President Donald Trump’s military attack in Venezuela not only risks entangling the United States in a new costly war but also opens the door to a world in which interstate wars of economic conquest and expansion are common practice. In the wake of the attack, Trump previewed such as he threatened military action against Greenland, Colombia, Cuba, and even Mexico. Continuing down this path will lead to a more violent global environment and surely put Americans at greater risk – especially in an increasingly multi-polar world with unconstrained nuclear weapons. If we want to avoid that future, we must come together now, raise our collective voices, and say no to these new wars of imperial conquest.
Trump has launched an illegal military action to kidnap Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro and has asserted that the U.S. will now “run” the country. The intervention is supposedly a response to narco-terrorism, yet there is little indication that Maduro’s arrest will slow narcotics trafficking. Indeed, as many have pointed out, only a small amount of the most dangerous illicit drugs entering in the United States originate in or transit Venezuela. The primary purpose of this move, stated boldly in imperialist terms, is to gain access to Venezuela’s oil. Trump has ordered Venezuelan authorities to cut oil trade with Russia, China and Cuba and is seeking indefinite U.S. control over Venezuelan energy resources.
Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio are exerting control of Venezuelan affairs with diplomatic pressures and a total embargo on oil exports, but they are prepared to use military force again if necessary. Trump made it explicit. “We are not afraid of boots on the ground if we have to.”
Trump’s military attack in Venezuela violates the U.S. Constitution and is contrary to U.S. laws that require congressional consultation and impose limits on the use of force abroad. It is also a clear violation of the UN Charter and is contrary to core principles of international law and international humanitarian law. As Michael Hirsh explains in Foreign Policy, the attack sets a dangerous precedent that could provide a green light for other powerful countries to engage in wars of conquest and aggression. The attack – and Trump’s subsequent threats to attack more countries – threatens to accelerate the unraveling of international norms established to keep the peace after two world wars.
The U.S. public reaction to the overthrow of Maduro so far is mixed. Few lament the removal of a repressive dictator, but many question Trump’s blatant disregard for the law and the lack of congressional oversight An initial Washington Postpoll found respondents evenly split on approving or disapproving the military capture of Maduro, 63% agreeing that the operation should have congressional approval, and 94% agreeing that the Venezuelan people should choose their own future leaders. A Reuters/Ipsos poll found 33% in favor of the operation and 72% concerned about the U.S. becoming too heavily involved in Venezuela.
Many Venezuelan exiles have applauded Trump’s military action, understandably. They have suffered from tyranny, corruption, and economic collapse, and are hoping that Maduro’s removal will bring national renewal. It is right to acknowledge and support the democratic aspirations of the Venezuelan people. It would be naïve, however, to believe that the Trump administration is actively interested in supporting democratic rights in Venezuela. While the U.S. supported Venezuelan democracy activist Maria Corina Machado for the Nobel Peace Prize and backed the campaign of her party’s presidential nominee, Edmundo González, in last year’s stolen election, Trump has dismissed opposition leaders as “lacking respect” within Venezuela.
Trump’s interest is oil, not democratic freedom. He seeks to give American energy companies control over Venezuela’s oil production. It’s about the money.
For the moment the administration has indicated its willingness to work with Venezuelan Vice President, now acting President, Delcy Rodriguez. The structures of the country’s government and armed forces remain in place. Whether and how Venezuelan officials will do Trump’s bidding remains uncertain. A lot of things could go wrong in this scenario. There are many cautionary lessons from past U.S. attempts to stabilize countries following military invasions, from Afghanistan to Iraq to Libya, but it is doubtful the Trump team cares about such.
In this moment, as envisioned by the country’s founders, Congress’ role is critical. Lawmakers must exercise their constitutional war power to ensure the United States does not use force rashly without weighing the significant potential consequences for the American public in the short- and long-term. Congress has the power of the purse to halt funding for any further use of force in, over or off the shores of Venezuela, and also to prevent threatened military action against other countries. Legislative debate and votes on these issues are underway in Washington. Grassroots activists and concerned citizens can make a difference by raising their voices and demanding that legislators (and candidates for the 2026 elections) support prohibitions on further military action in Venezuela and beyond.
We need a new American peace movement that can counter the march toward militarism at home and abroad, as we recently wrote in Waging Nonviolence. This includes developing a renewed, winning message about how the United States benefits from a rules-based international system, engaging in multilateralism, and investing in mechanisms to mitigate crises and resolve conflicts peacefully. Surely, some rules and mechanisms need updating and restructuring to meet the needs of a changing world. The U.N. system is imperfect, but could be modernized and strengthened with the support of member states.
Indeed, active engagement by the U.N. and other multilateral bodies, including the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, will be important to support any planned transitions and foster a peaceful future in Venezuela. If new elections are planned for Venezuela in the future, they should be structured and monitored by independent observers. Strong international engagement can help Venezuela enact critical reforms, including steps to address elements of the security sector truly involved in criminal activity. Mitigating the interference of competing external forces can also reduce the risk of a civil war scenario.
The American people do not want more wars of choice or conquest. Trump was elected on a promise to end wars, not to engage in aggressive action against other countries. The U.S. attempt to take control of Venezuela threatens to repeat some of the worst moral and strategic failures of past U.S. military adventurism, for which the American people and communities around the world have paid enormous costs. By coming together and emphatically rejecting this path, we can stop this dangerous trajectory. And importantly, we can begin to chart an alternative path for global peace and security.
David Cortright is a visiting scholar at Cornell University’s Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies and professor emeritus at Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. Peter J. Quaranto is a visiting professor of the practice and global policy fellow at the University of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs, and served previously in senior roles at the State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations.
October 16, 2025 – In response to reports that the Trump Administration has authorized covert Central Intelligence Agency action in Venezuela, Center for International Policy Executive Vice President Matt Duss issued the following statement:
“Reports that the Trump Administration has authorized covert efforts seeking to foment regime change in Venezuela are deeply concerning. These reports follow on the administration’s unlawful and unauthorized use of military force against vessels and their crews in the Caribbean – which constitute extrajudicial killings.
“Using covert or military measures to destabilize or overthrow regimes reminds us of some of the most notorious episodes in American foreign policy, which undermined the human rights and sovereignty of countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. We are still dealing with many of the harmful consequences of these disastrous interventions in today’s challenges with migration and the drug trade. Such interventions rarely lead to democratic or peaceful outcomes. Instead, they exacerbate internal divisions, reinforce authoritarianism, and destabilize societies for generations.
“Trump ran as an anti-war candidate and casts himself as a Nobel Prize-worthy peacemaker, yet he is conducting illegal strikes while threatening to start wars of choice across Latin America and the Caribbean. A majority of Americans oppose US military involvement in Venezuela. Lawmakers must make clear that Trump does not have the American people’s support or Congress’ authorization for the use of force against Venezuela or anywhere else in the region.”
September 29, 2025 — Following President Trump’s meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu at the White House, and the Trump administration’s release of a “21-point plan” to end the conflict in Gaza, Matt Duss, Executive Vice-President at the Center for International Policy, released the following statement:
“The world desperately needs an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, whose people have endured unspeakable horror over these past two years. Unfortunately, the 21-point plan released by the Trump administration today, while thankfully walking back from Trump’s previous goal of expelling Gaza’s people, contains numerous opportunities for Netanyahu to renege on his commitments, as he has repeatedly done in the past. It is not clear who has agreed to which terms of Trump’s plan, or whether Trump himself understands what is in it. Trump and Netanyahu’s remarks today were a litany of lies about the last 30 years, not a promising foundation for peace.
“Despite his claim of being close to a deal, Trump’s statement that Israel will have ‘full US backing’ to “‘finish the job’ in Gaza if his plan is not agreed to stood out most clearly. This would be more of what we have seen not only the last nine months, but the last two years, as the United States has unconditionally armed and subsidized a genocide in Gaza.”
“The path to a desperately needed peace remains the same as it has for nearly two years: using leverage and pressure on Israel to achieve a ceasefire that stops its atrocities, frees all hostages, ends the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and supports a real path to Palestinian liberation, without which the region will not know real security.”
September 22, 2025 – In response to key U.S. allies including the UK, France, Canada, Australia and Portugal recognizing Palestinian statehood on September 21 and 22, Center for International Policy Executive Vice President Matt Duss issued the following statement:
“The recognition of Palestinian Statehood by several United States allies is a necessary and historic affirmation of Palestinians’ national rights. As the United Nations General Assembly begins, this long overdue step should be welcomed by all who want to see a just and peaceful end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
“Still, we need to see all nations take urgent and concrete action to protect Palestinian human rights by countering the genocide in Gaza, and apartheid and annexation in the West Bank.
“All countries must act to stop Israel’s forced displacement, starvation and slaughter of Palestinian civilians. That begins with cutting off the flow of weapons that Israel is using to perpetrate these crimes, and imposing sanctions on the Israeli officials responsible for them.”
Executive Vice President Matt Duss joins Christopher S. Chivvis, Stephen Wertheim, Brett Rosenberg for a conversation on geopolitical changes in Taiwan. They visited Taipei and met with Taiwan’s officials and thought leaders. In this episode of Pivotal States, they share their takeaways and delve into the United States’ policy challenge in Taiwan.
Christopher Chivvis: So anyway, given all of that, we thought it would be a good idea to go to Taiwan, which is really sort of at the center of the maelstrom here, and try to get a sense of what it looked like from the island itself. There’s obviously tons of different issues that we can talk about and that we did talk about on the trip. You’ve got the state of Taiwan’s own democracy, the nature of its domestic politics. You’ve got the condition of cross-strait relations, and then finally, since it’s Taiwan, the military dimension is always really important.
But if it’s okay with you guys, I thought we might just start with domestic politics and then move to the larger strategic questions.
Matthew Duss: I’d say, knowing kind of a little bit about Taiwan’s domestic politics, but not a lot, I think we were able to dive in at a much, much deeper level that I really appreciated. And in a way, the positions of the two parties on the various domestic versus foreign policies are almost counterintuitive. The KMT, this is the Chinese Nationalist Party that literally fought a war against the Communist party and retreated to the island of Taiwan and still nominally claims to be the rightful government of all of China, and yet they are the ones who have the ongoing conversation with the CCP. Any channels that the Taiwanese government has are basically through the KMT. The DPP is much more forward-leaning in terms of an independent Taiwanese identity separate from the Chinese mainland. And yet, even though it seems a bit more hawkish on the foreign policy side, when it comes to domestic issues, gay rights, women’s rights, a whole range of things that we associate with progressive politics here in the United States.
… I thought that was really interesting. Yeah. And I do think it’s important always to understand as much as possible the domestic drivers of any country’s politics, because ultimately, that is what, in democracies, politicians — I hate to break it to people — are mainly concerned with. How do I get re-elected? How do I stay in power? How do I manage my own political coalition? So that’s something that we have to contend with as we try to come to our own decisions about U.S. policy.
Brett Rosenberg: And I was struck as well by, there’s obviously this polarization between the two parties, but there was an understanding that the public I think is much closer to where the DPP’s view is on the cross-strait approach, not necessarily in terms of a hawkish approach, but in terms of, we’re already an independent sovereign nation.
Matthew Duss: Yeah, I mean, I think it was not that this person was charged with activities, like they were ideas that were expressed, that were deemed so harmful to the security of Taiwan. And obviously that is a huge problem. The same with the recall effort. It’s a foundational principle of democracies that you respect outcomes of elections when they don’t go your way and you try again next time. Obviously we see echoes of all these problems here in our country. We should be humble about that. But it does really show the increasingly zero-sum nature of their politics. That’s the phrase that kept ringing around in my head as we heard both sides describing the other.
Christopher Chivvis: Bunch of unreasonable radicals was sort of the impression that you got from talking to the KMT.
Brett Rosenberg: We had one person refer to the DPP as the DEI party, clearly importing in some American…
Matthew Duss: I think that’s really important to understand the domestic side, but also the strategic impact of it on Taiwan’s security and its relationship with the U.S.
Christopher Chivvis: And I think it was really clear when we were there, and I completely agree that that’s a really excellent summary of the strategic situation. We often think about the defense side of it, getting Taiwan to do more for its defense. Obviously that’s what we’ve been asking of our European allies. There’s good reasons for that. But in this case, as you pointed out, there’s a flip side to it, which is Taiwan also needs to be demonstrating that diplomatically, it’s willing to go out of its way in order to ensure that we avoid having to come to its rescue, that we avoid having to get into that war with China that would be so destructive.
But, you know, so we asked several times our interlocutors, especially on the DPP side, you know, how they felt about cross-strait dialogue. This would be trying to return to the constructive discussions that were going on between Beijing and Taipei from the early 1990s up until around 2016. And just I’ll say off the bat, it’s clear that China bears a lot of the responsibility for why these fell apart, but we were in Taiwan, so we were trying to get their sense of it.
Matthew Duss: I think it’s a bit more concern, and just as Brett said, they had clearly heard that line, but they were a bit more, I guess, sanguine about the fact that, no Taiwan does have cards that Ukraine does not. TSMC being the most obvious example. But there’s two sides to that. They need to be able to deter an invasion and if necessary withstand it, fight back, things like that. But two, they need to be able to prove to the United States that they have cards so as to then bring the US in.
Brett Rosenberg: Exactly. And the question of whether Taiwan can prove its worth to the United States in a way that convinces them to commit fully.
Matthew Duss: Yeah, I mean, I think there are definitely elements of what Stephen and Jennifer wrote in their piece, stronger investments in Taiwan’s defense, certainly investments in its own resilience. One of the things we haven’t mentioned yet is there’s apparently an effort now to extend the amount of time that is required for national service for all young Taiwanese. Right now it’s about four months, which one person referred to as just a kind of summer camp where they go and hang out and do drills, and that’s their-
Christopher Chivvis: Shot a rifle once or twice.
Matthew Duss: Right, right. Exactly. And to extend that to one or two years as a lot of other countries do. But also it’s just understanding that, I mean, given the various scenarios, the kind of least bad scenario is what we have now with a few changes as we just mentioned. Also having a president of Taiwan who is really willing to try harder to have engagement with Beijing, which Taiwan does not have now, unfortunately. I think that would be good, that opens possibilities in talks with Beijing, but also I think that would have benefits in terms of US public opinion and global opinion as well. And I do think that matters, but I think coming from a DC perspective, the idea of just there’s not much we can do and we should keep this unsatisfying status quo is not a very attractive argument either there or here. And yet, that is I think probably the best option.
Stephen Wertheim: Actually, when you poll Americans, only thirty-some percent say that they would support coming to the direct defense of Taiwan against a Chinese attack. That’s a fairly low number if you compare that to the number that say that they would support defending a NATO ally, including the Baltic States.
Matthew Duss: Yeah, it’s a significant gap in perception. So from Taiwan’s perspective, I think they believe they have more support from the U.S. than might actually exist, and that’s concerning.
Matthew Duss: Right. No, it’s ripe for political actors on either side to disturb that status quo and political actors from the United States as we’ve seen in the recent past. But I was really struck by one conversation we had with a kind of progressive left DPP-affiliated journalist and activist.
Christopher Chivvis: This was in that bar. The Home Run Bar. That was fun.
Matthew Duss: Right, exactly. Who clearly was pro-independence. And then we asked, “Okay, so what’s the pathway?” And he said, “Well, there’s no path right now to achieving this.” So there’s at least a pragmatic-
Christopher Chivvis: Which was surprisingly realistic for someone who was so aspirational about it.
Matthew Duss: Right. A level of pragmatism to say, “Well, at the moment, there’s no path to this.” And that was one of the most interesting things I think we heard.
Matthew Duss: The announcement of a rise in the defense budget is definitely a part of that. The announcement, all the things that Brett talked about, I think is a part of that. So again, I wouldn’t overstate the amount of alarm, but I do think some people were perhaps a bit too relaxed and placing a bit too much stock in this kind of idea that, “Oh, Americans will always support Taiwan because maybe Americans when you poll them. But the question is will they punish a politician or a president who changes that?”
By Alexander Langlois, a Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities and analyst focused on the Middle East. Follow him on X @langloisajl and BlueSky @langloisajl.bsky.social.
The collapse of former President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 ushered in a generational political transition in Syria. Yet, as the country works to rebuild and heal after nearly 14 years of brutal conflict, Israel appears dead set on malignly stymieing Syria’s transition, territorial integrity and continuity, and basic sovereignty.
Indeed, Israel is pressuring Syria today under the guise of protecting minority groups in the country. The effort constitutes an extension of Israel’s “periphery doctrine” and “alliance of minorities” strategies – long central components of Israel’s broader regional effort to bolster its security through alliances with potential shared enemies of Sunni majority states. As such, Tel Aviv aims to operationalize real or perceived minority concerns in Syria to justify clear violations of its northern neighbor’s sovereignty, advancing its overarching security interests. Such efforts risk reigniting Syria’s civil conflict and should be rejected by the international community.
Israeli Violations of Syrian Sovereignty
Less than one day after the Assad regime collapsed on December 8, Israel quickly moved to secure its interests inside Syria. IDF soldiers captured the Syrian side of the disengagement zone along the disputed Israel-Syria border separating the illegally occupied Golan Heights from the rest of Syria. It has since captured and illegally occupied numerous towns in southwest Syria’s Quneitra Governorate – the country’s second-smallest province, which contains the Golan Heights.
Israel’s decision to invade Syria coincided with a sweeping bombing campaign across the country. In an estimated 480 strikes, Israel targeted the former Syrian Arab Army’s military infrastructure and assets, including bases, weapons stockpiles, aircraft and military airports, and supposed chemical weapons sites. The goal of the operation, according to Israeli officials, was to eliminate any Assad regime weapons that could fall into the wrong hands. These strikes continuetoday.
Yet Israeli officials originally stressed that these operations would be temporary, mindful of both the illegality of their actions and global public opinion against its broader regional operations over the last 16 months. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu then claimed on December 17, 2024, that Israeli forces would remain until an arrangement that “ensures Israel’s security” would be put in place. This announcement reflects a substantially deeper and more nefarious goal, as Tel Aviv couples national security rhetoric with expanding operations over time.
In this regard, Israeli leaders view Syria’s new rulers – senior leaders from the former Al-Qaeda-affiliated Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – as an immediate threat along their occupied northern border in the Golan. For Israel, the thought of another Islamist militia or armed entity on their border reflected the ongoing threat from Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Lebanon – a threat they largely eradicated in 2024.
That military operation in Lebanon highlights a drastic shift in Israel’s military strategy since the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023. Given the brutal success of Hamas’s operation in breaking through Israel’s security systems that have long blockaded Gaza, the military establishment in Israel adopted a strategy of enhanced border security on a national scale – namely by rejecting the most remote threats along those borders through the use of military force.
As such, Israel continues to expand its illegal occupation of southern Syria. Israeli Defense Minister Katz announced an indefinite occupation of the newly captured Syrian territory on January 28. Then, on February 23, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded that the southern Syrian governorates of Quneitra, Dara’a, and Suwayda remain demilitarized, threatening the use of force should Damascus deploy in these areas.
The threat effectively nullifies any sense of Syrian sovereignty while extending the Israeli exception to international law further into Syria and just miles from the capital of Damascus. Israeli officials have amplified ethno-sectarian tensions across the country to bolster those threats, claiming Israel’s self-proclaimed role in protecting Syria’s minority groups – including Alawites, Kurds, Druze, and Christians.
In one particularly telling instance, Israel repeatedly insisted it would use military force to protect the Druze, a major minority group in southern Syria – particularly in Suwayda Governorate. Tel Aviv cited so-called violations against the Druze in Jaramana, a densely populated and ethnically diverse suburb of Damascus with a sizable Druze population.
Working with small and disparate Druze groups, the Israelis argued that Druze spiritual and political leaders supported an alliance – something that Druze leaders immediately and publicly rejected. Unfortunately, this did not prevent days of violence between Damascus’s new security forces and some of these minor Druze factions, resulting in many deaths.
Understanding the risks, Syrian leaders have criticized Israel’s actions without escalating the situation. This position reflects Damascus’s weakened state. Indeed, it is in no position to challenge Israel or the broader West as it hopes to garner sanctions relief necessary for a successful transitional period. With its military and economy in shambles, it can ill afford a conflict with a rogue Israeli state that will simultaneously eradicate any hope to rebuild the country and provide for its people.
Israel’s Intentions in Syria
Ultimately, Israel’s efforts post-Assad are designed to create facts on the ground that advance their interests now and in the future. Tel Aviv expects some form of negotiations with Damascus that will dictate state-to-state relations for generations should the transition succeed. Thus, the Israeli government is collecting as many bargaining chips as possible ahead of potential talks.
To put it lightly, this approach is dangerous. Israel appears willing to induce ethno-sectarian infighting within Syria to ensure the transition fails to produce a territorially contiguous Syrian state. It is doing so by co-opting minority fears in a country where the previous regime used sectarianism to sow distrust throughout the population in a classic autocratic divide-and-rule strategy that left Syria’s social fabric destroyed.
Israel likely hopes to use this pressure to induce a series of concessions from Damascus under the threat of collapsing the state, resulting in the balkanization of Syria. In this context, the goal is to prevent any serious threat to Israeli interests or territory from inside Syria. As such, Tel Aviv could hope to dangle full recognition as an alternative – an item Assad was previously negotiating alongside a break from Iran in exchange for sanctions relief and a general Western acceptance of his victory in the war.
Given that this so-called victory was anything but real, Israel is hoping to get the same or a similar outcome from Syria’s new rulers at gunpoint. At minimum, they likely hope for Syria’s recognition of Israel’s claim to the Golan Heights. Both goals are non-starters for Damascus, which would not dare risk its limited legitimacy during a highly unstable transition period by recognizing Israel or its illegal occupation and annexation of its territory.
To be sure, Washington previously made offers their counterparts could not reject under US President Donald Trump’s first term in office – an effort that led to the infamous Abraham Accords. Morocco received US recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara; Sudan was removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list; and the UAE received numerous preferential deals. It is not unrealistic to assume Washington could bolster Israeli efforts to induce a false “peace” between Syria and Israel, especially given the former’s listing on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list since 1979.
Still, Syria could turn to other countries for support – namely Russia and Turkey. The latter is particularly important as it represents Israel’s other major concern in Syria. Ankara directly and strongly backed the opposition during Syria’s civil war, aggressively demanding Assad’s ouster and positioning itself well in today’s post-Assad Syria as a result. Given the total collapse of Israel-Turkey relations today, both view Syria as a battleground in their growing competition for regional power and influence.
Israel is working to ensure Turkey cannot realize its military goals in Syria. Ankara hopes to build multiple military bases in the country – something Tel Aviv worries could re-ignite Syria’s long-running role as a resistance front to its illegal occupation of Palestine and neighboring lands.
In line with the Israeli goal to not allow real or perceived threats on its borders, it is working to prevent this potential future. Yet, just as its military operations could inadvertently produce a new rival state in Syria, Israel’s efforts to weaken the country will likely force Damascus to rely more heavily on Ankara. Thus, the short-sighted nature of Israel’s strategy comes into full focus.
Preventing a Disaster
The international community cannot allow any regional actor to thwart or distort Syria’s transition in ways that could either upend the country or permanently tear it apart. Indeed, efforts should be focused on ensuring Syrians can lead their transition with minimal to no impediments – especially those that would harm Syria for another entity’s political gain. Washington can play a central role in this regard while retaining a light-touch approach to any post-Assad transition.
The Trump administration should temper Israeli actions in Syria, overtly and covertly pressing them to forego illegal military operations within and illegal occupation of Syria’s sovereign territory. This can be framed as supporting Israeli security – namely that occupying a neighboring country’s land creates long-term strife that could produce a Hezbollah-equivalent entity in Syria. Stressing that Syria is not interested in competition or conflict with Israel, and that Washington and Israel can work with regional partners to ensure that reality is sustained, should be central to this approach.
Washington should also coordinate with regional actors – particularly Turkey – to further ensure Syria does not remain a playground for regional and international actors to compete. Guaranteeing and supporting positive role for Ankara that does not use Syria to raise tensions with Israel is crucial in this regard as Israel views Turkish influence in the country with suspicion, if not hostility. Such efforts can bolster the parallel goal of reigning in Israel.
Finally, Washington should work with the new Syrian government to disincentivize any potential response that could escalate the situation and produce further Israeli encroachment on their territory. The United States still holds economic and diplomatic tools that can lightly steer the Caretaker Government in the best direction for Syria’s transition to succeed. Of course, this approach must reject micromanaged nation-building or any heavy-handed approach to Syria’s transition. Officials can openly back the Damascus government and gradually provide terror designation relief to reinforce this effort.
Ultimately, all states should support Syria’s political transition given the country’s geographic positioning as the “Heart of the Middle East” and out of respect for its people’s resilience and democratic aspirations after 14 years of war. Preventing unhelpful and short-sighted policies that harm that transition should be central to any actor with a stake in Syria today. Bargaining Syrian security for one of its neighbors will only produce more of the same instability that has plagued the Middle East for decades – a scenario no administration in Washington should promote or accept as pre-determined.
Omar Shaban is the founder and director of Palthink for Strategic Studiesand the inaugural Leahy Fellow at the Center for International Policy.
On January 19, 2025, Israel and Hamas announced a ceasefire, with the goal of ending a devastating round of conflict in Gaza that lasted nearly 15 months, amid complex international and regional contexts and conflicting interests. As of publication, the two sides are set to discuss the terms for implementing phases two and three of the agreement, though without guarantee of success or long-term enforcement. While the agreement has been described as a step towards calm, it does not yet represent a definitive solution to the conflict. Rather, it may be part of a long-term strategy that seeks to reshape the political and military landscape in Gaza and the region.
Successive official statements by international parties and mediators show that the agreement still contains ambiguity in its terms, raising questions about its viability and prospects for implementation.
The objectives of the agreement and its undeclared dimensions
American statements indicate the war is not over yet: Despite the announcement of the agreement as a first step towards calm, statements from the forthcoming Trump administration representing Israeli intentions reveal hidden goals beyond the ceasefire, for example statements by Trump’s new National Security Adviser Michael Waltz. He said that the complete demilitarization of Gaza and the destruction of Hamas remained goals, and that war could resume once Israeli and American hostages were released. He went even further by declaring, “If Hamas violates this agreement, we will support Israel 100 percent to return to war.”
Ambiguity about the fate of military leaders: The ceasefire’s clauses on medical treatment, which refer to the daily departure of 50 wounded soldiers with three escorts through the Rafah crossing, with the approval of Israel and Egypt, will need to be monitored closely and transparently, as it could potentially serve as a cover for the deportation of Hamas military and political leaders from the Gaza Strip.
This condition has already been put forward by Israel and the United States as part of any settlement. In the absence of transparency, it appears that the agreement may include secret arrangements that preserve Hamas’s face while serving Israeli and U.S. strategic goals. This raises the question of the various powers’ ability to impose such a clause on Hamas inside the Gaza Strip, which has made successive statements about its refusal to leave the Gaza Strip under any justification.
Last Minute Consensuses: Mutual Concessions or Interim Tactic? The announcement of a series of last-minute resolutions of differences between Israel and Hamas, and the imminent meeting of the Israeli cabinet to approve the deal, indicate intense regional and international pressure to ensure the implementation of the agreement. But the nature of these concessions is unclear, fueling speculation that some of the undeclared clauses may be more influential than those announced.
The main challenges in the agreement
Ambiguity in later stages: The agreement is divided into multiple phases, but the details of the second and third phases (such as reconstruction, full withdrawal, and final ceasefire) remain vague and subject to further negotiations. This opens the way for postponing these essential items, if all of these are subject to the ability of Hamas to implement everything contained in the provisions of the first phase, i.e. there is a severe test for Hamas to gain the confidence of mediators, especially the United States, in the first phase. The second and third phases are also fraught with many obstacles, with fundamental differences in perception between Israel and Hamas.
Israel makes it clear that, as part of the phase II negotiations, it will be possible to end the war only under the following conditions:
Release all abductees.
Hamas leadership agrees to exile (via safe exit) to a third country.
Agreeing to dismantle its military capabilities.
Avoid any active political participation in the form of Hamas in Gaza “the next day.”
According to Israeli officials, if Hamas agrees to these terms, Israel will not have to return to fighting, but if it refuses — and in Israel they estimate that Hamas will refuse — there is a high probability of resuming fighting.
Lack of real guarantees: The agreement lacks genuine and binding oversight mechanisms to ensure its transparent implementation, making it vulnerable to violations by the stronger party. US-Israeli statements linking the continuation of the truce to Hamas’s commitment reflect a reliance on the balance of power rather than a clear international or legal framework. This lack of guarantees opens the way for Israel to interpret the terms of the agreement in a way that serves its security and strategic interests, as happened in previous experiences such as the Oslo Accords.
Exclusion of the Palestinian Authority: The exclusion of the Palestinian Authority deepens the internal Palestinian division and makes the agreement a solely bilateral one between the Israelis and Hamas. This deprives the agreement of any overall national legitimacy and weakens the chances of turning it into a genuine political settlement.
Internal Israeli politics: Israel’s internal differences are currently felt strongly between Netanyahu and the right-wing led by Smotrich and Ben Gvir, the latter of whom resigned over the signing of the agreement between Hamas and Israel and stipulated that the return to the government is primarily contingent on Netanyahu’s commitment to return to fighting in Gaza after the first phase.
This calls into question Netanyahu’s ability to retain the government. Although there is consideration of the opposition’s promises to secure a safety net in the event that the far right withdraws from the government, Netanyahu is well aware that the opposition bloc led by Yair Lapid will work to save the government only until the deal is completed, and then it will withdraw at the first opportunity so as to collapse the Netanyahu government. The opposition is also seeking power in its own right and to do so must collapse the government in order to go to elections and compete for the parliamentary majority. These dynamics show that domestic politics may play a decisive role in determining the future of an agreement. Netanyahu may resort to disrupting or reinterpreting the agreement as a way to strengthen his domestic political position.
Other weakness of the agreement
The current agreement is more akin to a declaration of principles than to a permanent settlement, as its continuation depends on the commitment of the parties to implement the first phase smoothly. It is only the first step in a series of mysterious stages. Which is perceived as an unfinished frame.
The agreement lacks clear implementation guarantees and effective international oversight mechanisms. This reflects Israel’s continued policy of exploiting agreements as tools to manage negotiations and conflict, not resolve it.
The exclusion of other Palestinian parties threatens to turn the agreement into a “temporary truce” and the lack of any overarching national dimension makes it more difficult to achieve sustainable peace.
The announcement of the agreement from Doha and not Cairo reflects a regional competition between mediators, especially competition for the expected regional role in the US strategy for the region, which may exclude the party that does not seem to have much influence in imposing its conditions or influence on Hamas. This rivalry may weaken coordination and increase the fragility of the agreement, especially with the possibility of undeclared clauses and the ambiguity of the second and third phases, which may reflect differences in interests between regional parties.
Trump’s recent comments about the future of the Gaza Strip, both in regards to who should have political control over it and the fate of the Palestinians of Gaza during reconstruction, could undermine the implementation of the agreement in its later stages. It could also cause a crisis in neighboring countries like Jordan and Egypt, essential stakeholders in seeing de-escalation happen.
Opportunities and motives for the continuation of the agreement
Feeling the American determination and the role of the Trump administration and Baden in drafting the agreement through: – The balance between the two US administrations The agreement is not the product of the efforts of one administration but a combination of multiple factors, including international pressure on Israel after the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, and the role of regional mediators such as Qatar and Egypt. – Biden: Quiet diplomacy The Biden administration has worked to continue efforts through diplomatic channels, taking advantage of relations with mediators (Qatar and Egypt). Biden’s statements about the continuation of the ceasefire during the second and third stages of negotiations, even if the duration of the first phase exceeds the specified time, shows the administration’s desire to avoid the collapse of the agreement.
Trump: Maximum pressure policy
Trump relies on a “big stick” policy, as his statements and those of his advisers show unlimited support for Israel in the event of renewed war. But on the other hand, it was indirect pressure that pushed the parties to the agreement, and Trump himself is proud that his presence is what prompted this agreement to crystallize, not to mention his personal determination to the demands of calm in the Middle East, and that he has broader projects in the region, which are projects subject to strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and normalization with Israel, in order to devote himself to the great economic project and compete with the next China, which is the main goal that he does not manage in the coming stages, and he has no time to drain America, financially or militarily, in any future wars, economic peace depends on calm in the Middle East. Versus China’s competition.
As the agreement is not the product of the efforts of just one administration but a combination of multiple factors, including international pressure on Israel after the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, and the role of regional mediators such as Qatar and Egypt. That means the ceasefire agreement is most likely to sustain. The ceasefire agreement has regional and international back up.
Biden’s quiet diplomacy: Biden administration has worked to continue efforts through diplomatic channels, taking advantage of relations with mediators (Qatar and Egypt). Biden’s statements about the continuation of the ceasefire during the second and third stages of negotiations, even if the duration of the first phase exceeds the specified time, shows the administration’s desire to avoid the collapse of the agreement.
Trump’s Maximum pressure policy: Trump relies on a “big stick” policy, as his statements and those of his advisers show unlimited support for Israel in the event of renewed war. But on the other hand, it was indirect pressure that pushed the parties to the agreement, and Trump himself is proud that his presence is what prompted this agreement to crystallize, not to mention his personal interests and determination to the demands of calm in the Middle East, and that he has broader projects in the region, which are projects subject to strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. There is also the prospect of further Arab normalization with Israel, which he has repeatedly affirmed he has interest in building upon.
The Trump administration’s desire for the return of the Palestinian Authority: News reports have suggested that Trump will restore the Palestinian National Authority to run the Gaza Strip despite Israel’s opposition. Palestinian Authority officials said that President Trump asked the PA to control the crossings in the Gaza Strip, in a conversation with the Director General of the Crossings in the Palestinian Authority, Nazmi Muhanna, and the Attorney General of the Ministry of Civil Affairs in the Palestinian Authority, Ayman Qandil, who went to Cairo at Trump’s request, in order to close the details of this file and prevent Hamas or any other party from control, and this means that Trump has a vision about the future of any agreement with Saudi Arabia, which conditions normalization on the understanding of the solution of the Palestinian state and the need for its control over the Gaza Strip as part of any upcoming agreement.
However, political arrangements at the Rafah crossing remain dependent on Israel’s statements about maintaining a security presence in the Philadelphia axis, raising questions about its intentions towards a complete withdrawal or easing of the blockade of Gaza. Where control of the crossing may remain controversial, issues related to humanitarian aid are subject to the possibility of being used as leverage in later stages. At the same time, Trump’s ambiguous and incendiary comments about US control over the Gaza Strip could also embolden the Israeli government and undermine the Authority’s bid to reassume governance in the enclave.
Positions of key regional mediators:
While the announcement of the agreement was made in Doha instead of Cairo, despite the vital Egyptian role, there are differences between the two governments’ positions. Qatar has a great interest in ensuring this agreement by any means, as this is its first experience with regard to stopping a war in the Gaza Strip, which gives it an important place in any future Middle Eastern arrangement.
The Palestinian file historically represents an important issue for Egypt, especially through previous strategic interventions in this file, as it is an Egyptian national security file. This is especially true for the Gaza Strip, not to mention its real desire to stop the war in any way, in order to restore its economic losses and the return of navigation in the Suez Canal, which was severely affected by the support for the Palestinian people that was approved by Ansar Allah (Houthis) in Yemen, which targeted ships in the Red Sea, affected navigation in the canal, and in turn affected the canal’s revenues dramatically. Egypt has been able to prove that it is still an influential and strong player in this file through the Rafah land crossing, which is the only exit to the Gaza Strip and controlled by Egypt, where one of the conditions of the ceasefire agreement was to return to the management of the Rafah crossing through Egyptian supervision, and that Israel has the right to supervise the lists of injured military travelers who are required to be treated outside the Gaza Strip.
Hopeful recommendations
Future moves by Israel and the United States will determine whether the subsequent phases bring about a real calm, or be used as a cover for re-escalation. The following are recommendations that, if they were implemented, could be used to sustain the ceasefire and provide a framework for long-term peace.
Involve all Palestinian parties: The PA and the PLO should be included in any future negotiations to ensure the inclusiveness of the agreement. In the longer term, PA reform and new elections are essential for the PA to be seen as legitimate and effective.
Establishment of an international monitoring mechanism: the need for an impartial international body to supervise the implementation of the terms of the agreement and prevent violations.
Strengthening regional coordination: Push Qatar and Egypt to coordinate their efforts to avoid competition and achieve real stability in mediation.
Rebuilding international trust: engaging the United Nations and international actors to ensure a transparent and sustainable negotiating framework.
Affirm the territorial integrity of the whole of Palestinian territory including the Gaza Strip as part of a future Palestinian state.
Is the agreement the beginning of a solution or a temporary break?
While the agreement is seen as an opportunity to stop the bloodshed in Gaza, the ambiguity of its terms and the continued Israeli and American goals in reshaping the Palestinian landscape keep it within the framework of the temporary truce. The absence of international guarantees and the deepening of Palestinian and regional divisions make the future of the agreement dependent on complex political balances that could return the region to the cycle of escalation at any moment.
Pere Aragonès i Garcia is a former President of Catalonia, having served from 2021 to 2024.
There is no doubt about the crucial importance the coming years will have for history and how Donald Trump’s renewed presidency, which is just beginning, will unfold—not only for U.S. citizens but also for other regions of the world, especially Europe. It is an uncontested victory that we must understand well. In a context of accelerated global changes—geopolitical, economic, demographic, climatic, and technological—the difficulties this may generate for the rest of the planet, and for Europe in particular, are clear. We must remain vigilant and react decisively and swiftly.
One of the main concerns from this side of the Atlantic is the impact on democratic institutions and the rule of law during these rapidly changing times. Trump’s traditional disregard for the separation of powers and shared rules, as evidenced by his role in the January 2021 Capitol assault, poses a problem not only for the U.S. but for the world as a whole. Europe is all too familiar with the implications. The European far-right and right-wing populism see Trump as a reference point, both for the substance of his policies—financial deregulation, protectionist nationalism, and opposition to civil rights—and for his style. His disdain for democratic institutions, attacks on the media and press freedom, and use of falsehoods as political tools are now being emulated by many representatives of the reactionary movement in Europe.
This is why now, more than ever, we must reaffirm a firm defense of democracy, respect for the system of checks and balances, and the preservation of rigorous, ethical political debate, free from lies. This is more necessary than ever.
At the same time, in a world that is increasingly globalized yet more multipolar, with the rise of new global powers such as China and India, a U.S. commitment to defending multilateralism and a rules-based world order is more critical than ever. This includes the need for a democratic Syria that respects its internal diversity. Moreover, we urgently need to work tirelessly and without excuses toward a definitive peace in both Gaza and Lebanon, with all parties assuming their clear responsibility. We cannot look the other way, nor can we afford the indiscriminate killing of civilians. It is intolerable. History will judge our generation if we fail to do everything possible to end these atrocities, whether in this conflict or wherever our capabilities can reach.
Regarding Europe, it is essential that the historic transatlantic defense alliance maintains a strategic partnership rooted in democratic values, the defense of a just international order that upholds human rights, and the ability to preserve peace and democracy. The destabilization of this alliance, as could be anticipated during Trump’s presidency, is exactly what Vladimir Putin desires to accelerate his plans for Ukraine and possibly beyond, including in Moldova, the Baltic states, or the Balkans. At the same time, this would weaken the European Union’s position, forcing it into strategic dependence on Russia—something that must be avoided not only for geopolitical reasons but also to preserve democratic values on the continent. This would be harmful to Europe, its allies, and, consequently, the United States. Similarly, seeking internal advantages at the expense of other democratic states, as recently seen in the Greenland issue, is equally damaging. All territories have the right to be respected and to freely determine their future without external interference.
Europe and the U.S. must strengthen their strategic economic alliances for mutual benefit. We are witnessing a global economy undergoing a profound disruption of value chains, with an increasing risk of strategic dependency on non-democratic states for raw materials and intermediate products. Technological development, decarbonization, combating climate change, and the production of goods and services must be well-governed. At the same time, a political and economic relationship with the Global South must be based on mutual respect, inclusive development, human rights, and democracy. This is, and must remain, a demand of the citizenry.
We cannot afford delays, especially in implementing progressive economic policies that guarantee quality jobs for everyone. However, the coming years are likely to head in the opposite direction. Prioritizing internal interests and opting for isolationism and unilateralism would be a grave mistake. Should this occur, we must remain calm and return to the path of collaboration as soon as possible, standing firm democratically and convincing citizens through bold, transformative progressivism—not just ideology.
During President Biden’s term, significant strides were made, such as adopting climate policies that placed decarbonization as a cornerstone of economic and international policy. The U.S. and Europe must act together, aiming for much more ambitious measures to mitigate climate change. A U.S. president who denies scientific evidence, as Trump does, is paving the way for the acceleration of irreversible global warming. This affects all of us and especially our future generations. There is no time to waste.
Above all, defending human rights must remain a shared value between Europe and the U.S. In a demographic context where migration flows toward Europe and the U.S. will persist—albeit at varying intensities—any migration policy must incorporate a humanitarian perspective. Europe, where the struggle between border closures at the expense of human rights (championed by the right and far-right) and a pragmatic, humane migration policy is ongoing, needs a U.S. where individuals’ rights to forge a future in freedom and security are not only promoted but fully guaranteed. Progressives must be coherent and responsible, addressing this complex issue without succumbing to pressure from ultra-populism.
The American people have spoken clearly. Donald Trump is the new president, and if he fulfills his commitments, the coming years will be challenging for rights, freedoms, and relations with Europe. We must stand firm and build global democratic alternatives.
From Catalonia, where we work to defend rights, freedoms, and a fairer world, and where we continuously strive to improve the welfare state and equal opportunities, we recognize the importance of maintaining and strengthening the understanding and solidarity with progressive and Atlanticist United States. We will be here, ready to steer in the right direction, now and when the time comes. From Europe, we echo Eleanor Roosevelt’s words: “True patriotism springs from a belief in the dignity of the individual, freedom and equality not only for Americans but for all people on earth, universal brotherhood and goodwill, and a constant striving toward the principles and ideals on which this country was founded.”
Sina Toossi is a senior nonresident fellow at the Center for International Policy.
In the wake of a fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, the Middle East stands at a critical juncture. The recent agreement, brokered with the involvement of both the outgoing and incoming US administrations, has halted hostilities for now, but its durability remains uncertain. Amid this tenuous peace, Israeli leaders, emboldened by President-elect Donald Trump’s historically supportive stance, reportedly see a prime opportunity to push for direct war against Iran—a goal Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pursued for decades.
Exacerbating these tensions is the possibility of Trump doubling down on his “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran, which dismantled the Obama-era nuclear deal and inflicted crippling sanctions on Iran’s economy. Reports from The Wall Street Journal reveal Trump is even weighing military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Yet, in his inaugural address, Trump remarked, “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win, but also by the wars that we end, and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into.” This juxtaposition highlights a critical decision between diplomatic de-escalation and military action
Trump would be wise to pursue diplomacy. Granting Netanyahu the U.S.’s backing for such a conflict would further destabilize the region, heighten already white-hot anti-American sentiment, and derail Trump’s broader agenda. For Iran hawks, these shifting circumstances may seem like the ideal moment to act, but such enthusiasm dangerously ignores the lessons of Israel’s recent wars and the complexities of the region’s current security landscape. If Israel failed to decisively defeat a smaller non-state adversary like Hezbollah, how could it expect success against a well-fortified state like Iran? A preemptive strike would almost certainly provoke massive retaliation, fail to topple the Islamic Republic, and risk igniting a far-reaching, devastating conflict.
Instead of courting disaster, U.S. and Israeli policymakers should seize the moment to pursue diplomacy. Renewed negotiations and a verifiable nuclear agreement could deliver real security while steering the region away from catastrophic war.
Hezbollah’s Survival as a Cautionary Tale
Advocates of a strike on Iran often overlook a critical lesson from Israel’s recent conflict with Hezbollah: even with a relentless military campaign, Israel failed to decisively neutralize a much smaller non-state adversary. Over months of intense fighting in Lebanon, Israel launched an extensive air assault and a punishing ground invasion aimed at crippling Hezbollah’s arsenal. While Hezbollah suffered significant losses, including the assassination of its leader Hassan Nasrallah and senior commanders, its ability to strike Israel was not eliminated. Throughout the bombardment, the group continued firing rockets, missiles, and drones deep into Israeli territory. Major population centers, including Tel Aviv, were hit just days before the ceasefire, causing casualties, widespread displacement, and severe economic and psychological insecurity.
This experience offers two key lessons for policymakers. First, Israeli military superiority is not the absolute guarantee of success it is often assumed to be. Second, if Israel struggled to decisively defeat Hezbollah, a non-state militia, it is unrealistic to expect a knockout blow against a fortified state like Iran. Iran’s defense systems, nuclear facilities, and missile and drone stockpiles are far more robust and dispersed. Recent history underscores that a swift, clean military solution is less a viable strategy and more a dangerous illusion.
Iran’s Retaliatory Capabilities and the Costs of Escalation
Critics of diplomacy also often underestimate Iran’s ability to defend itself and respond effectively to an attack—a miscalculation fraught with danger. Over the past year, the back-and-forth strikes between Iran and Israel have vividly demonstrated Tehran’s growing military capabilities and its capacity for retaliation. For instance, on October 1, Iran launched a coordinated missile and drone attack on Israel, bypassing advanced Israeli air defenses and inflicting both material damage and insecurity. In response, Israel struck back on October 27, targeting Iran’s Russian-made S-300 air defense systems, ballistic missile production facilities, and solid fuel manufacturing infrastructure for long-range missiles.
Hawks portray the Israeli strike as a decisive blow, leaving Iran vulnerable to a low-cost U.S. or Israeli attack. Yet even Israeli officials disagree. The Nagel Committee in Israel recently confirmed that the country does not have the capability to launch a decisive attack on Iran’s military and nuclear facilities without U.S. support. Former IDF spokesperson and air defense commander Ran Kochav reinforced this reality, cautioning, “I would cautiously say they [Iran] still have strength left; it’s not as if this morning they have no air defense system at all and are completely exposed.” Retired Major General Yaakov Amidror warned an attack without U.S. coordination would risk severe retaliation requiring American intervention.
Despite Israel’s recent attack, many of Iran’s air defenses remain intact, bolstered by advanced systems reverse-engineered from Russian, Chinese, and U.S. technology. In recent military drills, Tehran has showcased its readiness, simulating responses to airstrikes and unveiling new underground “missile cities” alongside advanced drones and missiles. These moves send a clear signal: Iran is prepared to retaliate forcefully against any attack.
A large-scale assault on Iran’s nuclear facilities would all but guarantee a massive retaliatory campaign—one that could escalate beyond Israel’s borders to U.S. forces and partners in the region. At best, military strikes might set Iran’s nuclear timeline back by a few years. But at worst, such an action would ignite a far-reaching conflict that compromises energy security, endangers U.S. personnel, undermines regional stability, and strains diplomatic ties withallies who have no appetite for another protracted conflict in the Middle East.
Why a Foreign Attack Won’t Topple the Islamic Republic
A persistent idea among hawkish policymakers is that a foreign military strike could trigger the collapse of the Islamic Republic. But this belief overlooks a powerful force within Iran: nationalism. History shows that foreign aggression tends to unite Iranians against the invader, fostering a sense of shared solidarity that could bolster, rather than weaken, the ruling theocracy.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has long attempted to stoke dissent within Iran, even addressing Iranians directly multiple times in recent months to portray himself as some sort of savior against their repressive government. However, the aftermath of Israel’s October strike on Iran reveals the futility of this strategy. Instead of sparking mass opposition to the government, the attack plunged ordinary Iranians into fear and uncertainty. Civil society leaders and groups, pro-democracy activists, and politicalprisoners alike issued stark warnings: war would derail prospects for democratic change, not hasten them.
The reaction from everyday Iranians was equally telling. Many took to the streets—not in protest against the regime, but to mourn the soldiers killed in the assault. These moments of collective grief underscored a broader truth: foreign attacks are broadly seen as assaults on the nation itself, not just its government.
Far from weakening the Islamic Republic, a military campaign is likely to strengthen its hold, at least in the short term, and deepen the challenges faced by those fighting for a freer and more democratic Iran. The lesson for policymakers? Toppling the regime from the outside isn’t just wishful thinking—it’s counterproductive.
A Better Path Forward: Diplomacy and a Deal
With the risks clear, the pressing question remains: How can policymakers prevent Iran’s nuclear program from advancing while avoiding a devastating regional war? The answer lies in reinvigorated diplomacy.
The 2015 nuclear deal provided a proven framework for freezing and even rolling back key elements of Iran’s nuclear program. Next October, the UN sanctions “snapback” mechanism—a crucial part of that deal—expires, and if triggered by France, Germany, and the UK, it would automatically reinstate sanctions. Iran has warned that such a move would force it out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), destroying remaining safeguards and leaving diplomacy in tatters.
This looming deadline demands urgent action. If the Europeans trigger snapback, the reimposition of UN sanctions and Iran leaving the NPT would dramatically increase tensions and make future negotiations infinitely harder. Policymakers must prevent this domino effect by re-engaging diplomatically now.
Diplomacy offers tangible, achievable benefits that make it the most viable path forward. A revived or updated nuclear deal can reimpose verifiable restrictions and intrusive inspections on Iran’s nuclear program, significantly hindering any covert pursuit of a nuclear weapon. It also creates critical channels of communication that can help address broader regional flashpoints, reducing the risks of miscalculation and violent escalation. Furthermore, by incorporating economic incentives, diplomacy has the potential to empower civil society within Iran over time, avoiding the backlash and rally-around-the-flag effects that often result from military action or coercive measures.
Policymakers in the U.S. and Europe have a narrow but critical window to prioritize negotiations. Restoring or updating a nuclear deal—while leveraging the pressure of sanctions and Iran’s own economic vulnerabilities—offers the best path to curbing Tehran’s nuclear ambitions without plunging the region into chaos.
In a provocative new essay published by Foreign Affairs, Nancy Okail, President and CEO of the Center for International Policy, and Matt Duss, the organization’s Executive Vice President, present a sweeping critique of the entrenched U.S. foreign policy orthodoxy and lay out a bold blueprint for reform. The essay, “America Is Cursed by a Foreign Policy of Nostalgia,” challenges decades of militarism and neoliberal economic policies that have prioritized corporate and elite interests over the well-being of most Americans and people worldwide.
With the 2024 election confirming the collapse of Washington’s traditional foreign policy consensus, Okail and Duss argue that neither “America First” unilateralism nor liberal internationalism can address the urgent needs of a world grappling with climate change, economic inequality, and political instability. Instead, they call for a transformative foreign policy rooted in shared global challenges, equitable economic reform, and principled international cooperation.
“The United States must choose between advancing a genuinely equitable global order or clinging to an undemocratic and unsustainable quest for global primacy,” said Okail. “Our current trajectory not only fails to meet the needs of working Americans but also alienates nations and peoples worldwide that are calling for a more just and inclusive international system.”
Key recommendations in the essay include:
Ending Failed Militarism: Shifting from prioritizing global military hegemony at any cost to a foreign policy that prioritizes human security, accountability, conflict prevention, and consistent application of international laws and norms.
Breaking from Neoliberal Economics: Ensuring prosperity is more widely shared among US communities, while reducing global inequality and economic precarity through equitable trade, labor, and investment rules, including by reforming global institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to support low- and middle-income countries, enabling sustainable development and debt relief.
Redefining Relations with China: Moving beyond Great Power Competition and zero-sum strategic thinking to focus on collaborative solutions for climate change, public health, technological innovation, and a more inclusive global economic and political system.
“Decades of militarized foreign policy and economic systems designed to benefit corporations and the wealthy have left working-class Americans—and communities around the world—paying the price,” added Duss. “The 2024 election put a decisive stamp on what has long been clear: the Washington foreign policy consensus is not only intellectually bankrupt but also increasingly alienating to the American people. It’s time for a new approach that breaks from the false choice between ‘America First’ unilateralism and ‘America is Back’ nostalgia, focusing instead on the needs of everyday people and a future built on common good, human rights, and shared prosperity.”
This essay is a call to action for policymakers, thought leaders, and citizens who recognize that the challenges of the 21st century require a fundamentally new approach to U.S. leadership.
The full essay is available in Foreign Affairs and can be read here.
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The Center for International Policy (CIP) is a woman-led, progressive, independent nonprofit center for research, education, and advocacy working to advance a more peaceful, just, and sustainable U.S. approach to foreign policy.
