A Progressive Foreign Policy Agenda for Congress from CIP Advocacy

Today, CIP Advocacy shared a legislative agenda to the offices of legislators on Capitol Hill. The program builds on policies and research from the Center for International Policy, drawing from Executive Vice President Matt Duss’s call for a foreign policy revolution, published this month in Foreign Affairs.

The three-pronged agenda is built around stopping endless wars, defeating corruption at home and abroad, and reducing the cost of living.

“The new majority in the coming Congress can advance an ambitious foreign policy agenda around the three concerns voters made clear in the midterm election: endless wars, unprecedented corruption, and the rising cost of living,” writes Vice President of Government Affairs Dylan Williams writes. “The three are deeply linked, with Americans viscerally aware that the most severe threats to their security and livelihoods now come from within: a president who launches unauthorized wars while enriching his family and cronies, and an economy increasingly dominated by a handful of oligarchs and corporations threatening to destroy their jobs and financial futures.”

Explore the full agenda below:

Author & Attribution Notice: This policy memorandum was researched, drafted, and published by Center for International Policy Advocacy, an independent 501(c)(4) social welfare organization. It is shared on the CIP website for educational and informational purposes only. The views, legislative recommendations, and policy positions expressed in this document are solely those of Center for International Policy Advocacy.


Here’s How Congress Should Fight Corruption

After the midterm elections, Democrats should prioritize anti-corruption investigations. They can start with the Trump family, argues Casey Michel.

Two years into Donald Trump’s second administration, corruption is undeniably the defining issue of our time. Amidst unprecedented kleptocracy, overseen by an administration dedicated to brazen self-enrichment, Trump’s second term catapulted concerns about corruption to their greatest relevance in decades. While Trump at one point claimed that few people cared about his or his administration’s corruption, the recent midterms have proven him spectacularly wrong. Not only was corruption one of the clearest motivators for voters this week, but it was perhaps the most important topic—arguably for the first time in American electoral history. 

This new Congress has a clear mandate. It must transform voters’ concerns about corruption into momentum and progress. None of this will be easy, nor will all of the solutions be legislative alone. Trump has two more years in the White House – and opportunities not to just continue enriching himself and his family, but to block any kind of legislative solutions to rebuilding America’s anti-corruption architecture. 

White House opposition can’t stop the new Congress from placing corruption at the core of all of its efforts over the next two years. There must be high-level hearings, including a broad swath of subpoenas, on the spectacular corruption scandals we’ve seen this term, from the Trump family’s profiteering to his transformation of the pardons process into an open-air bidding racket, to launching an examination of how the most oligarchic forces and wealthiest corporations used campaign finance loopholes buy favorable outcomes. At the heart of all of this must be showing how all of this corruption harmed the average American, and how it decimated the American economy, and how it warped American foreign policy in the process. Along the way, policy-makers must begin building out a 2028 campaign playbook to continue this anti-corruption momentum, preventing not only brazen Trumpian corruption from returning but ending the decades-long policies, trends, and loopholes that led to a figure like Trump, and all of this corruption, in the first place.  

Voters Sick of Corruption

American voters told pollster after pollster that they are voting against corruption. Opposition to corruption transcends partisan lines; in an October 2026 poll, Fox News revealed that corruption topped the list of voter concerns in the midterms, surpassing everything from inflation to the war in Iran and beyond. 

Ten years since Donald Trump was first elected, his two administrations have overseen far and away the most kleptocratic regimes the U.S. has ever seen. Crypto schemes alone brought in over a billion dollars to the president and his family. Private investments flowed from foreign regimes to Jared Kushner, like an invisible hand on the scale helping Kushner guide his father-in-law’s policies from Iran to Israel to Ukraine and beyond. There are the real estate investments, the procurement scandals, and pay-to-play schemes for everything from pardons to sanctions relief and beyond. The list runs on ad nauseum.  

Trump may be a singularly corrupt figure in the history of the American presidency, but he benefits from years of increasingly favorable climates for corruption, like a Supreme Court that gutted campaign finance laws while legalizing bribery, to a compliant Congress that repeatedly shied away from taxing the wealthy.

After two years of the second Trump administration, the price and visibility of corruption is inescapeable. And, as voters demonstrated on Tuesday, Americans are desperate for anti-corruption in action, not just rhetoric. 

Which is why it’s now – right now, and not later – that a future Democratic Congress, and any campaign to retake the White House, prepares an accountability agenda to end this morass of corruption,  bringing this Age of Oligarchy to a close. The Center for International Policy contribution to that effort is our anti-corruption initiative, The Unrigging Project: Ending the Age of Impunity.

Targets for investigation 

Thankfully, Congress doesn’t necessarily need to pass legislation to be effective, at least after the midterms. With the majority, Democratic lawmakers can – and must – press ahead with high-level investigations into everything from the Trump family’s self-enrichment to the broader ways that American policy, both domestic and foreign, has been sold to the highest bidders. Once the new majority is seated, Democrats can once more use subpoena powers to force information out of investigative targets – and begin revealing how this American kleptocracy has impacted voters across the country. 

The most pertinent precedent remains the post-Watergate hearings led by Sen. Frank Church, who steered a select committee into intelligence abuses – and uncovered a raft of corruption scandals along the way. A select committee, in both the House and Senate, remains a nimble, dedicated option for leading these kinds of investigations. 

Such investigations don’t need to be limited to specific committees. If anything, breaking up the investigations into simultaneous topics and tracks can allow the new Congressional majority to tackle more (though not necessarily all) of the topics at hand – and craft a narrative about how all of this corruption has impacted the broad swath of Americans. 

Congressional investigations after the midterms should start with three major subjects: the Trump family, pardons and prosecutions, and money in politics.

Investigating the Trump family – and especially the children: Despite a reputation as being immune to corruption allegations, the staggering levels of self-enrichment embodied in Trump during his second term has notably dented his support. His children and in-laws – Donald Trump Jr., Eric Trump, Jared Kushner, and more – were never elected, and have no constituencies of their own. They present significant openings for Democrats to investigate the levels of self-dealing and rank corruption swirling through the administration. Defense procurement, crypto, foreign entanglements, the impact on everything from domestic policy to national security – investigating the Trump family and its hangers-on presents abundant  opportunities for Democrats to shine a light on just how much the administration is dedicated to personal profiteering at the expense of American interests. 

Pardons and dropped prosecutions: While there have always been questions about the scope and allowances for presidential pardons, we have never seen the kind of open-air market that has developed for bidding for pardons from President Trump. Story after story have revealed the details of an entire infrastructure of these kinds of pay-for-pardon schemes, now running into the millions of dollars with a proliferation of lobbyists and fixers acting as middlemen. Nor, of course, are those seeking these indulgent pardons among those actually deserving of them. Among those pardoned thus far are notorious scammers, fraudsters, and money launderers who targeted prone victims – the kind of white-collar criminals that Trump would recognize. So too are those foreign nationals who have either been pardoned or seen prosecutions explicitly blocked, from Trump’s pardon of Juan Orlando Hernández, the former Honduran president convicted of drug trafficking, to the Justice Department’s abandonment of prosecution against Gautam Adani, the  wealthy Indian oligarch accused of both fraud and bribery. Such investigations into this open-air market for pardons can shine a light on how it is only the wealthiest, and the most criminal, who have obtained them – and how it has all forced their victims to suffer once more. 

The explosion of money in politics: The intertwining of money and politics reached a natural end-state under Trump, in which the deepest-pocketed donors, either oligarchic or corporate, often buy their way and their preferred policies, regardless of what Americans want. Trump has made no secret of the open-door relationships his administration has developed with its constellation of donors. Nor are these just companies and corporate heads taking advantage of the lack of campaign finance regulations. Everything from the White House ballroom to Trump’s future library has been saturated by the wealthiest donors – many of whom promptly get their way, and whatever they want, from the administration. A congressional investigation centering and exposing all of these networks not only presents the opportunity to illustrate how little American interests play a role in administration decisions – but also lays the groundwork for far more substantial anti-corruption and campaign finance reform moving forward. 

These three targets present an opportunity for Democrats to highlight the kind of elite impunity that predates Trump, and that is inextricable from anti-corruption reforms more broadly. They craft a story that centers victims, and showcase the true costs of corruption for everyday Americans. 

They will also set the stage for plans for 2028 campaigns – and beyond. 

Looking ahead to 2028: Rebuild the Architecture

Fighting corruption should remain one of the primary pillars of Democratic campaigns after the midterms, including as candidates begin building out their 2028 playbooks. There are a number of reforms that they must focus on, falling into three primary buckets. 

Trump used his second term to destroy much of the anti-corruption architecture that the US  developed over decades. He’s succeeded far more than anticipated – but only to a point. While Trump spent much of his second administration detonating the US’s anti-corruption tools, he and his allies have not managed to repeal related legislation – meaning that, should a Democrat retake the White House, they will have every opportunity on their first day in office to restore all of the programs and policies Trump poleaxed. 

This is true across the executive branch. Out of the Treasury and Justice Departments, a new Democratic president can instantly restore the previous task forces dedicated to targeting networks of both domestic and international corruption. So too can a future president restore related bodies within the International Revenue Service to specifically target the wealthiest tax cheats in the U.S. And the next administration can announce the immediate reinforcement of tools like the US’s shell company registry, as well as things like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The foundation is, despite all of Trump’s efforts, still there – it just needs to be rebuilt. 

But a future administration can’t simply rebuild—they must also restore, and even expand, the funding for all of this. Funding for things like the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the IRS, the DOJ’s Public Integrity office, the Federal Election Commission, and other bodies (including more detailed below) related to corruption in America must be expanded. As we have seen, absent funding, these bodies can and will atrophy – and corruption will flourish as a result. 

Broaden the policy

The next president cannot stop there. It’s not enough to simply restore America’s anti-corruption architecture to what it was; it must be expanded, and significantly. 

This must start with traditional means of money laundering and corruption. A future administration, alongside allies in Congress, must immediately  close anti-money laundering loopholes for industries like real estate, private equity, hedge funds, and venture capital. These loopholes first emerged in the mid-2000s, and allowed all of these industries to explode into destinations for dirty money – including from foreign sources. 

But it’s not just traditional sources. In recent years, industries like crypto have likewise exploded as go-to money laundering vehicles, allowing for the immediate transfer and transformation of illicit wealth around the world to be moved, hidden, and injected into the American economy – including into American politics. For too long, crypto enthusiasts have claimed that they can and should be the ones overseeing all kinds of anti-corruption checks in their industry. But they have failed, spectacularly. This entire industry, most especially those who oversee the mixing of cryptocurrencies and those interacting with unhosted wallets, must be subject to stringent anti-money laundering requirements. 

So, too, must there be new regulations on the so-called “enablers” who provide everything from accounting and legal services to structuring these offshore and laundering networks in the first place. This is especially true for law firms, who have been caught out providing everything from shell company formation to lobbying services for nefarious actors for years, pointing to specific legal loopholes as reason enough not to conduct basic anti-corruption checks. This class of middlemen provides the expertise, guidance, and protections that networks both foreign and domestic rely on to hide their money from investigators around the world – and to curry favors with American politicians, buying them off and purchasing American policy in the process. 

In addition to all of these new anti-money laundering requirements, Congress must spearhead a new push to broaden transparency requirements elsewhere. This is especially true for two vehicles in particular: shell companies and trusts. For decades, these two vehicles have provided all of the secrecy and legal protections that corrupt networks both near and far require to hide their wealth. However, they have long abused those secrecy protections, transforming into key threats to American democracy in the process. While they shouldn’t be banned outright, the U.S. must pass legislation requiring their public registration, and identifying who are their ultimate owners or beneficiaries. If these vehicles want to continue enjoying legal protections, the least their owners can do is provide details on their structure and who benefits – and, it goes without saying, how they may connect to any American policy-makers or campaign funders in the process. 

Expand the toolkit

The executive, along with congressional allies, must also expand the fight against corruption. Significant transparency requirements, and even restrictions, must be placed on presidential pardons, allowing far greater insight into how and why a president issues a pardon – and what kind of payments were involved. Broader reforms within the executive branch must restore the independence of the Justice Department, preventing future executives from pursuing or dropping prosecutions and investigations in the name of political considerations. Congress should even consider revisiting previous authorities it had to appoint special counsels dedicated solely to anti-corruption offices, akin to what other countries like Albania have formed, tasked with overseeing major anti-corruption investigations. And the executive must pursue all options available – including to the point of supporting a constitutional amendment – to overturn the Supreme Court’s recent rulings allowing both unbridled campaign finance regulations and the breathtakingly strict definitions surrounding what counts as bribery. 

Nor can policy-makers stop there. Reformers must specifically target the Supreme Court for anti-corruption reform as well, implementing everything from transparency requirements for justices’ sources of funding to limits on court terms. Reformers must also place an outright ban on all stock-trading for members of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches, including Cabinet-level officials. And further strict bans must be placed on any official engaging in any prediction markets, which have opened up a brand new space for further insider trading and related corruption, without any requisite guardrails. Such bans should also be considered for any family members of any officials as well. 

Coordinate Efforts

Much of this will take time, and will significantly broaden the aperture of America’s anti-corruption efforts. As such, the executive must introduce a new body tasked with overseeing all facets of anti-corruption coordination. 

We have already begun seeing indications of this, as with Sen. Schumer’s formal call for an anti-corruption bureau. Similar efforts have proven effective elsewhere, like Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau. In order to streamline and successfully expand anti-corruption policies and efforts – including investigations, policy proposals, funding, enforcement, and more – the executive should introduce the US’s own Anti-Corruption Bureau, acting as a clearinghouse and coordinator for everything from Treasury, State, Justice, the FBI, CIA, and more. 

With this new body, America’s ad hoc anti-corruption efforts can find far more organization and for more efficacy – and continue the momentum already building far more effectively. Absent greater coordination, these efforts risk disintegrating, and setting anti-corruption work back years. As detailed below, this new body can also act as a broader center for linking anti-corruption efforts with campaign finance reform and tax policy, all of which remain the primary prongs for restoring American democracy more broadly. It can also act as a center of efforts to liaise with state-level corruption investigations and attorneys general, serving as a great means of coordinating anti-corruption efforts at multiple levels of government in the U.S. 

Likewise, as detailed in the next section, this new bureau can serve as the center for international anti-corruption efforts as well. Rather than dealing with scattered investigators and policy-makers, America’s democratic partners elsewhere will have a new body dedicated to aligning anti-corruption interests – and expanding this burst of anti-corruption momentum beyond the U.S. itself. 

Anti-corruption in America, anti-corruption internationally

Corruption, as the Biden administration previously outlined, is a core national security threat, and it can be beaten by Democracy, just as the Confederacy was in the 19th century and totalitarianism was in the 20th century. The fight against corruption is the 21st century’s fight for democracy. 

All of those reforms must center accountability. Americans correctly understand that impunity protects the elites steering  American politics, American economics, and American lives. Whether launching the Iraq War, driving the Great Recession, or aiding and abetting the genocidal war in Gaza, entire generations of elites – many of whom have been caught up in their own networks of corruption – skated off without any accountability whatsoever. That must change, both for the sake of the success of corruption reforms and for the future of American democracy writ large. Accountability must be a core, constituent part of the congressional investigations mentioned above, as well as the plans for executive-level reforms post-2028. 

This elite impunity extends to not just Americans guiding foreign policy, but often their allies, like the Bolsonaros, who sought to return Brazil to a crony state and were welcomed into the United States after electoral defeats, where they can avoid legal consequences at home.

The future of anti-corruption policy must adapt to the ways corruption evolved to evade old safeguards. In the 21st century, corruption is a far broader phenomenon than past, narrow definitions, as Americans well recognize. It’s no longer just about bags of cash slid under tables, or backroom dealings that benefit both public and private parties (especially since the Supreme Court ruled payment for favors already rendered doesn’t count). Corruption is now at the heart of American politics, and even the American economy. 

Modern anti-corruption includes ending the practices of offshore wealth and tax havenry more broadly. Shell companies, tax-dodging schemes, multinational races to the bottom – these are all prongs of corruption, and should be understood as such. They bilk taxpayers, gut nations, and lead directly to the rise of the kinds of oligarchy now dominating both democracies and dictatorships alike. 

Anti-corruption work must also extend to: campaign finance. While much of America’s campaign finance architecture remains perfectly legal – and therefore not traditionally understood as corruption, per se – the stark majority of Americans recognize for exactly what it is: the selling-off of American policy to those who can bankroll politicians, rather than constituents and voters. “Legalized corruption” may be an oxymoron, but it is the current state of American politics – which is why, to ensure the future success of anti-corruption efforts, campaign finance reform must be at the center of discussions. Indeed, it’s long past time to recognize that the fight for fairer taxation, the fight for campaign finance reform, and the fight for anti-offshore reforms are all part of the same struggle – and part of the anti-corruption conversation. 

None of this will be easy. But we know what needs to be done. Now we simply have to be ready.   

On Tuesday, voters gave Congress a mandate that they’re ready for action on corruption. Now, they are waiting for their new leaders to deliver the promise of a less corrupt present, and a far less corrupt future. 

Casey Michel is a Senior Non Resident Fellow at the Center for International Policy.

This report is part of the Center for International Policy’s anti-corruption initiative, The Unrigging Project: Ending the Age of Impunity. 


Foreign Policy at the Fore in A Change Election

Foreign policy might not be the first concern of every voter, but it’s top of mind for most in a time of war, American authoritarianism, and economic crisis. Center for International Policy experts on the international policy stakes of the US midterm elections.

Many candidates in the US midterm elections on November 3 have framed the election as an existential referendum on American democracy. Will voters reject the authoritarian practices of President Donald J. Trump? Foreign policy is at the front and center of the election, with a generational shift on the table. Twenty-five years since the Sept. 11 attacks, two generations of the American electorate – and the political class – have been shaped by world-changing American wars of choice. 

Narrowly, voters are choosing members of the U.S. House and Senate, as well as many state and local legislators and officials. Broadly, however, voters are expressing their preferences between war and peace, democracy and authoritarianism, chauvinism and cooperation. Americans are suffer a cost-of-living crisis brought on by an entirely elective US war against Iran — even while the US and Israel continue a genocide in Gaza and ethnic cleansing in the West Bank and Lebanon. Foreign policy might not be the first concern of every voter, but it’s top of mind for most.

To better understand how the election will shape US foreign policy, and what changes may reverberate throughout the world, experts from the Center for International Policy highlight the stakes for critical international issues in a world in flux.

Compiled and edited by Kelsey D. Atherton.

Extreme Corruption Prompts Backlash

Casey Michel

It’s clear that voters cared more about corruption in this election cycle than at any point in living memory—and maybe ever in American history. But the anti-corruption energy won’t end here. Voters expect high-level investigations into everything from the Trump family’s corruption to the pay-to-play nature of pardons to how American policy was consistently sold to the highest bidder, leading to disasters both domestic and foreign. And they’re expecting something else: accountability. For too long, elite accountability has been the name of the game in Washington—and has led directly to all of this rank corruption, of which voters are sick and tired. 

Democrats have an unprecedented opportunity to expose all of the corruption rotting Washington, and to set the stage for an even bigger anti-corruption campaign in 2028. It’s an opportunity they won’t get again—and that they can’t afford to squander. 

Iran Deal or No Deal

Sina Toosi

What I’m watching most closely in the midterms is how the outcome shapes Trump’s calculations about another major escalation with Iran. With reports that Washington is preparing for possible renewed military operations immediately after the election, the stakes could hardly be higher.

A major Republican defeat would leave Trump politically weakened, facing greater congressional scrutiny and probably leave him more concerned about salvaging his presidency and legacy. That could strengthen incentives for diplomacy, particularly given Iran’s demonstrated ability to disrupt global energy markets through its leverage over Hormuz. This is as another major escalation, especially one targeting regional energy infrastructure, could trigger an economic crisis with devastating political consequences for Trump.

Yet a weakened president with little left to lose electorally might also be more inclined to gamble on military force in pursuit of a decisive victory.

The central question is whether the midterm results make Trump more cautious or more willing to take more extraordinary risks. No longer facing another election himself, his calculations will presumably be shaped by his legacy and what he hopes to achieve in the final two years of his presidency.

Rejecting Forever Wars Abroad and at Home

Yumna Rizvi

What gets built for war abroad always comes back home. Tuesday will show whether Congress is ready to face that. 

The so-called Global War on Terror wrote a playbook: indefinite detention, torture, secret legal memos, expansive war authorities, impunity, and a label that can be stretched to fit anyone. No one was held accountable, so the playbook keeps getting reused: in the war on Iran, strikes in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific that Congress never authorized, and at home in immigration enforcement, policing, and detention. Military-grade equipment continues to flow to local police through programs like 1033 and 1122. Taxpayers pay twice: once for the war, and again for the machinery built to police them.

I’m looking for a Congress that won’t stop at ending forever wars: one that reclaims its war powers, follows the money, and asks who profits and who is targeted. Restraint abroad and accountability at home are how the playbook finally ends. 

A Middle East Policy Not Centered on Israel

Sam Heller

In terms of my main area of focus, Lebanon and Syria, neither country has really featured in any midterm race.

Israel and AIPAC, though, have figured prominently in a number of races—Michigan, most notably. If Abdul El-Sayed and other Israel-critical candidates win, that would represent a major blow to pro-Israel groups’ influence domestically. That, in turn, would raise new questions about the future of U.S. support for Israel.

Support for Israel is, to a large extent, the organizing principle of U.S. policy in the Middle East. If that support—heretofore unconditional, effectively—is no longer dependable and constant, then the logic of U.S. involvement in the region begins to de-cohere. That could open up all kinds of new policy possibilities, including reconsideration of the United States’ relationships with its regional authoritarian partners and—fingers crossed—an end to U.S. backing for continued Israeli aggression against Lebanon and Syria.

Voters Tired of War

Allie Hansen

Now that the anti-war veneer that put Donald Trump into office is gone, voters are looking to new candidates – the midterms could very well bring the largest cohort of progressive lawmakers to Capitol Hill.

Since Trump’s illegal war on Iran started, the executive branch has notified congress of almost $80 billion in major Foreign Military Sales of arms to the Israeli government and countries in the Gulf, and congress has given little oversight. Voters are feeling the effects of the war on their daily lives: over half of Americans in a recent poll believe that ending the war would improve the cost of living by “a lot.” After midterms, Congress should take their role seriously – they have the opportunity to enforce existing law, question arms sales that do not benefit the American people, and block defense spending that will continue the illegal war in Iran.

To follow through on their commitments to Americans after midterms, it is time for Democrats to expel the corrupt myth that sending billions of dollars of weapons to human rights abusers is protecting Americans. It is robbing them of funds that should be put into healthcare, public schools, and feeding and housing American families.

Tax War Profiteers to Offset Accumulating Costs

Zachary Cuyler

Pundits use gas prices as a bellwether for U.S. electoral politics. In the context of the Iran war, commentators assume that the Strait of Hormuz works like a tap, and that the United States and Iran are fighting over the rate of flow to determine the price of gasoline and shape the midterms. 

But the war’s effects are cumulative. Even as more oil has started to flow, the cost of moving it has increased. Accumulating damage to refineries in the Middle East (and Russia) has durably raised the price of diesel. High diesel prices hit rural voters dependent on trucking and agriculture hardest, but also raise the price of anything moved by truck or rail–virtually everything Americans consume. Even if the war somehow ends tomorrow, elected officials will have to deal with its long-term consequences. They should look to oil companies’ massive wartime profits when they do.

Rejecting War, Rejecting Islamophobia

Negar Mortazavi

As an Iran expert, I’m watching whether Trump’s war on Iran becomes a defining political liability for Republicans in this election.

Trump campaigned against endless U.S. wars in the Middle East and won votes promising to avoid them. Instead, alongside Netanyahu, he launched two illegal wars of aggression against Iran in 2025 and 2026, costing American blood and treasure and driving up prices for American families.

If Republicans lose, it will send a powerful warning to future presidents: starting another costly, open-ended war in the Middle East carries a political price at home.

I’m also watching Abdul El-Sayed’s Senate race in Michigan. This contest represents a front line in the struggle of Muslim Americans against racism, Islamophobia, xenophobia, and other forms of prejudice that often intensify when the U.S. wages wars in the Middle East. It will be an important test of whether Americans reject these politics of fear and division.

The Oligarchy Loses Steam

Nancy Okail

Already we have seen candidates who are mainly outside the establishment win primaries despite billionaire’s attempts to bury them with money. At the same time, candidates like Abdul El-Sayed and Adam Hamawy endure racist attacks, ones deemed acceptable in political and media circles. Triumph despite billionaire-backed attacks comes from voters rejecting the conduct of those opposed to pluralistic democracy.

Constituents have made clear their opposition to U.S. involvement in war, whose costs they bear while military contractors profit. Congress must use its constitutional powers to enforce the law, end the war, and cut further funding. It should hold hearings, investigative war profiteering, and hold those responsible accountable. Congress should also take this as an opportunity to reconsider its support of Israel, to stop abetting the genocide in Gaza and the illegal settlement of the West Bank.

The electoral turn is a challenge to increasingly unchecked oligarchic power. Tech billionaires spent a decade shaping policies to their own profit. Candidates across the nation campaigned against such corruption. We are looking to see a Congress meet the charge from the voters that elected them, and govern on anti-corruption to confront, restoring power to democracy and away from oligarchy.

End of the Blob

Thanassis Cambanis

For generations, a small coterie has held sway over US foreign policy, embracing a bipartisan consensus based on the flawed notion that war and military domination can secure American interests.

Status quo thinking has proved disastrous for America and the rest of the world. Since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Washington has led an assault on international law, multilateral institutions, and what remained of the Geneva Conventions. 

Advisers to Barack Obama rightly derided “the blob,” foreign policy experts who got all the major decisions wrong but somehow maintained a stranglehold on policymaking, even when it was clear to normie, non-expert, voters that those policies were epochal failures. Many of those same advisers went on to start new wars and underwrite the genocide in Gaza, and set the stage for Trump’s illegal and unwarranted war on Iran.

The good news is that candidates and voters are breaking the blob’s shackles. They don’t want a foreign policy imposed on them which savages the world and leaves Americans worse off too. The blob’s consensus left no one safer or better off. The raw and open discourse about Gaza, Israel, the Iran war, and America’s destructive addiction to militarism and military spending suggests that the blob’s monopoly might finally be collapsing.


Q&A: Serbia’s Triumphant Students Give Hope for Democracy

Serbia’s student movement overthrew an autocrat peacefully at the ballot box. What can the rest of the world learn from the Student List’s victory?

A student movement successfully defeated Serbia’s autocratic leader in an improbable journey from protest to electoral victory. On October 26, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić conceded after losing a high-turnout election driven by student activists against corruption, who put together an electoral slate that specifically excluded both students themselves and also almost all career politicians. 

The opposition ended 14 years of rule by Vučić after two years of students organizing through direct democracy. To better understand the achievements of Serbia’s student movement, and its significance for the global fight against authoritarianism, the Center for International Policy spoke to Ivan Marovic, a Serbian organizer and educator. Marovic was a leader of Otpor, a nonviolent resistance movement that played a critical role in the downfall of Slobodan Milošević.  He is now the Executive Director of the Center for Nonviolent Conflict Research in Washington, DC.

High Turnout Was Crucial

Kelsey D. Atherton: What was your initial reaction to the news?

Ivan Marovic: When we woke up here in D.C. with a five-hour difference, voting was already going on in Serbia, and we already saw that the turnout is huge. In my experience, from 2000 and also from Otpor and also from the Orange Revolution: turnout is the prime indicator for electoral revolutions. Big turnout is a good sign it’s gonna happen. 

By the time the polls closed, we saw that the turnout was almost 70%. Everything over 65 is good. Seventy, it’s gonna be a blowout. We did 72 against Milošević. He was defeated in the first round.

All of a sudden, Vučić comes out, half an hour or so after the polls were closed. Totally contrary to good manners and practice, where you wait for the winner to come out first and then you come out and congratulate the winner, he came out first and declared he lost the elections and blamed the American deep state. He said, ‘against the wishes of President Trump, the American deep state meddled in our election’. We were caught by surprise. We didn’t expect it to be that quick.

I know that the kids in Serbia were preparing for the battle that night, they had election observers at every polling station. They were ready. But he unexpectedly just gave in. 

There were some indications that he was preparing for something else. He was amassing some paramilitary troops, what they call the Titushki in former Soviet states. These are paramilitary thugs in civilian clothes. They were congregating in the city center, but then they dispersed. Probably there was some plan to do something, but that plan was never tried. He just gave in, and that’s election day.

Even Autocrats Need Footsoldiers

Thanassis Cambanis: Why do you think he folded?

IM: The most popular theory among Serbians is that somebody called him from abroad. I doubt that. I think that the reason why he folded was that the turnout was so big, and the difference was so big, that the only thing he could do was outright cancelation of the elections, and he didn’t have the repressive capacity for that. He also has experience from October 5 [the overthrow of Milošević in 2000]. He knows what could happen to him if he tries such a drastic measure.

Had the difference been smaller, he would have tried some manipulation, maybe annul elections in certain polling stations and tried to repeat them, maybe outright change some tabulations. But with such a huge difference in votes, the only thing you can do is drastic, annul the elections and impose some martial law. But he doesn’t have the repressive capacity for that. He is not Milošević.

Mobilizing Through Direct Democracy

KDA: Can you tell me about how these students were so able to compel the rest of society out to vote?

IM: What happened here, similarly to what happened in our case, is that the movement was able to grow outside of partisan politics until it reached maturity and developed its own independent political formation. It wasn’t immediately channeled into existing ones. In our case, in the case of Otpor, we started engaging with the opposition as an autonomous political force, and we pressured them to do certain things. In the case of the current students, they said of the opposition parties “We don’t care about you, we’re gonna build something completely different.” And then they did it!

KDA: A fascinating part of this to me is that while students didn’t run themselves, they decided to gain control of the government by running a list of competents untainted by politics. Can you speak a little to your understanding of how that came about?

IM: The whole thing started with organizing on universities through what is called plenums [Editor’s note: you can read the Center for Nonviolent Conflict Research’s research on plenums here.]

The plenums as a form of direct democracy were the main vehicle for politicizing the youth. We have testimonies from people saying they didn’t know anything about politics, they didn’t understand how democracy works, but engaging in plenums, they actually understood, and they started getting politically educated to understand the role of politics, democracy, people. They understood how to formulate policies, how to do advocacy, and they improved their game over time. 

That is the first six months of the student protest, and then they realized in those six months that they will not be able to reach their demands until they get involved in politics. They started thinking about ‘how can we get involved in politics? We have to run a list of candidates for MPs’, and so they started working groups preparing for elections, learning what they technically had to do. 

In the meantime, the other part of the student movement is already spreading the model to citizens, starting these popular assemblies. They asked people to self organize into popular assemblies in different parts of town, different villages, wherever. The model of plenums is being replicated now by citizens. So they have this huge body politic that kind of has that legitimacy. It’s not the same as being elected, but there is some sort of collective will that they represent, and then they use that to create the list of candidates for the election, and that was like a long process. 

What was interesting is that of all the people who were not just people who were selected, but even the people in the previous rounds that didn’t get selected, nobody nobody talked. We didn’t have a single kind of official confirmation of anybody that they were considered for a student list. The process was very kind of democratic, horizontal, whatever, but still very secretive.

Strategic Move from Protest to Politics

KDA: Was that secrecy a hedge against preemptive repression?

IM: When we saw the list, these are nobodies. There are a lot of professors and doctors or whatever, but they’re not political figures. They’re not public figures. I think they wanted to protect them. The biggest problem here is not repression, that somebody will put you in jail. They just drag you in the tabloid press. And for these people, these are ordinary people living in small towns, like surgeons, like doctors. They wouldn’t be able to handle that. I think that was wise to protect their identity, knowing what Vučić and his regime are capable of.

KDA: One of Vučić’s capabilities seemed to be securing jobs for inept patrons. His regime signed off on inept work to disastrous ends, to the point that anti-corruption has been the central organizing focus of the student movement.

TC: How motivating is anti-corruption as a way of mobilizing this movement, and how much of that is that it’s easy to sell and hard to translate into a meaningful political program?

IM: The whole thing started with the collapse of the canopy at the railroad station in Novi Sad, which killed 16 people, and the protests started around that, and then spread. That specific case was always central. A lot of people who would say look, what the courts are doing at this moment are actually spot on. They’re not dragging their feet. They are investigating. They are processing this, it’s just a complicated case and going to take a lot of time. That’s the problem of fighting corruption. Fighting corruption is, at the end of the day, a legal fight, and that has a different dynamic. But they did manage to turn that into a political issue, and mostly it wasn’t there. 

I will always salute the kids; they’re cute, but let’s be honest: the real mobilizer was Vučić.

The way he handled that actually gave wings to the movement because: first he denied it happened, then immediately he said that they renovated the whole train station except that canopy. Then he said that yes they did renovate the canopy. Then when they demanded the documentation he gave them something that wasn’t what they were asking for, so he was going from one mistake to another. Then, when they started the first kind of public protest, he sent the thugs to beat them up, and that is where the kids went and blockaded the university because they went out into the streets to protest. They were beaten up. They went to the university and they barricaded themselves. And this is how the blockade started. A lot of it is a dynamic of backfire, not so much corruption. Corruption was at the seed of it, but actually, his response to corruption was what made people angry, and that actually fueled the movement. 

Anti-Corruption: Enough of a Unifying Ideology?

IM: Very similar to what we’ve seen in Nepal, where it started also as anti-corruption, and then Bangladesh too started as anti-corruption. Then the repressive act backfires. Although in both Bangladesh and Nepal it was much more drastic; Serbia never had anything like that. Nobody was killed, but kids were run over by cars. They were beaten up by thugs, by police, and in the day of social media, you see kids protesting and somebody ramming their car into the crowd, videos of young girls being hit by cars. That really kind of pissed people off, and that gave fuel to the movement. 

What then happened over the next two or three months, was actually the student movement was just like repeating ‘The institutions need to do their work. Corruption needs to be investigated. It was more boilerplate vanilla values, the liberal values of rule of law.

But because on the other side you see the regime escalating and escalating. This is the moment where maybe five, six months into the protest, they finally decided that they’re going to go political, and that they’re going to demand elections and run in the election. It wasn’t an easy decision, and there were parts of the movement that were against it. There were parts of the movement that were for it. They went through the process of deciding through the plenums. It was a very slow process, but they finally made that decision, and then they, then they became political.

After that, corruption was still at the center of their message, but now as a political problem: this is the regime that enables corruption. Therefore, we need to remove the regime. It wasn’t this rule of law angle, ‘we need to prosecute those who are responsible for corruption’. It was more the regime is responsible. We need to replace it.

The Russia Factor 

KDA: What can you tell us about the student list candidates’ feelings on Russia? Will they break from the Vučić regime?

IM: It’s a very diverse list, there are all kinds of people there. However, there isn’t a single Russian agent or a Russian “polezniye duraki,” useful idiot. One maybe. But what is important is that they don’t have political unity on several issues, including Russia or EU integration. They don’t have unity on, I think, Montenegro, but mostly on foreign policy. 

Something that Vučić hopes will happen is that these opposing political orientations are going to cause a split in the movement, and in that gap, he is going to make a comeback. Maybe aligning with one of the factions, or the fight between them becomes so big that like nobody everybody forgets that he existed. So that’s one thing. Another thing that happens is that they keep some unity together until they dismantle the security apparatus. But that also means the Russian component of the security apparatus. 

This is where the two scenarios are conflicting. Yes, ideally they will stay together, both the Western and the Russian faction. And they all say they want to dismantle the security apparatus, but unfortunately there is the Russian component of it, and they will have to address that. They have a center in Niš, in south of Serbia, which is kind of a humanitarian center, and it’s all spies, all Russian spies. They’re there.

KDA: This is a live tension in the new governing coalition that wasn’t really at the forefront, but there from the beginning, and resolving it wasn’t part of the platform.

IM: Still is not. They’re pushing this for later. They are saying we should focus on the dismantling of the security apparatus, criminal security apparatus, and all these foreign policy issues, we’ll do them later. My theory is that when they start dismantling, they will run into Russians, and then they will have a foreign policy problem before they want to.

Global Contest: Democracy vs. Authoritarianism

KDA: Can you speak to this Serbian student movement as part of a global trend of resistance and protest around anti-corruption, anti-authoritarianism?

IM: I personally see them as part of the wave that started in Kenya in 2024. Bangladesh, Nepal, Madagascar, Indonesia, I think that’s part of the same trend. There are lots of similarities: focus on corruption, stepping out of traditional political parties. In Bangladesh they brought Yunus who is not a politician. In Nepal they got an engineer to be a prime minister. 

But they don’t see themselves like that. I took Serbian students with other students to Oslo for the Nobel Peace Conference, and so they were together with Nepalese, with Kenyans, with Brazilians. There were even Americans there, like American students, and the Serbians, they didn’t even know, they were realizing that they’re part of something bigger. It just showed me that they weren’t really influenced much by what was going on in these other countries which was for me kind of really interesting, just phenologically speaking.

TC: Are we in a moment, Ivan, where, after a lifetime spent immersed in Arab revolts and other beautiful movements that were slaughtered and marginalized. Do you see us at some kind of turning point or movement?

IM: I will say that what is happening now in Serbia, but also like what happened in Nepal is this kind of attempt to turn around.

People hate politics, people hate political parties, but then you get them to participate in the elections and to elect certain candidates, and so in a sense you still go back to the democratic process and democratic institutions, but it’s not a straightforward path. It’s like a winding path through plenums. But at the end of the day, we still have 250 MPs, and they’re going to have a government in like a couple of weeks or a month, and these are the same institutions. They have a popular mandate. Like 70% of people voted. So in a sense I believe that we are in a very big pickle globally. But I see that as a potential experiment that can revitalize democratic processes. 

Marovic spoke with CIP’s Vice President of Research Thanassis Cambanis and International Policy Journal editor Kelsey D. Atherton on October 29, 2026. The interview has been lightly edited for clarity.


CIP Statement on the Selection of the Next UN Secretary-General, Opposition to Nusseibeh Candidacy 

October 22, 2026 — Nancy Okail, president and CEO of the Center for International Policy, issued the following statement:

“The Trump administration’s reported rejection of every candidate for UN Secretary-General is another unprecedented attack on international institutions and norms. While imperfect, the post-World War II international system aspiring to multilateralism and the rule of law is far better than the world order this administration seems to want: one where might makes right, autocrats and oligarchs write the rules, and corruption is simply the cost of doing business. The United Nations must not be used to advance that dangerous vision.

“We are also concerned that Minister Lana Nusseibeh has been put forward as a seeming ‘compromise candidate’ in response to this impasse. As the United Arab Emirates’ top diplomat at the UN, Nusseibeh has been the public face of the UAE’s denials that it was arming the murderous Rapid Support Forces in Sudan. She kept up those denials even as evidence mounted of the RSF’s atrocities – which the US determined to be genocide.

Nusseibeh’s career and her family’s standing in the UAE are deeply entangled with an authoritarian regime that serves as a haven for global kleptocracy and corruption. Given her close ties to anti-democratic rulers and record of helping to undermine international law, she is a totally inappropriate choice to lead the UN. 

“People around the world are watching with real fear as authoritarianism, extremism, oligarchy and technological upheaval reshape their lives. While it is long past time for a woman to serve as Secretary-General, the UN needs a chief executive who has stood with the ordinary people caught in the crossfire of conflict, catastrophe and instability – not one who has helped shield the wealthy and powerful who are driving this violence and suffering.”


Q&A: Brazil’s Elections and the Return of Bolsonarismo

On October 4th, reactionary Flávio Bolsonaro took the lead in the first round of voting over incumbent Lula, buoyed by the growing strength of Brazil’s right-wing evangelicals and despite Lula overseeing a growing economy. To help get a sense of what this means for the international community in advance of the second round election on October 24th, where Bolsonaro appears favored to win, International Policy Journal editor Kelsey D. Atherton sat down with Senior Non Resident Fellow Michael Ahn Paarlberg. 

The following interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Kelsey D. Atherton:  As a foreign observer familiar with the region, how expected was this result?

Michael Paarlberg: Flavio Bolsonaro’s lead in the first round was a surprise. It was predictable that the election would go to a runoff, since there were multiple candidates in the race. However because those candidates were on the right, splitting Flavio’s vote, and because of positive economic indicators for Lula, it was expected that Lula would come out ahead and be in a slightly stronger position than Flavio for the runoff. The polls clearly underestimated Flavio, but none predicted a decisive Lula victory; the consensus was it was essentially a tossup. Only now has the consensus shifted to a probable, though not entirely certain, Flavio victory in the second round.

Extralegal Risks

KDA: In the last Brazilian presidential election, Flávio’s father Jair attempted to cling to power, in a pattern that to my eye at least resembles J6. Do you think there’s any likelihood of an extralegal effort here, a move to more legally in-bounds action on the election, or a clean and free process?

MP: It’s quite likely that Flavio wins outright, so there would be no need for him to attempt the kind of coup that his father actively planned, and nearly carried out. The degree to which Brazil came close to an outright coup in 2022/23 became clear in the police investigation that followed the J8 insurrection. Incidentally, it did indeed resemble J6 – there was even a Brazilian Q Anon shaman – although it was poorly planned for an insurrection, given that Congress wasn’t in session and the president was out of town. But in retrospect, the warnings by the Biden administration, and by senators Kaine and Sanders, for the Brazilian military to respect the democratic process, were crucial.

The most likely case for there to be extralegal actions were if Lula were to win in the second round. If that were to happen, it is likely that the Bolsonaristas would refuse to recognize the result, and would create a constitutional crisis. Were that to happen, I would not count on the Trump administration to play a helpful role.

Reactionary Congress Likely

KDA: Are there any down-ballot signals?

MP: The more decisive result from the first round is that, no matter who wins, the legislature will be controlled by the right. Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party won the plurality of seats up for election in both chambers of Congress. And while there are divisions between the more far-right Bolsonarista wing and the more traditionally conservative and clientelist Centrão, it is more likely that the two would come together around a shared neoliberal agenda under Flavio than make a deal with the PT under Lula. Thus it is hard to see a viable path for the kind of ambitious social democratic reforms under a fourth Lula term that he pursued under his first.

The Economic Story

KDA: Under Lula’ Brazil has achieved many of the robust material conditions that could once be expected to deliver reelection for an incumbent. What’s the story there?

MP: By all pocketbook measures, Lula should have had this election in the bag. He certainly thought so, and it seems these results have stunned his campaign. For those who say “it’s the economy, stupid,” these results don’t make sense. Brazil’s unemployment rate is at a historic low. Extreme poverty has been nearly halved under the current Lula administration alone. This is to say nothing of his first term, when the commodities export boom spurred GDP growth and financed social spending programs like Fome Zero and Bolsa Familia that lifted millions out of poverty and reshaped Brazil’s political map. Even crime, which was a big issue in this election, is actually dropping: including violent crime, down 8% year to year and nearly 40% since its peak a decade ago. It is true that inflation is a problem for voters, as it is across the world, but this is largely out of the government’s hands, and has much to do with global oil prices surging from Trump’s war with Iran. 

There are many non-material factors that have set the tone and issues of the election: a media environment which is strongly in favor of Flavio, the role of the evangelical mega-churches, corruption scandals which implicate Flavio but has turned out to be a liability for Lula too, and Trump’s own intervention in the election.

Changes in Political Culture

KDA: One enduring factor is the change in ideological composition of the Brazilian electorate. The rise of evangelicalism in the country has been blamed for everything from poor performance in the World Cup to the success of reactionary politics despite material conditions. What’s your read?

MP: A lot of observers outside the region miss this trend, because historically they associate Brazil, and Latin America as a whole, with Catholicism. In fact, Protestantism, in the form of evangelical Christianity, is fast growing throughout the region, and in some countries in Central America, evangelicals outnumber Catholics. In Brazil, they are about a third of the population, but if trends continue, they could overtake Catholics within a few decades. This has had tremendous consequences for Brazil’s politics. First, what in Brazil is often termed Pentecostalism has shifted a focus of politics more toward religiously defined issues. Brazil is becoming more conservative, but this is a social conservatism, rather than a traditional libertarianism of the business elite.

Second, it has stolen a significant part of Lula’s and the PT’s base. Lula’s first win shifted the left’s base from the urban factory workers of Sao Paulo to the rural poor of the northeast, where Lula is from. And these voters, many of whom are Afro-Brazilian, some of whom stay in the northeast and others who move to the cities, have reliably voted for the PT for a generation. It is within these communities where we see the fastest growth of the Pentecostal churches, and thus see a major shift of poor and Afro-Brazilian voters toward the right. The largest of these churches oversee vast media and business empires, can set the tone of political discourse, and serve as massive voter turnout machines for the Bolsonaristas. 

Campaigning in public spaces – Many of the Electoral Court's rules regarding election campaigning have changed since the last general election in 2022.

Using public space to distribute flyers, stickers, and small campaign cards is permitted, provided it does not obstruct the movement of the public. These items may be handed out on public streets, in squares, at street markets, and in parks.

Candidates were allowed to distribute printed materials and hold walking tours, motorcades, and marches until 10:00 PM yesterday, October 3—the eve of the election.
Photo: Edilson Rodrigues/Agência Senado

Anti-establishment Politics

KDA: Lots of presidential systems in the Americas have seen recurring backlash to incumbents; Chile, Colombia, and Brazil are all set to elect reactionaries after having incumbents on the left, a pattern one could argue extends as far north as the United States. Do you see this reactionary wave as distinct from anti-incumbency, part of it, or something else?

MP: It’s not just anti-incumbency, but a broader kind of anti-establishment politics: a selective one, because both Flavio and his father Jair have benefited from this sentiment (along with other right-wing figures such as Kast in Chile and Fujimori in Peru) despite being career politicians. It helps him that his opponent, Lula, is 80 years old, and is the most consequential politician of his era. Thus anyone dissatisfied with the direction of government, and with the political elite, will more likely associate their grievances with him – a great irony for someone who came from the anti-government labor movement of the 1980s. 

Elsewhere, incumbents have won reelection: Abinader in the Dominican Republic, MORENA in Mexico. But the social issues that have come to define many elections in the region, including in the US, crime, migration, gender and sexual issues, have driven a particular anti-establishment message that benefits populists of the right, as opposed to economic issues which tend to benefit populists of the left.

Amazon Conservation Implications

KDA: What would a second Bolsonaro on the world stage mean, especially for causes like preservation and climate change mitigation championed by progressives internationally that depend a great deal on limiting the exploitation of the Amazon?

MP: It certainly would reverse the gains made under Lula’s current term to combat deforestation. This is the policy reversal we can anticipate will have the most devastating consequences for the rest of the world. It should be understood that Lula’s push to preserve the Amazon is remarkable, and came with political cost, because Brazil has long bristled at efforts by the international community to limit its exploitation of the Amazon, seeing it as a matter of national sovereignty. 

To Brazil, the Amazon is roughly analogous to the West for the US in the Manifest Destiny era: an area of great promise and vast untapped wealth, with indigenous communities who unhelpfully live there standing in the way. Cutting down the rainforest to start a ranch has long been the path to economic independence for poor Brazilians unable to make a living elsewhere, serving as a pressure valve for urban labor markets. And many Brazilians consider it hypocritical to deny them the chance to grow rich by exploiting their resources, when it comes from countries like the US or Norway which did the same thing. Nevertheless, Brazilians are also seeing, and researching, the impacts of deforestation, and there is support for preservation. This comes into conflict with the political demands of ranchers and the agribusiness industry, which is the engine of Brazil’s economy.

Media and Media Narratives

KDA: Anything the rest of the world should read into it cautiously?

MP: I’d caution against reading that a Flavio Bolsonaro victory in the runoff is a reflection of a reversal in material living conditions in Brazil. As I mentioned: unemployment is down, poverty is down, crime is down. We can see this in other countries that shifted to a hard right turn, such as Chile, where Kast won on an anti-crime and anti-immigration platform despite both crime and migration dropping. 

It’s also important not to read this as a reflection of corruption in a simple sense: the Banco Master scandal touches Flavio directly, and Lula only indirectly, through a Supreme Court justice who is seen as allied with him. Yet that scandal has not hurt Flavio. Instead, it contributes to a general sense of cynicism that “they’re all corrupt” which favors a right-wing anti-establishment message. The left’s response, essentially: “we’re not as corrupt as our opponents,” is not a winning message. Even if it’s technically true. Nor is it helping them to point out that the social issues in this election, such as crime and education, are not really federal issues: policing and schools are administered at the state and local levels. The left’s reputational loss has less to do with its performance in office than with media narratives, which they do not control. 

Call it a vibes-based election. But these vibes come from institutions: media conglomerates, mega-churches, Silicon Valley, Trump, none of whom are friendly to Lula. 

For media availability and comment, contact Michael Paarlberg. 


CIP’s Global Progressive Network Welcomes New Partners in Canada and Chile

The Center for International Policy is delighted to welcome Canada’s Broadbent Institute and Chile’s Rumbo Colectivo to CIP’s Global Progressive Network. They join The Australia Institute and Japan’s New Diplomacy Initiative in connecting progressive organizations across regions for shared analysis and practical collaboration.

Each partner brings a distinct strength. The Broadbent Institute combines social-democratic research with movement-building, leadership development, and independent media. Rumbo Colectivo connects progressive thought in Chile and Latin America with practical policy development and public debate. The Australia Institute excels at turning rigorous research, particularly on the economy, climate, energy, and democracy, into public influence and policy change. Japan’s New Diplomacy Initiative brings deep expertise in cross-border advocacy, connecting civil-society perspectives with policymakers, legislators, and media in Japan and the United States.

“At this inflection point, marked by global disruption and the advance of anti-democratic forces, there is an urgent need and a real opportunity for greater solidarity and coordination among progressive partners,” says Nancy Okail, President and CEO of CIP. “I am proud to welcome the Broadbent Institute and Rumbo Colectivo as we develop concrete solutions on economic justice, anti-corruption, AI and digital sovereignty, digital public goods, multilateralism, and accountability.”

Network members have already exchanged research and expertise, shared resources, convened public discussions, appeared on one another’s podcasts, and collaborated on emerging policy challenges.

CIP’s recent merger with Century International expanded our institutional and research capacity, which now encompasses 40 staff and fellows. The growth of our global network complements that expansion, strengthening our ability to connect ideas across regions and translate them into public debate and policy action.

CIP, the Broadbent Institute, and Rumbo Colectivo have already collaborated, including as part of the 2026 Panamerican Conference. 

“To help build a progressive and internationalist vision for the world, the Broadbent Institute is pleased to become a part of the Center for International Policy’s Global Progressive Network. In championing human rights-led and democratic relationships between Canada and the nations of the world, the GPN is a new and important nexus for building international solidarity,” says Jen Hassum, Executive Director of the Broadbent Institute.

This collaboration is born of a shared vision for human flourishing, with collaboration across borders to tackle problems that transcend national boundaries.

“A serious progressive collaboration must be built across regions, not exported from one to another. Rumbo Colectivo is proud to bring Chilean and Latin American perspectives to a network grounded in mutual learning and concrete action,” says Tomás Leighton, Executive Director of Rumbo Colectivo.


Support Schumer’s Anti-Corruption Bill; Reverse the Corrosion of American Politics

July 31, 2026 – In response to Sen. Schumer’s announcement of new legislation to create an Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Center for International Policy Senior Nonresident Fellow Casey Michel issued the following statement:

“We welcome Sen. Schumer’s push to place anti-corruption efforts front and center for Democratic reforms. We also commend the bill for taking aim far beyond just Trump himself. Corruption has seeped so far into American politics, especially into American elections, that a new bureau is sorely needed to combat it, and to reverse the corrosion of American politics. We look forward to working with anti-corruption advocates to continue the much-needed work to take back our democracy from wealthy, powerful and unaccountable interests”



Against those who sow fear: Europe and the end of American Dependability

In 2016, as the world reeled from the surprise election of Donald Trump to his first term as President of the United States, writers across Washington looked for signs they could have missed about how this real estate mogul turned reality star could become president. Writing in The Daily Beast, journalist Ronald Radosh recalled a conversation in the District three years prior. Trump’s campaign manager Steven Bannon, then just the director of far-right Breitbart.com, told Radosh that “I want to bring everything crashing down, and destroy all of today’s establishment.” 

Deep into Trump’s second term, Bannon’ s invocation of the destruction of an ancien régime reads less like a provocation and more like a statement of intent. Despite the fluctuating relationship between Bannon and the U.S. president, the disruptive, quasi‑revolutionary authoritarian rationale he articulated has become increasingly visible in the trajectory of U.S. politics.

This development is hardly confined to the domestic sphere. The U.S. foreign policy characterized by the erosion of bilateral and multilateral agreements in favour of unilateral arrangements has generated growing concern among the United States’ partners, particularly in Europe. While the rise of reactionary politics is a global phenomenon, the democratic regression of a country with the structural influence of the United States carries disproportionate consequences. Should this trajectory consolidate, it risks accelerating similar dynamics elsewhere, including in Europe, where such tendencies have already taken hold.

Europe should mobilize an additional €10 trillion in investment in sustainable energy sources by 2050, alongside green and technological reindustrialization.

To foster a knowledge-based digital economy built on research and technology transfer, promoting digital humanism and environmental sustainability, and strengthening low-emission technological solutions.

Member States should allocate at least 1% of their GDP to renewable energy and energy efficiency. 

Before increasing defence spending, existing resources must be shared more effectively to prevent duplication and address the inefficiencies present in many national armed forces.

The EU and member states should increase foreign aid funding for democracy work, to fill gaps caused by a decline in US spending and ensure that pro-democracy activists are not abandoned in their aspirations.

This transformation is already reshaping the strategic environment. As uncertainty surrounding U.S. commitments deepens, states and regions that remain invested in a rules-based international order are increasingly compelled to reassess their partnerships and seek more stable and predictable counterparts.

In this context, democratic actors within the United States retain a central role in reversing institutional erosion. Their efforts will likely continue to find resonance among European counterparts. Yet if current trends persist, Europe will be forced to adapt to a more inward-looking United States, recalibrating its alliances in response to a more fragmented and volatile global landscape.

Regardless of the path Washington ultimately takes, the European Union faces an urgent imperative: to address its own structural vulnerabilities by deepening unity and strengthening sovereignty. Should democratic backsliding in the United States intensify, Europe may find itself assuming a more central role in upholding democratic norms at the global level. The geopolitical void created by a retreating United States offers such a possibility, provided Europe is willing to reduce long-standing dependencies and act with strategic coherence, and stand as a bastion for pro-democracy forces globally.

Democratic Backsliding and its Transnational Effects

The assault on the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021, marked a watershed in contemporary U.S. politics. Initially perceived by some as an isolated rupture, it increasingly appears as a precursor to a broader and more sustained process of institutional erosion. Trumpism has evolved into a political phenomenon with clear affinities to contemporary far-right movements, reflecting deeper structural tensions within the United States democracy.

In the years since, this regression has not abated. Developments associated with Trumpism, particularly during the president’s second term, pose a systemic challenge to democratic resilience in the United States. For Europe, this evolution is significant for both normative and strategic reasons.

First, the United States is falling short on the expectations that the western and liberal world had placed in it as a central pillar of the liberal democratic order, even though such expectations may have been somewhat unwarranted and even exaggerated. Its current trajectory raises fundamental questions about the durability of democratic institutions, even in what some consider to be historically consolidated systems. Second, Trumpism has demonstrated a capacity to project itself beyond U.S. borders, leveraging transatlantic networks to influence political dynamics in Europe. Initiatives linked to figures such as Bannon, including attempts to establish far-right training centers and think tanks across the continent, illustrate the increasingly transnational character of these movements.

Europe’s dependence on the United States spans multiple domains, but it has not, and should not, do so when it comes to the sphere of ideas. Indeed, the United States is no longer simply affected by global democratic backsliding; it has become one of its principal laboratories. The implication is clear: if institutional erosion can occur in a system as established as that of the United States, it can occur elsewhere.

The Strategic Logic Behind Trump’s “Peace” Agenda

During his second term, Donald Trump has increasingly framed himself as a promoter of peace. This positioning, often interpreted as linked to his stated ambition of receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, has nonetheless produced uncertain and, at times, contradictory outcomes.

Beyond its personal dimension, this posture reflects a broader structural logic associated with relative decline. Historically, declining empires facing economic strain—characterized by rising debt and inflation—have sought to secure access to strategic resources and maintain influence through coercive or violent means, frequently under the rhetorical cover of stability or peace. The United States and Donald Trump have in fact taken the concept of peace and turned it into subjugation, the notion that under the direction of the President the country is entitled to rob, exploit, dominate, and undertake any course of action to ensure that existing privileges—by being an empire—are maintained and protected.

Recent U.S. actions can be interpreted within this framework. Trump’s threats against Greenland’s sovereignty marked a significant rupture in transatlantic relations. For many European governments, it challenged a longstanding assumption: that the United States would not question the territorial integrity of allied nations. The episode has accelerated debates across Europe regarding strategic autonomy, particularly in defense, technology, industry, and energy.

Economic relations have also come under strain. Tariff measures targeting key European sectors, including automobiles, agri-food products, steel, and aluminum, have been widely interpreted as a direct challenge to the transatlantic economic partnership. As a result, confidence in the United States as a stable and predictable partner has been significantly weakened.

At the same time, in conflicts such as Ukraine, Palestine, and Iran, U.S. positioning has often appeared misaligned with that of its traditional allies. At the same time, Trump has shown greater synergy with the aggressors, like Putin and Netanyahu, than with the victims, like Zelenskyy, who have suffered public and televised humiliations coming from the U.S. president. This perception has contributed to a growing sense of strategic divergence across the Atlantic.

Public opinion reflects this shift. Survey data in recent years indicates a decline in European trust toward the United States, with increasing skepticism regarding its role as a security guarantor. Longstanding alliances, especially NATO, are being reconsidered amid growing doubts.

Europe in an Age of Strategic Reassessment

For decades, Europe, like much of the Western world, outsourced key dimensions of its sovereignty. Industrial production shifted to Asia, energy dependencies formed with Russia and North Africa, and responsibility for defense was largely delegated to the United States. This model has created the structural vulnerabilities that today undermine Europe’s position on the global playing field.

In a global environment increasingly defined by geopolitical competition and authoritarian tendencies, such dependencies are no longer tenable. Yet this moment of disruption also presents an opportunity. The European Union has the capacity to redefine its role, positioning itself as a central actor in the defense of democratic governance without replicating the coercive dynamics of traditional great powers.

Strategic autonomy, however, should not be equated with disengagement. Europe faces a strategic inflection point: adapt to instability and redefine its role in international order. This includes strengthening multilateral frameworks, investing in international institutions, and building coalitions with like-minded democracies.

To translate potential into capacity, structural adjustments are required. Reindustrialization and the revitalization of the primary sector are essential to reduce dependency on external supply chains. Equally critical is the development of an autonomous energy strategy centered on renewable sources. In parallel, advancing a coordinated European defense framework would allow for more efficient use of resources while reducing reliance on external actors.

Therefore, and willing to synthesize the lines of action that the European Union should adopt in order to move towards a strategic reassessment that brings more sovereignty, the following recommendations should be applied:

  1. To mobilize an additional €10 trillion in investment in sustainable energy sources by 2050, ensuring a green transition that allows us to achieve climate neutrality objectives while maintaining a competitive industrial base. 
  2. A European plan of public social and ecological investments designed to reindustrialise Europe, with a focus on the new economy and the green and technological industries, while also strengthening our autonomy and sovereignty.
  3. To foster a knowledge-based digital economy built on research and technology transfer, promoting digital humanism and environmental sustainability, and strengthening low-emission technological solutions.
  4. Investing in the energy transition: Member States should allocate at least 1% of their GDP to renewable energy and energy efficiency. The European Commission should present a multiannual investment strategy to plan the investment needs for the EU’s energy transition. We estimate that public and private investment needs in energy efficiency, renewable energy and sustainable technologies across the EU amount to €1.7 trillion by 2030.
  5. A common European security and defence policy, based on genuine cooperation in security matters across the EU. Before increasing defence spending, existing resources must be shared more effectively to prevent duplication and address the inefficiencies present in many national armed forces.
  6. The EU and member states should increase foreign aid funding for democracy work, to fill gaps caused by a decline in US spending and ensure that pro-democracy activists are not abandoned in their aspirations.

Conclusion: From Dependency to Agency

As the United States becomes increasingly inward-looking and more authoritarian, Europe faces a decisive strategic moment. The erosion of U.S. position within the democratic international order does not automatically produce a successor, but it does create an opening.

Whether the European Union can assume a more central role will depend on its willingness to act collectively, invest in its own capabilities, and articulate a coherent vision for its place in the world. This is not simply a matter of geopolitical positioning; it is a question of political responsibility.

If the United States no longer defends the democratic order, the question is no longer whether Europe should act, but whether it can afford not to.

Oriol Junqueras i Vies is the leader of the Catalan party Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya. He was the Minister of Economy and Finance of the Government of Catalonia from 2016 to 2017. He also served as a Member of the European Parliament (2009–2011 and 2019–2020), as a member of the Spanish Congress (2019), as a Member of the Parliament of Catalonia (2012–2019), and as the mayor of Sant Vicenç dels Horts, near Barcelona, from 2011 to 2015. He holds a degree in Modern and Contemporary History and a PhD in History of Economic Thought from the Autonomous University of Barcelona.


From the Sahel to Saint Paul, Curtailing Security Force Abuse Prevents Violence

In January, Americans became immediately and tragically familiar with the spectacle of masked and armed agents of Federal security forces shooting civilians in broad daylight. The horrific violence from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) against people in Minnesota, particularly the killings of protestors Renee Good and Alex Pretti, match the threat to everyday society seen in places abroad where security forces operate with reckless impunity. Immediate deescalation is necessary in Minneapolis, along with a commitment to avoid similar violence in other cities, but we must acknowledge that it is unlikely this administration will end their campaign to remove undocumented immigrants through seemingly any means. The systemic security force abuse that is accompanying ICE’s presence across American cities and hidden in detention centers will have lasting damage, particularly on already vulnerable immigrant communities and requires comprehensive prevention efforts by civil society and local government. 

This kind of violence is not new, even in the United States where police abuse has resulted in numerous deaths, though its deliberate provocation by a Presidency against the people of a US state is unique. In the past protecting civilians from such violence was seen as a crucial part of US foreign policy, as part of a holistic effort to combat the conditions that foster violent extremism.

I have spent my career designing and managing conflict prevention, counterterrorism and security assistance policy and programs in Africa. I am not the first to remark on the striking similarities occurring on American streets with what I witnessed in multiple authoritarian African countries. I’ve sat in traffic, protected by diplomatic plates, eyes down and afraid to truly look, as police officers beat a man who was refusing, or couldn’t pay a bribe. I’ve designed security assistance programs across the Sahel that have been canceled due to massive military attacks against unarmed civilians in the name of counterterrorism. I’ve interviewed young people who defected from Boko Haram to learn why they joined, and personal or family abuse by security officials was often a primary reason. 

Strengthen hyper-local resilience networks
Rebuild trust in security forces through community-engaged policing at the state and local level
Ensure a gender-sensitive approach
Provide psychosocial support and counseling to those that have suffered or witnessed security force abuses

I live in Washington DC, one of the first cities to be targeted by the Trump administration’s campaign to round up immigrants without regard for accepted standards of engagement. Like many in the community who pulled together through a patchwork system of signal chats, I drove kids to school who no longer felt comfortable walking or taking the metro. On our drives, we frequently witnessed masked agents pulling people, mostly men, from their cars and violently pressing them against the doors or shoving them to the ground, instantly handcuffed behind their back. Sometimes we drove past in silence, avoiding eye contact because it was too difficult. Other times they chatted in Spanish, identifying friends who lived in nearby buildings and texting them to make sure they knew to stay home. One day, the dreaded news came through: one of their fathers had been abducted on the street on his way to work. After being transferred from one detention facility to another, he told his family that the conditions were so terrible that he felt he had no choice but to self deport. 

Although media attention is focused intently on Minneapolis now, ICE is still present in Washington and many other cities around the country, and their violent tactics have become emboldened and sanctioned by political officials. In fact, rather than simply being a tactic, ICE violence has become a policy, and a means to promote and enforce power. 

Decades of research in Africa has shown that lack of trust in government, security force impunity, and general perception of marginalization are factors that can lead to recruitment by violent extremist organizations, especially when triggered by a “tipping point” event such as violent abuse by security forces. While there is no indication of increased violence among communities targeted by ICE, American civil society, and eventually the American government, should be attentive to these risks and take steps to prevent increased marginalization and risk of violent non-state groups forming in response to the abuses they have faced. 

As the large-scale public response in Minneapolis and micro-level networks to protect and support neighbors across the country have shown, communities are resilient in the face of state sponsored violence. I’ve seen this personally through hundreds of community-based organizations I’ve worked with across Africa that have developed with limited resources to protect their people who face violence from both the government and non-state armed groups. 

Federally sanctioned security force violence has harmed a sacred social contract between Americans and the government, but there are ways to prevent longer term damage. Although the context between the African countries where I have worked and the United States is very different, international experience and evidence suggest that states, cities and civil society could focus on the following actions to mitigate the risks of continued state violence and repression:

  1. Strengthen hyper-local resilience networks: Protection and support that occurs closest to home such as Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs), neighborhood committees, or churches/houses of worship can provide a sense of belonging that reduces real or perceived marginalization. These frontline groups may be able to help develop strategies and capacities to resist violence. Many of these networks exist organically but can be strengthened with external financial or organizational support, however it’s important not to overwhelm their authenticity. 
  2. Rebuild trust in security forces through community-engaged policing at the state and local level: This approach is not new to the American context where some law enforcement entities have spent decades building relationships and trust within immigrant communities. Rebuilding or developing positive relationships that effectively address non-immigration related crime will require redoubling these efforts and focusing on transparency and independence from immigration enforcement. Lessons can be drawn from Kenya, for example, where there has been significant challenges of police misconduct and political interference. 
  3. Ensure a gender-sensitive approach: Although many of the people impacted directly by ICE’s violence are adult men, women’s lives are also changed particularly if they must take on additional roles to support their family financially to compensate for the loss of one income if a spouse is detained or deported. A gender sensitive approach should also consider the impact on boys and young men, whose role in the family and society may also be shifting. 
  4. Provide psychosocial support and counseling to those that have suffered or witnessed security force abuses: Given the risk that security force abuses can be a tipping point towards violence, it is critical to address this trauma early and provide ongoing counseling particularly for youth. Psychosocial support has been identified as a critical aspect of peacebuilding, reintegration of former fighters, and post conflict reconstruction following many types of violent conflict in Africa.

In the near term, these actions will fall to civil society, state and local government, and private citizens. The Trump administration has decimated many federal government services that address community violence prevention and detection domestically and abroad in the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) Justice, and State, as well as the FBI, including funding for NGOs. But beyond that, as was the case in many other countries I have worked in, the use of sanctioned state sponsored violence is intentional. As opposed to many countries, where political leadership acknowledges the need to address systemic security force abuses but fails to control it in practice, in the United States, such abuse continues to be promoted as acceptable. The tragic deaths of Renee Good and Alex Pretti, as well as the deaths of at least 53 people held in detention by DHS, are a direct result of the consistent sanctioned violence by security forces. This violence continues around the country, in neighborhoods where national media has gathered to witness it and in others where the harm is documented only by bystanders, and it is causing both short- and long-term damage to this country, and requires a holistic response. 

Margot Shorey is an expert on counterterrorism and conflict prevention and previously served in the Department of State Bureaus of African Affairs and Conflict and Stabilization Operations.