Trump’s Aid Freeze Could Leave Millions of Syrians in the Dark

Omar Hamed Beato is a visual journalist from Spain based in the Middle East covering conflict, climate change, migration, and social issues. You can find him on Instagram and follow his work here.

As night falls over Qaboun, one of the many shattered neighborhoods on the outskirts of Syria’s capital Damascus, it almost becomes impossible to witness the devastation left by over thirteen years of civil war. What was once a bustling area with cars weaving through streets and vendors hawking their goods amid the rubble has now transformed into a ghost town, deserted streets dark except for the far in-between pockets of light from those wealthy enough to afford electricity generators. Rania Laila, a 38-year-old mother of four, lives in a small rental house that has recently been rebuilt surrounded by half-collapsed buildings. In their dimly lit living room, the family relies on candles and a small rechargeable lamp, charged during the single hour each day when the government briefly activates the neighborhood’s electrical grid.

”I hope for the electricity situation to get better because it’s the most important thing, we just want to be able to live our lives,” says Laila, in her living room surrounded by her family. 

Unlike many others who managed to flee during the war, Laila and her family had to stay in Qaboun during the war as they had no means to move elsewhere. Most of the electrical infrastructure in the area has either been destroyed or looted, and they count themselves among the fortunate few who can at least recharge their phones. Not having electricity means the family has to shower in icy water during the cold winter months where it is not uncommon to reach freezing temperatures in their unheated home. At night, the entire family huddles together in the living room, wrapped in layers of thick blankets to stay warm.

Rania's family and neighbors visit her home after sunset.
Rania’s family and neighbors visit her home after sunset. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

”We would like to go somewhere where there is electricity because electricity is everything in life,” she says. ”We are here without water, we wait for the electricity to come so we are able to shower. Yesterday was a tragedy. We all needed to shower but we couldn’t. Some days we get electricity for one hour, some days it is just from five to fifteen minutes and some days it turns on while we are asleep so we miss it. We have to be careful about using the phone’s battery because it is the only way we can know what time of day it is.”

Laila’s situation, while difficult, is not exclusive to her family. The entirety of the country lives with two hours or less of electricity a day — even in major cities like Damascus. Rural areas, meanwhile, are often left with no electricity at all. After more than thirteen years of civil war, Syria bears the scars of conflict, with 6.2 million people seeking asylum abroad and 7.2 million internally displaced. Combined, the displaced population amounts to more than five times the population of the city of Chicago. For those who have remained in the country, the situation is even worse —nine out of ten live below the poverty line, or on less than $2.15 per day

Rania uses her smartphone to light up the kitchen and do the dishes.
Rania uses her smartphone to light up the kitchen and do the dishes. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

The lack of electricity is a significant factor contributing to the hardships faced by Syrians. Electricity is essential for performing basic household chores, powering hospital operating rooms, and sustaining the production processes of countless businesses. Without it, leaving poverty behind seems like an impossible task. This is the case of Mohammed Kamal Kashef, a 51-year-old carpenter working in Yarmouk, Syria’s largest informal Palestinian refugee camp —an area that witnessed some of the darkest chapters of the war. The camp endured a nearly five-year siege by pro-Assad forces, three of which while it was under the control of the Islamic State, until 2018. Kashef fled to Sudan during the war and returned to Syria in 2019, when the frontlines stabilized and Damascus became a relatively safer zone. Six months ago, he opened his business on the camp’s main street, using a small generator to power the machinery needed for cutting and treating wood. 

”This is the third or fourth time I’ve started [my life] from zero,” recalls Kashef from inside his shop. ”We have no services in Yarmouk. I have a generator, it is enough for my work. I pay for fuel depending on the amount of work I have.” 

He says he could produce more stocks if he had cheaper access to electricity. ”Right now, I can’t use the generator unless a client asks for something specific. If I had electricity, I would have pre-made some sets to sell like tables, closets or even kitchens that would save me some time. Life needs fighting and in the end, God will help us. If we work, we eat, if we don’t, we starve.”

A long way towards reconstruction.

Years of war decimated Syria’s power plants and infrastructure, leaving half of the country’s electricity grid out of service. Power stations in Aleppo, Mahardah, and Zayzoun were destroyed and energy substations —in charge of distributing electricity coming from the main power station to different areas across population centers— have lost most of their transformers. As a result, even when electricity is available, it can only be supplied to limited areas at any given time. According to information obtained by the International Policy Journal (IPJ) from the Syrian Ministry of Electricity, which has recently been merged with the Ministry of Energy after the formation of the new transitional government, it will take $40 billion to rebuild the electricity grid alone. Some estimates put the total cost of reconstruction of Syria at $250 billion, a figure comparable to New Zealand’s annual GDP.

Fuel shortages have further worsened Syria’s electricity crisis. Before the Arab Spring in 2011, Syria produced over 330,000 barrels of oil per day; by 2014, three years into civil war, that figure had plummeted to just 20,000 barrels. To compensate for this decrease in production, a sizable quantity of fuel began to be supplied by the Iranian government. 

'[We want] to live life with dignity.'' Portrait of Mohammed at his shop.
“[We want] to live life with dignity.” Portrait of Mohammed at his shop. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

“We used to get fuel from Iran. The supplies were cut off and we are facing [international] sanctions,” says Omar Shakrouk, the appointed minister of electricity after Assad’s fall, speaking from his office at the Ministry in Damascus. To compensate for the shortage of electricity, the Qatari and Turkish governments are set to send electricity-generating ships to Syria that can produce 800 megawatts (MW). However, the ministry has not been able to confirm the arrival date of these ships.

”As you know the electricity situation is very bad in Syria, there’s a shortage in generation and the energy supply. The situation is bad in general,” continues Shakrouk. According to him, the country can currently produce 1,700 MW of electricity; that figure will have to be increased seven-fold to meet the 12,000 MW country-wide demand over the next five years. To bridge the gap, the government will have to repair the damaged infrastructure. However, a shortage of spare parts and oil, as well as a lack of skilled labour make it increasingly challenging. 

With Assad now in Russia and Iranian troops withdrawn from Syria, Western sanctions enacted against the now-absent regime present a major hurdle for the new government’s reconstruction efforts. These sanctions not only block the government’s purchase of essential spare parts but also limit the import of the oil needed to run the remaining infrastructure at full capacity.

Although the U.S. has removed the $10 million bounty on Interim President Ahmed Al-Shaara, the rebel group he led towards Damascus last December, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS),  is still classified as a terrorist organization by the UN Security Council, the European Union, and the U.S., with its former ties to Al-Qaeda remaining a point of concern.

Despite this, Western nations have adopted a cautious “wait-and-see” approach, signaling a readiness to lift sanctions if the new Syrian administration enacts meaningful reforms, such as protecting the rights of minorities and women. For instance, in January, the former Biden administration issued a six-month waiver of sanctions, and, at the end of February, the EU lifted sanctions targeting key sectors such as energy and banking. 

Hired workers removing rubble. Removing the rubble created by years of war will be one of the most challenging tasks of the new government --without international help, qualified civil engineers, and heavy machinery, this task will likely take decades before neighborhoods resemble some normalcy.
Hired workers removing rubble. Removing the rubble created by years of war will be one of the most challenging tasks of the new government –without international help, qualified civil engineers, and heavy machinery, this task will likely take decades before neighborhoods resemble some normalcy. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

However, even after repeated visits by Western diplomats to Damascus following the fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime last December, and Ahmed Al-Shaara’s ongoing efforts to build relationships with the West, many of the sanctions imposed on Assad’s regime for its oppressive actions remain largely intact.

”If you want big investments in Syria, you need to stop sanctions indefinitely, not only temporarily. If the EU lifts sanctions while the US keeps them in place, it won’t make any effect because companies have a much bigger stake in the US than in Syria,” explains Joseph Daher, a Syrian political economist and author of the book Syria after the uprisings: the political economy of state resilience, via phone call from Switzerland. 

”The power plants need complete maintenance, we could not secure the needed parts. Buying fuel from other countries is complicated. We are struggling to secure flows of funding and the international currency that we need, ”continues Shakrouk. ”The sanctions impact every area, for example securing spare parts and [bringing foreign] companies. With the European sanctions lifted there is more space to have international companies, but the U.S. sanctions have a bigger impact especially because of the currency exchange and [lack of] funding. The removal of the U.S. sanctions is the most important step toward reconstructing Syria. If it doesn’t happen, the rebuilding will be impacted and much harm will be done.”

It’s not only the sanctions, it’s also the aid

The Trump administration’s decision to dismantle USAID and halt foreign aid, followed by significant aid cuts from the British government, means the funding for Syria’s reconstruction remains uncertain. The U.S. has historically been Syria’s top aid donor contributing to a quarter of all foreign aid going into the country —that compromised almost $390 million in 2024 alone. This will only exacerbate the strain on Syria’s chronically underfunded programs. In 2024, the UN inter-agency funding plan for Syria had a 64 percent funding shortfall. 

At a video appearance at the Ninth Annual Brussels Conference ‘Standing with Syria: meeting the needs for a successful transition’ on March 17, Antonio Guterres, UN Secretary General, urged countries to reconsider funding cuts. ”Syria [is] one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world, but funding for the humanitarian response continues to fall short. The international community must move with urgency to invest in Syria’s future, By expanding humanitarian support and reconsidering any cuts to funding at this critical time. By investing in Syria’s recovery, including addressing sanctions and other restrictions.”

A barber shop at night. The government plans to improve electricity in stages with big cities as the main priority before that is extended to rural areas.
A barber shop at night. The government plans to improve electricity in stages with big cities as the main priority before that is extended to rural areas. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

On the same day, the EU pledged $6.5 billion in grants and low-interest loans towards the reconstruction. Natasha Franceschi, US deputy assistant secretary for the Levant and Syria, who was also present during the meeting, did not disclose any further aid assistance to Syria on behalf of the U.S. government as they ”expect that other nations are going to help shoulder the financial burden.”

”You need international assistance to rebuild the main cities of Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs. All assistance is needed and it should not be conditional. Aid [and sanctions] are a tool of the U.S. government to have leverage with the new government –this is the problem,” says Daher.

According to Reuters, during the donor conference in Brussels, the U.S. gave the new Syrian government a list of demands to partially lift some sanctions. These include the destruction of remaining chemical weapon stockpiles, collaboration on counter-terrorism efforts, creating a liaison office to help on the search of Austin Tice, the U.S journalist who disappeared in Syria over a decade ago, and barring foreign fighters to take on senior government roles among others. 

Aerial view of Yarmouk. Many of its inhabitants live in destroyed buildings with no services.
Aerial view of Yarmouk. Many of its inhabitants live in destroyed buildings with no services. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Given that the EU is hosting millions of Syrian refugees who fled the country in the 2010s, it has an interest in stabilizing Syria so member states can legally begin returning refugees. On the other hand, the U.S., which only accepted 18,000 Syrian refugees during the height of the war, has its sights on accomplishing Israel’s policy goals on Syria. Both blocs have different policy interests when it comes to the future of Syria.

”There are contradictions [between the U.S and] the EU when it comes to Syria. The EU sees the lifting of sanctions will allow the return of Syrian refugees,” states Daher. On the other hand, he believes that ”the US government is pressuring Syria to make a deal with Israel and to weaken the region to seek normalization between the region and Israel.”

It’s not all about the money

Ahmed Al-Shaara is confronted with the nearly-impossible task of reuniting a country where social divisions run deep after fourteen years of brutal civil war. Alawites, Kurds, Christians, and Druze are some of the minorities inhabiting Syria, all wary of the steps Al-Shaara’s government may follow. In February, the government launched the ‘national dialogue conference,’ in which roughly 600 people from across the country, including minorities and women, were invited to the presidential palace in Damascus to discuss the political reconstruction of the country. Furthermore, after a delay of one month, on March 29, Al-Shaara unveiled the new transitional government, which includes a Christian woman, an Alawite, and a member of the Druze community. It remains to be seen whether this will be enough to bring different sects onboard the new government’s vision for Syria.

In the meantime, Al-Shaara has reached a deal with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who control the north east part of the country —where most of the country’s oil reserves are located and the majority of Kurds live, to integrate the group under the Syrian Ministry of Defence and achieve a ceasefire in the east side of the country, where there have been clashes between the SDF and armed groups loyal to the government in Damascus. Shortly after, the interim President signed the draft of a new constitution which, in theory, will saveguard freedom of expression, press, or minorities, and women rights, with Islamic law as the base of Syria’s legal system. Additionally, he has established five-year presidential terms with promises of elections within the next five years. He stated he hoped the constitution would open a new era in Syria ”where we replace oppression with justice.”

In central Damascus, largely spared of the war, relatively wealthy people have bought their own generators and solar panels to have an independent electricity supply
In central Damascus, largely spared of the war, relatively wealthy people have bought their own generators and solar panels to have an independent electricity supply. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

Yet, the path towards reconciliation will be anything but straightforward. Already there is internal conflict along sectarian lines. The Assads came from and privileged the Alawite community during their rule, but are no longer in power. At the beginning of March, after weeks of revenge killings and kidnappings targeting the Alawite community, Alawite armed groups loyal to Assad ambushed HTS-led security forces in the coastal regions, home to many Alawite communities. This sparked a brutal counter insurgency operation in which HTS, foreign mercenaries, and other armed groups from all over the country with resentment towards the Alawite community rushed in to fight the remnant of the regime. This resulted in over 803 extrajudicial killings and mass executions between March 6 and March 10, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, a human rights organization documenting human rights abuses in Syria. Motivated by revenge and sectarianism, the killings also claimed the lives of non-combatants, including women, children, medical personnel, humanitarian workers, and journalists.

”You have remnants of the regime that create instability, especially in rural areas. HTS is also responsible because of their policies: lack of inclusivity in consolidating their power and not tackling sectarian issues, there hasn’t been transitional justice because they have no interest in that because [HTS] should also be prosecuted for their crimes, especially Ahmed Al-Shaara and other commanders,” says Daher.

These killings have fueled skepticism about Al-Shaara’s true intentions among various groups that have yet to align themselves with Damascus. This has been the case of the Druze community, who has historically enjoyed some level of autonomy from Damascus, in the southern province of Sweida bordering Jordan and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajri, the spiritual leader of the Druze community, has so far rejected unifying the Druze community with the central government in Damascus calling the new constitution ”dictatorial.”

Protesters in Sweida demand justice for the Alawite minority who have been massacred in the coastal areas in recent weeks.
Protesters in Sweida demand justice for the Alawite minority who have been massacred in the coastal areas in recent weeks. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

In the city of Sweida, home to the Druze community, after a minute of silence held at a student-led protest against the indiscriminate killings of Alawites, Shaza al-Khatib, a 22-year-old medical student said  “[Alawites] were killed in the worst possible ways, and sadly the bloodshed is still happening even after the old regime fell. I have no trust right now. I’ll criminalize the defense ministry now just like I [criminalized] the old regime. This ministry doesn’t represent us, they killed people who trusted them and surrendered their weapons. As a Syrian, I am scared we will be killed just because we are Druze.”

Despite my meeting with Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajri at his residence in Sweida, he refused to provide any on-the-record comments on his views regarding the role of the Druze community in post-Assad Syria.

Israel has joined the game

Since the fall of Bashar, tensions between the Druze, who enjoyed certain privileges under the regime, and HTS, in the role of Syria’s transitional government, have been on the rise. At the beginning of March, there were four days of clashes between Druze armed groups and HTS in Jaramana, a suburb of the capital majorly inhabited by the Druze community. Israel, which illegally occupies the Golan Heights (where a sizeable Druze community lives), claimed it would intervene to ”prevent harm to their Druze brothers in Syria.” 

Since the fall of Assad, Israel has seized more territory adjacent to the illegally-occupied Golan Heights, striked different military sites across Syria, and declared a non-militarized zone between Damascus and its border under the pretext of ‘security concerns.’

”Conflict with Israel is not only slowing down the reconstruction of Syria but destroying more of it”, continues Daher. ”The Israeli government is trying to destabilize the new Syrian government. There is a long history of Israel trying to instrumentalize sectarian differences —it is not new at all. Israel is opposed to democratization of the region and this has been done with support of the U.S..”

He further emphasized that “If you democratize the region, you have[more] solidarity with Palestine. The day they announced a ceasefire in Gaza, you had demonstrations in Syria in favour of Palestine. The Assad regime had a policy of stopping any group from stating they want to liberate the Golan Heights. If you democratize the Middle East, that would force governments to have a more radical opinion of Israel. When people protest in favour of Palestine, they also protest against their country’s complicity with Israel and the U.S.. Israel knows that if you have more democracy, you have more opposition.”

In Sweida, Amer Alba, a commander of the Sweida Military Council —a Druze armed group formed last February by former soldiers and officials of Assad’s regime to protect the Druze community— welcomed me at one of their sites. The setting is stark, with assault rifles, .50 caliber machine guns, and rocket launchers surrounding him. The group has been accused of having pro-Israeli views.

Alba (right) at a garrison in the outskirts of Sweida. ''We don't want our weapons, we love peace but they made us keep them because of the massacres that are happening in the coast''
Alba (right) at a garrison in the outskirts of Sweida. “We don’t want our weapons, we love peace but they made us keep them because of the massacres that are happening in the coast.”Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

”[HTS] didn’t respect its people, not a child, not a woman, it’s like they’re slaughtering sheep. Al-Shaara is not different from the old regime,” says Alba. ”We will never surrender our weapons to killers and mafia like HTS. I refuse dealing with them or their existence in Sweida. There will be a waterfall of blood in the governorate [if government forces arrive]. If Israel had not intervened in Jaramana, it would’ve been a massacre just like in the coast —we will collaborate with any state that will protect our people. Sadly HTS are rejecting our existence in this country.”

The International Policy Journal has not been able to independently verify how Israel intervened in Jaramana beyond statements given by government officials.

At the local market, Marwan al-Srekhy, a 58-year-old vendor believes that the Druze community has majoritarily rejected Israel’s interference in Syria. ”The people of Sweida in general are with the government. [We support] unifying all of Syria’s groups —every citizen wants this. We want to be a part of the government and under the same flag, but [they] need to give citizens their rights,” the 58-year-old explains.

He continues, ”We don’t have anything against the current president but the people around him are bad. The government should include every group of people, but this government does not. Religion is for God and the homeland is for everyone.”

An unexploded mortar shell next to a destroyed power station in Qaboun. The manager at the only remaining power station in the area says only two out of eight of the transformers are operational.
An unexploded mortar shell next to a destroyed power station in Qaboun. The manager at the only remaining power station in the area says only two out of eight of the transformers are operational. Omar Hamed Beato for Center for International Policy.

This post also appears on the IPJ Substack, read and subscribe here.

Israel’s Invasion Seeks To Keep Syria Divided

By Alexander Langlois, a Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities and analyst focused on the Middle East. Follow him on X @langloisajl and BlueSky @langloisajl.bsky.social.

The collapse of former President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 ushered in a generational political transition in Syria. Yet, as the country works to rebuild and heal after nearly 14 years of brutal conflict, Israel appears dead set on malignly stymieing Syria’s transition, territorial integrity and continuity, and basic sovereignty. 

Indeed, Israel is pressuring Syria today under the guise of protecting minority groups in the country. The effort constitutes an extension of Israel’s “periphery doctrine” and “alliance of minorities” strategies – long central components of Israel’s broader regional effort to bolster its security through alliances with potential shared enemies of Sunni majority states. As such, Tel Aviv aims to operationalize real or perceived minority concerns in Syria to justify clear violations of its northern neighbor’s sovereignty, advancing its overarching security interests. Such efforts risk reigniting Syria’s civil conflict and should be rejected by the international community.

Israeli Violations of Syrian Sovereignty     

Less than one day after the Assad regime collapsed on December 8, Israel quickly moved to secure its interests inside Syria. IDF soldiers captured the Syrian side of the disengagement zone along the disputed Israel-Syria border separating the illegally occupied Golan Heights from the rest of Syria. It has since captured and illegally occupied numerous towns in southwest Syria’s Quneitra Governorate – the country’s second-smallest province, which contains the Golan Heights.

Israel’s decision to invade Syria coincided with a sweeping bombing campaign across the country. In an estimated 480 strikes, Israel targeted the former Syrian Arab Army’s military infrastructure and assets, including bases, weapons stockpiles, aircraft and military airports, and supposed chemical weapons sites. The goal of the operation, according to Israeli officials, was to eliminate any Assad regime weapons that could fall into the wrong hands. These strikes continue today.

Yet Israeli officials originally stressed that these operations would be temporary, mindful of both the illegality of their actions and global public opinion against its broader regional operations over the last 16 months. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu then claimed on December 17, 2024, that Israeli forces would remain until an arrangement that “ensures Israel’s security” would be put in place. This announcement reflects a substantially deeper and more nefarious goal, as Tel Aviv couples national security rhetoric with expanding operations over time. 

In this regard, Israeli leaders view Syria’s new rulers – senior leaders from the former Al-Qaeda-affiliated Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – as an immediate threat along their occupied northern border in the Golan. For Israel, the thought of another Islamist militia or armed entity on their border reflected the ongoing threat from Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Lebanon – a threat they largely eradicated in 2024.

That military operation in Lebanon highlights a drastic shift in Israel’s military strategy since the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023. Given the brutal success of Hamas’s operation in breaking through Israel’s security systems that have long blockaded Gaza, the military establishment in Israel adopted a strategy of enhanced border security on a national scale – namely by rejecting the most remote threats along those borders through the use of military force. 

As such, Israel continues to expand its illegal occupation of southern Syria. Israeli Defense Minister Katz announced an indefinite occupation of the newly captured Syrian territory on January 28. Then, on February 23, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded that the southern Syrian governorates of Quneitra, Dara’a, and Suwayda remain demilitarized, threatening the use of force should Damascus deploy in these areas. 

The threat effectively nullifies any sense of Syrian sovereignty while extending the Israeli exception to international law further into Syria and just miles from the capital of Damascus. Israeli officials have amplified ethno-sectarian tensions across the country to bolster those threats, claiming Israel’s self-proclaimed role in protecting Syria’s minority groups – including Alawites, Kurds, Druze, and Christians.

In one particularly telling instance, Israel repeatedly insisted it would use military force to protect the Druze, a major minority group in southern Syria – particularly in Suwayda Governorate. Tel Aviv cited so-called violations against the Druze in Jaramana, a densely populated and ethnically diverse suburb of Damascus with a sizable Druze population. 

Working with small and disparate Druze groups, the Israelis argued that Druze spiritual and political leaders supported an alliance – something that Druze leaders immediately and publicly rejected. Unfortunately, this did not prevent days of violence between Damascus’s new security forces and some of these minor Druze factions, resulting in many deaths.

Understanding the risks, Syrian leaders have criticized Israel’s actions without escalating the situation. This position reflects Damascus’s weakened state. Indeed, it is in no position to challenge Israel or the broader West as it hopes to garner sanctions relief necessary for a successful transitional period. With its military and economy in shambles, it can ill afford a conflict with a rogue Israeli state that will simultaneously eradicate any hope to rebuild the country and provide for its people.

Israel’s Intentions in Syria

Ultimately, Israel’s efforts post-Assad are designed to create facts on the ground that advance their interests now and in the future. Tel Aviv expects some form of negotiations with Damascus that will dictate state-to-state relations for generations should the transition succeed. Thus, the Israeli government is collecting as many bargaining chips as possible ahead of potential talks.

To put it lightly, this approach is dangerous. Israel appears willing to induce ethno-sectarian infighting within Syria to ensure the transition fails to produce a territorially contiguous Syrian state. It is doing so by co-opting minority fears in a country where the previous regime used sectarianism to sow distrust throughout the population in a classic autocratic divide-and-rule strategy that left Syria’s social fabric destroyed.

Israel likely hopes to use this pressure to induce a series of concessions from Damascus under the threat of collapsing the state, resulting in the balkanization of Syria. In this context, the goal is to prevent any serious threat to Israeli interests or territory from inside Syria. As such, Tel Aviv could hope to dangle full recognition as an alternative – an item Assad was previously negotiating alongside a break from Iran in exchange for sanctions relief and a general Western acceptance of his victory in the war.

Given that this so-called victory was anything but real, Israel is hoping to get the same or a similar outcome from Syria’s new rulers at gunpoint. At minimum, they likely hope for Syria’s recognition of Israel’s claim to the Golan Heights. Both goals are non-starters for Damascus, which would not dare risk its limited legitimacy during a highly unstable transition period by recognizing Israel or its illegal occupation and annexation of its territory. 

To be sure, Washington previously made offers their counterparts could not reject under US President Donald Trump’s first term in office – an effort that led to the infamous Abraham Accords. Morocco received US recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara; Sudan was removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list; and the UAE received numerous preferential deals. It is not unrealistic to assume Washington could bolster Israeli efforts to induce a false “peace” between Syria and Israel, especially given the former’s listing on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list since 1979. 

Still, Syria could turn to other countries for support – namely Russia and Turkey. The latter is particularly important as it represents Israel’s other major concern in Syria. Ankara directly and strongly backed the opposition during Syria’s civil war, aggressively demanding Assad’s ouster and positioning itself well in today’s post-Assad Syria as a result. Given the total collapse of Israel-Turkey relations today, both view Syria as a battleground in their growing competition for regional power and influence. 

Israel is working to ensure Turkey cannot realize its military goals in Syria. Ankara hopes to build multiple military bases in the country – something Tel Aviv worries could re-ignite Syria’s long-running role as a resistance front to its illegal occupation of Palestine and neighboring lands. 

In line with the Israeli goal to not allow real or perceived threats on its borders, it is working to prevent this potential future. Yet, just as its military operations could inadvertently produce a new rival state in Syria, Israel’s efforts to weaken the country will likely force Damascus to rely more heavily on Ankara. Thus, the short-sighted nature of Israel’s strategy comes into full focus.

Preventing a Disaster     

The international community cannot allow any regional actor to thwart or distort Syria’s transition in ways that could either upend the country or permanently tear it apart. Indeed, efforts should be focused on ensuring Syrians can lead their transition with minimal to no impediments – especially those that would harm Syria for another entity’s political gain. Washington can play a central role in this regard while retaining a light-touch approach to any post-Assad transition.

The Trump administration should temper Israeli actions in Syria, overtly and covertly pressing them to forego illegal military operations within and illegal occupation of Syria’s sovereign territory. This can be framed as supporting Israeli security – namely that occupying a neighboring country’s land creates long-term strife that could produce a Hezbollah-equivalent entity in Syria. Stressing that Syria is not interested in competition or conflict with Israel, and that Washington and Israel can work with regional partners to ensure that reality is sustained, should be central to this approach.

Washington should also coordinate with regional actors – particularly Turkey – to further ensure Syria does not remain a playground for regional and international actors to compete. Guaranteeing and supporting positive role for Ankara that does not use Syria to raise tensions with Israel is crucial in this regard as Israel views Turkish influence in the country with suspicion, if not hostility. Such efforts can bolster the parallel goal of reigning in Israel.

Finally, Washington should work with the new Syrian government to disincentivize any potential response that could escalate the situation and produce further Israeli encroachment on their territory. The United States still holds economic and diplomatic tools that can lightly steer the Caretaker Government in the best direction for Syria’s transition to succeed. Of course, this approach must reject micromanaged nation-building or any heavy-handed approach to Syria’s transition. Officials can openly back the Damascus government and gradually provide terror designation relief to reinforce this effort.

Ultimately, all states should support Syria’s political transition given the country’s geographic positioning as the “Heart of the Middle East” and out of respect for its people’s resilience and democratic aspirations after 14 years of war. Preventing unhelpful and short-sighted policies that harm that transition should be central to any actor with a stake in Syria today. Bargaining Syrian security for one of its neighbors will only produce more of the same instability that has plagued the Middle East for decades – a scenario no administration in Washington should promote or accept as pre-determined.

This post also appears on the IPJ Substack, read and subscribe here.

CIP Insider: Doomsday Clocking In

Welcome, readers! The International Policy Journal sends out a weekly roundup of what CIP’s experts and fellows have been up to, as well as articles and statements we’ve published. CIP Insiders received this newsletter as an email first. Sign up here to get on the inside.

This week, we cover the fall of Bashar al Assad in Syria, the ongoing political crisis in South Korea, diminished prospects from gender justice from the UN’s climate conference, and preparing for another Trump administration.

But first…why is President Joe Biden handing Donald Trump a reloaded and expanded nuclear arsenal?

Joseph Cirincione has decades of experience in Washington around issues of nuclear security and disarmament. He also recently joined CIP’s board of Directors, and offered a thorough examination of the renewed nuclear peril brought about by a disinterest in disarmament in Washington.

Writes Cirincione: 

It is unlikely that in their present state, the existing pro-arms control organizations and research programs can have a meaningful impact on Trump’s nuclear policies. Nor is a mass anti-nuclear movement likely to emerge, as it did in the 1980s. There are, however, several possibilities that could develop measurable influence over nuclear policy.

Read the full piece, “Can We Prevent Nuclear Catastrophe during the Trump Administration?,” in the International Policy Journal.

In Other News…

After Assad

On December 8, Bashar Al-Assad fled Syria for Moscow, ending decades of rule by the Assad family, and in particular the Assad family’s direct oversight of a brutal war against Syrians in revolt against the dictatorship. In response to the overthrow, Nancy Okail said, “Today belongs to the people of Syria. The astonishing speed at which the Assad regime has crumbled exposes once again the inherent fragility of seemingly ironclad dictatorships,” adding, “the United States and its partners should take immediate steps to facilitate delivery of humanitarian and reconstruction aid.” Read the full statement. Sina Toossi explains why Assad’s fall reinforces the need to de-escalate in the region, including by “offering Palestinians a credible political horizon and not opposing US-Iran negotiations.” 

Faces of MAGA

Nancy Okail tells EuroNews that, by picking property mogul Steve Witkoff as Middle East envoy, Trump is doubling down on a transactional policy for the region, one grounded more in real estate than real people. Trump’s floated Department of Government Efficiency, to be efficiently co-headed by Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, has attracted a lot of ire, not the least for its too-online name, but Stephen Semler tells The Hill, “If there’s common ground, let’s play ball. But I think there needs to be more dialogue steering Musk and […] encouraging him and DOGE to focus on the Pentagon waste.” Meanwhile, the elevation of reactionary Brian Mast to chair the House Foreign Affairs Committee is “hugely troubling,” Matt Duss tells Al Monitor, urging Democrats to “be very clear how objectionable his views are.”

Progress, Not Nostalgia

As Okail and Matt Duss argue in Foreign Affairs, neither “America First” unilateralism nor a backwards-looking liberal internationalism can address the urgent needs of a world grappling with climate change, economic inequality, and political instability. On Background Briefing With Ian Masters, Okail elaborates on the path forward for progressives.

Dressing Down

Iran’s parliament passed a new bill mandating strict penalties for improper dress. Iran’s reformist president Masoud Pezeshkian, has voiced opposition to the bill. As Sina Toossi tells CNN, this “reflects a miscalculation of public sentiment and is unlikely to achieve the government’s stated goals of preserving traditional social norms.” The elected president and administration “ just don’t have the power to overhaul and change the situation,” added Negar Mortazavi.

Listen Up!

On the Un-Diplomatic Podcast, Van Jackson continues his geopolitical dumpster dive, covering everything from the attempted self-coup by South Korea’s president to Trump’s threatened tariffs, New Zealand labour foreign policy, and funding submarines in the United States.

Spotlight: COP29 Gender
Protesters at COP29, including some with signs that say "feminist climate" and "no carbon markets"

The United Nations held its annual climate change conference, COP29, in Baku, Azerbaijan in November. While activists attended expecting to build on previous progress, they found that when it came to addressing the disparate impact of climate change along gender lines, they had to rebuild from scratch.

Reports Anmol Irfan:

“There were women in Honduras who were told winds of 260 km were coming but they didn’t know what that meant, whether that was fast or slow, and so they continued to be on the coast and one of them lost two of her kids,” [gender advocate and Costa Rica’s former Vice Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] Lorena Aguilar says, adding that when an NGO came to help them rebuild their house which had also been destroyed, they asked them for land property rights papers which these women didn’t have.”

Read the rest of Irfan’s report at The International Policy Journal.

Second Run

Negar Mortazavi participated in ISPI International Mediterranean Dialogue, where she took part in The future of Iran-Gulf relations panel. The panel is available on YouTube.

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Want more podcast content with CIP experts? Check out Un-Diplomatic with Van Jackson and Matt Duss, Black Diplomats with Terrell Jermaine Starr and The Iran Podcast with Negar Mortazavi

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Statement on the Overthrow of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad

In response to the overthrow of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Center for International Policy President and CEO Nancy Okail issued the following statement:

“Today belongs to the people of Syria. The astonishing speed at which the Assad regime has crumbled exposes once again the inherent fragility of seemingly ironclad dictatorships, and of all governments whose rule is based on repression and corruption. 

“The regime’s fast disintegration shows how autocracy, resistance to political transitions, and gross atrocities and the lack of accountability for committing them ultimately doomed Assad’s brutal rule. Ritualistic elections cannot replace legitimacy, which remains crucial for stability.

“True sovereignty cannot be attained under the influence of foreign powers that exploit nations as arenas for their own geopolitical competition. While Syria’s future is for its people to determine, the United States and its partners should take immediate steps to facilitate delivery of humanitarian and reconstruction aid, and help ensure that future is free and democratic, and the rights of all of its communities are protected.”

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