Peace and Foreign Policy Archives

A Reading of the Ceasefire Agreement Between Israel and Hamas – Dimensions and Challenges

Omar Shaban is the founder and director of Palthink for Strategic Studies and the inaugural Leahy Fellow at the Center for International Policy.

On January 19, 2025, Israel and Hamas announced a ceasefire, with the goal of ending a devastating round of conflict in Gaza that lasted nearly 15 months, amid complex international and regional contexts and conflicting interests. As of publication, the two sides are set to discuss the terms for implementing phases two and three of the agreement, though without guarantee of success or long-term enforcement. While the agreement has been described as a step towards calm, it does not yet represent a definitive solution to the conflict. Rather, it may be part of a long-term strategy that seeks to reshape the political and military landscape in Gaza and the region.

Successive official statements by international parties and mediators show that the agreement still contains ambiguity in its terms, raising questions about its viability and prospects for implementation.

The objectives of the agreement and its undeclared dimensions

American statements indicate the war is not over yet: Despite the announcement of the agreement as a first step towards calm, statements from the forthcoming Trump administration representing Israeli intentions reveal hidden goals beyond the ceasefire, for example statements by Trump’s new National Security Adviser Michael Waltz. He said that the complete demilitarization of Gaza and the destruction of Hamas remained goals, and that war could resume once Israeli and American hostages were released. He went even further by declaring, “If Hamas violates this agreement, we will support Israel 100 percent to return to war.”

Ambiguity about the fate of military leaders: The ceasefire’s clauses on medical treatment, which refer to the daily departure of 50 wounded soldiers with three escorts through the Rafah crossing, with the approval of Israel and Egypt, will need to be monitored closely and transparently, as it could potentially serve as a cover for the deportation of Hamas military and political leaders from the Gaza Strip.

This condition has already been put forward by Israel and the United States as part of any settlement. In the absence of transparency, it appears that the agreement may include secret arrangements that preserve Hamas’s face while serving Israeli and U.S. strategic goals. This raises the question of the various powers’ ability to impose such a clause on Hamas inside the Gaza Strip, which has made successive statements about its refusal to leave the Gaza Strip under any justification.

Last Minute Consensuses: Mutual Concessions or Interim Tactic? The announcement of a series of last-minute resolutions of differences between Israel and Hamas, and the imminent meeting of the Israeli cabinet to approve the deal, indicate intense regional and international pressure to ensure the implementation of the agreement. But the nature of these concessions is unclear, fueling speculation that some of the undeclared clauses may be more influential than those announced.

The main challenges in the agreement

Ambiguity in later stages: The agreement is divided into multiple phases, but the details of the second and third phases (such as reconstruction, full withdrawal, and final ceasefire) remain vague and subject to further negotiations. This opens the way for postponing these essential items, if all of these are subject to the ability of Hamas to implement everything contained in the provisions of the first phase, i.e. there is a severe test for Hamas to gain the confidence of mediators, especially the United States, in the first phase. The second and third phases are also fraught with many obstacles, with fundamental differences in perception between Israel and Hamas.

Israel makes it clear that, as part of the phase II negotiations, it will be possible to end the war only under the following conditions:

Release all abductees.

Hamas leadership agrees to exile (via safe exit) to a third country.

Agreeing to dismantle its military capabilities.

Avoid any active political participation in the form of Hamas in Gaza “the next day.”

According to Israeli officials, if Hamas agrees to these terms, Israel will not have to return to fighting, but if it refuses — and in Israel they estimate that Hamas will refuse — there is a high probability of resuming fighting.

Lack of real guarantees: The agreement lacks genuine and binding oversight mechanisms to ensure its transparent implementation, making it vulnerable to violations by the stronger party. US-Israeli statements linking the continuation of the truce to Hamas’s commitment reflect a reliance on the balance of power rather than a clear international or legal framework. This lack of guarantees opens the way for Israel to interpret the terms of the agreement in a way that serves its security and strategic interests, as happened in previous experiences such as the Oslo Accords.

Exclusion of the Palestinian Authority: The exclusion of the Palestinian Authority deepens the internal Palestinian division and makes the agreement a solely bilateral one between the Israelis and Hamas. This deprives the agreement of any overall national legitimacy and weakens the chances of turning it into a genuine political settlement.

Internal Israeli politics: Israel’s internal differences are currently felt strongly between Netanyahu and the right-wing led by Smotrich and Ben Gvir, the latter of whom resigned over the signing of the agreement between Hamas and Israel and stipulated that the return to the government is primarily contingent on Netanyahu’s commitment to return to fighting in Gaza after the first phase.

This calls into question Netanyahu’s ability to retain the government. Although there is consideration of the opposition’s promises to secure a safety net in the event that the far right withdraws from the government, Netanyahu is well aware that the opposition bloc led by Yair Lapid will work to save the government only until the deal is completed, and then it will withdraw at the first opportunity so as to collapse the Netanyahu government. The opposition is also seeking power in its own right and to do so must collapse the government in order to go to elections and compete for the parliamentary majority. These dynamics show that domestic politics may play a decisive role in determining the future of an agreement. Netanyahu may resort to disrupting or reinterpreting the agreement as a way to strengthen his domestic political position.

Other weakness of the agreement

The current agreement is more akin to a declaration of principles than to a permanent settlement, as its continuation depends on the commitment of the parties to implement the first phase smoothly. It is only the first step in a series of mysterious stages. Which is perceived as an unfinished frame.

The agreement lacks clear implementation guarantees and effective international oversight mechanisms. This reflects Israel’s continued policy of exploiting agreements as tools to manage negotiations and conflict, not resolve it.

The exclusion of other Palestinian parties threatens to turn the agreement into a “temporary truce” and the lack of any overarching national dimension makes it more difficult to achieve sustainable peace.

The announcement of the agreement from Doha and not Cairo reflects a regional competition between mediators, especially competition for the expected regional role in the US strategy for the region, which may exclude the party that does not seem to have much influence in imposing its conditions or influence on Hamas. This rivalry may weaken coordination and increase the fragility of the agreement, especially with the possibility of undeclared clauses and the ambiguity of the second and third phases, which may reflect differences in interests between regional parties.

Trump’s recent comments about the future of the Gaza Strip, both in regards to who should have political control over it and the fate of the Palestinians of Gaza during reconstruction, could undermine the implementation of the agreement in its later stages. It could also cause a crisis in neighboring countries like Jordan and Egypt, essential stakeholders in seeing de-escalation happen.

Opportunities and motives for the continuation of the agreement

Feeling the American determination and the role of the Trump administration and Baden in drafting the agreement through: – The balance between the two US administrations The agreement is not the product of the efforts of one administration but a combination of multiple factors, including international pressure on Israel after the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, and the role of regional mediators such as Qatar and Egypt. – Biden: Quiet diplomacy The Biden administration has worked to continue efforts through diplomatic channels, taking advantage of relations with mediators (Qatar and Egypt). Biden’s statements about the continuation of the ceasefire during the second and third stages of negotiations, even if the duration of the first phase exceeds the specified time, shows the administration’s desire to avoid the collapse of the agreement.

Trump: Maximum pressure policy

Trump relies on a “big stick” policy, as his statements and those of his advisers show unlimited support for Israel in the event of renewed war. But on the other hand, it was indirect pressure that pushed the parties to the agreement, and Trump himself is proud that his presence is what prompted this agreement to crystallize, not to mention his personal determination to the demands of calm in the Middle East, and that he has broader projects in the region, which are projects subject to strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and normalization with Israel, in order to devote himself to the great economic project and compete with the next China, which is the main goal that he does not manage in the coming stages, and he has no time to drain America, financially or militarily, in any future wars, economic peace depends on calm in the Middle East. Versus China’s competition.

As the agreement is not the product of the efforts of just one administration but a combination of multiple factors, including international pressure on Israel after the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, and the role of regional mediators such as Qatar and Egypt. That means the ceasefire agreement is most likely to sustain. The ceasefire agreement has regional and international back up.

Biden’s quiet diplomacy: Biden administration has worked to continue efforts through diplomatic channels, taking advantage of relations with mediators (Qatar and Egypt). Biden’s statements about the continuation of the ceasefire during the second and third stages of negotiations, even if the duration of the first phase exceeds the specified time, shows the administration’s desire to avoid the collapse of the agreement.

Trump’s Maximum pressure policy: Trump relies on a “big stick” policy, as his statements and those of his advisers show unlimited support for Israel in the event of renewed war. But on the other hand, it was indirect pressure that pushed the parties to the agreement, and Trump himself is proud that his presence is what prompted this agreement to crystallize, not to mention his personal interests and determination to the demands of calm in the Middle East, and that he has broader projects in the region, which are projects subject to strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. There is also the prospect of further Arab normalization with Israel, which he has repeatedly affirmed he has interest in building upon.

The Trump administration’s desire for the return of the Palestinian Authority: News reports have suggested that Trump will restore the Palestinian National Authority to run the Gaza Strip despite Israel’s opposition. Palestinian Authority officials said that President Trump asked the PA to control the crossings in the Gaza Strip, in a conversation with the Director General of the Crossings in the Palestinian Authority, Nazmi Muhanna, and the Attorney General of the Ministry of Civil Affairs in the Palestinian Authority, Ayman Qandil, who went to Cairo at Trump’s request, in order to close the details of this file and prevent Hamas or any other party from control, and this means that Trump has a vision about the future of any agreement with Saudi Arabia, which conditions normalization on the understanding of the solution of the Palestinian state and the need for its control over the Gaza Strip as part of any upcoming agreement.

However, political arrangements at the Rafah crossing remain dependent on Israel’s statements about maintaining a security presence in the Philadelphia axis, raising questions about its intentions towards a complete withdrawal or easing of the blockade of Gaza. Where control of the crossing may remain controversial, issues related to humanitarian aid are subject to the possibility of being used as leverage in later stages. At the same time, Trump’s ambiguous and incendiary comments about US control over the Gaza Strip could also embolden the Israeli government and undermine the Authority’s bid to reassume governance in the enclave.

Positions of key regional mediators:

While the announcement of the agreement was made in Doha instead of Cairo, despite the vital Egyptian role, there are differences between the two governments’ positions. Qatar has a great interest in ensuring this agreement by any means, as this is its first experience with regard to stopping a war in the Gaza Strip, which gives it an important place in any future Middle Eastern arrangement.

The Palestinian file historically represents an important issue for Egypt, especially through previous strategic interventions in this file, as it is an Egyptian national security file. This is especially true for the Gaza Strip, not to mention its real desire to stop the war in any way, in order to restore its economic losses and the return of navigation in the Suez Canal, which was severely affected by the support for the Palestinian people that was approved by Ansar Allah (Houthis) in Yemen, which targeted ships in the Red Sea, affected navigation in the canal, and in turn affected the canal’s revenues dramatically. Egypt has been able to prove that it is still an influential and strong player in this file through the Rafah land crossing, which is the only exit to the Gaza Strip and controlled by Egypt, where one of the conditions of the ceasefire agreement was to return to the management of the Rafah crossing through Egyptian supervision, and that Israel has the right to supervise the lists of injured military travelers who are required to be treated outside the Gaza Strip.

Hopeful recommendations

Future moves by Israel and the United States will determine whether the subsequent phases bring about a real calm, or be used as a cover for re-escalation. The following are recommendations that, if they were implemented, could be used to sustain the ceasefire and provide a framework for long-term peace.

Involve all Palestinian parties: The PA and the PLO should be included in any future negotiations to ensure the inclusiveness of the agreement. In the longer term, PA reform and new elections are essential for the PA to be seen as legitimate and effective.

Establishment of an international monitoring mechanism: the need for an impartial international body to supervise the implementation of the terms of the agreement and prevent violations.

Strengthening regional coordination: Push Qatar and Egypt to coordinate their efforts to avoid competition and achieve real stability in mediation.

Rebuilding international trust: engaging the United Nations and international actors to ensure a transparent and sustainable negotiating framework.

Affirm the territorial integrity of the whole of Palestinian territory including the Gaza Strip as part of a future Palestinian state.

Is the agreement the beginning of a solution or a temporary break?

While the agreement is seen as an opportunity to stop the bloodshed in Gaza, the ambiguity of its terms and the continued Israeli and American goals in reshaping the Palestinian landscape keep it within the framework of the temporary truce. The absence of international guarantees and the deepening of Palestinian and regional divisions make the future of the agreement dependent on complex political balances that could return the region to the cycle of escalation at any moment.

In the Face of Trump’s New Term: A Stronger, Honest, and Progressive Europe

Pere Aragonès i Garcia is a former President of Catalonia, having served from 2021 to 2024.

There is no doubt about the crucial importance the coming years will have for history and how Donald Trump’s renewed presidency, which is just beginning, will unfold—not only for U.S. citizens but also for other regions of the world, especially Europe. It is an uncontested victory that we must understand well. In a context of accelerated global changes—geopolitical, economic, demographic, climatic, and technological—the difficulties this may generate for the rest of the planet, and for Europe in particular, are clear. We must remain vigilant and react decisively and swiftly.

One of the main concerns from this side of the Atlantic is the impact on democratic institutions and the rule of law during these rapidly changing times. Trump’s traditional disregard for the separation of powers and shared rules, as evidenced by his role in the January 2021 Capitol assault, poses a problem not only for the U.S. but for the world as a whole. Europe is all too familiar with the implications. The European far-right and right-wing populism see Trump as a reference point, both for the substance of his policies—financial deregulation, protectionist nationalism, and opposition to civil rights—and for his style. His disdain for democratic institutions, attacks on the media and press freedom, and use of falsehoods as political tools are now being emulated by many representatives of the reactionary movement in Europe.

This is why now, more than ever, we must reaffirm a firm defense of democracy, respect for the system of checks and balances, and the preservation of rigorous, ethical political debate, free from lies. This is more necessary than ever.

At the same time, in a world that is increasingly globalized yet more multipolar, with the rise of new global powers such as China and India, a U.S. commitment to defending multilateralism and a rules-based world order is more critical than ever. This includes the need for a democratic Syria that respects its internal diversity. Moreover, we urgently need to work tirelessly and without excuses toward a definitive peace in both Gaza and Lebanon, with all parties assuming their clear responsibility. We cannot look the other way, nor can we afford the indiscriminate killing of civilians. It is intolerable. History will judge our generation if we fail to do everything possible to end these atrocities, whether in this conflict or wherever our capabilities can reach.

Regarding Europe, it is essential that the historic transatlantic defense alliance maintains a strategic partnership rooted in democratic values, the defense of a just international order that upholds human rights, and the ability to preserve peace and democracy. The destabilization of this alliance, as could be anticipated during Trump’s presidency, is exactly what Vladimir Putin desires to accelerate his plans for Ukraine and possibly beyond, including in Moldova, the Baltic states, or the Balkans. At the same time, this would weaken the European Union’s position, forcing it into strategic dependence on Russia—something that must be avoided not only for geopolitical reasons but also to preserve democratic values on the continent. This would be harmful to Europe, its allies, and, consequently, the United States. Similarly, seeking internal advantages at the expense of other democratic states, as recently seen in the Greenland issue, is equally damaging. All territories have the right to be respected and to freely determine their future without external interference.

Europe and the U.S. must strengthen their strategic economic alliances for mutual benefit. We are witnessing a global economy undergoing a profound disruption of value chains, with an increasing risk of strategic dependency on non-democratic states for raw materials and intermediate products. Technological development, decarbonization, combating climate change, and the production of goods and services must be well-governed. At the same time, a political and economic relationship with the Global South must be based on mutual respect, inclusive development, human rights, and democracy. This is, and must remain, a demand of the citizenry.

We cannot afford delays, especially in implementing progressive economic policies that guarantee quality jobs for everyone. However, the coming years are likely to head in the opposite direction. Prioritizing internal interests and opting for isolationism and unilateralism would be a grave mistake. Should this occur, we must remain calm and return to the path of collaboration as soon as possible, standing firm democratically and convincing citizens through bold, transformative progressivism—not just ideology.

During President Biden’s term, significant strides were made, such as adopting climate policies that placed decarbonization as a cornerstone of economic and international policy. The U.S. and Europe must act together, aiming for much more ambitious measures to mitigate climate change. A U.S. president who denies scientific evidence, as Trump does, is paving the way for the acceleration of irreversible global warming. This affects all of us and especially our future generations. There is no time to waste.

Above all, defending human rights must remain a shared value between Europe and the U.S. In a demographic context where migration flows toward Europe and the U.S. will persist—albeit at varying intensities—any migration policy must incorporate a humanitarian perspective. Europe, where the struggle between border closures at the expense of human rights (championed by the right and far-right) and a pragmatic, humane migration policy is ongoing, needs a U.S. where individuals’ rights to forge a future in freedom and security are not only promoted but fully guaranteed. Progressives must be coherent and responsible, addressing this complex issue without succumbing to pressure from ultra-populism.

The American people have spoken clearly. Donald Trump is the new president, and if he fulfills his commitments, the coming years will be challenging for rights, freedoms, and relations with Europe. We must stand firm and build global democratic alternatives.

From Catalonia, where we work to defend rights, freedoms, and a fairer world, and where we continuously strive to improve the welfare state and equal opportunities, we recognize the importance of maintaining and strengthening the understanding and solidarity with progressive and Atlanticist United States. We will be here, ready to steer in the right direction, now and when the time comes. From Europe, we echo Eleanor Roosevelt’s words: “True patriotism springs from a belief in the dignity of the individual, freedom and equality not only for Americans but for all people on earth, universal brotherhood and goodwill, and a constant striving toward the principles and ideals on which this country was founded.”

The Illusion of Opportunity in Attacking Iran

Sina Toossi is a senior nonresident fellow at the Center for International Policy.

In the wake of a fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, the Middle East stands at a critical juncture. The recent agreement, brokered with the involvement of both the outgoing and incoming US administrations, has halted hostilities for now, but its durability remains uncertain. Amid this tenuous peace, Israeli leaders, emboldened by President-elect Donald Trump’s historically supportive stance, reportedly see a prime opportunity to push for direct war against Iran—a goal Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pursued for decades.

Exacerbating these tensions is the possibility of Trump doubling down on his “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran, which dismantled the Obama-era nuclear deal and inflicted crippling sanctions on Iran’s economy. Reports from The Wall Street Journal reveal Trump is even weighing military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Yet, in his inaugural address, Trump remarked, “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win, but also by the wars that we end, and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into.” This juxtaposition highlights a critical decision between diplomatic de-escalation and military action

Trump would be wise to pursue diplomacy. Granting Netanyahu the U.S.’s backing for such a conflict would further destabilize the region, heighten already white-hot anti-American sentiment, and derail Trump’s broader agenda. For Iran hawks, these shifting circumstances may seem like the ideal moment to act, but such enthusiasm dangerously ignores the lessons of Israel’s recent wars and the complexities of the region’s current security landscape. If Israel failed to decisively defeat a smaller non-state adversary like Hezbollah, how could it expect success against a well-fortified state like Iran? A preemptive strike would almost certainly provoke massive retaliation, fail to topple the Islamic Republic, and risk igniting a far-reaching, devastating conflict.

Instead of courting disaster, U.S. and Israeli policymakers should seize the moment to pursue diplomacy. Renewed negotiations and a verifiable nuclear agreement could deliver real security while steering the region away from catastrophic war.

Hezbollah’s Survival as a Cautionary Tale

Advocates of a strike on Iran often overlook a critical lesson from Israel’s recent conflict with Hezbollah: even with a relentless military campaign, Israel failed to decisively neutralize a much smaller non-state adversary. Over months of intense fighting in Lebanon, Israel launched an extensive air assault and a punishing ground invasion aimed at crippling Hezbollah’s arsenal. While Hezbollah suffered significant losses, including the assassination of its leader Hassan Nasrallah and senior commanders, its ability to strike Israel was not eliminated. Throughout the bombardment, the group continued firing rockets, missiles, and drones deep into Israeli territory. Major population centers, including Tel Aviv, were hit just days before the ceasefire, causing casualties, widespread displacement, and severe economic and psychological insecurity.

This experience offers two key lessons for policymakers. First, Israeli military superiority is not the absolute guarantee of success it is often assumed to be. Second, if Israel struggled to decisively defeat Hezbollah, a non-state militia, it is unrealistic to expect a knockout blow against a fortified state like Iran. Iran’s defense systems, nuclear facilities, and missile and drone stockpiles are far more robust and dispersed. Recent history underscores that a swift, clean military solution is less a viable strategy and more a dangerous illusion.

Iran’s Retaliatory Capabilities and the Costs of Escalation

Critics of diplomacy also often underestimate Iran’s ability to defend itself and respond effectively to an attack—a miscalculation fraught with danger. Over the past year, the back-and-forth strikes between Iran and Israel have vividly demonstrated Tehran’s growing military capabilities and its capacity for retaliation. For instance, on October 1, Iran launched a coordinated missile and drone attack on Israel, bypassing advanced Israeli air defenses and inflicting both material damage and insecurity. In response, Israel struck back on October 27, targeting Iran’s Russian-made S-300 air defense systems, ballistic missile production facilities, and solid fuel manufacturing infrastructure for long-range missiles.

Hawks portray the Israeli strike as a decisive blow, leaving Iran vulnerable to a low-cost U.S. or Israeli attack. Yet even Israeli officials disagree. The Nagel Committee in Israel recently confirmed that the country does not have the capability to launch a decisive attack on Iran’s military and nuclear facilities without U.S. support. Former IDF spokesperson and air defense commander Ran Kochav reinforced this reality, cautioning, “I would cautiously say they [Iran] still have strength left; it’s not as if this morning they have no air defense system at all and are completely exposed.” Retired Major General Yaakov Amidror warned an attack without U.S. coordination would risk severe retaliation requiring American intervention.

Despite Israel’s recent attack, many of Iran’s air defenses remain intact, bolstered by advanced systems reverse-engineered from Russian, Chinese, and U.S. technology. In recent military drills, Tehran has showcased its readiness, simulating responses to airstrikes and unveiling new underground “missile cities” alongside advanced drones and missiles. These moves send a clear signal: Iran is prepared to retaliate forcefully against any attack.

A large-scale assault on Iran’s nuclear facilities would all but guarantee a massive retaliatory campaign—one that could escalate beyond Israel’s borders to U.S. forces and partners in the region. At best, military strikes might set Iran’s nuclear timeline back by a few years. But at worst, such an action would ignite a far-reaching conflict that compromises energy security, endangers U.S. personnel, undermines regional stability, and strains diplomatic ties with allies who have no appetite for another protracted conflict in the Middle East.

Why a Foreign Attack Won’t Topple the Islamic Republic

A persistent idea among hawkish policymakers is that a foreign military strike could trigger the collapse of the Islamic Republic. But this belief overlooks a powerful force within Iran: nationalism. History shows that foreign aggression tends to unite Iranians against the invader, fostering a sense of shared solidarity that could bolster, rather than weaken, the ruling theocracy.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has long attempted to stoke dissent within Iran, even addressing Iranians directly multiple times in recent months to portray himself as some sort of savior against their repressive government. However, the aftermath of Israel’s October strike on Iran reveals the futility of this strategy. Instead of sparking mass opposition to the government, the attack plunged ordinary Iranians into fear and uncertainty. Civil society leaders and groups, pro-democracy activists, and political prisoners alike issued stark warnings: war would derail prospects for democratic change, not hasten them.

The reaction from everyday Iranians was equally telling. Many took to the streets—not in protest against the regime, but to mourn the soldiers killed in the assault. These moments of collective grief underscored a broader truth: foreign attacks are broadly seen as assaults on the nation itself, not just its government.

Far from weakening the Islamic Republic, a military campaign is likely to strengthen its hold, at least in the short term, and deepen the challenges faced by those fighting for a freer and more democratic Iran. The lesson for policymakers? Toppling the regime from the outside isn’t just wishful thinking—it’s counterproductive.

A Better Path Forward: Diplomacy and a Deal

With the risks clear, the pressing question remains: How can policymakers prevent Iran’s nuclear program from advancing while avoiding a devastating regional war? The answer lies in reinvigorated diplomacy.

The 2015 nuclear deal provided a proven framework for freezing and even rolling back key elements of Iran’s nuclear program. Next October, the UN sanctions “snapback” mechanism—a crucial part of that deal—expires, and if triggered by France, Germany, and the UK, it would automatically reinstate sanctions. Iran has warned that such a move would force it out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), destroying remaining safeguards and leaving diplomacy in tatters.

This looming deadline demands urgent action. If the Europeans trigger snapback, the reimposition of UN sanctions and Iran leaving the NPT would dramatically increase tensions and make future negotiations infinitely harder. Policymakers must prevent this domino effect by re-engaging diplomatically now.

Diplomacy offers tangible, achievable benefits that make it the most viable path forward. A revived or updated nuclear deal can reimpose verifiable restrictions and intrusive inspections on Iran’s nuclear program, significantly hindering any covert pursuit of a nuclear weapon. It also creates critical channels of communication that can help address broader regional flashpoints, reducing the risks of miscalculation and violent escalation. Furthermore, by incorporating economic incentives, diplomacy has the potential to empower civil society within Iran over time, avoiding the backlash and rally-around-the-flag effects that often result from military action or coercive measures.

Policymakers in the U.S. and Europe have a narrow but critical window to prioritize negotiations. Restoring or updating a nuclear deal—while leveraging the pressure of sanctions and Iran’s own economic vulnerabilities—offers the best path to curbing Tehran’s nuclear ambitions without plunging the region into chaos.

New Foreign Affairs Essay Offers Bold Blueprint for U.S. Foreign Policy Reform

In a provocative new essay published by Foreign Affairs, Nancy Okail, President and CEO of the Center for International Policy, and Matt Duss, the organization’s Executive Vice President, present a sweeping critique of the entrenched U.S. foreign policy orthodoxy and lay out a bold blueprint for reform. The essay, “America Is Cursed by a Foreign Policy of Nostalgia,” challenges decades of militarism and neoliberal economic policies that have prioritized corporate and elite interests over the well-being of most Americans and people worldwide.

With the 2024 election confirming the collapse of Washington’s traditional foreign policy consensus, Okail and Duss argue that neither “America First” unilateralism nor liberal internationalism can address the urgent needs of a world grappling with climate change, economic inequality, and political instability. Instead, they call for a transformative foreign policy rooted in shared global challenges, equitable economic reform, and principled international cooperation.

“The United States must choose between advancing a genuinely equitable global order or clinging to an undemocratic and unsustainable quest for global primacy,” said Okail. “Our current trajectory not only fails to meet the needs of working Americans but also alienates nations and peoples worldwide that are calling for a more just and inclusive international system.”

Key recommendations in the essay include:

Ending Failed Militarism: Shifting from prioritizing global military hegemony at any cost to a foreign policy that prioritizes human security, accountability, conflict prevention, and consistent application of international laws and norms.
Breaking from Neoliberal Economics: Ensuring prosperity is more widely shared among US communities, while reducing global inequality and economic precarity through equitable trade, labor, and investment rules, including by reforming global institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to support low- and middle-income countries, enabling sustainable development and debt relief.
Redefining Relations with China: Moving beyond Great Power Competition and zero-sum strategic thinking to focus on collaborative solutions for climate change, public health, technological innovation, and a more inclusive global economic and political system.

“Decades of militarized foreign policy and economic systems designed to benefit corporations and the wealthy have left working-class Americans—and communities around the world—paying the price,” added Duss. “The 2024 election put a decisive stamp on what has long been clear: the Washington foreign policy consensus is not only intellectually bankrupt but also increasingly alienating to the American people. It’s time for a new approach that breaks from the false choice between ‘America First’ unilateralism and ‘America is Back’ nostalgia, focusing instead on the needs of everyday people and a future built on common good, human rights, and shared prosperity.”

This essay is a call to action for policymakers, thought leaders, and citizens who recognize that the challenges of the 21st century require a fundamentally new approach to U.S. leadership.

The full essay is available in Foreign Affairs and can be read here.

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The Center for International Policy (CIP) is a woman-led, progressive, independent nonprofit center for research, education, and advocacy working to advance a more peaceful, just, and sustainable U.S. approach to foreign policy.

CNN: After Yahya Sinwar

CIP executive vice president Matt Duss tells CNN’s Kaitlan Collins that the death of Hamas leader and architect of the October 7, 2023 attacks, Yahya Sinwar, can and should provide a new opening to push for a ceasefire and hostage release in the Gaza War.

Duss explains:

“The Biden Administration, the United States has leverage it’s not choosing to use. We provide an enormous amount of ammunition for a start: arms, bombs, all kinds of ammunition, intelligence support, and of course diplomatic support in multilateral fora like the United Nations. And so withholding, or at least beginning to withhold some of that support as a way to change Netanyahu’s behavior here and push him to accept a ceasefire I think is something that should have been done long ago.”

Watch the full CNN interview here and read Duss’s New York Times essay here.

WSJ: Sinwar’s Bloody Gambit Changed the Middle East—but Not as He Imagined

The death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on October 17 closes a distinct chapter in the conflict between Hamas and Israel, even as the Palestinian people continue to suffer through the war and Israelis prepare for possible retaliation from Hezbollah and Iran, Hamas’ long-standing allies. In the Wall Street Journal, Yaroslav Trofimov explores how Sinwar’s death and the October 7th, 2023 attacks, Sinwar’s “bloody gambit,” has changed the politics of the region.

President and CEO of the Center for International Policy Nancy Okail tells Trofimov:

“Sinwar certainly achieved his goal of bringing the Palestinian issue to the center of geopolitics. […] But this came at a very high cost and in reality hasn’t moved the United States an inch in its support of Israel. And if the U.S. policy doesn’t change, the situation for Palestinians won’t change.”

Read the full piece at the Wall Street Journal.

The Gaza War at One Year: Five Recommendations for Ending the Fighting and Ensuring Human Security in the Middle East

This week marks one year since the horrific Hamas-led October 7, 2023 attack and atrocities against civilians in southern Israel, followed by the devastating and often indiscriminate Israeli assault on Gaza. Of the more than 40,000 Palestinians currently estimated to have been killed in Gaza during the war, at least 6,000 are women and 11,000 are children, with nearly 2 million civilians subjected to displacement, disease and desperate hunger. In addition to the more than 1,150 Israelis killed in Hamas’ initial attack, the Israeli government believes that 97 of the 251 hostages abducted by Hamas on October 7 remain in Gaza, including the bodies of at least 33 confirmed dead.

This memo updates our recommended steps for the Biden Administration to take to stop the fighting, end the nightmare faced by Palestinian civilians and Israeli hostages, arrest the spread of large-scale war in Lebanon and possibly with Iran, and ensure the long term security, rights and well-being of Israelis, Palestinians and all people in the region.

Recommendation #1: Finally use U.S. leverage to press for a full ceasefire

A full and sustained ceasefire and hostage release in Gaza is vitally necessary to prevent further loss of civilian life and suffering on a mass scale given continuing bombardment, disease and hunger across the territory, and the nightmare being experienced by Israeli hostages’ families. Prolonged fighting in Gaza and inability to achieve a ceasefire has also directly contributed to escalation in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon and between the U.S. and Houthis in Yemen – as well as with the Iranian regime which has responded to acts of Israeli escalation in the region with escalating attacks of its own.

The Biden administration’s diplomacy to secure a ceasefire has unfortunately been hobbled by the continued unconditional supply of offensive weapons to Israel even as Netanyahu (according to his own negotiators) obstructed ceasefire efforts for months. The U.S. has rightly applied heavy sanctions and other forms of pressure against Hamas since October 7 and for decades prior – its unused leverage in ceasefire diplomacy is unquestionably vis-a-vis Israel. President Biden needs to end months of toothless rhetoric and finally apply meaningful pressure to Netanyahu by suspending U.S. arms deliveries.

Recommendation #2: Fully enforce U.S. law and arms policy to ensure accountability and adequate humanitarian aid delivery

Pressured by Democratic lawmakers’ efforts to legislate against Israel’s misuse of U.S. arms and its impeding of humanitarian aid delivery in Gaza, President Biden on February 8, 2024 issued National Security Memorandum 20 (NSM-20), requiring Israel and other recipients of U.S. military assistance to affirm that they would use American-origin arms in accordance with international humanitarian law and were complying with longstanding U.S. law, Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), prohibiting countries from restricting the delivery of U.S. humanitarian aid. Contrary to the assessments of numerous international aid agencies and many of the interested lawmakers, on March 25, the administration indicated that it accepted Israel’s initial assurance that it is and would remain in compliance with these requirements as “credible and reliable.”

Treating the assurances received from the Israeli government as credible and reliable in the face of aid delivery obstruction, disproportionate civilian casualties and other well-documented violations of international humanitarian law has undercut NSM-20 and damaged the administration’s credibility while functionally greenlighting the continued use of American weapons in ways that clearly violate U.S. laws, interests and values. Failure to take action under NSM-20 or Section 620I of the FAA also compounded the longstanding failure to adequately enforce the Leahy Law, which prohibits U.S. assistance to foreign security units engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. The administration should immediately correct course and fully enforce U.S. law by suspending delivery to Israel of the arms it is using in Gaza, while pressing for and helping coordinate a massive emergency increase in humanitarian aid and services to the territory.

Recommendation #3: Focus diplomacy toward a just resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on multilateral rather than bilateral normalization efforts

There is broad consensus in Israel, Palestine and globally that returning to the status quo that existed before October 7 is impossible. While the Biden administration has rightly acknowledged this reality in rhetoric emphasizing the need for a resolution to the underlying Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it nonetheless reverted to prioritizing the Trump/Netanyahu vision of piecemeal bilateral normalization agreements between Israel and Arab- and Muslim-majority autocracies incentivized by massive U.S. advanced arms sales. Rather than increase stability and advance a just end to the conflict, these accords have given cover to the consolidation of Israeli control of the occupied Palestinian Territories and the inherently discriminatory denial of fundamental Palestinian national, political and human rights in violation of international law.

A meaningful and viable effort to resolve the underlying conflict requires prioritizing Palestinian self-determination and championing the inherent benefits of Israel’s full acceptance and integration in the Middle East, while moving away from an “arms for peace” model where recognition of Israel is bought with U.S. weapons and defense guarantees that tie the United States to autocrats and increase militarization and instability in the region. It also means avoiding the failed model of a peace process based on direct, bilateral negotiations between parties with a massive imbalance of military and diplomatic power.

Instead, the United States should seek to construct a truly multilateral framework involving key regional players with universal normalization and recognition of the national rights of both Israelis and Palestinians – alongside ensuring the security and well-being of both peoples – as its North Star. Different models, such as the Arab Peace Initiative or recent joint Israeli/Palestinian proposals from Holy Land Confederation and Land For All could be introduced as terms of reference. As the government of Saudi Arabia itself has recently emphasized, absent a focus on achieving universal recognition of Palestinian statehood, the lack of a political horizon will prevent normalization and continue to feed insecurity.

Recommendation #4: Take meaningful anti-occupation, anti-annexation steps

Permanent Israeli occupation and annexation of Palestinian territory are incompatible with international law and U.S. interests. Failure to impose consequences for Israel’s ongoing effort to consolidate permanent, undemocratic control in the territories dooms any conflict resolution effort and will continue to feed the current cycle of violence. The Biden administration has rightly begun to move away from the demonstrably inadequate practice of limiting itself to mild criticism of deepening occupation and related human rights abuses. Explicitly reinstating State Department legal guidance that settlements are inconsistent with international law and the issuance of an Executive Order to combat settler violence and other destabilizing activity in the West Bank are welcome, if overdue, first steps.

Yet the administration’s unwillingness to impose real consequences for official Israeli actions that violate international law in the West Bank – or even Israel’s killing of American citizens – and efforts to ease the impact of its own sanctions on the relatively small number of violent settlers penalized under its Executive Order again undermines the credibility it was just beginning to build in this area. The administration should instead press forward using its anti-occupation tools, including consistently applying its Executive Order to designate Israeli officials responsible for evictions, demolitions and forced relocations in West Bank Palestinian communities, while making clear that use of U.S. arms in connection with such settlement and annexation activity also violates NSM-20.

Recommendation #5: Substantially expand support for the Palestinian people and Palestinian leaders who seek peace with Israel

The Biden Administration should strengthen the legitimacy of Palestinians seeking a peaceful path to conflict resolution by upgrading the United States’ own bilateral relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), including by finally following through on its promise to reopen a consulate in Jerusalem serving Palestinians, exercising existing executive authority to terminate the decades-old legislative designation of the PLO as a terrorist organization, and working with regional and other international partners toward a major economic and infrastructure support program benefitting the Palestinian people.

This is especially necessary in the wake of the shameful statutory cut-off of all U.S. funding of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for one year in a hasty, politically-driven response to the participation of a small number of its 13,000 Gaza-based staff in the October 7 attack. Not only should the Biden administration do its utmost to ensure that the international community is able to make up the shortfall to UNRWA caused by this shortsighted collective punishment of the top relief agency in Gaza and the millions of refugees it serves throughout the region, but it must work now to ensure that critical governance structures, funds and infrastructure are in place as soon as possible after the war to meet the substantial ongoing needs of Palestinian people in Gaza and elsewhere.

The Biden administration must also recognize and meaningfully act on the fact that paying mere lip service to Palestinian self-determination while blocking lawful, nonviolent initiatives toward Palestinian statehood only delays the day when such intensive international support is no longer needed. The United States must stop discouraging international organizations and other countries from recognizing Palestinian statehood, and must cease its delegitimization of international court proceedings involving Israel.

While a comprehensive, permanent resolution to their conflict can only be agreed between Israelis and Palestinians themselves, Palestinians are well within their rights as a nation to seek recognition of their state and enforcement of their rights from international organizations and governments around the world. Binding themselves to the obligations of statehood and acceding to treaties that require responsible conduct are non-violent, international law-affirming efforts that should be applauded, not discouraged or penalized. The United States should therefore cease its practice of delegitimizing these efforts, and instead welcome them as bolstering the prospects for a peaceful and just resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Statement on Major Israeli Escalation in Lebanon

Center for International Policy (CIP) executive vice president Matt Duss issued the following statement regarding Israel’s recent escalation in Lebanon, including the current ground offensive:

“The Israeli government’s decision to dramatically escalate its attacks in Lebanon is a dangerous gamble that risks the lives of countless Lebanese, Israeli, Palestinian and other civilians across the region.

“Israel has the right to defend itself from Hezbollah and other threats, but we note that this escalation comes after months of Prime Minister Netanyahu rejecting U.S. efforts to secure a ceasefire in Gaza. As we know from the very recent past, the potential for protracted, deadly escalation is significant. Israel has been caught in a costly quagmire in Lebanon before – one that ultimately did not defeat Hezbollah or provide lasting security on its northern border. An Israeli military assault on Lebanon that employs the same methods or maximalist objectives as the nearly year-old war in Gaza threatens to cause even more devastation and death, with civilians bearing the brunt of the carnage.

“The Biden Administration is right to seek deescalation, but must realize that months of failure to impose meaningful consequences on Netanyahu for grave international humanitarian law violations and obstructing a ceasefire in Gaza has contributed to the disregard for U.S. and international concerns with which Israel has now acted in Lebanon. The ability of the United States to prevent an all-out war that could draw in the U.S. and Iran and imperil millions in the region, including American personnel, rests on whether President Biden is finally willing to take the steps necessary – including suspending offensive weapons deliveries – to prevent a horrific conflagration.”

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How Democrats Can Fix Their Failed Israel-Gaza Policy And Hold Netanyahu Accountable

Matt Duss, EVP of Center for International Policy, joins Wajahat Ali on Chai Talk to discuss what a successful Israel-Gaza policy would look like under a Harris-Walz Administration — one that could finally help regional security, end war crimes, and benefit Democrats politically. Duss offers immediate solutions and long-term course corrections in which the United States could use its immense power and leverage to direct a more sane, just, and peaceful policy in the Middle East.

This Is How Democrats Can Fix Their Failed Israel-Gaza Policy And Hold Netanyahu Accountable by THE LEFT HOOK with Wajahat Ali

The Biden Administration’s foreign policy in Israel has enabled Prime Minister Netanyahu to unleash a genocide and escalate the war to Lebanon. How can Democrats course correct?

Read on Substack

Check out the full interview on Wajahat Ali’s Substack, The Left Hook.

Matt Duss discusses Hezbollah, Lebanon, and Israel on Mehdi Unfiltered

Executive Vice President Matt Duss joins Zeteo’s Mehdi Hassan to discuss the humanitarian toll in Lebanon, how likely it is that Iran will get involved, and how another war could impact the US presidential election:

Hezbollah, Lebanon, and Israel: Five Things You Need To Know by Mehdi Hasan

Mehdi debunks some of the main media and hasbara myths about the new escalation in the Middle East.

Read on Substack

Watch the full interview on Zeteo. Check out transcript excerpts below:

MEHDI HASAN: Matt, were you surprised at the sheer ferocity of the Israeli assault? It’s the single biggest day of killing in Lebanon since the end of the Civil War in 1990, I believe. Over 500 dead in a day, even by Israeli standards. Even by the standards of Gaza, 500 dead in a day.

MATT DUSS: Right, no, I was surprised. And that’s saying a lot. What we’ve seen over the past 11 months really just defies belief, really unprecedented, I think, in this century in terms of modern warfare, the amount of destruction. But the ferocity of the strikes this week were staggering.

[….]

MEHDI HASAN: And, Matt, in terms of long histories, obviously Americans aren’t very good when it comes to long histories, whether it’s American elites or the American public. When you look at what’s happening with Lebanon right now from a D.C. perspective… You had Joe Biden say, my red line is Rafah. Netanyahu trampled all over that red line, destroyed Rafah in many ways. Then he said, well, regional escalation, that’s another red line. We’re not going to support you. There were all these leaks from the administration. We’re not going to support you if you pick a fight beyond Gaza. They’ve picked a fight beyond Gaza. There’s an argument that they want to escalate to Iran, and we’ll come to that. What is going on in Washington, D.C.? You’re here. You’ve worked in this town on foreign policy for a long time. You’ve worked in Congress. What is the… What calculations are going on right now in the White House, in Congress?

MATT DUSS: Right. I mean, to back up what you said about the red line, I think is right. I mean, President Biden laid down a red line on Rafah, but it became clear that the real red line was that regional escalation. We’ve seen the U.S. engage in strikes on Iran-backed groups, especially after the strike on the Jordanian facility that killed several American service members. And they opposed the Rafah invasion until it became clear that that invasion could be carried out without spilling into Egypt. So they have themselves admitted that the humanitarian impact, the number of deaths and displaced in the Rafah operation was as bad or worse than they feared. But as long as it was contained within Gaza, And as you said, Netanyahu rolled right over it. The challenge we have now is almost a year into this, whatever President Biden might say about what he wants or doesn’t want, he refuses and has refused all along to impose any costs on Netanyahu. And until that equation changes, Netanyahu is going to continue what he’s doing, which is prolonging, sustaining and expanding this war for his own political purposes. Again, it is very clear. that that is what is driving this. Israeli officials themselves have acknowledged this. The president himself apparently, you know, reportedly, privately has acknowledged that he understands that Netanyahu knows his only path to staying in political power and avoiding the reckoning for October 7 is to sustain this war.

[…]

MEHDI HASAN: When Israel says we’re being attacked on multiple fronts by Iran-backed groups, by the Houthis, by Hamas, by Hezbollah, And someone like Karim says, well, actually, they all say end the genocide and we’ll stop this. The Houthis have said that for a while. The counter comes, well, you can’t trust these groups. That’s a very naive, simplistic view of the world. But could it be that simple that if you stop the killing in Gaza, a lot of this goes away?

MATT DUSS: No, there is obviously a larger regional context here. Some of these groups, you know, they have relationships with Iran, some of which are much closer, as with Hezbollah, some not so close, as with the Houthis. But It seems pretty clear that Gaza is the crisis that is driving this right now. So yes, once you end the Gaza war, you do have a range of other problems that you still need to deal with, a range of other conflicts and tensions. But really, the Gaza catastrophe, it is what is driving this crisis right now. And we just, you know, there’s an effort by the Israelis, by Netanyahu, and by some in the United States to try and de-link these things. But we cannot.

MEHDI HASAN: Do you think that the people who are doing the de-linking in DC, Matt, they’re doing that through ignorance, or they know? Is the guy sitting inside the Pentagon, the State Department, the White House National Security Council, is that guy, he knows.

MATT DUSS: He knows that this is all interlinked, and that if we stopped one, we would stop the rest. But he can’t say it, because the political atmosphere doesn’t allow him to say it. By and large, I think people know. But you do have, you know, you have a faction in Washington, a very influential one, that is just fundamentally committed to backing what Israel wants at any given time. Some who seem, you know, particularly committed to Netanyahu. Some are acting, I think, in good faith. They are committed to the security of Israel. But the way that they divide, you know, support that in policy, we all see the results. Right? I mean, this Gaza war, the context of it comes in years and decades of U.S.-backed impunity in the occupied territories. That is what created the context for the attacks, the horrific attacks of October 7.

[…]

MEHDI HASAN: We’ve seen this movie before, Matt, in the War on Terror, where, quote, unquote, the War on Terror, which was a war of terror in many ways, and which emboldened a lot of groups and pushed a lot of people in the Middle East who should have been on our side, quote, unquote, onto the side of our opponents because of the nature of how we fought. Has the United States, A) learned any lessons from its war on terror and B) is it trying to impart any of those lessons to the Israelis?

MATT DUSS: Well that’s really interesting because president Biden as you might remember in the days and weeks after October 7 when he was you know demonstrating his support for Israel, which again I think was appropriate especially in the wake of that attack, said specifically we’re trying I’m trying to help them understand some of the lessons we learned after 9/11. Don’t make our mistakes and yet they’re making worse mistakes. And the United States and President Biden himself is backing those mistakes unconditionally. So I’m very sorry to say it does not seem that this city, many in this city have — I think there’s been more criticism of this policy than we’ve seen in the past — but I’m really frustrated to see that so many in this city have not learned those lessons.

MEHDI HASAN: A lot of people watching this will wonder, especially globally, why can people in Washington DC not see what everyone else in the world sees? As I say, you’ve been part of the bureaucracy. You’ve been in Congress. You’re in a think tank in DC. I think it’s too simplistic just to say it’s AIPAC, right? It’s a lot of factors.

MATT DUSS: That’s right–

MEHDI HASAN: What kind of factors are we talking here? Military industrial complex, the blob, as Ben Rhodes identified, kind of lazy conventional wisdom thinking. Is it Joe Biden being a Zionist in his gut? Just briefly explain to us, what are the multiplicity of factors that make Washington DC so impervious to the arguments that seem to work everywhere else? Macron comes out and says the occasional sensible thing. The British government occasionally comes out, but not in DC.

MATT DUSS: Yeah. I mean, first of all, it’s really hard to overstate the impact of a president who’s setting the tone as Joe Biden has, which is just full support for Israel and little, if any, acknowledgment of the humanity of the Palestinians, their value as human beings. I think we have seen this time and time again. And it’s partially the avoiding disagreement with the leader of your party. I mean, this is not just a foreign policy problem. Any party, politicians in that party are by and large going to be very hesitant to break with the leader in their party. And he has set this tone. Now, that has not been total. We certainly have seen people in the Congress who have had the courage to disagree and criticize.

MEHDI HASAN: All Democrats, by the way. All Democrats. No Republicans.

MATT DUSS: Of course, all Democrats. Part of it is just who, you know, the people we have kind of informing us in the major media, they tend to have a particular ideological bent on this as well, or else they just don’t know very much about it, and so the people they are trying to learn from aren’t giving them the best information. And I think we also have to acknowledge that a lot of this is just careerism. There are boundaries that are set Those boundaries are changing. Again, I think the conversation we were having about these issues is different and in many ways better than we’ve been having in the past. But there is still a very real caution, especially for younger and maybe mid-level foreign policy professionals who have their eye on that future job in the administration and don’t want to create problems for themselves down the road because they have seen how careers have been destroyed by people who take Palestinian lives too seriously. For people who take Palestinian lives to seriously.

MEHDI HASAN: What’s so insane to me, Matt, is that it is very clearly going to hurt the Democrats domestically if this continues to escalate. We are a month or two away from the election, month and a half, whatever, they can’t keep track of the date anymore. Countdown to disaster. And there’s no scenario in which a Middle East regional war involving America supporting Israel against Iran helps Kamala Harris. It’s insane.

MATT DUSS: I agree.

MEHDI HASAN: It’s self-harming for the Democrats.

MATT DUSS: I think this is, you know, the Biden administration’s, you know, calculation clearly was that Americans wouldn’t really care. I think, you know, Vice President Harris, you know, obviously has taken a bit more of a forward-leaning approach on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. I think that’s important. I think it is notable that she lifted up the Palestinians and their right to self-determination in the convention speech. She didn’t go as far as many of us wanted. But still, the fact that that was a short speech that checked a number of boxes, that was a box she felt she needed to check. So I think we should take that as an acknowledgement. of this party, and that’s a growing constituency in the party. But yes, the fact that she has not signaled more of a break from Biden’s approach here, I think that’s going to be a problem. It may be a problem at the margins, but this election is going to be very close. It will be decided on the margins, and this could make the difference.

Issue: Peace and Foreign Policy