danger.

This escalation further compounds the mental health crisis. In the years following the 2019 financial crash, Lebanon has recorded some of the highest rates of daily negative experiences in the world, according to a survey by Gallup. These experiences remain prevalent, particularly among the poorest households. The poorest 20% of the population are disproportionately affected by worry (77%), stress (76%), pain (68%), sadness (52%), and anger (49%), compared with those with higher incomes. This emotional and psychological toll compounds the humanitarian crisis in Lebanon, adding a layer of distress to an already fragile situation.

Booby-trapping the public square

Former CIA director Leon Panetta called the deadly pager explosions in Lebanon a form of terrorism. He stated, “This is going right into the supply chain, […] and when you have terror going into the supply chain, it makes people ask the question: ‘What the hell is next?’” The explosion of pagers raises significant concerns about civilian harm and potential violations of international humanitarian law (IHL). Brian Finucane, writing in Just Security, highlights key questions regarding the legality of targeting individuals based on their status as Hezbollah fighters, whether the attacks were proportionate and discriminated between military and civilian targets, and if the use of booby-trap-like devices in a civilian area adhered to IHL obligations.

The U.S. cannot ignore the gravity of this development. U.S.-supplied military technology and financial assistance have empowered Israel’s military dominance in the region, enabling destructive campaigns in Gaza, the West Bank, and throughout Lebanon. The U.S. has both a moral and legal responsibility to ensure that its security assistance is not being used to violate international law or endanger civilian populations. The use of clandestine tactics, like supply chain infiltration, to target civilians and civilian infrastructure crosses a dangerous line.

The use of clandestine tactics, like supply chain infiltration, to target civilians and civilian infrastructure crosses a dangerous line.

To prevent further destabilization, the Biden administration must seriously consider halting weapons transfers to Israel. This action would send an unmistakable message: the United States will not condone military actions that violate international law or endanger civilian populations. The Biden administration must not allow Israel to continue operating unchecked, especially when it’s using covert means that disrupt and derail civilian life.

Ultimately, the Biden administration must use its influence to promote peace and de-escalation. Halting arms transfers to Israel is a crucial first step toward reducing tensions, protecting civilians, and preventing further escalation in Lebanon and the region in the midst of an already devastating conflict.

Democratic foreign policy cannot be for elites alone

Alex Thurston is Associate Professor in the University of Cincinnati’s School of Public and International Affairs.

The foreign policy establishment has been famously cast as a bipartisan “Blob” with monolithic views. Yet if the Blob is bipartisan, the Democratic foreign policy network has become the core of the Blob today. Democratic foreign policy hands view themselves as the keepers of order within American foreign policy, the crew that cleans up Republican foreign policy disasters. Democrats stand as reliable defenders of an American imperial order, the party tasked with winding down unwinnable wars (Iraq under Barack Obama, Afghanistan under Joe Biden) while prosecuting wars where the U.S. is ostensibly not a front-line combatant (Libya, Syria, Ukraine, Gaza). Serious reforms to status quo American foreign policy have been fleeting. As vice president, Kamala Harris has championed the Democratic foreign policy status quo; at the insider-heavy Munich Security Conference in February 2024, she offered up the party’s mantras about American leadership, “international rules and norms,” and the importance of alliances with Europe and beyond. As the new nominee and through her choice of Tim Walz as vice president, Harris has stirred some hope that she will prove less militaristic than Biden and that her advisers will listen more to dissenting views.

A more progressive foreign policy would need a different kind of executive, but also a different cadre of people to implement it.
Reformists can and should cut their teeth in the existing Democratic foreign policy world, resigning when morally imperative but gleaning knowledge of how things work when possible.
The challenge is instead to make the foreign policy elite more answerable and vulnerable to mass politics.
Solutions, Distilled, from Democratic Foreign Policy Cannot Be For Elites Alone
by Alex Thurston for the International Policy Journal

The Democratic foreign policy elite sometimes tinkers with the status quo, but in relatively superficial and fleeting ways. Obama’s team showed imagination on Iran and Cuba, and Biden’s team promised a “new Washington consensus.” Yet Trump easily undermined Obama’s reforms, especially on Iran, and Biden’s team did not fight back vigorously once Democrats were back in power. Nor did Biden’s team undo Trump decisions such as moving the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. As on many domestic issues, Democrats portray themselves as the adults while mostly letting Republicans shape the playing field. Democrats’ defense of the status quo, moreover, often brings both criticism from the non-governmental players in the Blob (the think tank set and the editorial pages of East Coast newspapers) and fallout among their own base; in different ways, Ukraine and Gaza both exemplify how Democrats act out the preferred policies of the Blob, take elite criticism for not being hawkish enough, and simultaneously lose ground with Democratic activists and core voters.

As on many domestic issues, Democrats portray themselves as the adults while mostly letting Republicans shape the playing field.

A more progressive foreign policy would need a different kind of executive, but also a different cadre of people to implement it. If the National Security Council-led “Process Makes Perfect” when it comes to debating foreign policy in the White House – a dubious claim, actually – then that “process” also involves not just selecting among options but constructing those options for the principals. The people who steer the process matter.

Yet pathways into the Democratic foreign policy establishment remain narrow. One is to be a politician whose brand revolves partly or heavily around supposed foreign policy expertise, for example Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, or John Kerry. Another path is to be a career political appointee, in the mold of Antony Blinken, Jake Sullivan, or Susan Rice – and, one could add, in the mold of Harris’ top two foreign policy advisors, Philip Gordon and Rebecca Lissner. A third path is to rise through the civil service (especially the Foreign Service or the CIA) and then convert bureaucratic capital into political capital, in the mold of Bill Burns or Linda Thomas-Greenfield. More complex pathways are possible too, involving careers in journalism, the NGO world, academia, or other sectors – Samantha Power came out of journalism and academia, for example. These pathways have some commonalities, however: they are all highly dependent on mentor-mentee relationships, and at the highest levels of a presidential administration, the representatives of different pathways tend to talk and sound the same.

Pathways into Power

Senior policymakers in the Biden administration today, mostly born in the 1960s and 1970s, represent the third or fourth generation to 1) steer the national security state, itself a relatively recent creation that dates to the end of World World II, the National Security Act of 1947, and the advent of the Cold War; and 2) manage the “liberal world order,” also a WWII-era phenomenon centered upon the Bretton Woods institutions, the United Nations, and NATO.

Aside from the handful of Senators to brand themselves as foreign policy experts, the Democratic Party’s foreign policy professionals have no political constituency of their own; few of them are household names. Being a career political appointee requires close relationships with elected politicians and with more senior members of the foreign policy elite. Moreover, power within any given administration can manifest in different ways; the author James Mann, for example, argues that during Obama’s first term, the cabinet (Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, etc.) had less direct presidential access and empowerment than did members of Obama’s inner circle, such as Ben Rhodes and Denis McDonough. In Biden’s administration, in contrast, levels of formal and informal power sometimes seem to align, as with Blinken’s appointment as Secretary of State.

For career political appointees, the path into power often involves academic accomplishment (a Rhodes Scholarship, and/or an Ivy League J.D. or Ph.D.), then work for a Senator, then a senior post in a Democratic administration, followed by a cabinet-level post. Vetting and selection mechanisms kick in early; it is not that working-class Americans are completely frozen out, but attending a state school, or missing out on the mentorship that prepares one for major fellowship competitions, acts as a major brake on early access to the network. And if the foreign policy elite is becoming more diverse over time by gender and race, it nonetheless continues to skew male and white. Even more subtle, meanwhile, are the homogenizing effects of the selection mechanisms when it comes to ideological diversity, or lack thereof; the Ivies, the elite fellowships, and the early career opportunities in government or at top publications can all act as screening devices for junior applicants to the Blob.

the Ivies, the elite fellowships, and the early career opportunities in government or at top publications can all act as screening devices for junior applicants to the Blob.

To take a few examples of career political appointees, a 30-year-old Blinken served on Bill Clinton’s National Security Council in a mid-level role from 1994 to 2001, then became a key aide to then-Senator Biden on the Foreign Relations Committee. Blinken followed Biden into the Obama administration and, in 2021, was tapped as Secretary of State. Sullivan, a Yale-educated lawyer, worked for Minnesota Senator Amy Klobuchar. That role opened the door to a 31-year old Sullivan joining Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaigns in 2008 and 2016. When Clinton became Secretary of State, Sullivan served in two key posts – Director of Policy Planning at State, and then as National Security Advisor to then-Vice President Biden. Had Clinton won the 2016 presidential election, Sullivan likely would have become National Security Advisor, one of the youngest ever. He eventually did take on that role in the Biden administration (2021-present).

For career bureaucrats, meanwhile, the Foreign Service and the intelligence community offer structured, hierarchal paths to advancement. If the bureaucrat rises high enough, he/she becomes visible to the politicos in the White House. A post such as Assistant Secretary can offer an audition for even more politically important jobs in a subsequent administration. One representative of the bureaucratic path is Bill Burns. The son of a major general, he won a Marshall Scholarship to Oxford in 1978, completed his Ph.D. there, and then joined the Foreign Service in 1982. He served in the offices of both of Bill Clinton’s Secretaries of State and then, starting at 42 took up high-profile posts as Ambassador to Jordan (1998-2001), Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (2001-2005), Ambassador to Russia (2005-2008), Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (2008-2011), and Deputy Secretary of State (2011-2014). Burns’ rise proceeded under Democratic and Republican presidents alike, but his post-Foreign Service career has seen him gravitate towards the Democratic establishment, serving as president of the liberal think tank the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2014-2021) before accepting the directorship of the CIA under Biden.

Bureaucrats-turned-elites are major assets to any administration – these bureaucrats bring substantial government experience to the table, as well as long-practiced diplomatic skills. If there is an American “Deep State,” then Burns personifies it; indeed, some post-October 7 coverage suggests that it is Burns, rather than Blinken, who is the real voice of American negotiations in the Middle East.

Power, finally, and lesser-known figures such as Richard Stengel, exemplify paths that run through journalism or other sectors. Power, a war correspondent, joined Harvard in 1998 to establish the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy; she earned fame, and a Pulitzer, for her 2003 book on genocide, A Problem from Hell. She then became a key advisor to Barack Obama, eventually serving, starting at 42, as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations during his second term and returning to the White House under Biden as director of the United States Agency for International Development.

Pathways When Out of Power

One important facet of such figures’ careers is what they do when Democrats are out of power. The typical moves are to think tanks, universities (again, especially Ivy Leagues), or consulting firms. Such roles can keep foreign policy professionals visible (through speaking engagements, appearances in the media, and/or participating in policy reports and high-level working groups) and can help them maintain and expand their networks. Consulting firms are, obviously, lucrative ways to leverage government experience and political connections, but are also important parts of the foreign policy infrastructure, again allowing out-of-power elites to stay connected to key contacts at home and abroad, and also to create professional perches for peers and proteges. When out of power, top figures not only often find prestigious and lucrative perches but also combine multiple roles – as think tankers and consultants, for example – to burnish their images as serious thinkers while simultaneously cashing in.

Key pipelines into the Biden administration included two consulting firms: Albright Stonebridge Group (an outgrowth of former Clinton secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s consulting firm, founded in 2001, which merged in 2009 with Stonebridge International, a firm launched by Albright’s fellow Clinton administration alumnus Sandy Berger, who had served as National Security Advisor from 1997-2001); and WestExec Advisors (founded in 2017 by Blinken and several other top Obama officials). Although such firms are substantially smaller than Wall Street giants such as Goldman Sachs and Citigroup, they play a broadly similar function in the revolving door of Washington, allowing the kind of zig-zagging career mobility (and profitability) for the foreign policy elite that major investment banks and corporations have allowed for the financial elite. WestExec has been criticized for the opacity of its client list, and for the ways in which the firm leveraged promises of “face time” with once-and-future officials as a selling point for clients.

Another way that out-of-power Democrats occupy themselves is, of course, with planning how to get back into power. A key venue between the Obama and Biden administrations was National Security Action, a 501(c)(4) advocacy group. Co-chaired by Rhodes and Sullivan, the group included Blinken, Burns, Thomas-Greenfield, and a host of other familiar faces, many of whom joined the Biden administration. Various institutions, then, allow the Democratic foreign policy elite to bide their time and stay in the game while between White Houses. It may also be time out of power, moreover, that reinforces the network’s cohesion even more than time in power; the shared experience of opposing a Republican president, planning lines of attack and promises for the future, and engaging in shared consulting and corporate work likely also serve to bind a diverse elite more closely together.

Worldviews and Goals of the Democratic Foreign Policy Establishment

What do the Democratic foreign policy elites want and believe? From their writings and statements, many senior members of this club exhibit a generic liberal view of America’s place in the world, tinged with elements of progressivism.

There are no specific values that one could permanently associate with Blinken or Sullivan, for example. While out of power, Democratic foreign policy elites – as with top candidates for office – gesture towards the imperative to uphold “our values” and restore a perceived normalcy in American life and foreign policy. National Security Action, for example, “work[ed] to ensure that America endures as a beacon of opportunity, dignity, and hope to people around the world.” The group declared, “We reject the false choice between welcoming immigrants and refugees and ensuring our security” and also said that “enabling or excusing oppression abroad today only fuels the injustices and instability that endanger us all tomorrow.” Back in office, however, the Biden administration proved more than willing to crack down on immigrants, and even more willing to double down on alliances with autocrats around the world.

Similar promises from Sullivan and others that U.S. foreign policy under Biden would “work better for the middle class” had relatively little substance and were soon abandoned. The policy paper Sullivan helped organize in 2020 recommended, among other items, to “shift some defense spending toward research and development (R&D) and technological workforce development to protect the U.S. innovative edge and enhance long-term readiness,” but the defense budget has instead grown each year under Biden.

When called upon to articulate a view of America’s role in the world, the top Democratic strategists are often vague. In October 2023, Sullivan penned an article for Foreign Affairs called “The Sources of America Power.” The article became infamous for Sullivan’s boast that “although the Middle East remains beset with perennial challenges, the region is quieter than it has been for decades” – lines written and spoken before Hamas’ attack on October 7, 2023 and the ensuing genocidal response by Israel, but naïve nonetheless. More telling of Sullivan’s worldview, however, was this sentence: “The essence of President Biden’s foreign policy is to lay a new foundation of American strength so that the country is best positioned to shape the new era in a way that protects its interests and values and advances the common good.” Such sentiments amount to little more than an argument that America is inherently good, so therefore it should lead the world, and therefore America must be “strong.” This is less a foreign policy than it is a vague, all-purpose justification for ad hoc decisions.

Such sentiments amount to little more than an argument that America is inherently good, so therefore it should lead the world, and therefore America must be “strong.”

Harris’ advisors are clearly reflective – Gordon published a book in 2020 called Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East – yet there are limits to their introspection. If Gordon is a reformist, as some have argued, he is a moderate one at most. Gordon’s thinking in Losing the Long Game revolves around cost-benefit analysis in a framework that still assumes and extols American primacy, rather than a wider set of questions about how, for example, U.S. failures in the Middle East could provide impetus for a fundamentally different approach to the region and the world. And reflection can turn into overcorrection; among various troubling notes in the book, Gordon portrays Obama’s (very reluctant) support for Egyptian protesters in 2011 as a form of “regime change” gone wrong, collapsing U.S. rhetorical support for largely non-violent Egyptian protests with the more aggressive U.S. interventions in Syria and Libya. And despite Gordon’s reflections when out of power, Biden himself has appeared to call for regime change in Russia and, depending on how one parses his statements, Iran. Biden’s statements could be seen as gaffes, but the instinct to push for regime change in adversaries runs deep, and no senior staff resigned over either remark. Meanwhile, Lissner co-authored a book in 2020 called An Open World: How America Can Win the Contest for 21st Century Order. Endorsed by Henry Kissinger, the book’s call for openness is welcome – but is the key question facing the U.S. really how to “win”?

Even those individuals who do enter the foreign policy elite with a more recognizable set of values (or, more cynically, a “brand”) typically end up becoming defenders rather than reformers of existing policy frameworks; the ultimate example is Samantha Power, an ostensible critic of U.S. inaction in the face of genocide but, while in senior posts under the Obama and Biden administrations, a rather conventional liberal hawk.

There are also no specific policies that Democratic elites consistently defend. Many of the top officials in Biden’s administration, for example, were involved in negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the “Iran Deal”) under Obama, but showed little hunger to restore the deal under Biden. Some fixtures of Democratic White Houses are more associated with specific policies – Middle East hand Rob Malley, for example, is seen as a leading Democratic expert on Iran and a proponent of easing tensions – but those associations can in fact become professional liabilities, and Malley was subjected to an extended barrage of criticisms in the press before being placed on leave in June 2023 under unclear circumstances concerning his security clearance.

Democratic foreign policy elites will sometimes innovate, but more often they default to defending the status quo of the moment, while invoking 1945 and 1989-1991 as idealized moments of supposed “order” in a U.S.-centric worldview. The goals of any given moment – for example, the administration’s reported push for a “grand bargain” between Saudi Arabia and Israel as a purported path for ending the Gaza war – often appear predicated on a hunger for “normalcy” and an eye to what would play well with establishment media, rather than on introspection about America’s changing place in the world or about why the status quo might be a problem rather than a destination. It is striking, meanwhile, how often Democratic foreign policy elites invoke George H.W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, and James Baker as foreign policy hands they admire – a Republican-lite foreign policy sometimes appears to be the horizon of imagination for today’s top Democrats.

a Republican-lite foreign policy sometimes appears to be the horizon of imagination for today’s top Democrats.

If ideological vagueness, a belief in American greatness, and a preference for the status quo are all interwoven with a hierarchical, elite, and difficult to permeate network, then it is little surprise that the Democratic foreign policy establishment is largely self-perpetuating and unfriendly to genuine reformers. New entrants to the establishment are almost invariably proteges of existing members, and/or the senior campaign staff of winning presidential campaigns. Meanwhile, surviving and rising in that world requires intricate knowledge of the government’s inner workings as well as a sophisticated mental rolodex of who is who in Washington. If one is working sixteen-hour days at the National Security Council attempting to plan foreign trips and write talking points for a frazzled boss all while running “sub-IPC” meetings and plotting one’s next career move, what time is left to question whether American foreign policy is heading in the right direction?

Opportunities for Reform – or Revolution?

The reproduction mechanisms of the Democratic foreign policy elite are strong. From one’s undergraduate years on, access to opportunities relies heavily on connections to top mentors, who are overwhelmingly likely to prefer people with worldviews similar to their own – or at least malleable ones. The rewards for ideological and professional conformity are huge: proximity to power when Democrats are in office and, when out of office, lucrative positions within consulting firms and/or prestigious perches within universities and think tanks. All of this adds up for considerable longevity, over decades, for people who make it into the foreign policy elite. Whether or not Harris wins in November, and whoever the next Democratic president is, Biden administration figures such as Blinken, Sullivan, and their close proteges are likely to continue shaping Democratic executives’ foreign policy for years to come. One can also look ahead to key incubators for upcomers – the State Department’s Policy Planning unit, for example, or the National Security Council’s myriad senior directorships – to get a sense of what the next cadre of senior policymakers will look like.

The rewards for ideological and professional conformity are huge

Is such a system impenetrable to change? For would-be reformers, one exciting prospect would be a presidential candidate who bypasses the foreign policy establishment and brings genuinely fresh perspectives into senior levels of government. As the 2016 and 2020 Democratic primaries showed, however, the obstacles to such a scenario are massive. The 2008 election is another cautionary tale, in fact; a president whom many perceived as a reformer ended up welcoming numerous upholders of the status quo into his administration.

Another potential prospect is reform from without – in other words, building up an alternative cadre of foreign policy experts. To some extent, that alternative cadre already exists, just not in a cohesive way; people with progressive foreign policy visions are already distributed throughout academia, think tanks, NGOs, and the wider society. Yet their empowerment would, again, be predicated on appointments to key positions, which in turn depends upon access to powerful elected politicians. And appointments to such positions are no guarantee against the ensuing pressures for ideological conformity and malleability.

an “inside-outside” strategy appears most promising

For the time being, an “inside-outside” strategy appears most promising. Reformists can and should cut their teeth in the existing Democratic foreign policy world, resigning when morally imperative but gleaning knowledge of how things work when possible. Critics can and should challenge the Democratic foreign policy elite and worldview, and not just issue by issue but in a holistic way that lays bare the vacuity of appeals to American power, greatness, and leadership. Ultimately, more creative and broad-reaching coalitions will be key to transformation – it is not the pens of academics and unconventional analysts that will give Harris pause on Gaza, but the tens of thousands of uncommitted votes cast in primaries. Biden’s team has claimed to be implementing a foreign policy for the middle class, but they have largely spoken for the middle class rather than with it or through it, and listening efforts have been token and performative.

For progressives and leftists, a mass working-class base, involved directly in the articulation and advocacy of an alternative foreign policy, is one key to achieving change. Such an effort, already underway in tentative forms, would involve connecting the cadres of an alternative foreign policy team more directly and intensively to the workers unionizing Amazon and Starbucks, as well as to the mostly domestically-focused organizers pursuing single-issue campaigns at the state level. To make those connections stronger and more powerful will take new and more robust institutions, as well as a great deal of listening from the reformists currently embedded in the offices of progressive members of Congress, NGOs, and academia. It is unlikely that status quo-minded Democrats could be dislodged from the foreign policy ladder simply by being out-argued; the challenge is instead to make the foreign policy elite more answerable and vulnerable to mass politics.

Labor unions going global for workers rights

Wouter van de Klippe is a freelance journalist and Public Policy graduate based in Europe. He’s particularly interested in organized labor, economic, social, and environmental justice, and social welfare states.

Boiling in Amazon’s warehouses

The city boiled as the unrelenting sun cooked Manesar in India’s northern state of Haryana. Temperatures soared to 50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit) in some areas of India on May 16th this year as a deadly heat wave swept the region.

At 4:30pm, a manager inside of Amazon’s Manesar warehouse called a meeting. The meeting was, according to the manager, intended to motivate the workers to push their efforts and increase productivity despite the heat. To accomplish this, a worker testified in The Independent, the manager asked the warehouse workers to make a pledge: workers “will not take any breaks, we will not stop to drink water or go to the bathroom until we meet our targets.”

The inhumane pledge came as the same worker reported shifts of organizing products for 10 hours a day with only two breaks of 30 minutes to rest. While the facility has been outfitted with fans and coolers, she said that their impact is “negligible”, “walk just 10 steps away and you can barely feel any difference. The areas where we work are typically between 30-35C on any given day.”

Amazon has since said that the pledge was an “unfortunate and isolated incident”, but the case has catalyzed a renewed discussion of the brutal labor conditions in Amazon warehouses.

These conditions were brought to the attention of India’s National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) by the Amazon India Workers Association (AIWA), established in 2022 and supported by UNI Global Union, a global union federation for service sector workers. AIWA is one of over 80 organizations across the globe fighting to improve the often brutal conditions faced by Amazon under the banner of the Make Amazon Pay campaign.

AIWA, with the help of UNI, was able to document and raise awareness of the conditions experienced by Amazon warehouse workers, ultimately resulting in the NHRC taking action at what the commission stated could potentially “raise a serious issue of the human rights of workers.”

Now, UNI Global union is campaigning to demand that Amazon provide safe working conditions – especially in light of the climate crisis. Amazon’s warehouses in India are not alone in unsafe temperatures – the Teamsters union in the US is mobilizing for better protections in the Northeast, and back in 2022 workers reported scorching temperatures during the 2022 California heatwave.

These campaigns and others like are one example of a burgeoning wave of global labor solidarity that is rising as unions seek out new strategies to confront global capital.

Especially in the United States, unions are experiencing a renaissance of public attention and support. Less well-known is that union victories in the United States could have the consequence of pushing union victories around the world.

Less well-known is that union victories in the United States could have the consequence of pushing union victories around the world.

On the last Friday of the groundbreaking United Auto Workers (UAW) walkout that led to a historic victory, Tesla servicing workers went on strike in Sweden. It was the first attempt ever to get Tesla to sign a collective bargaining agreement and the action benefited from the momentum of the UAW actions to organize auto workers.

Unions that are pushing the envelope of labor organizing in the United States could spearhead efforts around the world, especially when it comes to global efforts at US-based multinationals such as Amazon.

For Nick Rudikoff, UNI’s campaign director and coordinator of the Make Amazon Pay campaign, “only a global labor movement can transform Amazon into a responsible employer.”

“You have such a multisectoral company that transcends sectors and geographies, it’s the largest logistics and commerce company in the world.”

The Make Amazon Pay campaign was launched four years ago and has coordinated growing days of strike action each year – most notably during Amazon’s (in)famous Black Friday sales.

Last year’s Black Friday strike mobilized workers in over 30 countries and, according to Rudikoff, received more press coverage than the sales themselves. “The fact that the Make Amazon Pay strikes and actions received so much support shows just how much solidarity there is for workers wanting a union.”

A representative from AIWA told me that coordinating with UNI Global and the Make Amazon Pay campaign “shows that the poor working conditions at Amazon are similar everywhere across the world. We are fighting for the right cause, not only in India. We are fighting everywhere across the world, and we are learning from each other.”

New campaigns seeking to organize workers the world over within multinationals are one of the many ways that unions have responded to globalization and increasingly spread supply chains.

Globalization and International Framework Agreements

Labor unions have had to be nimble in response to contemporary capitalism. Historically, the labor union’s bread and butter way to improve working conditions has been to represent workers by negotiating collective bargaining agreements. When employers are unwilling to come to the bargaining table and negotiate these agreements, unions demonstrate their power through organizing strikes and collective actions.

Globalization and outsourcing put pressure on the ability of workers to do this – first, by companies threatening to move operations abroad in response to pressure from workers; second, by companies increasingly moving operations to countries with less-robust unions and fewer legal protections for workers and organizing.

In a report written by Astrid Kaag, policy advisor for the largest Dutch trade union confederation FNV, Kaag notes that “the most important tool we have, the collective labor agreement, means little in such situations.”

The heart of Union action has always been at the shop-floor between workers in a shared space.

The heart of Union action has always been at the shop-floor between workers in a shared space. As the threads of global capitalism weave increasingly international distances, the process of building worker power and manifesting it at the local level has come under threat.

To adapt, and strengthen international worker solidarity, unions developed a new tool to fight for improvements in working conditions called “Global Framework Agreements” (GFA). Essentially, these are agreements made between unions (most often global union confederations) and multinational companies that set a baseline of working conditions for the companies’ employees and suppliers.

One of the most impactful GFAs that have been signed to date was in response to one of the greatest worker tragedies in recent memory – the Rena Plaza disaster.

“The International Accord”

In April of 2013, an eight story commercial building containing several garment factories in Dhaka Bangladesh called the Rena Plaza collapsed, killing 1,138 garment workers. Companies that sourced clothing from the building included C&A (Belgium), Carrefour (France), El Corte Inglés (Spain), Benetton (Italy), and J.C. Penny (U.S).

The disaster catalyzed a response from workers, trade unions, and NGO’s that resulted in the creation of a legally binding framework agreement – first called the Bangladesh Accord and more recently transforming into the “International Accord for Health and Safety in the Garment and Textile Industry”, or more commonly just “The International Accord .”

The International Accord was signed and negotiated by IndustriALL Global Union and UNI Global union, alongside several NGOs. According to the accord’s dedicated website, it has resulted in over 2 million workers across Bangladesh being trained in workplace safety, over 56,000 factory inspections, and over 1,000 resolved complaints.

The accord’s first legal test came when in 2016 UNI Global and IndustriALL won a lawsuit against brands that had failed to live up to the requirements stipulated in the accord. In 2018, the two global union confederations won the court case and the brands were forced to pay over $2 million to remedy the accord violations at their suppliers.

Despite this victory, there are real limits for what workers can secure relying on GFAs. A study recently showed that while GFAs have indeed resulted in significant material improvements in some cases, they are largely dependent on the goodwill of management at a company’s headquarters.

Other studies have been less sanguine about the impacts of GFAs. In a report by the German foundation the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, it was shown that in many cases in the United States, the agreements were essentially ignored – either intentionally, or due to the fact that local managers didn’t even know of their existence. Between 1998 and 2018, the International Labour Organization estimates that over 300 GFAs were signed – and yet, many of these global agreements have failed to secure the workers rights that they call for.

despite the International Accord being lauded as a major victory, workers trying to organize in Bangladesh are consistently repressed, and in some cases, murdered.

At worst, GFAs can serve as opportunities for multinational companies to boast their corporate social responsibility while continuing the longstanding abuse of workers. This is especially the case when GFAs are not legally binding and do not contain dedicated ways to assess, monitor, and intervene on violations of the agreements by independent bodies.

In Bangladesh, although The Accord has led to changes in factories and successful legal battles for unions, worker abuses are still common in the country and garment workers are still paid very low wages. Many companies have yet to sign The Accord, especially those from the United States such as Walmart, Amazon, and Target. In fact, these corporations created their own, non-legally binding organization called ‘Nirapon’ which NGOs have described as being self-regulating and entirely opaque.

A key part of these agreements is to make companies agree to remain neutral when workers decide to unionize. Yet, despite the International Accord being lauded as a major victory, workers trying to organize in Bangladesh are consistently repressed, and in some cases, murdered. For example, Shahidul Islam, a prominent union organizer for the Bangladesh Garment and Industrial Workers Federation, was murdered on the 25th of April, 2023, after attempting to resolve a dispute over wages at a factory in Gazipur.

Not only has globalization put significant pressure on the ability of unions to organize. Political hostility to workers and unions have resulted in working conditions degrading in many places across the world.

Labor is under pressure the world over

The world’s largest trade union confederation, the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), releases an annual report that describes the status of labor rights all over the world and provides ratings for each countries’ respect for workers rights.

This year’s results were bleak.

The ITUC’s 2024 report found that globally, workers were denied the right to strike in 9 out of 10 countries. In 49% of countries, trade union members were either arbitrarily arrested or detained. Only two countries’ ratings improved year on year (Brazil and Romania), whereas 13 countries saw their ratings fall.

An outlier can be found in the United States, where the Biden administration’s impressive support for organized labor has undoubtedly strengthened the movement in the country after decades of anti-union political leadership. Consider UAW’s successful amd ambitious campaign to organize non-union autoworkers. Surveys show that the US public is currently more supportive of labor unions than at any time in the past 60 years.

Alongside Biden’s formal political support has come new legitimacy within public discourse – although reactionaries have sought to disguise their intentions under a veneer of worker-friendly rhetoric.

reactionaries have sought to disguise their intentions under a veneer of worker-friendly rhetoric

Consider that the notoriously anti-union Republican party is attempting to rebrand itself as being pro-worker by, for example, inviting Teamster’s union president Sean O’Brien to the Republican National Convention.

Many of Europe’s far-right populists are similarly, and deceitfully, claiming an allegiance to the continent’s working class as well. The far-right Finnish Finn’s party has allegedly referred to itself as the “worker’s party without socialism”. Marine le Pen’s Rassemblement National is consistently attempting to present itself as the party of France’s working class.

In practice, these parties consistently implement policies hostile to organized labor. In the United States, the Republican party is blocking pro-union legislation and plans on rolling back labor protections for the working class when in power. In Finland, the Finns helped the center-conservative party slash worker and union protections.

Unions the world over are countering the far-right’s pseudo-allegiance to the working class by coming together.

Unions for Democracy

IndustriALL’s Walton Pantland wrote in 2019 that now, more than ever, there is a need for international union solidarity. He argues that the increasingly global and interconnected nature of contemporary capitalism requires new forms of worker movements.

“Labor is on the back foot. Jobs are becoming more precarious. Fewer workers have good pensions. Inequality is growing. The balance of power between capital and labor has tilted heavily in favor of capital.”

This year, the ITUC has been organizing a campaign “For Democracy” and warns that there are concerning anti-democratic movements in every continent that would have devastating consequences for workers’ rights.

For the ITUC, this gradual erosion of democracy presents an existential risk to the trade union movement. According to the ITUC’s For Democracy campaign, unions are forges for democracy. “Generations of trade unionists have fought and died, been tried and executed to advance democratic rights. Today, hundreds of trade unionists sit in jail, under house arrest or on trial as they continue to defend it.”

Wooing the labor vote has been a central part of the 2024 US presidential election and the outcome will have serious consequences on organized labor around the world. The stronger the labor movement becomes in the United States, the more pressure and momentum can be developed internationally. Just this year, Amazon workers in Coventry nearly succeeded in a vote for union recognition.

Labor organizers in the United States must take advantage of the current momentum and fight for legislative changes that will support organizing in the long-term. For example, campaigns must be centered around garnering support for the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) act which would empower worker organizing through new legal protections.

There are also legislative victories that can be fought at the global level. Take actions like the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) which requires companies based in the EU to make sure that there are no labor and environmental abuses in their supply chains. Yes, the act has significant shortcomings and has been made significantly weaker through lobbying, but it is a good starting point that unions can organize around to fight for legal due diligence requirements at the global scale.

Another battleground could be union campaigns pressuring legislators to ensure that trade agreements contain clauses to protect the right for workers to unionize and requirements for participating in collective bargaining agreements.

The global fight for workers rights is a struggle contested on a cornucopia of battlegrounds – from legislation and presidential politics to local actions.

The Make Amazon Pay campaign represents one the many different ways that unions are fighting the world over to secure workers’ rights.

When asked on whether unions should be focusing at the global level, the local level, via old union confederations or new unions such as the Amazon Labor Union in the U.S., Rudikoff replies “every worker organizing drive at Amazon inspires dozens more – in other cities, in other states, and in other countries.”

“As a progressive movement we’re all in this together.”

After a surprise victory, can France’s left plot a course to 2027?

Alexandre Khadivi was until recently the foreign policy adviser to the “La France Insoumise” group in the French National Assembly.

On 7 July, the second round of the snap legislative elections called by Emmanuel Macron a month earlier delivered startling results. As voters went to the polls, most observers agreed that Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally (RN) would obtain a majority.

In the end, the left-wing New Popular Front (NFP) coalition came out on top with 182 seats, followed by Macron’s centrist bloc with 168 seats, the far-right in third with 143, and finally the legacy centre-right group with 46.

As of writing, and with no bloc having an absolute majority, a new government has yet to form. Despite his gamble failing spectacularly, Macron obstinately refuses to nominate the NFP candidate as prime minister, hoping to find a “consensual,” centrist head of government instead.

How parliamentary elections work in France

Since a constitutional amendment in 2000, presidential and legislative terms align for a period of five years. As a result, once the president is elected, the legislative elections a few weeks later usually grant them an absolute majority out of 577 seats, preventing the sort of “cohabitation” impasses of the past whereby the head of state and head of government were from opposing groups.

Both presidential and parliamentary elections have two rounds. In the latter, this usually means a second-round runoff between the top two candidates. In some cases, the runoff can include additional candidates as anyone with at least 12.5% of registered electors’ votes also qualifies.

Why Macron dissolved Parliament

Since he was first elected in 2017, Macron has consistently played a dangerous balancing act by slowly and carefully propping up the far-right to weaken the left as much as possible. It’s a well-worn strategy in which left-wing voters have no alternative but to support the “centrist” bloc in runoffs to defeat the RN. As in 2002 and 2017, when the far-right candidate also reached the second round of the presidential elections, in 2022 a “republican front” led to Le Pen’s defeat.

Yet a few weeks later, Macron’s bloc failed to gain an absolute majority in parliament, as both the brittle left-wing New Ecological and Social People’s Union (NUPES) coalition and the RN made inroads, illustrating the population’s increasing discontent with the president’s social policies and authoritarian tendencies.

The lack of a clear majority in parliament hindered his legislative agenda and democratic legitimacy for the next two years. This frustration led him to call a snap election right after the European parliamentary elections on 9 June, in which the RN came first with 31%. The various left-wing groups had failed to form a coalition prior to the vote, contrary to 2022.

Macron’s cynical calculus, and how pollsters got it wrong (but not entirely)

Macron bet on three things:

The left-wing groups – whose NUPES coalition had fallen apart since 2022 due to infighting – would not be a threat;
As in elections past, most voters would be rational enough to not vote en masse for the far-right either, potentially giving Macron a new majority;
Even if the far-right did gain a majority and formed a government, their incompetence until the next presidential elections in 2027 would turn the population against them.

Most pollsters predicted more than 230 seats for the far-right, based on numbers showing around 35% support for the bloc. Macron’s Ensemble movement would come in second, with the divided left-wing groups at a distance.

But within two hours of Macron’s announcement, the four main left-wing parties – Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise (LFI), The Greens, the Socialist Party (PS), and the Communists (PCF) – formed the NFP coalition. This included the decisive provision that, in each constituency, only one NFP candidate would run to avoid diluting the left-wing vote and increase chances of participating in the runoff.

Without getting into too much detail, the implicit instructions prior to the second round were:

In case of a runoff involving a far-right candidate, the “republican front” would ideally vote for the opponent, e.g.: Macron supporters would vote for the NFP and vice-versa;
In case of a three- or four-person runoff, depending on the first-round results of the specific constituency, the “republican front” candidates would decide on which of them would drop out to decrease chances of the far-right candidate winning.

Therein lie the surprises in the final results. In effect, the absolute numbers were correct:

400 National Rally candidates reached the runoffs;
Voter turnout jumped from 46% in 2022 to an astounding 64% (the highest since 1981), indicating increasing dissatisfaction with Macron among swathes of the population;
The far-right bloc garnered 37% of the votes, the left-wing bloc 25%, and Macron’s bloc 23%.

Yet the left became the marginally dominant force in parliament.

The left moving forward

With the gradual neoliberalisation of French politics since at least the turn of the millennium, Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise movement has steadily become the dominant force on the left.

Macron’s election in 2017 shattered most of the simmering contradictions and tensions in the country’s politics, centralising the neoliberal wings of the centre-left and centre-right under his rule. On the left, the legacy Socialist Party became a shell of its former self.

However, ego clashes, the PS’ comfortable insularity, and LFI’s uncompromising style on fundamental issues have made it difficult for the left to create a homogenous bloc with a long-term strategy.

It took more than three weeks of acrimonious negotiations to settle on a candidate for prime minister. Lucie Castets is a civil society nominee who ticks the right boxes: a 37-year-old woman with the “requisite” academic background, familiar with the intricacies of government, and who has fought her entire career in defence of public services and against neoliberal reforms.

Beyond the short-term, however, the numbers confirm the seemingly irrepressible rise of the RN leading up to the 2027 presidential elections.

In the event of an NFP government, the coalition should therefore lay its cards on the table from day one with two instantly impactful measures: repealing Macron’s undemocratic and wildly unpopular pension reform of 2023, and circumventing the market by fixing energy prices to alleviate the population’s financial distress.

Without an outright majority, it must therefore be bold, not limit itself to endless parliamentary infighting, and act through decrees when necessary.

In the longer term, tax reform, wage increases, investment in public health and education, and the necessary (socially minded) modernisation of the pension system must be addressed. The NFP’s programme clearly outlines these prescriptions. Without an outright majority, it must therefore be bold, not limit itself to endless parliamentary infighting, and act through decrees when necessary.

The final point is the most contentious: identity politics. Like most Western liberal democracies, these issues have become a lightning rod exploited by both neoliberals and the far-right. A large majority of the parochial Parisian media and political elites have eagerly fed what has essentially become a rabid form of islamophobia in the country. An extensive sociological literature shows that a majority of far-right voters are influenced by this even though their most pressing priorities are economic and social in nature, for which the RN has no proposals.

The left must not shy away from serenely addressing issues such as immigration, religion, and other similarly contentious matters. However, major divisions within the NFP must be overcome, particularly on the question of battling bigotry in all its forms. So far, only LFI has consistently called out islamophobia in a country where religion is an extremely awkward and taboo subject.

Foreign policy implications and the left’s divisions

Since the advent of the Fifth Republic, the conduct of foreign policy has been the near-exclusive remit of the head of state.

Barring some acrimonious and mostly “Franco-French” point-scoring over LFI’s unremitting condemnation of Israel’s brutal campaign in Gaza, foreign policy was largely absent from the election debates. The focus should therefore be on the 2027 presidential elections.

A large spectrum of French polity understands that a more balanced, less blindly Atlanticist (read: “neo-Gaullian”) foreign policy is needed, considering the major geopolitical shifts taking place and the United States’ quasi-existential political crises of the past few years. The extent to and the manner in which this should happen are where the major fault lines lie.

Macron’s approach has been scattergun and, all too often, improvised. His first major foreign policy pronouncements explicitly denounced neoconservatism and famously declared that NATO was in a state of “brain death.” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine upended this. He has entirely followed the maximalist NATO script on the issue and even overstepped the mark by publicly opining in May on the possibility of sending French troops directly into the theatre of operations, earning immediate rebukes from Washington, London, Berlin, and Brussels. He also came into office deriding the notion of a European defence pact before suggesting a debate on its feasibility in April, including the potential deployment of continent-wide nuclear deterrence capabilities.

Macron’s approach has been scattergun and, all too often, improvised.

Paradoxically, the NFP’s primary divisions lie precisely on the different groups’ geopolitical outlooks, with two distinct blocs: LFI and the PCF vs. PS and the Greens.

LFI and the PCF have the same broad sensibilities, the former being more vocal and explicit in its pronouncements. They share an anti-imperialist vision and are critical of NATO, Western military interventions, and neocolonialism.

They both propose leaving NATO, which they consider an aggressive military alliance that has contributed to the destabilisation of Eastern Europe. LFI in particular has consistently criticised NATO’s expansion towards Russia’s borders, warning of the risk of a full-blown conflict as far back as 2014. However, it explicitly condemned Russia’s invasion and supported tactical military aid to Ukraine, while calling for diplomacy and de-escalation rather than an increased military response.

LFI is also fairly radical in its prescriptions and strategy vis-à-vis the EU, which it considers an instrument of domination by the major economic powers (notably Germany). It calls for disobedience to European treaties deemed neoliberal and anti-social and is sceptical of the EU’s entirely market-based approach towards issues such as climate change, agriculture, and energy prices.

A similar dynamic is at play on Israel/Palestine where both parties are aligned but LFI is much more outspoken and insistent, thus bearing the brunt of establishment criticism. It was severely derided for choosing to call Hamas’ attack on 7 October a “war crime” rather than an act of terrorism and refusing to label it as “antisemitic.” It was also the first to explicitly call Israel’s actions in Gaza a genocide and has long supported the boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movements.

Moving forward, for the NFP to display a unified front and reach some level of consensus on foreign policy will require a delicate balancing act.

While immediately condemning Hamas’ attack as illegal, immoral, and entirely unjustifiable, LFI’s candid but clumsy attempts to situate it within the context of Israel’s brutal, decades-long occupation of Palestine invited controversy. The deafening noise and extreme emotions that the attack unleashed in France (which has both the largest Muslim and Jewish populations in Europe) rendered any attempt at a critical analysis of the situation near impossible, especially in the immediate aftermath of 7 October. Facile accusations of antisemitism have been particularly virulent, especially from establishment circles.

Finally, on the “Global South,” both parties advocate for a profound reshaping of France’s relations, particularly in Africa, where they strongly criticise its neocolonial policies (e.g. support for “friendly” dictators, a decade-long and ultimately failed military presence in the Sahel). They call for an end to military and economic cooperation agreements detrimental to local populations and for the promotion of relations based on equality and respect for sovereignty. In LFI’s view especially, this is the first step towards tackling the root causes of migration.

The PS and the Greens are much more Europhilic, the former also carrying a traditionally Atlanticist bent. Neither of them considers leaving NATO and both fully support unconditional military and economic aid to Ukraine. The PS also supports the suspension of arms sales to Israel and targeted sanctions against West Bank settlers but has so far stopped short of calling for general economic sanctions against the country.

Segments of the more assertive anti-imperialist left argue that, while the PS’ and the Greens’ priorities are generally sound, some of their methods and policy positions betray a lack of historical outlook, long-term strategic thinking, and understanding of balance of power. For instance, they view the two parties’ efforts to reform the EU from within as quixotic and argue that the United States’ often “aggressive” and “domineering” conduct in world affairs barely figures in their thinking.

Moving forward, for the NFP to display a unified front and reach some level of consensus on foreign policy will require a delicate balancing act. This will prove difficult because of ideological differences, divergent strategic priorities, historical rivalries, vast and accelerating shifts in global politics, and internal and external pressures.

To subsist until the 2027 presidential election, where its only hope of winning rests on presenting a single candidate, the NFP will need to develop robust internal mechanisms for dialogue and compromise, while respecting the sensitivities and priorities of each group. This will require periodic reassessments of agreements to maintain unity and, most importantly, avoid the French left’s cardinal sin: its self-defeating proclivity for airing dirty laundry in public.

Unaccountable military surplus fuels police violence at home and abroad.

Lillian Mauldin and Janet Abou-Elias are co-founders of Women for Weapons Trade Transparency and research fellows at the Center for International Policy. Liv Owens, Mekedas Belayneh, and Rosie Khan are all researchers with Women for Weapons Trade Transparency and, respectively, a doctoral candidate at City St. George’s University of London, an economic master’s candidate at John Jay College, and an environmental policy master’s candidate at Duke University.

For the past ten months, the world has watched the devastating Israeli assault on Gaza in which more than 38,000 Palestinians in Gaza have been killed, 70% of them women and children. Protestors internationally have drawn public attention to the mass civilian casualties and unprecedented destruction. Student protests and encampments across the United States erupted in response to the ongoing genocide in Gaza, only to be met with increasingly violent and militarized responses from law enforcement.

Equipped with riot gear, tear gas, and rubber bullets, police forces have swiftly and aggressively dismantled peaceful demonstrations. Columbia University police used crowd control weapons and riot squads to break up encampments and deployed surveillance drones to monitor protester activity. Indiana University authorized state police to set up snipers aimed at protestors from the top of the student union building. At UCLA, the only pause the police took from throwing stun grenades at the encampments was during the hours-long attack from violent counter protesters. For this, police opted to stand aside and watch. At the University of Arizona, police confronted peaceful protestors with MRAP-style armored vehicles called Lenco BearCats. Then they deployed chemical agents against the crowd.

These instances of selective brutality are no surprise; if anything, it draws stark parallels to the historic suppression of dissent in the U.S. From the Bonus Army to the Civil Rights Movement protests, the Kent State Shootings, The War on Drugs, the “Battle of Seattle”, the Ferguson Protests and Standing Rock Protests, the current militarized response to these student encampments follows a grim precedent of police intimidation and violence.

As defense contractors and weapons manufacturers seek new markets, they find lucrative opportunities in selling military style equipment to domestic police forces.

The military-industrial complex plays a significant role in encouraging increasingly militarized responses by law enforcement agencies against civilians in the United States. As defense contractors and weapons manufacturers seek new markets, they find lucrative opportunities in selling military style equipment to domestic police forces. Programs such as the Department of Defense’s 1033 and 1122 federal surplus programs facilitate easier access to weapons and tactical gear designed for warfare.

This normalization of military style tools in police arsenals creates a mindset that views civilian protests as combat situations requiring aggressive force. Consequently, police departments equipped with advanced weaponry and armored vehicles are more likely to resort to brutalization and violent tactics, even in situations involving peaceful demonstrations. This not only escalates tensions and leads to excessive use of force but also undermines the principle of policing by consent, transforming community protectors into warriors prepared for battle.

What is the 1122 Program?

The 1122 program is one way excess military equipment from the bloated Pentagon budget is offloaded to police departments, bringing militarization abroad back home. Established in 1994, the 1122 Program is managed by the Defense Logistics Agency, the Army, and the General Services Administration to allow law enforcement agencies to purchase discounted military equipment for counter-drug, homeland security, and emergency response activities. These discounts are meant to encourage local police departments to purchase equipment from the DOD inventory and contractors, propping up the same military-industrial companies that profit off of war abroad and police violence at home.

Federal agencies responsible for the program have failed to track, audit, or account for the weapons and gear that are transferred or sold through it.

The excess production of military equipment by these companies justifies the need for DOD programs that sell accumulating surplus equipment to various law enforcement agencies. Since the program primarily gives ownership of equipment to police departments, there is very little tracking of the military equipment that is sold to them. The 1122 Program does not have an audit mechanism; therefore, its sale of secondhand military weapons and other equipment, such as surveillance gear, does not have any safeguards to protect against its improper use. Currently, the program has no centralized database of purchases so there is no mechanism for public accountability or awareness of the distribution and use of military equipment by police. Federal agencies responsible for the program have failed to track, audit, or account for the weapons and gear that are transferred or sold through it. Meanwhile, police brutalization and use of excess force is ever present. With military equipment in the hands of police, there are dangers of significant misuse and harm going unchecked.

Missing records, no audits, and dangerous by design

Throughout Women for Weapons Trade Transparency’s investigation into the program starting in 2021, we sought clarity on the program’s record-keeping processes, departmental oversight, and typical purchases. We encountered unclear purchase record-keeping procedures that varied by state, agencies that were uncooperative and violated their obligations to open records law, and state points of contact who had little or no information about the operations of the program in their state. When we attempted to confirm which law enforcement agencies were enrolled and which state agencies managed them, our inquiries frequently yielded no certain answers.

Despite filing open records requests with dozens of local and state agencies in states that participate in the 1122 Program, we were only able to acquire centralized, organized spreadsheets of purchases from Colorado, California, and Massachusetts. Most state agencies denied or ignored our requests. When government staff responded to our requests, they would commonly misdirect us to other agencies, misinterpret our requests, or reject our requests without valid explanation.

A lack of record keeping on 1122 Program procurements creates a risk of military style equipment being unaccounted for in police inventory. When asked if purchases from the 1122 program are audited after procurement, a Texas official responsible for administering the program in the state commented: “Once the items are received, our office does not inventory, account or audit.” A New York point of contact commented that “[my] responsibilities and duties end at the approval of the purchase. I do collect Contract Usage forms. The NYS 1122 Program does contain language in that the ultimate responsibility lies with the customer.” A Colorado point of contact confirmed separately: “We verify that purchases are made by state and local governments in support of counter-drug, homeland security and emergency response activities prior to procurement of vehicles. We do not trace purchased vehicles after they are received by the state and local agencies. Vehicles become property of the agency once received…”

Without state or federal level end use monitoring, the 1122 Program fails to create safeguards to protect against violence perpetrated by equipment

What’s more, the federal government does not require any oversight to monitor an agency’s compliance with counter drug, homeland security, and emergency response purposes. Without state or federal level end use monitoring, the 1122 Program fails to create safeguards to protect against violence perpetrated by equipment and against diversion into the wrong hands. After months of FOIA request correspondence with the Defense Logistics Agency, we finally acquired federal level data on 1122 Program transfers. Unfortunately, the data was incomplete, accounting only for purchases through the program after 2017, and moreover, missing item identifications for years prior to 2020. The total 1122 Program acquisition value for years 2017–2021 was given as just $379,473. However, this number contradicts data we received on the state level. A Colorado point of contact estimated that the state had purchased $1 million in vehicles in one year through the program, a number far greater than what was reported by the DLA for total nationwide purchases.

The inconsistent data across local, state, and national levels uncovers a disturbing reality that 1122 Program transfers are largely unaccounted for. It is clear from the harms that occur as a result of this gross negligence and inconsistency that the 1122 Program should be sunsetted by Congress.

Connecting the dots to increasing criminalization

In June 2024, the Supreme Court ruled that unhoused people could be arrested for sleeping in public spaces, overturning a previous rule that cities could not do so if there was insufficient shelter space in the city. With U.S. law enforcement agencies over-funded and relied on to tackle issues of U.S. infrastructure, lack of social services, and public health crises, these already vulnerable populations are exposed to an even higher risk of encountering unlawful violence from militarized police forces.

Criminalization of unhoused people has long perpetuated cycles of poverty and injustice. But as federal programs like 1122 continue to equip police with dangerous military style weapons and vehicles, and this criminalization of unhoused people is legalized nationwide, the threats to life and safety of Americans without homes becomes even greater and widespread. Police have historically ignored the constitutional rights of vulnerable populations during interactions and arrests. The U.S. Department of Justice issued a report on the Phoenix Police Department in June of this year after an almost three-year investigation. It found that Phoenix police routinely violated the rights of unhoused people “by unlawfully detaining, citing and arresting them and unlawfully disposing of their belongings.” Further, the report found that over a third of all “arrests in Phoenix from 2016 to 2022 were of people experiencing homelessness” and that many of these arrests were unconstitutional. The DOJ — the highest law enforcement authority in the country — has confirmed that these police committed crimes against the very individuals they are sworn to serve. And because Arizona is enrolled in the 1122 Program, these same agencies have the ability to purchase military style equipment and weapons.

In response to the report, Ann Oliva, CEO of the National Alliance to End Homelessness, commented: “Criminalization doesn’t end anybody’s homelessness. The way to resolve homelessness for people is to provide housing and the supportive services that people want and need… we need investments at the federal level to address the affordable housing crisis and shortage that is impacting not just Arizona but communities across the country.”

The pathological warrior-cop mentality, the violations of unhoused people’s rights committed by police, and the brutal repression of domestic political protests are manifestations of the imperial boomerang – inevitable consequences of the U.S.’s foreign policy

The aforementioned increasingly violent and militarized responses from law enforcement in response to protests since April also highlight a larger trend of repression and criminalization of protest and free speech that is aided and abetted by military equipment transferred through the 1122 Program. A recent analysis of police misconduct lawsuits filed during the 2020 protests in response to the murder of George Floyd revealed that the police response to many protests broke laws and violated rights. Many of these lawsuits also resulted in police reforms, including restrictions on the use of “less lethal” weapons, such as rubber bullets, pepper balls, and tear gas that have long been used to crush dissent in the United States around the world. If weapons such as these are being scrutinized and restricted, military style equipment purchased through the 1122 Program such as MRAPs and BearCats should be too.

Furthermore, studies have found that additional force by police leads to increased violence and a positive feedback loop of escalation from both protesters and police forces. Additionally, empirical analysis of the correlations between police militarization through the 1122 Program’s sister 1033 Program and police violence revealed “a positive and statistically significant relationship between 1033 transfers and fatalities from officer-involved shootings.” The pathological warrior-cop mentality, the violations of unhoused people’s rights committed by police, and the brutal repression of domestic political protests are manifestations of the imperial boomerang – inevitable consequences of the U.S.’s foreign policy.

Intertwined international and domestic militarization

“The means of defense against foreign danger have been always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people.”

― James Madison, speech at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia

Investigative scrutiny, such as Government Accountability Office reports on DOD’s Section 333 Train and Equip programs, highlights how U.S. military resources are not only allocated for foreign allies’ military forces but also integrated into their law enforcement agencies. Programs such as Worldwide Warehouse Redistribution Services (WWRS), DOD’s Section 333 Authority to Build Capacity, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s Excess Defense Articles (EDA) showcase how the US operates a durable system for distributing weapons and other military equipment to the local and federal level forces of other nations. These programs are not isolated: they demonstrate a U.S. strategy of distributing military-grade equipment internationally through numerous channels, which has far-reaching harms for civilians policed by both military and law enforcement forces.

The 1122 Program’s impacts on domestic militarization and other programs like EDA and WWRS paint a picture of the broader landscape of militarization. While the 1122 Program enables states and local governments in the United States to access federal equipment and discounts for domestic use, EDA and WWRS enable the redistribution of surplus U.S. military equipment to international customers. This common mechanism of reallocating excess military resources demonstrates the similar causes and effects of domestic and international militarization: inflated defense budgets beget greater civilian harm. In these ways, the repurposing of military equipment raises concerns about the budgetary and human security implications of such programs.

This common mechanism of reallocating excess military resources demonstrates the similar causes and effects of domestic and international militarization: inflated defense budgets beget greater civilian harm.

WWRS exemplifies the complexity and opacity of U.S. military transfer programs. This program facilitates the transfer of articles acquired under the U.S. Arms Export Control Act through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases or Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) purchases. Essentially, WWRS operates as a global redistribution center for excess U.S. military equipment. U.S. Government organizations are eligible to be WWRS buyers as well as foreign FMS customers. The anonymity maintained for both buyers and sellers within this program raises concerns about its lack of transparency and oversight, much like that of the 1122 Program. As such, both programs display larger trends of a lack of end use monitoring of U.S. supplied weaponry, leading to their potential misuse.

EDA repurposes surplus U.S. military equipment to foreign governments and international organizations with the primary goal of modernizing U.S. ally forces in line with U.S. foreign policy objectives. This program underscores the similarities between international militarization and domestic militarization practices. The equipment provided through EDA is often the same equipment that could be accessed domestically through programs like the 1122 Program, such as armored vehicles, MRAPs, and surveillance gear. Clearly, the line between military forces abroad and law enforcement agencies at home has been blurred. DOD’s Section 333 Train and Equip Programs similarly militarize foreign security forces and have funded police abroad in their counter terrorism and drug trafficking activities, which directly mirrors the purposes and mechanisms of the 1122 Program in the United States.

The parallels between international and domestic militarization practices raise concerns about the lack of accountability and oversight of these transfer and security cooperation programs. The redistribution of military-style equipment, whether to international allies or domestic agencies, can lead to the misuse and diversion of such equipment. For instance, there is a risk that this equipment could be used to suppress democratic protests or other forms of civil unrest, both abroad and at home. The opaque nature of these transfers obscures the end-uses of such equipment, thus eroding public trust and posing threats to civilian safety.

there is a risk that this equipment could be used to suppress democratic protests or other forms of civil unrest, both abroad and at home

After drawdowns from conflicts such as that in Afghanistan, the U.S. has often repurposed military equipment by transferring it to domestic law enforcement agencies. This process is in addition to the over $7.1 billion in U.S.-funded military weapons left in Afghanistan, which face a high risk of diversion in the region and have already appeared in conflicts such as in the disputed South Asian region of Kashmir. Following the U.S. drawdown, CENTCOM reported that “984 C-17 loads of material” had been transported out of Afghanistan. Among this material, the DOD declared 17,074 pieces of equipment as federal excess personal property, which was sent to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) for disposition. Contrary to some media reports equating “disposition” with “destruction,” most of this equipment is unlikely to be destroyed. Instead, it often finds its way into the hands of local police through programs like the DOD’s 1033 Program. These transfers have resulted in police departments acquiring surplus military gear, including armored vehicles and tactical equipment. This raises an important question: how often do military drawdowns and other foreign engagements lead to spikes in the transfer of military equipment to domestic law enforcement agencies?

The linkage between military drawdowns abroad and upturns in 1033 transfers at home is evident in the data. Stephen Semler, co-founder of Security Policy Reform Institute, observed that there was a significant uptick in the transfers of surplus military equipment to domestic law enforcement agencies as the U.S. military pulled out of Iraq. This pattern is particularly clear from the flow of MRAPs (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles), which were produced in large numbers to protect troops from improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. As military operations decreased, these vehicles, along with other excess equipment, were funneled into the 1033 Program, flooding police departments with gear intended for war zones. The surge in military budgets during this period also contributed to an abundance of surplus equipment, further fueling the transfers. This trend underscores the direct relationship between overseas drawdowns and the increased militarization of police forces at home. If this pattern holds true for the 1033 Program, then it is likely that a similar trend of cyclical militarization occurs with the 1122 Program.

The Solution

The 1122 Program’s lack of oversight and inconsistent data collection practices obscure public and policymaker understanding, hindering effective civilian and governmental scrutiny. This scrutiny is crucial, as the transfer of military equipment to local police forces blurs the line between military and civilian roles. It encourages a warrior-cop mentality, leading to a more aggressive and confrontational style of policing inappropriate for community-based law enforcement. Increased surveillance and excessive force suppresses dissent through intimidation and violence, threatening First Amendment freedoms of speech and demonstration.

Sunsetting the 1122 Program would have three main benefits.

First, sunsetting the 1122 Program would address critical issues in U.S. foreign policy by curbing the overproduction of military equipment that contributes to domestic and international militarization and surveillance. By reducing the domestic demand for such equipment, the incentive for manufacturing and exporting militarization would diminish. The aggressive posture that currently drives U.S. foreign policy is unsustainable and deadly – and it should be divested from. This shift is essential, as it not only promotes a restraint and peace-oriented foreign policy but also counters the normalization of using military-style weaponry against civilians.

Second, discontinuing the 1122 Program would significantly reduce the demand for the mass production of military-style equipment, thereby lessening the environmental impact from the extraction of resources needed for its production. The consumption of fuel and energy involved in the manufacture and deployment of this equipment exacerbates environmental degradation both domestically and internationally. Directing funding away from militarization would not only mitigate these environmental harms but also support global efforts to avoid conflict stemming from resource extraction. This realignment would reflect a strong commitment to responsible governance and international cooperation, fostering a more sustainable and peaceful global landscape.

Third, redirecting funds from the acquisition of excess military equipment to the provision of social programs can address the root causes of crime and improve overall community safety and health, creating a more just and equitable society. At a time when communities across the United States face significant challenges such as poverty, public health crises, and inadequate social services, it is imperative to prioritize funding for programs that directly benefit the well-being of residents. State and local governments have much more finite budgets than the Pentagon and the federal government, and yet, they still inevitably subsidize the DOD and weapons manufacturers through the 1122 Program. Sunsetting the 1122 Program would free up these dollars to be used for much needed social and infrastructure projects and will foster a more transparent, accountable, and humane approach to both national security and international relations.

* This publication was made possible in part by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.