Program: International Policy Journal

Democratic foreign policy cannot be for elites alone

Alex Thurston is Associate Professor in the University of Cincinnati’s School of Public and International Affairs.

The foreign policy establishment has been famously cast as a bipartisan “Blob” with monolithic views. Yet if the Blob is bipartisan, the Democratic foreign policy network has become the core of the Blob today. Democratic foreign policy hands view themselves as the keepers of order within American foreign policy, the crew that cleans up Republican foreign policy disasters. Democrats stand as reliable defenders of an American imperial order, the party tasked with winding down unwinnable wars (Iraq under Barack Obama, Afghanistan under Joe Biden) while prosecuting wars where the U.S. is ostensibly not a front-line combatant (Libya, Syria, Ukraine, Gaza). Serious reforms to status quo American foreign policy have been fleeting. As vice president, Kamala Harris has championed the Democratic foreign policy status quo; at the insider-heavy Munich Security Conference in February 2024, she offered up the party’s mantras about American leadership, “international rules and norms,” and the importance of alliances with Europe and beyond. As the new nominee and through her choice of Tim Walz as vice president, Harris has stirred some hope that she will prove less militaristic than Biden and that her advisers will listen more to dissenting views.

A more progressive foreign policy would need a different kind of executive, but also a different cadre of people to implement it. Reformists can and should cut their teeth in the existing Democratic foreign policy world, resigning when morally imperative but gleaning knowledge of how things work when possible. The challenge is instead to make the foreign policy elite more answerable and vulnerable to mass politics. Solutions, Distilled, from Democratic Foreign Policy Cannot Be For Elites Alone by Alex Thurston for the International Policy Journal

The Democratic foreign policy elite sometimes tinkers with the status quo, but in relatively superficial and fleeting ways. Obama’s team showed imagination on Iran and Cuba, and Biden’s team promised a “new Washington consensus.” Yet Trump easily undermined Obama’s reforms, especially on Iran, and Biden’s team did not fight back vigorously once Democrats were back in power. Nor did Biden’s team undo Trump decisions such as moving the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. As on many domestic issues, Democrats portray themselves as the adults while mostly letting Republicans shape the playing field. Democrats’ defense of the status quo, moreover, often brings both criticism from the non-governmental players in the Blob (the think tank set and the editorial pages of East Coast newspapers) and fallout among their own base; in different ways, Ukraine and Gaza both exemplify how Democrats act out the preferred policies of the Blob, take elite criticism for not being hawkish enough, and simultaneously lose ground with Democratic activists and core voters.

As on many domestic issues, Democrats portray themselves as the adults while mostly letting Republicans shape the playing field.

A more progressive foreign policy would need a different kind of executive, but also a different cadre of people to implement it. If the National Security Council-led “Process Makes Perfect” when it comes to debating foreign policy in the White House – a dubious claim, actually – then that “process” also involves not just selecting among options but constructing those options for the principals. The people who steer the process matter.

Yet pathways into the Democratic foreign policy establishment remain narrow. One is to be a politician whose brand revolves partly or heavily around supposed foreign policy expertise, for example Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, or John Kerry. Another path is to be a career political appointee, in the mold of Antony Blinken, Jake Sullivan, or Susan Rice – and, one could add, in the mold of Harris’ top two foreign policy advisors, Philip Gordon and Rebecca Lissner. A third path is to rise through the civil service (especially the Foreign Service or the CIA) and then convert bureaucratic capital into political capital, in the mold of Bill Burns or Linda Thomas-Greenfield. More complex pathways are possible too, involving careers in journalism, the NGO world, academia, or other sectors – Samantha Power came out of journalism and academia, for example. These pathways have some commonalities, however: they are all highly dependent on mentor-mentee relationships, and at the highest levels of a presidential administration, the representatives of different pathways tend to talk and sound the same.

Pathways into Power

Senior policymakers in the Biden administration today, mostly born in the 1960s and 1970s, represent the third or fourth generation to 1) steer the national security state, itself a relatively recent creation that dates to the end of World World II, the National Security Act of 1947, and the advent of the Cold War; and 2) manage the “liberal world order,” also a WWII-era phenomenon centered upon the Bretton Woods institutions, the United Nations, and NATO. 

Aside from the handful of Senators to brand themselves as foreign policy experts, the Democratic Party’s foreign policy professionals have no political constituency of their own; few of them are household names. Being a career political appointee requires close relationships with elected politicians and with more senior members of the foreign policy elite. Moreover, power within any given administration can manifest in different ways; the author James Mann, for example, argues that during Obama’s first term, the cabinet (Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, etc.) had less direct presidential access and empowerment than did members of Obama’s inner circle, such as Ben Rhodes and Denis McDonough. In Biden’s administration, in contrast, levels of formal and informal power sometimes seem to align, as with Blinken’s appointment as Secretary of State.

For career political appointees, the path into power often involves academic accomplishment (a Rhodes Scholarship, and/or an Ivy League J.D. or Ph.D.), then work for a Senator, then a senior post in a Democratic administration, followed by a cabinet-level post. Vetting and selection mechanisms kick in early; it is not that working-class Americans are completely frozen out, but attending a state school, or missing out on the mentorship that prepares one for major fellowship competitions, acts as a major brake on early access to the network. And if the foreign policy elite is becoming more diverse over time by gender and race, it nonetheless continues to skew male and white. Even more subtle, meanwhile, are the homogenizing effects of the selection mechanisms when it comes to ideological diversity, or lack thereof; the Ivies, the elite fellowships, and the early career opportunities in government or at top publications can all act as screening devices for junior applicants to the Blob.

the Ivies, the elite fellowships, and the early career opportunities in government or at top publications can all act as screening devices for junior applicants to the Blob.

To take a few examples of career political appointees, a 30-year-old Blinken served on Bill Clinton’s National Security Council in a mid-level role from 1994 to 2001, then became a key aide to then-Senator Biden on the Foreign Relations Committee. Blinken followed Biden into the Obama administration and, in 2021, was tapped as Secretary of State. Sullivan, a Yale-educated lawyer, worked for Minnesota Senator Amy Klobuchar. That role opened the door to a 31-year old Sullivan joining Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaigns in 2008 and 2016. When Clinton became Secretary of State, Sullivan served in two key posts – Director of Policy Planning at State, and then as National Security Advisor to then-Vice President Biden. Had Clinton won the 2016 presidential election, Sullivan likely would have become National Security Advisor, one of the youngest ever. He eventually did take on that role in the Biden administration (2021-present). 

For career bureaucrats, meanwhile, the Foreign Service and the intelligence community offer structured, hierarchal paths to advancement. If the bureaucrat rises high enough, he/she becomes visible to the politicos in the White House. A post such as Assistant Secretary can offer an audition for even more politically important jobs in a subsequent administration. One representative of the bureaucratic path is Bill Burns. The son of a major general, he won a Marshall Scholarship to Oxford in 1978, completed his Ph.D. there, and then joined the Foreign Service in 1982. He served in the offices of both of Bill Clinton’s Secretaries of State and then, starting at 42 took up high-profile posts as Ambassador to Jordan (1998-2001), Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (2001-2005), Ambassador to Russia (2005-2008), Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (2008-2011), and Deputy Secretary of State (2011-2014). Burns’ rise proceeded under Democratic and Republican presidents alike, but his post-Foreign Service career has seen him gravitate towards the Democratic establishment, serving as president of the liberal think tank the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2014-2021) before accepting the directorship of the CIA under Biden.

Bureaucrats-turned-elites are major assets to any administration – these bureaucrats bring substantial government experience to the table, as well as long-practiced diplomatic skills. If there is an American “Deep State,” then Burns personifies it; indeed, some post-October 7 coverage suggests that it is Burns, rather than Blinken, who is the real voice of American negotiations in the Middle East.

Power, finally, and lesser-known figures such as Richard Stengel, exemplify paths that run through journalism or other sectors. Power, a war correspondent, joined Harvard in 1998 to establish the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy; she earned fame, and a Pulitzer, for her 2003 book on genocide, A Problem from Hell. She then became a key advisor to Barack Obama, eventually serving, starting at 42, as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations during his second term and returning to the White House under Biden as director of the United States Agency for International Development. 

Pathways When Out of Power

One important facet of such figures’ careers is what they do when Democrats are out of power. The typical moves are to think tanks, universities (again, especially Ivy Leagues), or consulting firms. Such roles can keep foreign policy professionals visible (through speaking engagements, appearances in the media, and/or participating in policy reports and high-level working groups) and can help them maintain and expand their networks. Consulting firms are, obviously, lucrative ways to leverage government experience and political connections, but are also important parts of the foreign policy infrastructure, again allowing out-of-power elites to stay connected to key contacts at home and abroad, and also to create professional perches for peers and proteges. When out of power, top figures not only often find prestigious and lucrative perches but also combine multiple roles – as think tankers and consultants, for example – to burnish their images as serious thinkers while simultaneously cashing in.

Key pipelines into the Biden administration included two consulting firms: Albright Stonebridge Group (an outgrowth of former Clinton secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s consulting firm, founded in 2001, which merged in 2009 with Stonebridge International, a firm launched by Albright’s fellow Clinton administration alumnus Sandy Berger, who had served as National Security Advisor from 1997-2001); and WestExec Advisors (founded in 2017 by Blinken and several other top Obama officials). Although such firms are substantially smaller than Wall Street giants such as Goldman Sachs and Citigroup, they play a broadly similar function in the revolving door of Washington, allowing the kind of zig-zagging career mobility (and profitability) for the foreign policy elite that major investment banks and corporations have allowed for the financial elite. WestExec has been criticized for the opacity of its client list, and for the ways in which the firm leveraged promises of “face time” with once-and-future officials as a selling point for clients.

Another way that out-of-power Democrats occupy themselves is, of course, with planning how to get back into power. A key venue between the Obama and Biden administrations was National Security Action, a 501(c)(4) advocacy group. Co-chaired by Rhodes and Sullivan, the group included Blinken, Burns, Thomas-Greenfield, and a host of other familiar faces, many of whom joined the Biden administration. Various institutions, then, allow the Democratic foreign policy elite to bide their time and stay in the game while between White Houses. It may also be time out of power, moreover, that reinforces the network’s cohesion even more than time in power; the shared experience of opposing a Republican president, planning lines of attack and promises for the future, and engaging in shared consulting and corporate work likely also serve to bind a diverse elite more closely together.

Worldviews and Goals of the Democratic Foreign Policy Establishment

What do the Democratic foreign policy elites want and believe? From their writings and statements, many senior members of this club exhibit a generic liberal view of America’s place in the world, tinged with elements of progressivism. 

There are no specific values that one could permanently associate with Blinken or Sullivan, for example. While out of power, Democratic foreign policy elites – as with top candidates for office – gesture towards the imperative to uphold “our values” and restore a perceived normalcy in American life and foreign policy. National Security Action, for example, “work[ed] to ensure that America endures as a beacon of opportunity, dignity, and hope to people around the world.” The group declared, “We reject the false choice between welcoming immigrants and refugees and ensuring our security” and also said that “enabling or excusing oppression abroad today only fuels the injustices and instability that endanger us all tomorrow.” Back in office, however, the Biden administration proved more than willing to crack down on immigrants, and even more willing to double down on alliances with autocrats around the world.

Similar promises from Sullivan and others that U.S. foreign policy under Biden would “work better for the middle class” had relatively little substance and were soon abandoned. The policy paper Sullivan helped organize in 2020 recommended, among other items, to “shift some defense spending toward research and development (R&D) and technological workforce development to protect the U.S. innovative edge and enhance long-term readiness,” but the defense budget has instead grown each year under Biden.

When called upon to articulate a view of America’s role in the world, the top Democratic strategists are often vague. In October 2023, Sullivan penned an article for Foreign Affairs called “The Sources of America Power.” The article became infamous for Sullivan’s boast that “although the Middle East remains beset with perennial challenges, the region is quieter than it has been for decades” – lines written and spoken before Hamas’ attack on October 7, 2023 and the ensuing genocidal response by Israel, but naïve nonetheless. More telling of Sullivan’s worldview, however, was this sentence: “The essence of President Biden’s foreign policy is to lay a new foundation of American strength so that the country is best positioned to shape the new era in a way that protects its interests and values and advances the common good.” Such sentiments amount to little more than an argument that America is inherently good, so therefore it should lead the world, and therefore America must be “strong.” This is less a foreign policy than it is a vague, all-purpose justification for ad hoc decisions. 

Such sentiments amount to little more than an argument that America is inherently good, so therefore it should lead the world, and therefore America must be “strong.”

Harris’ advisors are clearly reflective – Gordon published a book in 2020 called Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East – yet there are limits to their introspection. If Gordon is a reformist, as some have argued, he is a moderate one at most. Gordon’s thinking in Losing the Long Game revolves around cost-benefit analysis in a framework that still assumes and extols American primacy, rather than a wider set of questions about how, for example, U.S. failures in the Middle East could provide impetus for a fundamentally different approach to the region and the world. And reflection can turn into overcorrection; among various troubling notes in the book, Gordon portrays Obama’s (very reluctant) support for Egyptian protesters in 2011 as a form of “regime change” gone wrong, collapsing U.S. rhetorical support for largely non-violent Egyptian protests with the more aggressive U.S. interventions in Syria and Libya. And despite Gordon’s reflections when out of power, Biden himself has appeared to call for regime change in Russia and, depending on how one parses his statements, Iran. Biden’s statements could be seen as gaffes, but the instinct to push for regime change in adversaries runs deep, and no senior staff resigned over either remark. Meanwhile, Lissner co-authored a book in 2020 called An Open World: How America Can Win the Contest for 21st Century Order. Endorsed by Henry Kissinger, the book’s call for openness is welcome – but is the key question facing the U.S. really how to “win”? 

Even those individuals who do enter the foreign policy elite with a more recognizable set of values (or, more cynically, a “brand”) typically end up becoming defenders rather than reformers of existing policy frameworks; the ultimate example is Samantha Power, an ostensible critic of U.S. inaction in the face of genocide but, while in senior posts under the Obama and Biden administrations, a rather conventional liberal hawk.

There are also no specific policies that Democratic elites consistently defend. Many of the top officials in Biden’s administration, for example, were involved in negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the “Iran Deal”) under Obama, but showed little hunger to restore the deal under Biden. Some fixtures of Democratic White Houses are more associated with specific policies – Middle East hand Rob Malley, for example, is seen as a leading Democratic expert on Iran and a proponent of easing tensions – but those associations can in fact become professional liabilities, and Malley was subjected to an extended barrage of criticisms in the press before being placed on leave in June 2023 under unclear circumstances concerning his security clearance.

Democratic foreign policy elites will sometimes innovate, but more often they default to defending the status quo of the moment, while invoking 1945 and 1989-1991 as idealized moments of supposed “order” in a U.S.-centric worldview. The goals of any given moment – for example, the administration’s reported push for a “grand bargain” between Saudi Arabia and Israel as a purported path for ending the Gaza war – often appear predicated on a hunger for “normalcy” and an eye to what would play well with establishment media, rather than on introspection about America’s changing place in the world or about why the status quo might be a problem rather than a destination. It is striking, meanwhile, how often Democratic foreign policy elites invoke George H.W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, and James Baker as foreign policy hands they admire – a Republican-lite foreign policy sometimes appears to be the horizon of imagination for today’s top Democrats.

a Republican-lite foreign policy sometimes appears to be the horizon of imagination for today’s top Democrats.

If ideological vagueness, a belief in American greatness, and a preference for the status quo are all interwoven with a hierarchical, elite, and difficult to permeate network, then it is little surprise that the Democratic foreign policy establishment is largely self-perpetuating and unfriendly to genuine reformers. New entrants to the establishment are almost invariably proteges of existing members, and/or the senior campaign staff of winning presidential campaigns. Meanwhile, surviving and rising in that world requires intricate knowledge of the government’s inner workings as well as a sophisticated mental rolodex of who is who in Washington. If one is working sixteen-hour days at the National Security Council attempting to plan foreign trips and write talking points for a frazzled boss all while running “sub-IPC” meetings and plotting one’s next career move, what time is left to question whether American foreign policy is heading in the right direction?

Opportunities for Reform – or Revolution?

The reproduction mechanisms of the Democratic foreign policy elite are strong. From one’s undergraduate years on, access to opportunities relies heavily on connections to top mentors, who are overwhelmingly likely to prefer people with worldviews similar to their own – or at least malleable ones. The rewards for ideological and professional conformity are huge: proximity to power when Democrats are in office and, when out of office, lucrative positions within consulting firms and/or prestigious perches within universities and think tanks. All of this adds up for considerable longevity, over decades, for people who make it into the foreign policy elite. Whether or not Harris wins in November, and whoever the next Democratic president is, Biden administration figures such as Blinken, Sullivan, and their close proteges are likely to continue shaping Democratic executives’ foreign policy for years to come. One can also look ahead to key incubators for upcomers – the State Department’s Policy Planning unit, for example, or the National Security Council’s myriad senior directorships – to get a sense of what the next cadre of senior policymakers will look like.

The rewards for ideological and professional conformity are huge

Is such a system impenetrable to change? For would-be reformers, one exciting prospect would be a presidential candidate who bypasses the foreign policy establishment and brings genuinely fresh perspectives into senior levels of government. As the 2016 and 2020 Democratic primaries showed, however, the obstacles to such a scenario are massive. The 2008 election is another cautionary tale, in fact; a president whom many perceived as a reformer ended up welcoming numerous upholders of the status quo into his administration.

Another potential prospect is reform from without – in other words, building up an alternative cadre of foreign policy experts. To some extent, that alternative cadre already exists, just not in a cohesive way; people with progressive foreign policy visions are already distributed throughout academia, think tanks, NGOs, and the wider society. Yet their empowerment would, again, be predicated on appointments to key positions, which in turn depends upon access to powerful elected politicians. And appointments to such positions are no guarantee against the ensuing pressures for ideological conformity and malleability.

an “inside-outside” strategy appears most promising

For the time being, an “inside-outside” strategy appears most promising. Reformists can and should cut their teeth in the existing Democratic foreign policy world, resigning when morally imperative but gleaning knowledge of how things work when possible. Critics can and should challenge the Democratic foreign policy elite and worldview, and not just issue by issue but in a holistic way that lays bare the vacuity of appeals to American power, greatness, and leadership. Ultimately, more creative and broad-reaching coalitions will be key to transformation – it is not the pens of academics and unconventional analysts that will give Harris pause on Gaza, but the tens of thousands of uncommitted votes cast in primaries. Biden’s team has claimed to be implementing a foreign policy for the middle class, but they have largely spoken for the middle class rather than with it or through it, and listening efforts have been token and performative.

For progressives and leftists, a mass working-class base, involved directly in the articulation and advocacy of an alternative foreign policy, is one key to achieving change. Such an effort, already underway in tentative forms, would involve connecting the cadres of an alternative foreign policy team more directly and intensively to the workers unionizing Amazon and Starbucks, as well as to the mostly domestically-focused organizers pursuing single-issue campaigns at the state level. To make those connections stronger and more powerful will take new and more robust institutions, as well as a great deal of listening from the reformists currently embedded in the offices of progressive members of Congress, NGOs, and academia. It is unlikely that status quo-minded Democrats could be dislodged from the foreign policy ladder simply by being out-argued; the challenge is instead to make the foreign policy elite more answerable and vulnerable to mass politics.    

 

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Labor unions going global for workers rights

Wouter van de Klippe is a freelance journalist and Public Policy graduate based in Europe. He’s particularly interested in organized labor, economic, social, and environmental justice, and social welfare states.
 

Boiling in Amazon’s warehouses

The city boiled as the unrelenting sun cooked Manesar in India’s northern state of Haryana. Temperatures soared to 50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit) in some areas of India on May 16th this year as a deadly heat wave swept the region.

At 4:30pm, a manager inside of Amazon’s Manesar warehouse called a meeting. The meeting was, according to the manager, intended to motivate the workers to push their efforts and increase productivity despite the heat. To accomplish this, a worker testified in The Independent, the manager asked the warehouse workers to make a pledge: workers “will not take any breaks, we will not stop to drink water or go to the bathroom until we meet our targets.”

The inhumane pledge came as the same worker reported shifts of organizing products for 10 hours a day with only two breaks of 30 minutes to rest. While the facility has been outfitted with fans and coolers, she said that their impact is “negligible”, “walk just 10 steps away and you can barely feel any difference. The areas where we work are typically between 30-35C on any given day.”

Amazon has since said that the pledge was an “unfortunate and isolated incident”, but the case has catalyzed a renewed discussion of the brutal labor conditions in Amazon warehouses.

These conditions were brought to the attention of India’s National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) by the Amazon India Workers Association (AIWA), established in 2022 and supported by UNI Global Union, a global union federation for service sector workers. AIWA is one of over 80 organizations across the globe fighting to improve the often brutal conditions faced by Amazon under the banner of the Make Amazon Pay campaign.

AIWA, with the help of UNI, was able to document and raise awareness of the conditions experienced by Amazon warehouse workers, ultimately resulting in the NHRC taking action at what the commission stated could potentially “raise a serious issue of the human rights of workers.”

Now, UNI Global union is campaigning to demand that Amazon provide safe working conditions – especially in light of the climate crisis. Amazon’s warehouses in India are not alone in unsafe temperatures – the Teamsters union in the US is mobilizing for better protections in the Northeast, and back in 2022 workers reported scorching temperatures during the 2022 California heatwave.

These campaigns and others like are one example of a burgeoning wave of global labor solidarity that is rising as unions seek out new strategies to confront global capital.

Especially in the United States, unions are experiencing a renaissance of public attention and support. Less well-known is that union victories in the United States could have the consequence of pushing union victories around the world.
 
 

Less well-known is that union victories in the United States could have the consequence of pushing union victories around the world.

On the last Friday of the groundbreaking United Auto Workers (UAW) walkout that led to a historic victory, Tesla servicing workers went on strike in Sweden. It was the first attempt ever to get Tesla to sign a collective bargaining agreement and the action benefited from the momentum of the UAW actions to organize auto workers.

Unions that are pushing the envelope of labor organizing in the United States could spearhead efforts around the world, especially when it comes to global efforts at US-based multinationals such as Amazon.

For Nick Rudikoff, UNI’s campaign director and coordinator of the Make Amazon Pay campaign, “only a global labor movement can transform Amazon into a responsible employer.”

“You have such a multisectoral company that transcends sectors and geographies, it’s the largest logistics and commerce company in the world.”

The Make Amazon Pay campaign was launched four years ago and has coordinated growing days of strike action each year – most notably during Amazon’s (in)famous Black Friday sales.

Last year’s Black Friday strike mobilized workers in over 30 countries and, according to Rudikoff, received more press coverage than the sales themselves. “The fact that the Make Amazon Pay strikes and actions received so much support shows just how much solidarity there is for workers wanting a union.”

A representative from AIWA told me that coordinating with UNI Global and the Make Amazon Pay campaign “shows that the poor working conditions at Amazon are similar everywhere across the world. We are fighting for the right cause, not only in India. We are fighting everywhere across the world, and we are learning from each other.”

New campaigns seeking to organize workers the world over within multinationals are one of the many ways that unions have responded to globalization and increasingly spread supply chains.
 

Globalization and International Framework Agreements

Labor unions have had to be nimble in response to contemporary capitalism. Historically, the labor union’s bread and butter way to improve working conditions has been to represent workers by negotiating collective bargaining agreements. When employers are unwilling to come to the bargaining table and negotiate these agreements, unions demonstrate their power through organizing strikes and collective actions.

Globalization and outsourcing put pressure on the ability of workers to do this – first, by companies threatening to move operations abroad in response to pressure from workers; second, by companies increasingly moving operations to countries with less-robust unions and fewer legal protections for workers and organizing.

In a report written by Astrid Kaag, policy advisor for the largest Dutch trade union confederation FNV, Kaag notes that “the most important tool we have, the collective labor agreement, means little in such situations.”
 
 

The heart of Union action has always been at the shop-floor between workers in a shared space.

The heart of Union action has always been at the shop-floor between workers in a shared space. As the threads of global capitalism weave increasingly international distances, the process of building worker power and manifesting it at the local level has come under threat.

To adapt, and strengthen international worker solidarity, unions developed a new tool to fight for improvements in working conditions called “Global Framework Agreements” (GFA). Essentially, these are agreements made between unions (most often global union confederations) and multinational companies that set a baseline of working conditions for the companies’ employees and suppliers.

One of the most impactful GFAs that have been signed to date was in response to one of the greatest worker tragedies in recent memory – the Rena Plaza disaster.
 

“The International Accord”

In April of 2013, an eight story commercial building containing several garment factories in Dhaka Bangladesh called the Rena Plaza collapsed, killing 1,138 garment workers. Companies that sourced clothing from the building included C&A (Belgium), Carrefour (France), El Corte Inglés (Spain), Benetton (Italy), and J.C. Penny (U.S).

The disaster catalyzed a response from workers, trade unions, and NGO’s that resulted in the creation of a legally binding framework agreement – first called the Bangladesh Accord and more recently transforming into the “International Accord for Health and Safety in the Garment and Textile Industry”, or more commonly just “The International Accord .”

The International Accord was signed and negotiated by IndustriALL Global Union and UNI Global union, alongside several NGOs. According to the accord’s dedicated website, it has resulted in over 2 million workers across Bangladesh being trained in workplace safety, over 56,000 factory inspections, and over 1,000 resolved complaints.

The accord’s first legal test came when in 2016 UNI Global and IndustriALL won a lawsuit against brands that had failed to live up to the requirements stipulated in the accord. In 2018, the two global union confederations won the court case and the brands were forced to pay over $2 million to remedy the accord violations at their suppliers.

Despite this victory, there are real limits for what workers can secure relying on GFAs. A study recently showed that while GFAs have indeed resulted in significant material improvements in some cases, they are largely dependent on the goodwill of management at a company’s headquarters.

Other studies have been less sanguine about the impacts of GFAs. In a report by the German foundation the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, it was shown that in many cases in the United States, the agreements were essentially ignored – either intentionally, or due to the fact that local managers didn’t even know of their existence. Between 1998 and 2018, the International Labour Organization estimates that over 300 GFAs were signed – and yet, many of these global agreements have failed to secure the workers rights that they call for.
 
 

despite the International Accord being lauded as a major victory, workers trying to organize in Bangladesh are consistently repressed, and in some cases, murdered.

At worst, GFAs can serve as opportunities for multinational companies to boast their corporate social responsibility while continuing the longstanding abuse of workers. This is especially the case when GFAs are not legally binding and do not contain dedicated ways to assess, monitor, and intervene on violations of the agreements by independent bodies.

In Bangladesh, although The Accord has led to changes in factories and successful legal battles for unions, worker abuses are still common in the country and garment workers are still paid very low wages. Many companies have yet to sign The Accord, especially those from the United States such as Walmart, Amazon, and Target. In fact, these corporations created their own, non-legally binding organization called ‘Nirapon’ which NGOs have described as being self-regulating and entirely opaque.

A key part of these agreements is to make companies agree to remain neutral when workers decide to unionize. Yet, despite the International Accord being lauded as a major victory, workers trying to organize in Bangladesh are consistently repressed, and in some cases, murdered. For example, Shahidul Islam, a prominent union organizer for the Bangladesh Garment and Industrial Workers Federation, was murdered on the 25th of April, 2023, after attempting to resolve a dispute over wages at a factory in Gazipur.

Not only has globalization put significant pressure on the ability of unions to organize. Political hostility to workers and unions have resulted in working conditions degrading in many places across the world.
 

Labor is under pressure the world over

The world’s largest trade union confederation, the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), releases an annual report that describes the status of labor rights all over the world and provides ratings for each countries’ respect for workers rights.

This year’s results were bleak.

The ITUC’s 2024 report found that globally, workers were denied the right to strike in 9 out of 10 countries. In 49% of countries, trade union members were either arbitrarily arrested or detained. Only two countries’ ratings improved year on year (Brazil and Romania), whereas 13 countries saw their ratings fall.

An outlier can be found in the United States, where the Biden administration’s impressive support for organized labor has undoubtedly strengthened the movement in the country after decades of anti-union political leadership. Consider UAW’s successful amd ambitious campaign to organize non-union autoworkers. Surveys show that the US public is currently more supportive of labor unions than at any time in the past 60 years.

Alongside Biden’s formal political support has come new legitimacy within public discourse – although reactionaries have sought to disguise their intentions under a veneer of worker-friendly rhetoric.
 
 

reactionaries have sought to disguise their intentions under a veneer of worker-friendly rhetoric

Consider that the notoriously anti-union Republican party is attempting to rebrand itself as being pro-worker by, for example, inviting Teamster’s union president Sean O’Brien to the Republican National Convention.

Many of Europe’s far-right populists are similarly, and deceitfully, claiming an allegiance to the continent’s working class as well. The far-right Finnish Finn’s party has allegedly referred to itself as the “worker’s party without socialism”. Marine le Pen’s Rassemblement National is consistently attempting to present itself as the party of France’s working class.

In practice, these parties consistently implement policies hostile to organized labor. In the United States, the Republican party is blocking pro-union legislation and plans on rolling back labor protections for the working class when in power. In Finland, the Finns helped the center-conservative party slash worker and union protections.

Unions the world over are countering the far-right’s pseudo-allegiance to the working class by coming together.
 

Unions for Democracy

IndustriALL’s Walton Pantland wrote in 2019 that now, more than ever, there is a need for international union solidarity. He argues that the increasingly global and interconnected nature of contemporary capitalism requires new forms of worker movements.

“Labor is on the back foot. Jobs are becoming more precarious. Fewer workers have good pensions. Inequality is growing. The balance of power between capital and labor has tilted heavily in favor of capital.”

This year, the ITUC has been organizing a campaign “For Democracy” and warns that there are concerning anti-democratic movements in every continent that would have devastating consequences for workers’ rights.

For the ITUC, this gradual erosion of democracy presents an existential risk to the trade union movement. According to the ITUC’s For Democracy campaign, unions are forges for democracy. “Generations of trade unionists have fought and died, been tried and executed to advance democratic rights. Today, hundreds of trade unionists sit in jail, under house arrest or on trial as they continue to defend it.”

Wooing the labor vote has been a central part of the 2024 US presidential election and the outcome will have serious consequences on organized labor around the world. The stronger the labor movement becomes in the United States, the more pressure and momentum can be developed internationally. Just this year, Amazon workers in Coventry nearly succeeded in a vote for union recognition.

Amazon workers on strike in Coventry nearly won union recognition in a vote earlier this year. Image provided by UNI Global Union.
 
Labor organizers in the United States must take advantage of the current momentum and fight for legislative changes that will support organizing in the long-term. For example, campaigns must be centered around garnering support for the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) act which would empower worker organizing through new legal protections.

There are also legislative victories that can be fought at the global level. Take actions like the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) which requires companies based in the EU to make sure that there are no labor and environmental abuses in their supply chains. Yes, the act has significant shortcomings and has been made significantly weaker through lobbying, but it is a good starting point that unions can organize around to fight for legal due diligence requirements at the global scale.

Another battleground could be union campaigns pressuring legislators to ensure that trade agreements contain clauses to protect the right for workers to unionize and requirements for participating in collective bargaining agreements.

The global fight for workers rights is a struggle contested on a cornucopia of battlegrounds – from legislation and presidential politics to local actions.

The Make Amazon Pay campaign represents one the many different ways that unions are fighting the world over to secure workers’ rights.

When asked on whether unions should be focusing at the global level, the local level, via old union confederations or new unions such as the Amazon Labor Union in the U.S., Rudikoff replies “every worker organizing drive at Amazon inspires dozens more – in other cities, in other states, and in other countries.”

“As a progressive movement we’re all in this together.”

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After a surprise victory, can France’s left plot a course to 2027?

Alexandre Khadivi was until recently the foreign policy adviser to the “La France Insoumise” group in the French National Assembly. 

On 7 July, the second round of the snap legislative elections called by Emmanuel Macron a month earlier delivered startling results. As voters went to the polls, most observers agreed that Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally (RN) would obtain a majority.

In the end, the left-wing New Popular Front (NFP) coalition came out on top with 182 seats, followed by Macron’s centrist bloc with 168 seats, the far-right in third with 143, and finally the legacy centre-right group with 46.

As of writing, and with no bloc having an absolute majority, a new government has yet to form. Despite his gamble failing spectacularly, Macron obstinately refuses to nominate the NFP candidate as prime minister, hoping to find a “consensual,” centrist head of government instead.
 

How parliamentary elections work in France

Since a constitutional amendment in 2000, presidential and legislative terms align for a period of five years. As a result, once the president is elected, the legislative elections a few weeks later usually grant them an absolute majority out of 577 seats, preventing the sort of “cohabitation” impasses of the past whereby the head of state and head of government were from opposing groups.

Both presidential and parliamentary elections have two rounds. In the latter, this usually means a second-round runoff between the top two candidates. In some cases, the runoff can include additional candidates as anyone with at least 12.5% of registered electors’ votes also qualifies.
 

Why Macron dissolved Parliament

Since he was first elected in 2017, Macron has consistently played a dangerous balancing act by slowly and carefully propping up the far-right to weaken the left as much as possible. It’s a well-worn strategy in which left-wing voters have no alternative but to support the “centrist” bloc in runoffs to defeat the RN. As in 2002 and 2017, when the far-right candidate also reached the second round of the presidential elections, in 2022 a “republican front” led to Le Pen’s defeat.

Yet a few weeks later, Macron’s bloc failed to gain an absolute majority in parliament, as both the brittle left-wing New Ecological and Social People’s Union (NUPES) coalition and the RN made inroads, illustrating the population’s increasing discontent with the president’s social policies and authoritarian tendencies.

The lack of a clear majority in parliament hindered his legislative agenda and democratic legitimacy for the next two years. This frustration led him to call a snap election right after the European parliamentary elections on 9 June, in which the RN came first with 31%. The various left-wing groups had failed to form a coalition prior to the vote, contrary to 2022.
 

Macron’s cynical calculus, and how pollsters got it wrong (but not entirely)

Macron bet on three things:

  1. The left-wing groups – whose NUPES coalition had fallen apart since 2022 due to infighting – would not be a threat;
  2. As in elections past, most voters would be rational enough to not vote en masse for the far-right either, potentially giving Macron a new majority;
  3. Even if the far-right did gain a majority and formed a government, their incompetence until the next presidential elections in 2027 would turn the population against them.

Most pollsters predicted more than 230 seats for the far-right, based on numbers showing around 35% support for the bloc. Macron’s Ensemble movement would come in second, with the divided left-wing groups at a distance.

But within two hours of Macron’s announcement, the four main left-wing parties – Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise (LFI), The Greens, the Socialist Party (PS), and the Communists (PCF) – formed the NFP coalition. This included the decisive provision that, in each constituency, only one NFP candidate would run to avoid diluting the left-wing vote and increase chances of participating in the runoff.

Without getting into too much detail, the implicit instructions prior to the second round were:

  1. In case of a runoff involving a far-right candidate, the “republican front” would ideally vote for the opponent, e.g.: Macron supporters would vote for the NFP and vice-versa;
  2. In case of a three- or four-person runoff, depending on the first-round results of the specific constituency, the “republican front” candidates would decide on which of them would drop out to decrease chances of the far-right candidate winning.

Therein lie the surprises in the final results. In effect, the absolute numbers were correct:

  1. 400 National Rally candidates reached the runoffs;
  2. Voter turnout jumped from 46% in 2022 to an astounding 64% (the highest since 1981), indicating increasing dissatisfaction with Macron among swathes of the population;
  3. The far-right bloc garnered 37% of the votes, the left-wing bloc 25%, and Macron’s bloc 23%.

Yet the left became the marginally dominant force in parliament.
 

The left moving forward

With the gradual neoliberalisation of French politics since at least the turn of the millennium, Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise movement has steadily become the dominant force on the left.

Macron’s election in 2017 shattered most of the simmering contradictions and tensions in the country’s politics, centralising the neoliberal wings of the centre-left and centre-right under his rule. On the left, the legacy Socialist Party became a shell of its former self.

However, ego clashes, the PS’ comfortable insularity, and LFI’s uncompromising style on fundamental issues have made it difficult for the left to create a homogenous bloc with a long-term strategy.

It took more than three weeks of acrimonious negotiations to settle on a candidate for prime minister. Lucie Castets is a civil society nominee who ticks the right boxes: a 37-year-old woman with the “requisite” academic background, familiar with the intricacies of government, and who has fought her entire career in defence of public services and against neoliberal reforms.

Beyond the short-term, however, the numbers confirm the seemingly irrepressible rise of the RN leading up to the 2027 presidential elections.

In the event of an NFP government, the coalition should therefore lay its cards on the table from day one with two instantly impactful measures: repealing Macron’s undemocratic and wildly unpopular pension reform of 2023, and circumventing the market by fixing energy prices to alleviate the population’s financial distress.
 
 

Without an outright majority, it must therefore be bold, not limit itself to endless parliamentary infighting, and act through decrees when necessary.

In the longer term, tax reform, wage increases, investment in public health and education, and the necessary (socially minded) modernisation of the pension system must be addressed. The NFP’s programme clearly outlines these prescriptions. Without an outright majority, it must therefore be bold, not limit itself to endless parliamentary infighting, and act through decrees when necessary.

The final point is the most contentious: identity politics. Like most Western liberal democracies, these issues have become a lightning rod exploited by both neoliberals and the far-right. A large majority of the parochial Parisian media and political elites have eagerly fed what has essentially become a rabid form of islamophobia in the country. An extensive sociological literature shows that a majority of far-right voters are influenced by this even though their most pressing priorities are economic and social in nature, for which the RN has no proposals.

The left must not shy away from serenely addressing issues such as immigration, religion, and other similarly contentious matters. However, major divisions within the NFP must be overcome, particularly on the question of battling bigotry in all its forms. So far, only LFI has consistently called out islamophobia in a country where religion is an extremely awkward and taboo subject.
 

Foreign policy implications and the left’s divisions

Since the advent of the Fifth Republic, the conduct of foreign policy has been the near-exclusive remit of the head of state.

Barring some acrimonious and mostly “Franco-French” point-scoring over LFI’s unremitting condemnation of Israel’s brutal campaign in Gaza, foreign policy was largely absent from the election debates. The focus should therefore be on the 2027 presidential elections.

A large spectrum of French polity understands that a more balanced, less blindly Atlanticist (read: “neo-Gaullian”) foreign policy is needed, considering the major geopolitical shifts taking place and the United States’ quasi-existential political crises of the past few years. The extent to and the manner in which this should happen are where the major fault lines lie.

Macron’s approach has been scattergun and, all too often, improvised. His first major foreign policy pronouncements explicitly denounced neoconservatism and famously declared that NATO was in a state of “brain death.” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine upended this. He has entirely followed the maximalist NATO script on the issue and even overstepped the mark by publicly opining in May on the possibility of sending French troops directly into the theatre of operations, earning immediate rebukes from Washington, London, Berlin, and Brussels. He also came into office deriding the notion of a European defence pact before suggesting a debate on its feasibility in April, including the potential deployment of continent-wide nuclear deterrence capabilities.
 
 

Macron’s approach has been scattergun and, all too often, improvised.

Paradoxically, the NFP’s primary divisions lie precisely on the different groups’ geopolitical outlooks, with two distinct blocs: LFI and the PCF vs. PS and the Greens.

LFI and the PCF have the same broad sensibilities, the former being more vocal and explicit in its pronouncements. They share an anti-imperialist vision and are critical of NATO, Western military interventions, and neocolonialism.

They both propose leaving NATO, which they consider an aggressive military alliance that has contributed to the destabilisation of Eastern Europe. LFI in particular has consistently criticised NATO’s expansion towards Russia’s borders, warning of the risk of a full-blown conflict as far back as 2014. However, it explicitly condemned Russia’s invasion and supported tactical military aid to Ukraine, while calling for diplomacy and de-escalation rather than an increased military response.

LFI is also fairly radical in its prescriptions and strategy vis-à-vis the EU, which it considers an instrument of domination by the major economic powers (notably Germany). It calls for disobedience to European treaties deemed neoliberal and anti-social and is sceptical of the EU’s entirely market-based approach towards issues such as climate change, agriculture, and energy prices.

A similar dynamic is at play on Israel/Palestine where both parties are aligned but LFI is much more outspoken and insistent, thus bearing the brunt of establishment criticism. It was severely derided for choosing to call Hamas’ attack on 7 October a “war crime” rather than an act of terrorism and refusing to label it as “antisemitic.” It was also the first to explicitly call Israel’s actions in Gaza a genocide and has long supported the boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movements.
 
 

Moving forward, for the NFP to display a unified front and reach some level of consensus on foreign policy will require a delicate balancing act.

While immediately condemning Hamas’ attack as illegal, immoral, and entirely unjustifiable, LFI’s candid but clumsy attempts to situate it within the context of Israel’s brutal, decades-long occupation of Palestine invited controversy. The deafening noise and extreme emotions that the attack unleashed in France (which has both the largest Muslim and Jewish populations in Europe) rendered any attempt at a critical analysis of the situation near impossible, especially in the immediate aftermath of 7 October. Facile accusations of antisemitism have been particularly virulent, especially from establishment circles.

Finally, on the “Global South,” both parties advocate for a profound reshaping of France’s relations, particularly in Africa, where they strongly criticise its neocolonial policies (e.g. support for “friendly” dictators, a decade-long and ultimately failed military presence in the Sahel). They call for an end to military and economic cooperation agreements detrimental to local populations and for the promotion of relations based on equality and respect for sovereignty. In LFI’s view especially, this is the first step towards tackling the root causes of migration.

The PS and the Greens are much more Europhilic, the former also carrying a traditionally Atlanticist bent. Neither of them considers leaving NATO and both fully support unconditional military and economic aid to Ukraine. The PS also supports the suspension of arms sales to Israel and targeted sanctions against West Bank settlers but has so far stopped short of calling for general economic sanctions against the country.

Segments of the more assertive anti-imperialist left argue that, while the PS’ and the Greens’ priorities are generally sound, some of their methods and policy positions betray a lack of historical outlook, long-term strategic thinking, and understanding of balance of power. For instance, they view the two parties’ efforts to reform the EU from within as quixotic and argue that the United States’ often “aggressive” and “domineering” conduct in world affairs barely figures in their thinking.

Moving forward, for the NFP to display a unified front and reach some level of consensus on foreign policy will require a delicate balancing act. This will prove difficult because of ideological differences, divergent strategic priorities, historical rivalries, vast and accelerating shifts in global politics, and internal and external pressures.

To subsist until the 2027 presidential election, where its only hope of winning rests on presenting a single candidate, the NFP will need to develop robust internal mechanisms for dialogue and compromise, while respecting the sensitivities and priorities of each group. This will require periodic reassessments of agreements to maintain unity and, most importantly, avoid the French left’s cardinal sin: its self-defeating proclivity for airing dirty laundry in public.
 

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Unaccountable military surplus fuels police violence at home and abroad.

Lillian Mauldin and Janet Abou-Elias are co-founders of Women for Weapons Trade Transparency and research fellows at the Center for International Policy. Liv Owens, Mekedas Belayneh, and Rosie Khan are all researchers with Women for Weapons Trade Transparency and, respectively, a doctoral candidate at City St. George’s University of London, an economic master’s candidate at John Jay College, and an environmental policy master’s candidate at Duke University.

For the past ten months, the world has watched the devastating Israeli assault on Gaza in which more than 38,000 Palestinians in Gaza have been killed, 70% of them women and children. Protestors internationally have drawn public attention to the mass civilian casualties and unprecedented destruction. Student protests and encampments across the United States erupted in response to the ongoing genocide in Gaza, only to be met with increasingly violent and militarized responses from law enforcement.

Equipped with riot gear, tear gas, and rubber bullets, police forces have swiftly and aggressively dismantled peaceful demonstrations. Columbia University police used crowd control weapons and riot squads to break up encampments and deployed surveillance drones to monitor protester activity. Indiana University authorized state police to set up snipers aimed at protestors from the top of the student union building. At UCLA, the only pause the police took from throwing stun grenades at the encampments was during the hours-long attack from violent counter protesters. For this, police opted to stand aside and watch. At the University of Arizona, police confronted peaceful protestors with MRAP-style armored vehicles called Lenco BearCats. Then they deployed ​​chemical agents against the crowd.

These instances of selective brutality are no surprise; if anything, it draws stark parallels to the historic suppression of dissent in the U.S. From the Bonus Army to the Civil Rights Movement protests, the Kent State Shootings, The War on Drugs, the “Battle of Seattle”, the Ferguson Protests and Standing Rock Protests, the current militarized response to these student encampments follows a grim precedent of police intimidation and violence.

As defense contractors and weapons manufacturers seek new markets, they find lucrative opportunities in selling military style equipment to domestic police forces.

The military-industrial complex plays a significant role in encouraging increasingly militarized responses by law enforcement agencies against civilians in the United States. As defense contractors and weapons manufacturers seek new markets, they find lucrative opportunities in selling military style equipment to domestic police forces. Programs such as the Department of Defense’s 1033 and 1122 federal surplus programs facilitate easier access to weapons and tactical gear designed for warfare.

This normalization of military style tools in police arsenals creates a mindset that views civilian protests as combat situations requiring aggressive force. Consequently, police departments equipped with advanced weaponry and armored vehicles are more likely to resort to brutalization and violent tactics, even in situations involving peaceful demonstrations. This not only escalates tensions and leads to excessive use of force but also undermines the principle of policing by consent, transforming community protectors into warriors prepared for battle.

What is the 1122 Program?

The 1122 program is one way excess military equipment from the bloated Pentagon budget is offloaded to police departments, bringing militarization abroad back home. Established in 1994, the 1122 Program is managed by the Defense Logistics Agency, the Army, and the General Services Administration to allow law enforcement agencies to purchase discounted military equipment for counter-drug, homeland security, and emergency response activities. These discounts are meant to encourage local police departments to purchase equipment from the DOD inventory and contractors, propping up the same military-industrial companies that profit off of war abroad and police violence at home.

Federal agencies responsible for the program have failed to track, audit, or account for the weapons and gear that are transferred or sold through it.

The excess production of military equipment by these companies justifies the need for DOD programs that sell accumulating surplus equipment to various law enforcement agencies. Since the program primarily gives ownership of equipment to police departments, there is very little tracking of the military equipment that is sold to them. The 1122 Program does not have an audit mechanism; therefore, its sale of secondhand military weapons and other equipment, such as surveillance gear, does not have any safeguards to protect against its improper use. Currently, the program has no centralized database of purchases so there is no mechanism for public accountability or awareness of the distribution and use of military equipment by police. Federal agencies responsible for the program have failed to track, audit, or account for the weapons and gear that are transferred or sold through it. Meanwhile, police brutalization and use of excess force is ever present. With military equipment in the hands of police, there are dangers of significant misuse and harm going unchecked.

Missing records, no audits, and dangerous by design

Throughout Women for Weapons Trade Transparency’s investigation into the program starting in 2021, we sought clarity on the program’s record-keeping processes, departmental oversight, and typical purchases. We encountered unclear purchase record-keeping procedures that varied by state, agencies that were uncooperative and violated their obligations to open records law, and state points of contact who had little or no information about the operations of the program in their state. When we attempted to confirm which law enforcement agencies were enrolled and which state agencies managed them, our inquiries frequently yielded no certain answers.

Despite filing open records requests with dozens of local and state agencies in states that participate in the 1122 Program, we were only able to acquire centralized, organized spreadsheets of purchases from Colorado, California, and Massachusetts. Most state agencies denied or ignored our requests. When government staff responded to our requests, they would commonly misdirect us to other agencies, misinterpret our requests, or reject our requests without valid explanation.

A lack of record keeping on 1122 Program procurements creates a risk of military style equipment being unaccounted for in police inventory. When asked if purchases from the 1122 program are audited after procurement, a Texas official responsible for administering the program in the state commented: “Once the items are received, our office does not inventory, account or audit.” A New York point of contact commented that “[my] responsibilities and duties end at the approval of the purchase. I do collect Contract Usage forms. The NYS 1122 Program does contain language in that the ultimate responsibility lies with the customer.” A Colorado point of contact confirmed separately: “We verify that purchases are made by state and local governments in support of counter-drug, homeland security and emergency response activities prior to procurement of vehicles. We do not trace purchased vehicles after they are received by the state and local agencies. Vehicles become property of the agency once received…”

Without state or federal level end use monitoring, the 1122 Program fails to create safeguards to protect against violence perpetrated by equipment

What’s more, the federal government does not require any oversight to monitor an agency’s compliance with counter drug, homeland security, and emergency response purposes. Without state or federal level end use monitoring, the 1122 Program fails to create safeguards to protect against violence perpetrated by equipment and against diversion into the wrong hands. After months of FOIA request correspondence with the Defense Logistics Agency, we finally acquired federal level data on 1122 Program transfers. Unfortunately, the data was incomplete, accounting only for purchases through the program after 2017, and moreover, missing item identifications for years prior to 2020. The total 1122 Program acquisition value for years 2017–2021 was given as just $379,473. However, this number contradicts data we received on the state level. A Colorado point of contact estimated that the state had purchased $1 million in vehicles in one year through the program, a number far greater than what was reported by the DLA for total nationwide purchases.

The inconsistent data across local, state, and national levels uncovers a disturbing reality that 1122 Program transfers are largely unaccounted for. It is clear from the harms that occur as a result of this gross negligence and inconsistency that the 1122 Program should be sunsetted by Congress.

Connecting the dots to increasing criminalization

In June 2024, the Supreme Court ruled that unhoused people could be arrested for sleeping in public spaces, overturning a previous rule that cities could not do so if there was insufficient shelter space in the city. With U.S. law enforcement agencies over-funded and relied on to tackle issues of U.S. infrastructure, lack of social services, and public health crises, these already vulnerable populations are exposed to an even higher risk of encountering unlawful violence from militarized police forces.

Criminalization of unhoused people has long perpetuated cycles of poverty and injustice. But as federal programs like 1122 continue to equip police with dangerous military style weapons and vehicles, and this criminalization of unhoused people is legalized nationwide, the threats to life and safety of Americans without homes becomes even greater and widespread. Police have historically ignored the constitutional rights of vulnerable populations during interactions and arrests. The U.S. Department of Justice issued a report on the Phoenix Police Department in June of this year after an almost three-year investigation. It found that Phoenix police routinely violated the rights of unhoused people “by unlawfully detaining, citing and arresting them and unlawfully disposing of their belongings.” Further, the report found that over a third of all “arrests in Phoenix from 2016 to 2022 were of people experiencing homelessness” and that many of these arrests were unconstitutional. The DOJ — the highest law enforcement authority in the country — has confirmed that these police committed crimes against the very individuals they are sworn to serve. And because Arizona is enrolled in the 1122 Program, these same agencies have the ability to purchase military style equipment and weapons.

In response to the report, Ann Oliva, CEO of the National Alliance to End Homelessness, commented: “Criminalization doesn’t end anybody’s homelessness. The way to resolve homelessness for people is to provide housing and the supportive services that people want and need… we need investments at the federal level to address the affordable housing crisis and shortage that is impacting not just Arizona but communities across the country.”

The pathological warrior-cop mentality, the violations of unhoused people’s rights committed by police, and the brutal repression of domestic political protests are manifestations of the imperial boomerang – inevitable consequences of the U.S.’s foreign policy

The aforementioned increasingly violent and militarized responses from law enforcement in response to protests since April also highlight a larger trend of repression and criminalization of protest and free speech that is aided and abetted by military equipment transferred through the 1122 Program. A recent analysis of police misconduct lawsuits filed during the 2020 protests in response to the murder of George Floyd revealed that the police response to many protests broke laws and violated rights. Many of these lawsuits also resulted in police reforms, including restrictions on the use of “less lethal” weapons, such as rubber bullets, pepper balls, and tear gas that have long been used to crush dissent in the United States around the world. If weapons such as these are being scrutinized and restricted, military style equipment purchased through the 1122 Program such as MRAPs and BearCats should be too.

Furthermore, studies have found that additional force by police leads to increased violence and a positive feedback loop of escalation from both protesters and police forces. Additionally, empirical analysis of the correlations between police militarization through the 1122 Program’s sister 1033 Program and police violence revealed “a positive and statistically significant relationship between 1033 transfers and fatalities from officer-involved shootings.” The pathological warrior-cop mentality, the violations of unhoused people’s rights committed by police, and the brutal repression of domestic political protests are manifestations of the imperial boomerang – inevitable consequences of the U.S.’s foreign policy.

Intertwined international and domestic militarization

“The means of defense against foreign danger have been always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people.”

― James Madison, speech at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia

Investigative scrutiny, such as Government Accountability Office reports on DOD’s Section 333 Train and Equip programs, highlights how U.S. military resources are not only allocated for foreign allies’ military forces but also integrated into their law enforcement agencies. Programs such as Worldwide Warehouse Redistribution Services (WWRS), DOD’s Section 333 Authority to Build Capacity, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s Excess Defense Articles (EDA) showcase how the US operates a durable system for distributing weapons and other military equipment to the local and federal level forces of other nations. These programs are not isolated: they demonstrate a U.S. strategy of distributing military-grade equipment internationally through numerous channels, which has far-reaching harms for civilians policed by both military and law enforcement forces.

The 1122 Program’s impacts on domestic militarization and other programs like EDA and WWRS paint a picture of the broader landscape of militarization. While the 1122 Program enables states and local governments in the United States to access federal equipment and discounts for domestic use, EDA and WWRS enable the redistribution of surplus U.S. military equipment to international customers. This common mechanism of reallocating excess military resources demonstrates the similar causes and effects of domestic and international militarization: inflated defense budgets beget greater civilian harm. In these ways, the repurposing of military equipment raises concerns about the budgetary and human security implications of such programs.

This common mechanism of reallocating excess military resources demonstrates the similar causes and effects of domestic and international militarization: inflated defense budgets beget greater civilian harm.

WWRS exemplifies the complexity and opacity of U.S. military transfer programs. This program facilitates the transfer of articles acquired under the U.S. Arms Export Control Act through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases or Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) purchases. Essentially, WWRS operates as a global redistribution center for excess U.S. military equipment. U.S. Government organizations are eligible to be WWRS buyers as well as foreign FMS customers. The anonymity maintained for both buyers and sellers within this program raises concerns about its lack of transparency and oversight, much like that of the 1122 Program. As such, both programs display larger trends of a lack of end use monitoring of U.S. supplied weaponry, leading to their potential misuse.

EDA repurposes surplus U.S. military equipment to foreign governments and international organizations with the primary goal of modernizing U.S. ally forces in line with U.S. foreign policy objectives. This program underscores the similarities between international militarization and domestic militarization practices. The equipment provided through EDA is often the same equipment that could be accessed domestically through programs like the 1122 Program, such as armored vehicles, MRAPs, and surveillance gear. Clearly, the line between military forces abroad and law enforcement agencies at home has been blurred. DOD’s Section 333 Train and Equip Programs similarly militarize foreign security forces and have funded police abroad in their counter terrorism and drug trafficking activities, which directly mirrors the purposes and mechanisms of the 1122 Program in the United States.

The parallels between international and domestic militarization practices raise concerns about the lack of accountability and oversight of these transfer and security cooperation programs. The redistribution of military-style equipment, whether to international allies or domestic agencies, can lead to the misuse and diversion of such equipment. For instance, there is a risk that this equipment could be used to suppress democratic protests or other forms of civil unrest, both abroad and at home. The opaque nature of these transfers obscures the end-uses of such equipment, thus eroding public trust and posing threats to civilian safety.

there is a risk that this equipment could be used to suppress democratic protests or other forms of civil unrest, both abroad and at home

After drawdowns from conflicts such as that in Afghanistan, the U.S. has often repurposed military equipment by transferring it to domestic law enforcement agencies. This process is in addition to the over $7.1 billion in U.S.-funded military weapons left in Afghanistan, which face a high risk of diversion in the region and have already appeared in conflicts such as in the disputed South Asian region of Kashmir. Following the U.S. drawdown, CENTCOM reported that “984 C-17 loads of material” had been transported out of Afghanistan. Among this material, the DOD declared 17,074 pieces of equipment as federal excess personal property, which was sent to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) for disposition. Contrary to some media reports equating “disposition” with “destruction,” most of this equipment is unlikely to be destroyed. Instead, it often finds its way into the hands of local police through programs like the DOD’s 1033 Program. These transfers have resulted in police departments acquiring surplus military gear, including armored vehicles and tactical equipment. This raises an important question: how often do military drawdowns and other foreign engagements lead to spikes in the transfer of military equipment to domestic law enforcement agencies?

The linkage between military drawdowns abroad and upturns in 1033 transfers at home is evident in the data. Stephen Semler, co-founder of Security Policy Reform Institute, observed that there was a significant uptick in the transfers of surplus military equipment to domestic law enforcement agencies as the U.S. military pulled out of Iraq. This pattern is particularly clear from the flow of MRAPs (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles), which were produced in large numbers to protect troops from improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. As military operations decreased, these vehicles, along with other excess equipment, were funneled into the 1033 Program, flooding police departments with gear intended for war zones. The surge in military budgets during this period also contributed to an abundance of surplus equipment, further fueling the transfers. This trend underscores the direct relationship between overseas drawdowns and the increased militarization of police forces at home. If this pattern holds true for the 1033 Program, then it is likely that a similar trend of cyclical militarization occurs with the 1122 Program.

The Solution

The 1122 Program’s lack of oversight and inconsistent data collection practices obscure public and policymaker understanding, hindering effective civilian and governmental scrutiny. This scrutiny is crucial, as the transfer of military equipment to local police forces blurs the line between military and civilian roles. It encourages a warrior-cop mentality, leading to a more aggressive and confrontational style of policing inappropriate for community-based law enforcement. Increased surveillance and excessive force suppresses dissent through intimidation and violence, threatening First Amendment freedoms of speech and demonstration.

Sunsetting the 1122 Program would have three main benefits.

First, sunsetting the 1122 Program would address critical issues in U.S. foreign policy by curbing the overproduction of military equipment that contributes to domestic and international militarization and surveillance. By reducing the domestic demand for such equipment, the incentive for manufacturing and exporting militarization would diminish. The aggressive posture that currently drives U.S. foreign policy is unsustainable and deadly – and it should be divested from. This shift is essential, as it not only promotes a restraint and peace-oriented foreign policy but also counters the normalization of using military-style weaponry against civilians.

Second, discontinuing the 1122 Program would significantly reduce the demand for the mass production of military-style equipment, thereby lessening the environmental impact from the extraction of resources needed for its production. The consumption of fuel and energy involved in the manufacture and deployment of this equipment exacerbates environmental degradation both domestically and internationally. Directing funding away from militarization would not only mitigate these environmental harms but also support global efforts to avoid conflict stemming from resource extraction. This realignment would reflect a strong commitment to responsible governance and international cooperation, fostering a more sustainable and peaceful global landscape.

Third, redirecting funds from the acquisition of excess military equipment to the provision of social programs can address the root causes of crime and improve overall community safety and health, creating a more just and equitable society. At a time when communities across the United States face significant challenges such as poverty, public health crises, and inadequate social services, it is imperative to prioritize funding for programs that directly benefit the well-being of residents. State and local governments have much more finite budgets than the Pentagon and the federal government, and yet, they still inevitably subsidize the DOD and weapons manufacturers through the 1122 Program. Sunsetting the 1122 Program would free up these dollars to be used for much needed social and infrastructure projects and will foster a more transparent, accountable, and humane approach to both national security and international relations.

* This publication was made possible in part by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

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Wayne Smith: An Appreciation

Bill Goodfellow co-founded the Center for International Policy in 1975, and from 1985 to 2017, served as CIP’s executive director. He is a member of CIP’s advisory board and the director of the Afghanistan Peace Campaign.

For nineteen years, Wayne Smith led the Center for International Policy’s Cuba program. Wayne, who died on June 28th, was widely acknowledged as the most effective and best-known critic of the failed U.S. policy toward Cuba.

Wayne spent twenty-five years in the Foreign Service and had a PhD from George Washington University. But he was not a cautious State Department bureaucrat or a milquetoast academic. Rather, his aggressive style of political advocacy drew on his time as a star high school and college football player and a Parris Island Marine drill sergeant.

While directing the Center for International Policy’s Cuba program, Wayne continued to teach at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. His perch at CIP gave him the freedom to speak out, provided full-time staff to organize delegations to Cuba and provided legal and financial backing to fend off his litigious right-wing critics.

Wayne took on the powerful and well-financed Cuban-American National Foundation, which twice sued him, and CIP, for libel. After we spent tens-of-thousands of dollars for lawyers in Washington and Miami, Wayne eventually prevailed.

Wayne loved Cuba and the Cuban people, but he was not a starry-eyed admirer of Fidel Castro or the Cuban government. Cubans from all walks of life respected him for his long commitment to increasing understanding between Cuba and the United States. In Havana, cab drivers often called out to him, and his visits to Cuba occasionally included long dinner meetings with Fidel Castro.

But his best Cuban friends on the island were independent thinkers like Pablo Armando Fernández, one of Cuba’s most famous poets and novelists, and Elizardo Sánchez, a former philosophy professor who is one of Cuba’s most prominent dissidents still residing in the country.
 

Wayne challenged the U.S. government’s restrictions on American citizens’ freedom to travel to Cuba by intentionally going to Cuba without the required license.

Wayne challenged the U.S. government’s restrictions on American citizens’ freedom to travel to Cuba by intentionally going to Cuba without the required license. He was disappointed when he was not arrested after giving a press conference on the Miami airport tarmac before boarding a flight to Havana.

Under the auspices of the Center for International Policy and using the Center’s Treasury Department travel license, Wayne took dozens of influential Americans to Cuba. Delegations of members of Congress and their staffers, farm-state business executives keen to sell American agricultural products to Cuba, as well as academics, all traveled to Cuba with Wayne.

One memorable trip was in December 2014 when I accompanied Wayne and a half-dozen CIP board members to Havana. Wayne was being honored by a Cuban academic institution for his decades of advocacy for better relations between the United States and Cuba. The morning after the ceremony, we were stunned to see Barack Obama and Raul Castro on the television announcing that the U.S. and Cuba would begin to move to restore full diplomatic relations. Wayne was summoned to the CNN studio in Havana to explain the significance of the two presidents’ announcement to a world-wide audience.

In July of 2015, we were invited to the Cuban mission in Washington when the Cuban flag was raised and it became the Cuban embassy. A month later, Wayne was in Havana, along with Secretary of State John Kerry, when the U.S. interests section reopened as the U.S. embassy.

Wayne had been the third secretary at the U.S. embassy in Havana in 1962 when relations were broken and the American flag was lowered, and from 1979 to 1981, Wayne was chief of the U.S. interests section. He was teary-eyed when he saw the American flag once again flying over the U.S. embassy.

Although relations between the United States and Cuba are fraught, the two countries still maintain full diplomatic relations. Moreover, most Americans agree with Wayne: our policy of trying to isolate Cuba is counterproductive and it is long past time to try something new, diplomacy and engagement.

Although Wayne did not live long enough to see it, eventually the United States and Cuba will have truly normalized relations, just as every other nation in the hemisphere has with Cuba. That will be Wayne’s legacy.

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Venezuela’s people, not government, deserve solidarity

Michael Paarlberg is an associate professor of political science at Virginia Commonwealth University and associate fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies. Follow him on X: @MPaarlberg

Voters in Venezuela were greeted at midnight Sunday with the least surprising outcome to the latest in a string of dubious elections: the incumbent president, Nicolás Maduro was declared winner in a race that he was projected to lose in a landslide. The state election body, the CNE (Consejo Nacional Electoral), did not produce the evidence which they are required by law to post under an electoral system set up by Maduro’s predecessor and mentor, Hugo Chávez – the actas, or printed vote tallies. Instead, the CNE simply announced Maduro the winner. Give the regime credit, at least, for declaring he won with just 51% of the vote, rather than 80 or 90%; officials clearly thought they were being subtle.

Since Sunday, the opposition  – the coalition of Maduro’s opponent and likely winner, Edmundo González, and led by banned candidate María Corina Machado  – announced that they have collected 73% of the vote tallies, which show González winning by a 70-30 margin. This is consistent with pre-election polls that showed him leading Maduro by at least a 35 point margin, and exit polls on Sunday showing a similar blowout. Polls are not always correct, and have been hampered in recent years by nonresponse bias – the tendency of voters on one side or another to be more likely to refuse to answer polls. In an authoritarian context like Venezuela’s however, nonresponse would actually underestimate the opposition’s support. But with nearly three-quarters of vote tallies collected as of the time of writing, the margins reported make it mathematically impossible for Maduro to have won.

As testified by the Carter Center, which has monitored Venezuelan elections since 1998, the fault lies not with the Venezuelan people, polling staff, party witnesses, or citizen observers, all of whom contributed to a fair election. “However,” the Center declared in a statement, “their efforts were undermined by the CNE’s complete lack of transparency in announcing the results.”

Thus it is clear that Maduro stole the election. The question remains what happens next. Events on the ground are moving fast, with mass protests breaking out throughout the country. This, too, is unsurprising, and a scenario for which the regime had clearly prepared. In the run-up to the election, Maduro had bolstered his standing with the military to ensure their loyalty in the face of inevitable unrest and warned of a “bloodbath.” It has been the government’s response to those protests that has made this bloodbath a reality; as of the time of this writing, at least 20 protesters have been killed and over 700 jailed. Venezuela’s political future is being decided on the streets, but at the moment, the government and its security forces – both police and paramilitary colectivos – have the upper hand.
 

Lessons for the US

That Maduro would not accept the results of the election was always a highly likely outcome. None should be less prepared for this than the US government, the longtime antagonist to the chavista regime. Successive administrations, Democrats and Republicans, have been open about their desire for regime change, though not necessarily an Iraq-style approach. In 2019, the US and much of the rest of the world recognized a shadow presidency of Juan Guaidó, who never consolidated domestic support nor threatened Maduro’s grip on power. Trump hinted at military action before losing interest and imposed “maximum pressure” sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector, crippling the economy and contributing to the migrant exodus.

Biden pushed hard for a negotiated settlement under which the regime agreed to hold elections in exchange for a gradual lifting of the Trump-era sectoral sanctions, resulting in 2023’s Barbados Agreement. The July election was thus a major Biden foreign policy objective, one that was hoped to lower both oil prices and migration flows – an incredible 7.7 million Venezuelans, 20% percent of the population, have left the country in the past decade – ahead of the US election in November. Had it resulted in a peaceful transfer of power, it would be a crowning achievement. That it did not should have been anticipated, with contingency plans in place to protect those now being targeted by the regime.

What went wrong? Diplomacy is fundamentally about meeting the leaders of nations where they are, but that must be the starting point, not the end, and Maduro’s declaration of victory despite evidence to the contrary violates the existing agreement. As a result, the Biden administration appears naïve, or at least too eager to reach a deal to curb migration and inflation with a strongman who never intended to bargain in good faith. To confront this blatant theft and state violence, the US and the world community need to have a smarter strategy. The condition for noncompliance with the Barbados Agreement, a clawback to status quo ante sanctions, is no disincentive to a regime that has weathered them so far.

 

Venezuelan civil society needs to call the shots, and be empowered to negotiate an end to an untenable situation that even the regime knows cannot last forever.

One way out of the present crisis would be a negotiated exit using both carrots and sticks, which would require giving Maduro and his cronies and the generals who really decide his fate, immunity from prosecution for their many crimes against the Venezuelan people and considerable corruption – a deal that was similarly unsatisfying but successful in hastening the exit of right-wing dictatorships in the 1980s. This seems unlikely. With multiple indictments against him in US courts, and Republicans calling for Maduro to serve prison time, he is making the same calculation as other dictators with their backs to the wall: to spill as much blood as necessary to stay in power.

This is not to say sanctions relief was a mistake. Broad-based sanctions have done nothing to dislodge Maduro; rather, they have exacerbated the suffering of ordinary Venezuelans while government elites remained insulated. Targeted relief aimed at improving the lives of everyday Venezuelans is both humane and strategic: it is one of the best ways to reduce irregular migration while empowering Venezuelan civil society. Free and fair elections are vital, but making them the condition for targeted relief hurts as much as helps. Ultimately, Venezuelan civil society, not the US, China or Russia, needs to call the shots, and be empowered to negotiate an end to an untenable situation that even the regime knows cannot last forever.
 

Lessons for progressives

For an uncomfortably long time, criticism of Venezuela’s chavista regime has been taboo for the global left. In large part a legacy of Chávez’s personal charisma and eagerness to confront the US at a low point in its global reputation – the Iraq War – and partly also due to Venezuela’s financial largesse at a time when its treasury was overflowing under a global oil price boom, many center- to far-left parties reflexively defended Maduro even as he tanked the economy and ramped up repression.

This residual support is fading. Venezuela’s longtime allies such as Brazil’s Lula and Colombia’s Petro have voiced skepticism about Maduro’s purported victory, demanding to see the vote tallies. Other, newer leaders of Latin America’s left, Chile’s Gabriel Boric and Guatemala’s Bernardo Arévalo, have been more forceful in their criticisms. The Maduro regime has reacted by expelling diplomats of critical countries, left or right, an unprecedented move signaling its growing self-isolation. The few countries to unquestionably accept the cooked results have been Bolivia, Cuba, Honduras, and Nicaragua, and outside the region, Russia, Iran and China. The divides don’t line up neatly by ideology, unless one considers Putin to be a better arbiter of the progressive position than Boric. Even Venezuela’s Communist Party is in opposition to the Maduro regime, in stark contrast to left parties in other countries who lazily view the world through a campist lens.

If the global left seeks to show solidarity with the Venezuelan people, it should listen to voices within civil society rather than the regime: NGOs, human rights advocates, labor unions, and groups like the Foro Cívico that have articulated reforms necessary for true representation. And if the left seeks to play the long game and cares about its prospects in the future, it should recognize the Maduro regime for what it is: the worst model of the left with which to be associated. Throughout Latin America, far right candidates win office by running against the chavista bogeyman, and for millions of voters, “socialism” means what it means in Venezuela: authoritarianism, state terror, hunger and insecurity. The 7-plus million Venezuelans who have fled the country bring with them stories of what made them leave, and as this crisis escalates, more will follow. At the same time, it is a model other strongmen (not on the left) find useful. Even Trump praised Maduro for supposedly lowering Venezuela’s crime rate, and according to his former national security advisor, privately expressed admiration for Maduro for being “too smart and too tough” to be overthrown, as well as for “all those good-looking generals” who stood beside him. Should Maduro succeed in crushing the protests, it would likely only make those in the global authoritarian axis admire him more.

EDITOR’S NOTE: you can watch Paarlberg discuss Venezuela’s election, and the reaction to it, with CIP fellow María José Espinosa and Executive Vice President Matt Duss.
 

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A Diminished Netanyahu Meets Growing Protest in Congress

Editor’s note: On July 24, 2024, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel spoke before a joint session of the US Congress. Concurrently CIP co-hosted a counter-programming event, featuring among others Representative Pramila Jayapal, pictured above. The IPJ is happy to publish this paired response to Netanyahu’s speech, authored by Y.L. Al-Sheikh and Hadar Susskind.
 

Protest honors the dead. Action can save the living

Y.L. Al-Sheikh is a Palestinian-American writer and organizer.

Despite being responsible for the murder of more than 40,000 Palestinians and one of the most horrific campaigns of mass starvation in modern history, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was rewarded with the opportunity to come to Washington D.C. for a victory lap.

There will rightfully be many articles written on the saber rattling against Iran, or the slanderous attacks on American college students, but the most important element of the Prime Minister’s speech was by far his unsurprising rejection of Palestinian freedom and self-determination. By proposing that Gaza remain under Israeli “security control” for an indefinite amount of time, Netanyahu made clear yet again that he is ideologically opposed to anything but apartheid and Jewish supremacism between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. While it is obvious to anyone who pays attention that this sort of regime does not guarantee Jewish safety, the facts seemed to matter little on Capitol Hill.

Netanyahu peddled lie after lie about the last ten months of warfare and destruction. When the Prime Minister claimed there were no civilian deaths in Rafah, this was of course a lie. The Prime Minister said that there has been no use of starvation as a weapon of war against Palestinians, and that is plainly untrue. The Prime Minister insisted that there are no plans to “resettle” Gaza, but his most senior coalition partners openly advocate for cleansing the land of its Palestinians and embedding Israeli settlers in their place. This is just a sampling of the falsehoods he threw at the audience.

Yet it was perhaps those who were or were not in attendance which painted the bigger picture. Roughly half of all the Democratic members of Congress opted to boycott Netanyahu’s propaganda tour, and those who didn’t were not keen to visibly approve of his rant. Palestinian-American state legislator Ruwa Romman (D-GA) was right to note that this demonstrates significant progress compared to the measly 58 Democrats who chose to boycott back in 2015. The boycott was hardly limited to socialists like Bernie Sanders and AOC, instead being embraced by the likes of Nancy Pelosi, Jim Clyburn, and Dick Durbin. This is likely because they know support for this war is unequivocally unpopular. Poll after poll shows that the demand for a ceasefire is a mainstream view, with voters more likely to cast a ballot for a Democrat who expresses clear support for a ceasefire than a Democrat who mirrors the Republican point of view. More than 45% of voters who expressed support for the Biden-Harris ticket believe that military assistance to Israel should be decreased. Some of the biggest labor unions in the country want President Biden to suspend military assistance entirely until the war is concluded. It is likely because of these facts that the Vice President herself opted not to attend Netanyahu’s remarks so soon after she became the presumptive nominee for the Democratic Party in the forthcoming presidential election.

As promising as the trend-line is for the long-term prospects of a Democratic party that values Palestinian life, slow shifts offer cold comfort while the Biden-Harris administration still supplies Netanyahu and his government with the bullets and bombs that kill Palestinians and the United States still acts as a diplomatic shield protecting the State of Israel from the consequences of its decades-long illegal occupation. Displays of discontent do not bring our dead back to life, and symbolic gestures will not secure us what we are entitled to.

Without an arms embargo, sanctions on the government of the State of Israel and its settler enterprise, and an internationally coordinated push for Palestinian self-determination, it is unlikely that any ceasefire will actually be permanent. Durable peace is not possible without Palestine, and the sooner that Democrats in the United States understand this the better. Occupation and apartheid systems are systematic obstacles to peace, not just the choices of the present Prime Minister, and as such require systematic response, and not just a change in Israel’s leadership, to remedy.

It is time for the Democratic Party to face the one-state reality in the eyes, admit that there will be no such thing as peace in the Middle East so long as Palestinians are subject to military rule and displacement, and take meaningful action. If those who boycotted the Prime Minister’s speech are truly disgusted with what this war has produced, then they should demand that not another bomb be sent to the government of Israel until a permanent ceasefire is established. If those who claim to support democracy at home want to prove their sincerity, they ought to oppose military rule and racial segregation abroad and fight for an end to the illegal occupation of Palestine. It will be up to us who care about Palestinian and Jewish life alike to ensure that these advancements finally happen. The Vice President, if she wins in November, has the chance to work with us and be bold on this front. I hope that she takes it up.
 

Netanyahu and the Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Day

Hadar Susskind is President and CEO, Americans for Peace Now, and an Israeli-American dual citizen.

Yesterday, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu stood before a joint session of Congress and spoke eloquently about Israel, about the October 7th attacks by Hamas, about the conflict with Hezbollah, about the looming threat of Iran, and about the US-Israel relationship. It was heartfelt, it was well delivered, and it was mostly not true.

He spoke about how Israel has allowed so much food into Gaza that any accusations of hunger as collective punishment are absurd. Sadly, it is his statement that strains credibility. The accounts of hunger are widespread and well documented.

He spoke about how he will do anything and everything to bring home the hostages still being held in Gaza. And yet, at this very speech, seven Israeli family members of those hostages were arrested for the “crime” of wearing t-shirts reading “Seal the Deal Now”. Those grieving family members showed up in those shirts knowing that they could be arrested, but did so despite that risk because they cannot otherwise get their Prime Minister’s attention, unless it’s for a photo-op.

He also spoke about how Iran is funding the “anti-Israel” protest in the United States, including those that took place right outside of the Capitol Building yesterday. As someone who helped lead, and spoke at, one of those protests, I can assure you, that wasn’t true either. The protest I spoke at, organized by UnXeptable, a group of Israeli ex-pats living here in the United States and cosponsored by many American Jewish organizations, featured rabbis, IDF veterans, and hostage families. Each demanded that Netanyahu end the war, bring home the hostages, and stop prioritizing his own political survival over the good of the nation he is supposed to be leading.

One remarkable facet of Netanyahu’s speech was how few people were there to hear it. Approximately half of the Democratic caucus (and one Republican) declared that they were unwilling to be used as props for Netanyahu’s speech, and they didn’t go. And many of those who were there, including the senior Jewish member of Congress Jerry Nadler, made their disdain for Netanyahu very clear. Even Senator Chuck Schumer, a longtime friend of the Prime Minister, gave him barely a nod as he entered, and received even less in return. This of course stems from Senator Schumer’s remarks in May in which he said he believes “Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has lost his way and is an obstacle to peace in the region”.

Netanyahu spoke in English, but his real audience was back in Israel. He has, for his whole career, told Israelis that he and he alone knows how to “manage America”. That he can captivate Congress and build bipartisan support. Like most of his speech, it was never very true. But yesterday it was made absolutely clear that through his words, his actions, and his failed government, Netanyahu has alienated not only Democrats in Congress, but the many millions of Americans who they represent. If anything, Congress lags behind the opinions of those Americans, many of whom were surprised and disappointed to see that any Democrats showed up for the speech.

Between the protests outside, the members of Congress who skipped the speech, the hostage families who showed up only to get arrested, and the disdain that the speech was met with in Israel, it is clear that Netanyahu had a terrible, horrible, no good, very bad day.

 

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Repairing Turkey’s relationship with the West through trade and trust

Maximilian Hess is the founder of the London-based political risk consultancy Enmetena Advisory and a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and associate fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

James Ryan is the Executive Director of the Middle East Research and Information Project. He has a Ph.D. in History from the University of Pennsylvania and writes frequently on politics and culture in Turkey’s past and present.

Nicholas Danforth and Aaron Stein recently cautioned that Washington and the West must ‘come to terms’ with losing Turkey’ as a key geopolitical ally. We disagree. A positive case for how to get the most from the current relationship and prepare for its growth in the future is more urgent than ever. Turkish domestic dynamics are at a particularly tender moment, as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been dealt a defeat in recent mayoral elections, and is four years away from closing out his final term as President, according to the current constitutional rules.

There are many areas where the US can be a positive influence in the near and medium term, chief among them on Syria policy where the US and Turkey have long been at odds. As Erdoğan and Bashar al-Assad are sending signals of normalization of their bilateral ties, the US could work to make sure a Turkish-Syrian rapprochement does not continue to trample on marginalized refugee populations, or greenlight significant military action against its Kurdish partners. Additionally, Washington can still hope for positive contributions from Ankara with regards to Russia policy and European energy security. Washington’s demands have not, and will not, sway Ankara – but the right offers may.

There remain significant potential upsides to further developing the West’s relationship with Turkey, for both sides of the bargaining table – and in particular for the United States, EU, and regional and global governance. Looking ahead to a post-Erdoğan horizon, western policymaking institutions should find ways to non-coercively signal that a Turkey that restores rule of law, cleans up its human rights record, and reverses its authoritarian slide has friends and wealth waiting for it on the other end.

Addressing these challenges in the international relationship and in Turkey’s domestic dynamics will take work. But Ankara’s geostrategic position is not going away – and is only increasingly important. Even if the U.S. does somehow manage to extract itself from its long-standing overfocus on the Middle East – an always-unlikely outcome made all-but-impossible amid Israel’s war in Gaza and threatened expansion of the conflict – Turkey will remain crucial in a number of areas of Western interests – including with regards to migration towards Europe, efforts to constrain Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin, energy policy particularly on natural gas, and political transition and instability on the horizon in the Caucasus and in Iran.

As Stein and Danforth correctly identify, “U.S. policy is to now engage with Turkey on specific issues of concern, rather than simply build policy around Turkey as a crucial and trusted partner” but while they recognize that transactionalism can result in key benefits to the relationship, they also argue that “where U.S.-Turkish interests overlap…Turkey will work toward these interests without the need for American incentives. Where U.S.-Turkish interests diverge, Turkey will do what it wants regardless of what America tells it”. This is precisely the argument for both more assertive engagement and for offering Ankara more carrots that create an overlap of interests, rather than focusing on sticks and a strategy of coercion.

This relationship has worked best when the messaging from the West has encouraged deeper cooperation, and supported stable democratic growth, best demonstrated in the early years of the Cold War when the Marshall Plan and NATO membership worked to amplify democratic progress.
 

Carrots and Sticks

To understand Turkey’s role in the western bloc we must clearly understand how Turkey ended up joining Western institutions in the first place. While Turkey has perceived itself as “westernizing” in social, cultural, and institutional modes since the beginning of the republic, it would be a far stretch to say that the regime of Atatürk and his initial successor shared much ideological affinity with Western Europe and the United States. During World War II, the prime motivating factor behind Turkey’s quixotic neutrality was a fear of Russian encroachment on Turkish sovereignty – and it was for this reason Turkey only joined the Allies after the German defeat at Stalingrad, and even then in name only.

A large parliamentary chamber is set up in a semi-circle facing the speaker's chair, with second-story gallery seating on the sides.

Following the war, Stalin voiced several revisionist aspirations on the regime across the Straits and regarding borderland territories in Turkey’s northeastern provinces. This prompted Turkey to hew closely to the western bloc in the San Francisco conference in August 1945, and ultimately join the Marshall Plan in July 1947. It was only after signing those documents, which would ultimately provide Turkey with massive western-backed economic assistance, that Turkey would commit itself to a more democratic future, which would first erupt in the defeat of Atatürk’s party and the ascension of Adnan Menderes’ Democrat Party in the 1950 parliamentary elections.

This sequence of events is often credited to some deep commitment to liberalization on the part of Turkey’s authoritarian ruler of the time – President İsmet İnönü. On the contrary, İnönü had already proved throughout the war to be ruthless in his suppression of dissent and ambivalent in his commitments to liberalism and democracy throughout his career. Rather, it was the perception that limited liberalization and democratization would secure even greater security against a Russian threat that prompted İnönü’s decisions to advance multiparty politics in Turkey. This should be a key example to keep in mind as a post-Erdoğan future creeps closer to a reality.
 

Knowing what to ask

Learning from these past successful approaches, the West must take a selective but targeted approach towards offering Ankara carrots. The Turkish economy remains strained and Erdogan will likely grab at any and all such opportunities – for evidence one need to look no further than the benefits that Erdogan has extracted from Russia through the construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, set to open next year that have stretched from Russian subsidies for its construction to extracting funds from the programme to help support the Turkish bond markets as they cratered in 2022.

The West – and in particular the United States – has the ability to offer far greater carrots, however, and indeed the Biden Administration and Western allies have quietly already begun to do so. We’ve already seen Turkey open to these efforts. At June’s St. Petersburg International Economic Forum – Russia’s alternative to Davos – Putin himself complained about the successes here, stating “it seems to me that the economic bloc of the Turkish government has lately been focused on obtaining, loans, investments and grants from Western financial institutions…but if this is connected with limiting the trade and economic connections with Russia then the losses for the Turkish economy will be greater than the gains”. Turkish trade with Russia did indeed stall in the first quarter of 2024. And while Washington has expanded its secondary sanctions threats over support for the Russian economy, no notable Turkish financial institutions or even smaller money transfer services were targeted in the first major round of such designations issued on 12 June.

It is, regrettably, unrealistic to hope that Erdogan will join the sanctions regime against Russia in full, or take significant steps to embrace it more. But that is not to say that Turkey is entirely unresponsive to Western sanctions policy against Russia. Erdogan will continue to seek to transact with Russia and the West, but it is clear that he also has very strict red lines for the relationship with Moscow. Ankara has never recognised Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and Erdogan has repeatedly granted Turkish state awards to members of the region’s indigenous Crimean Tatar population and called for the release of activists from the community, which suffers state sponsored discrimination under Putin’s occupation. Erdogan sees Turkey as the leading power in Eurasia, and his support for the Crimean Tatars follows in part from his efforts to position himself as the leader of Turkic peoples across the region, as seen through the Organization of Turkic States that Turkey founded when Erdogan was prime minister in 2009.
 

It is more urgent than ever that the West engage seriously with the idea that Turkey may be its energy hub of the future – and to transact accordingly – rather than leave open the door to future weaponization of energy supplies by Putin.

The economics of natural gas reveal how Erdogan’s interests are increasingly diverging from Russia’s, even as Turkey remains the main conduit for Russian natural gas entering Europe through the Blue Stream and Turk Stream pipelines and from Turkey to Hungary, Ankara and Serbia through the Balkan Stream pipeline. The latter two were even developed after Russia’s initial 2014 invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. But so too were the Trans-Anatolian and Trans-Adriatic Pipelines, bringing natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe. The launch of that network, the culmination of a goal first set by the European Union in 2008 to create a ‘southern gas corridor,’ to diversify away from Russia and long backed by the United States as well, came just fourteen months before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

While Azerbaijan carries its own substantial geopolitical risks given its still-unsettled conflict with Armenia and capacity limitations, Baku cannot alone become Europe’s key natural gas provider. Turkey offers the route not only to Azeri gas, but Ankara also itself offers potential crucial additional supplies given recent promising exploration in the Black Sea. Additionally, Ankara can help to push Russian gas further out of the European market thanks to Turkey’s substantial liquefied natural gas (LNG) regasification capacity, making it a potential import hub into the Balkans and south-eastern Europe’s pipeline networks. This is crucial to defeating the claims made by regional populists that there is still a need for Europe to secure Russian gas in the future. It is more urgent than ever that the West engage seriously with the idea that Turkey may be its energy hub of the future – and to transact accordingly – rather than leave open the door to future weaponization of energy supplies by Putin.
 

Human Rights and Democracy

Restoration of the rule of law and a return to democracy should focus on the independence of the judiciary, which has acted as the vengeful arm of the Erdoğan regime, in targeting political opponents and perceived conspiracists with trumped up charges and thin evidence for over a decade now.

In particular, diplomatic energy should be focused on loosening the grip on Turkey’s Kurdish-led DEM Party (previously the People’s Democracy Party, or HDP). DEM’s co-founder, Selahattin Demirtaş, is among Turkey’s most talented politicians and has been serving lifetime sentences for trumped up terrorism charges for several years. DEM’s elected mayors in the southeast continually face arbitrary suspension and replacement with AKP appointees. Increasingly, Kurds are becoming disaffected with the electoral process in Turkey and there is a serious risk of Kurds turning in bigger numbers to radical, armed groups like the PKK, and set the limited progress achieved in Turkish-Kurdish reconciliation over the past decade back 30-40 years. Releasing Demirtaş and normalizing relationships with the country’s Kurdish population will shore up human rights, democracy and rule of law, and could serve as a crucial step to bringing the US and Turkey closer together on Syria policy.

Behind a marble dais is a speakers chair. Off to the side are other chairs with microphones.

The current regime’s motivations in Syria are driven by a combination of personal animus with Bashar al-Asad, the economic value of refugee labor, the salience of anti-Kurdish nationalism in Turkish politics and the soft-expansionist aims of creating Turkish-sponsored buffer zones along the border. Opponents of Erdoğan might be less engaged on some of these aspects – if the 2023 election was any guide, they would like refugees sent back to Syria as soon as humanly possible – but they certainly share, perhaps with even greater fervor, the desire to freeze out potential Kurdish autonomy in NE Syria.

Any rapprochement between the two sides on this issue will be hard won as long as the United States is committed to cooperating with Kurdish groups in Syria, but calming tensions inside Turkey around this issue is a critical first step. If the Syrian groups are increasingly seen as the champions of Kurdish autonomy by their brothers inside Turkey, and Kurdish electoral advances are repeatedly met with arbitrary repression and prosecution, then the divides between the West and Turkey are likely to deepen no matter what corner Erdoğan’s successor may come from.
 

Building a healthy relationship

Turkey under Erdogan is a strong candidate for engaging with in a transactional manner, but the asks should be limited, not tailored. The country’s economy remains highly fragile and although Erdogan has allowed orthodox central bankers and Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek to take the lead in trying to stabilize the still-inflating lira since the 2023 elections, there remain substantial risks to the downside. Erdogan recently declared that he still believes in his ‘neo-Fisherite’ economics – which flips the traditional relationship between interest rates and inflation – and may be his own worst enemy. But he has repeatedly adapted policy in response to economic carrots – as Putin’s aforementioned complaint alludes to. There are also already signs that the West is aware of this, with the World Bank, in which the US holds the dominant vote share, last September outlining plans to more than double credit to the Turkish government. Proving a positive partner on this front will not only be able to shape Erdogan’s policy, but help align interests with any future Turkish government. The West can also offer other carrots that would appeal to Erdogan, and even benefit Western interests.

Firstly, recognizing Ankara’s increasingly important geopolitical position across Eurasia – particularly in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus – and working through Turkey, rather than against it, offers a more credible alternative to the region’s strongman leaders who worry about Western interest only being fleeting in response to Russia and challenge Putin’s assertions that increased geopolitical competition there is somehow the result of Western expansion rather than Russian mismanagement. Secondly, by offering to partner with Ankara to boost its own gas production, and invest in LNG networks, Turkish interests can align more with Washington’s own broad desire for promoting American LNG and provide the EU with a sustainable pipeline alternative as well.  

Balancing these carrots will require the West remaining steadfast about its ‘sticks’ as well. The secondary sanctions threat regarding trade with sanctioned Russian entities has already proven effective and cannot be allowed to weaken going forward, otherwise Erdogan will exploit it to secure carrots from Putin as well. Similarly, the west cannot count on Turkey to be a reliable partner as long as power continues to be centralized in the Presidential Palace. Turkey is a tough negotiator, and under Erdogan particularly so. But it has not been lost to the West forever, and by improving the offer, and being serious about the value of democracy, there is still much to be gained for both parties.

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The US and EU can build a more democratic world with sports diplomacy

Raül Romeva i Rueda is currently Professor of Global Politics and Sport Diplomacy, as well as the President of the Irla Foundation, a catalan think tank which promotes studies on politics, democracy, fundamental rights and civic republicanism. He is also a former Member of the European Parliament and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Institutional Relations, and Transparency in the Catalan Government.

In the span of my career, from the corridors of the European Parliament and the meeting rooms of the Catalan Government, to the classes of Sports Development and Diplomacy at the University, I have witnessed the ebb and flow of international relations. Today, as we navigate a world fraught with rising populism, the resurgence of the extreme right, and the looming shadow of the climate emergency, the need for a robust partnership between the United States and the European Union has never been more urgent. This transatlantic alliance, founded on shared democratic values, holds the promise not only of addressing immediate threats but also of paving the way towards a more just, inclusive, and sustainable global order.

The Rise of Populism and Extremism 

In the heart of Europe and across the Atlantic, the specter of populism and extreme right-wing ideologies threatens the very fabric of our societies. Twenty years ago we already perceived these movements, often born from disenfranchisement and fear, capitalize on division and discord. Unfortunately, we didn’t care much about them. Too many people thought they were anecdotal. Obviously this perception was wrong.

Nowadays, we have to confront that reality. The transatlantic bond must be a bulwark against this tide, through coordinated policies and shared intelligence that preemptively address the roots of extremism.

Joint public diplomacy initiatives can counter misinformation and promote democratic values. By fostering a culture of critical thinking and resilience, we can inoculate our societies against the lure of simplistic, divisive rhetoric. According to my experience, sports, guided appropriately, can be an extraordinary tool to that end. Let’s see how, with some examples.

Tackling the Climate Emergency: sports sector must take its responsibilities

The climate crisis is a global challenge that transcends borders and ideologies. The US and the EU, as major global players, have a moral and practical obligation to lead by example. Strengthening commitments to the Paris Agreement and setting more ambitious, actionable targets is imperative.

Investment in green technologies and renewable energy must be a cornerstone of this alliance. Collaborative efforts in research and development can accelerate the transition to a sustainable economy. By sharing technological advancements and best practices, the transatlantic partnership can drive a global green revolution, fostering economic growth while safeguarding our planet for future generations.

As a concrete example I’d like to mention the significant responsibility of the sports sector, in general, and football, in particular, both in the US and the EU, in addressing its climate footprint, due to the vast resources consumed and the environmental impacts associated with sports events, facilities, and related activities. Just to name some of them: resource consumption, waste generation, transportation emissions, land use and biodiversity impact, facility construction and maintenance practices. In that regard, collaborative efforts can lead to the widespread adoption of energy-efficient design and technology in new and existing sports facilities, promoting sustainability and setting a standard for the industry.

Good examples of that cooperation would be the Mercedes-Benz Stadium in Atlanta, USA, and the Spotify Camp Nou (the Futbol Club Barcelona Stadium), in Barcelona, Catalonia.

Both are examples of how green technologies can be applied to sports facilities, given the fact that both projects have integrated solar panels, rainwater harvesting systems, and energy-efficient lighting. By sharing these best practices and technologies, sports facilities across the US and EU can reduce their carbon footprint and operational costs.

Strengthening Democratic Institutions, through Sport partnerships

Democracy is indeed the foundation of the transatlantic partnership and again the sports sector (and institutions) have a unique role to play in promoting democratic values, combating corruption, and protecting human rights.

By leveraging their influence and reach, sports organizations can help strengthen democratic institutions both within the US and Europe and extend these efforts to neighboring regions.

There are several ways this can be achieved. For instance, Promoting International Sports Diplomacy, Supporting Grassroots Programs in Neighboring Regions, Hosting International Conferences and Workshops, establishing transparency and accountability programs (Initiatives like FIFA’s compliance program aim to ensure ethical conduct within football organizations), supporting human rights campaigns (UEFA’s “Respect” campaign promotes inclusion, diversity, and respect in football, tackling discrimination and promoting human rights), or, finally, collaborating with Anti-Corruption Bodies (as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) collaborates with INTERPOL to fight corruption and match-fixing in sports).

In sum, policymakers and sports institutions can work together to develop policy frameworks that integrate sports into broader democratic and human rights initiatives. This integration can ensure that sports contribute to the resilience of democratic institutions and the promotion of justice and equality. By taking these steps, sports institutions can play a pivotal role in strengthening democratic institutions, combating corruption, and protecting human rights, both within the US and Europe and beyond.

A Path Forward

As we stand at the precipice of an uncertain future, the transatlantic partnership offers a beacon of hope. By leveraging our shared values and pooling our strengths, we can confront the challenges of our time and build a more democratic, fair, and inclusive global order. This alliance is not merely a strategic necessity but a moral imperative. It calls for visionary leadership, unwavering commitment, and the courage to act in the face of adversity. Together, the United States and the European Union can forge a path forward, turning crisis into opportunities and ensuring that the future we bequeath to our children is brighter, more just, and more sustainable. And what is more universal than the language of sports?

As someone who has navigated the intricacies of international relations firsthand, I remain hopeful. The challenges are great, but so too is our capacity for cooperation and innovation. In the words of the poet Antonio Machado, “Caminante, no hay camino, se hace camino al andar” – “Traveler, there is no path, the path is made by walking.” Let us walk, or run, this path together, forging a future that reflects the best of our shared humanity.

Bearing all this in mind, my impression is clearly that a more pro-democracy United States administration in 2017 might have been a better friend than the Trump administration was. What we can expect from the future is in the people’s hands.

Iran’s Election Surprise: A Reformist Victory Amid Turmoil

In a dramatic turn of events, Masoud Pezeshkian’s election as Iran’s new president has set the stage for potential change in a nation grappling with deep-seated discontent and geopolitical turmoil. His victory in a snap presidential election, just 50 days after a helicopter crash that claimed the lives of conservative president Ebrahim Raisi, the foreign minister, a governor, and five others, carries significant implications for Iran, the region, and US-Iran relations. This election comes at a critical juncture, with ongoing conflicts such as the Gaza war, the looming threat of its expansion to Lebanon, continued US sanctions on Iran, a rapidly growing Iranian nuclear program, and shifting geopolitical winds challenging the US-dominated global order.

Pezeshkian’s victory is particularly noteworthy given Iran’s political system, which does not hold free or fair elections and is heavily influenced by unelected institutions and theocratic bodies. The Islamic Republic, born from the 1979 revolution that overthrew the US-backed Shah, has been characterized by a persistent power struggle between its republican factions, which advocate for greater political inclusion and reform, and its religiously fundamentalist and ideological factions, which prioritize theocratic governance and strict adherence to revolutionary principles. This internal tension has shaped Iran’s domestic and foreign policies, creating an often contentious political environment.

This election highlighted the enduring clash within the Islamic Republic’s political landscape, and was set against a backdrop of widespread discontent among Iranians. Many citizens are profoundly disillusioned or actively opposed to a political system that has imposed severe economic hardships, social and political restrictions, including pervasive internet censorship, and the enforcement of traditional religious norms like mandatory hijab, in an increasingly secular society. The political environment has also become more insular in recent years, with reformist and moderate figures who once played significant roles becoming largely marginalized.

Pezeshkian’s victory is significant on multiple levels. His approval to run by the Guardian Council—a 12-member body of clerics and jurists that vets candidates—marked the first time in years that a prominent reformist was allowed to seek the presidency. Pezeshkian, a five-term parliamentarian and former health minister in the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami, has represented Tabriz in northwestern Iran, near the Turkish border, where his core constituency includes Iranian Azeris and Kurds, reflecting his own ethnic heritage.

Speculation abounds regarding the motivations behind the Guardian Council, and by extension the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in allowing Pezeshkian to run. It was likely an attempt to increase voter turnout, which had dropped to historic lows in uncompetitive elections since 2021. The Guardian Council approved six candidates, with Pezeshkian being the only reformist, and his main competitors being hardline conservatives.
 

His approval to run by the Guardian Council—a 12-member body of clerics and jurists that vets candidates—marked the first time in years that a prominent reformist was allowed to seek the presidency.

The election’s outcome, however, likely deviated from the Guardian Council’s expectations. The first round saw a new historic low turnout of 39.93%, a reflection of the electorate’s deep-seated apathy and disillusionment. However, amid intense rivalry among conservatives, Pezeshkian emerged as the frontrunner, with Saeed Jalili, a staunch hardliner, advancing to the second round. This result shocked the Iranian political landscape, as historically, lower turnout has typically benefited conservative candidates.

In the second round, Pezeshkian, representing the republican wing of the Islamic Republic, faced off against Jalili, who advocated for autarky and a return to the 1979 revolutionary ideology. The results delivered another surprise: turnout increased to 49.68%.

A critical aspect of this election was the electorate’s strategic behavior. Two key groups emerged: those who actively voted for Pezeshkian in both rounds and those who abstained strategically in the first round but participated in the second. The former rejected Jalili’s ideology, while the latter, through calculated abstention, significantly influenced the outcome and sent an undeniable message to the authorities. By abstaining initially, they sent a message of discontent, and the subsequent participation of part of this constituency ensured Pezeshkian’s victory while maintaining their protest voice and signaling ongoing dissatisfaction.
 

By abstaining initially, [second-round voters] sent a message of discontent, and the subsequent participation of part of this constituency ensured Pezeshkian’s victory while maintaining their protest voice and signaling ongoing dissatisfaction.

Looking ahead, Pezeshkian faces numerous challenges. He ran on a platform calling for an end to mandatory hijab enforcement, easing social restrictions, opening up the political arena, and pursuing constructive international relations, including with the West. During debates, he emphasized the debilitating impact of sanctions and the need for negotiations to lift them. He defended the 2015 nuclear deal, abandoned by the Trump administration, which reimposed US sanctions and decimated the political capital of centrist former president Hassan Rouhani. He also criticized hardliners for actions that he said immensely harmed the country, such as attacks on the Saudi and British embassies.

Hardliners and unelected institutions in Iran will undoubtedly try to obstruct Pezeshkian’s reformist efforts. Their influence, coupled with continued policies of sanctions and regime change from hawkish forces in the US, Israel, and Europe, presents significant challenges. Yet, the Iranian electorate has made its stance unmistakably clear: it rejects extremism and desires a better quality of life, both domestically and through constructive international engagement. Pezeshkian’s platform, centered on economic revitalization and improving diplomatic relations, resonates deeply with the aspirations of many Iranians. This election signals a major moment in Iran, reflecting a collective yearning for progressive change and a break from the past.

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