Israel & Occupied Palestinian Territories Archives - Page 2 of 4

Harris Candidacy Gives Democrats a Chance to Pivot on Gaza

When President Joe Biden announced he was dropping his bid for reelection and endorsing his Vice President, Kamala Harris, to succeed him to the Presidency, he created the space for Harris to set out a new policy on Gaza. In Foreign Policy, CIP executive vice president Matt Duss writes that Harris can plot a new path, distinct from Biden’s nearly unconditional support for Israel’s indiscriminate destruction of Gaza.

Writes Duss:

While no one expects Harris to dramatically distance herself from Biden, there are steps that she can take to show that she speaks for the Democratic Party of today and not 40 years ago. She can announce that as president, she will immediately suspend the U.S.-supplied military aid being used in violation of U.S. law. She can publicly make clear that she agrees with the assessment of countless Israelis—including Israeli opposition lawmakers and top sitting security officials—that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is stalling hostage release and cease-fire efforts in order to cling to power. She can reject the baseless and inflammatory claims that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the largest and most important relief agency in Gaza, is a “Hamas front,” and state that she’ll work to see UNRWA funding resumed as soon as legally possible. In doing so, she would join U.S. partners—such as Britain, France, and Germany—that have already resumed their contributions.

Read the full piece here.

Matt Duss on Netanyahu visit & protests, Gaza policy, Kamala Harris

In his first public call since leaving the race, President Joe Biden vowed to end the war in Gaza during his final months in office as he is set to meet with Netanyahu this week.

But much of the attention will be on Vice President Kamala Harris. The presumptive Democratic nominee will reportedly have her own face-to-face chat with Netanyahu.

CIP executive vice president Matt Duss joined Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s RN Breakfast to discuss. Listen here.

Continue reading “Matt Duss on Netanyahu visit & protests, Gaza policy, Kamala Harris”

Harris bid for Oval Office puts spotlight on foreign policy track record

As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visits Washington and prepares for a July 24 address to Congress, CIP executive vice president Matt Duss discusses Kamala Harris’s record on Israel-Palestine. The Hill’s Laura Kelly and Rafael Bernal report:

Advocates for a tougher U.S. policy towards Israel point to Harris’s March speech in Selma, Ala., as a promising example of the vice president addressing the plight of Palestinians at a time when Biden was under increasing pressure to hold back weapons deliveries to Israel over the toll of death and destruction in the Gaza Strip amid its war against Hamas.

“The Israeli government must do more to significantly increase the flow of aid [to Palestinians]. No excuses,” Harris said to applause.

“She really lifted up the humanitarian crisis in Gaza in a much more aggressive way, much more critical of the Israeli government’s approach there. I think that was noticed by everyone,” said Matt Duss, executive vice president for the Center for International Policy and a former foreign policy adviser for Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.).

But it’s unclear if Harris’s speech represented a major policy difference or only a shift in rhetoric. Stepping forward as a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, she now has an opportunity to articulate what she wants to do differently, Duss said.

He added it’s an important signal that she will not attend Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech to Congress on Wednesday. A number of Democratic lawmakers have announced they will boycott the speech, largely progressives.

“I hope and expect that she and her team will engage with the whole array of voices that make up the Democratic Party, and that includes its growing progressive [wing].”

Read the full story in The Hill here.

ICJ Determination of Violations in Israeli Occupation of Palestinian Territories a Welcome Step

The Center for International Policy welcomed today’s advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) determining that Israel’s conduct in and policies toward the Occupied Palestinian Territories and its Palestinian residents constitute multiple serious violations of international law. In response, CIP president and CEO Nancy Okail issued the following statement:

“The Court’s advisory opinion affirms what virtually the entire world has recognized for decades – that Israel’s 57 year occupation of the Palestinian Territories has long served as a project to illegally dispossess the Palestinian people and annex their land.

International law allows for occupation as a temporary measure in a time of active conflict. It does not allow for occupation as a cover for relentless land theft, apartheid and other grave violations of the national and human rights of an entire people. The Israeli Knesset’s unequivocal rejection this week of any Palestinian state west of the Jordan River only provides additional conclusive evidence supporting the Court’s opinion.

While the ICJ’s action is non-binding, countries that seek to uphold international law should respect the Court’s determination and take all appropriate steps to counter the injustices of the occupation and bring it to a peaceful end. At a minimum, countries should not engage in actions which help to perpetuate the occupation and its discriminatory, annexationist goals. In particular, the United States must end the unconditional supply of arms that Israel uses in connection with the dispossession and settlement of Palestinian land and other violations of Palestinian rights.

We also reiterate the importance of rejecting all attempts to delegitimize, intimidate or penalize the ICJ or its officers in light of this or any of its other proceedings. The security and rights of people around the globe hang in the balance as the institutions tasked with upholding international law are being attacked by right-wing nationalist and autocratic figures worldwide. Disagreements with the Court’s actions may be expressed appropriately and challenged through the established processes, but attempting to undermine or criminalize the multilateral legal bodies that are a core part of the rules-based international system threatens essential US and global security interests.”

Duss on Democracy Now! discusses JD Vance, Trump and Biden foreign policy

Following J.D. Vance’s first speech at the Republican Convention as the official vice presidential nominee, CIP Executive Vice President Matt Duss joined Democracy Now! to discuss the competing narratives and records on foreign policy espoused by Vance, Trump and Biden. Below are excerpted transcripts of Matt’s discussion.

On the Iraq War:

“The story he wants to tell America about Trumpism, about the MAGA movement is that he was misled; he was told by Washington elites that this [the Iraq War] was a just war, a necessary war and was lied to, so he did his duty as an American citizen and went to serve in Marines in Iraq but then came to realize that that war was based on a lie. And of course that is a very valid argument. It was based on a series of lies and and and untruths and had enormously disastrous effects of course for the region but also for the United States. And that’s again an area where President Biden is quite vulnerable. He was a strong supporter of the Iraq War and to this day has never fully accounted for his support for the war.”

On Trump’s foreign policy record:

“If you look at the actual record of Trump’s presidency, it was in fact quite militarist. It was not isolationist, it was certainly not dovish in any respect. It was just unilateralist. And that I think is consistent with what we saw [in Vance’s speech] last night. It’s not that the United States will be pulling back from the world necessarily. It’s that we will be much more aggressive in advancing our own perceived interests. And if you look at some of the steps Trump took with North Korea, we came closer than ever before to a war in North Korea in 2017. We were on the brink of war with Iran in the wake of the assassination of Qasem Solemaini in January 2020. There was of course the attempt at regime change in Venezuela. So again, I think it’s important to understand all of these in the background even while we recognize the validity of the critique of the foreign policy establishment that we’ve seen from Trump and now from Vance.”

On support for Israel:

“What [Vance] said at the beginning about the kind of political support from many Americans, particularly Christian Americans –I myself grew up in the evangelical church so I can relate to what he’s talking about– there is a deep understanding, a deep sympathy culturally, religiously and politically for the state of Israel for a whole bunch of reasons. I think that is valid, it’s important to understand that. But I think there is a separate conversation about what is the correct policy if people care about Israel. What actually leads to security, not just for Israelis, but to Palestinians, for Palestinians, and for people across the region. And I think that is where we’re going to have real disagreement.”

Read Matt’s recent analysis with co-author Daniel Levy, In the U.K. and France, There Was a Gaza Vote. And in the U.S.?, in The New Republic.

On the Abraham Accords and plans for a normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia:

“You heard […] Vance praising the Abraham Accords, and unfortunately the Abraham Accords are not a formula for genuine security. It’s important to understand what the countries in the region –Israel, the United Arab Emirates, some of these other undemocratic and repressive countries– see the purpose of the Abraham Accords as, and that is sustaining their own undemocratic rule. I think that ultimately is not going to be formula either for security of Israel in the long term, certainly not for the Palestinians. I don’t want to blame the Abraham Accords for October 7th attacks, but I will note that the logic behind the Abraham Accords, which is that the Palestinians can just be pushed to the side and kind of just managed in perpetuity. That is the logic and environment in which the October 7th attacks happened.

“Unfortunately this is not an area where the Biden administration is able to offer a counterargument because President Biden himself has adopted the Abraham Accords and now pretends that they can be a basis for regional peace and security, which they cannot.”

In the U.K. and France, There Was a Gaza Vote. And in the U.S.?

Today, Matt Duss of CIP and Daniel Levy of the U.S. / Middle East Project have an article in The New Republic arguing that a Gaza voting block helped the left in France and cost Labour votes in the U.K., and will likely play a pivotal role in the 2024 Presidential election in the United States.

Describing the UK experience, they write:

Among Muslim voters and a slew of progressive and younger voters, positions on Gaza had translated into electoral choices. That had never happened before in U.K. politics. While some of it may have been a luxury vote, assuming an inevitable Labour win, Britain’s governing party is well aware of the consequences for maintaining its rule if this trend cannot be reversed. In sum, the evidence suggests that the narrative that Labour’s aggressively distancing itself from Corbyn-era criticism of Israel by aligning with the Sunak government on Gaza was an essential element of its success was not only wrong but precisely wrong, with that shift acting as a drag on the party in the current circumstances.

Read the full piece here.

The Gaza Pier Is a $320 Million Symbol of the Biden Administration’s “Ineffectiveness”

On July 11, US officials announced that the pier it funded and built to get more humanitarian aid into Gaza would be dismantled. CIP executive vice president Matt Duss discussed this announcement and what it says about the Biden administration’s Israel/Palestine policy with Mother Jones’ Sophie Hurwitz:

The pier was more of “a way for the Biden Administration to try to look busy,” said Matt Duss, the executive vice president of the Center for International Policy and a former foreign policy adviser to Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), than an actual solution.

“I don’t ever want to diminish efforts to get more humanitarian aid to people who desperately need it,” Duss continued. “But there were other things the administration should have been doing to facilitate the delivery of aid that they…continue to refuse to do. [The pier] is essentially a physical symbol of this administration’s ineffectiveness around this war.”

[…]

The pier’s months of shutdowns and breakdowns made food aid delivery haphazard at best. And, as Duss explained, the deliveries that do make it into Gaza are difficult to distribute due to the sheer scale of infrastructure demolition, as well as the ongoing bombings. Smaller amounts of food aid are still being delivered through Israel’s Kerem Shalom crossing, but news reports say that aid is piling up on the Gaza side of the border without making it to those who need it.

“The problem wasn’t just that people weren’t getting enough aid…it’s that the amount of actual physical destruction in Gaza, which is enormous, just makes it nearly impossible to deliver that aid,” Duss said. “This is done with the complete support of the United States.”

Read the full piece in Mother Jones.

Post-CNN Debate: Visions for the World in 2025

On June 27, CNN held a debate between former president Donald Trump and incumbent president Joe Biden. Both men are in the unique position of running against a previous office holder, and the election itself is a rematch of the socially distanced contest held between the same two candidates in 2020.

There is arguably no area of governance where a president has greater freedom and impact than foreign policy. To better understand how the candidates used foreign policy positions on the debate stage, and the limits of their understanding or desired policies, the fellows of the Center for International Policy have assembled to offer some deeper insight. A transcript of the debate can be read here.

Sina Toossi, on the Middle East in the Debate

The presidential debate offered little hope for a more peaceful and just U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East. The most egregious moment was Trump’s use of “Palestinian” as an insult in an exchange with Biden over their “pro-Israel” stances, a shocking display of racism that has largely escaped mainstream scrutiny.

Trump’s false claims about his Iran policy—asserting Iran was impotent and “broke” by the end of his term—belie the reality of his maximum pressure campaign, which provoked increased aggression from Iran, including unprecedented attacks on U.S. assets and allies, and accelerated nuclear activities.

Biden also faltered, with factual inaccuracies about Iran having intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities and misleading claims about U.S. military members not being killed under his watch in the region. Both candidates failed to present a coherent vision of the realities of U.S. policies towards the region.

Joanna Rozpedowski, on NATO in the Debate

Voters concerned about America’s security and geopolitical strategy face a pivotal choice between two starkly different approaches to international conflicts the new president will inevitably confront.

In the CNN debate, President Biden emphasized the importance of robust alliances and collective security measures, arguing that NATO and allied support are essential for deterring Russian aggression and maintaining global stability.

Former President Trump’s transactional approach prioritized national sovereignty, extreme frugality, and direct negotiation over costly multilateral commitments. His rhetoric indicated skepticism about the economic and tactical burdens the US bears in supporting NATO’s Ukraine approach, which thus far failed to result in the war’s peaceful settlement and risks further escalation onto neighboring European countries.

In November, this strategic divide presents Americans with a critical decision: maintain strong international alliances, an aggressive deterrence posture, and multilateral NATO engagement or attempt to resolve the conflict through diplomatic channels and direct negotiation. The decision rests squarely with the electorate.

Michael Chamberlin, on Mexico in the Debate

Regarding the issue of fentanyl crossing the border, neither candidate focuses on addressing the root causes. They fail to discuss how to collaborate with Mexico to strengthen its justice and anti-corruption institutions or how to stop Mexican criminal groups from obtaining guns in U.S. stores. Nothing was said about gun control in the United States or the movement of guns south through the same border, which arms the cartels that later send fentanyl north. Additionally, they overlook the importance of preventive measures from a health service perspective. Approaching the problem from a prohibition standpoint alone will never stop drug abuse.

Negar Mortazavi, on Iran in the Debate

Neither Trump nor Biden offered a coherent policy on Iran and the broader Middle East. Trump claimed that Iran had no money under his administration which is false. It’s true that he imposed broad sanctions against Iran that hurt the economy. But the impact of sanctions is mainly felt by average Iranian citizens and it does not really influence or change Iran’s foreign policy and regional spending. In fact, during Trump’s term tensions were high between Iran and its network of allies, the Axis of Resistance, and the U.S. and its regional allies.

Trump’s assassination of the top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani brought the two countries to the brink of a dangerous war, with Iran retaliating against the U.S. by shooting missiles from its soil targeting U.S. forces in Iraq. Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy towards Iran was not only dangerous but failed to achieve its stated goal of bringing Iran to the negotiating table for a better deal.

Biden’s policy towards Iran in general has not been very different or successful either. Candidate Biden had promised to prioritize diplomacy with Iran and revive the nuclear deal, but he couldn’t deliver on that promise.

Van Jackson, on China in the Debate

Biden has accepted Trump’s premise about China and economic statecraft. He now thinks reducing the trade deficit with China is a mark of progress. He imagines political economy as a zero-sum terrain where their gain is not just our loss; it’s a threat to us. This is the kind of economic nationalism that ultimately serves defense-industrial interests and reactionary political projects.Trump, for his part, openly accused the sitting American president of treason and corruption–he called him a “Manchurian candidate.” This is actual red-baiting; literally John Birch Society stuff. The notable thing, which is of pattern, is that Trump is using China as the wedge to attack his political opponent. The fascistic, corrupt politician is using the China bogeyman to advance his politics against his democratic opponent. The GOP did much the same in 2020 and 2022.

It’s true that politicians from both parties try to play the “China card” to their advantage…but it’s false that the “China card” is some value-neutral object that anyone can use for their purposes with equal effectiveness. China-threat rhetoric systematically biases toward reactionary, demagogic political outcomes; it’s unfavorable terrain for democratic politics. That’s why Democrats who tried to out-hawk their opponents on China in 2022 fared poorly in the general election.

Trump is not wrong that Biden’s foreign policy is pushing us toward World War III—we’re still insisting on a strategy of primacy in a world where power realities simply make it impossible. And by pursuing primacy anyway, the national security state naturalizes the necessity of the most dangerous kinds of policies: containment, arms-racing, and economic nationalism. This will not end well for anyone. The falsity in Trump’s rant though is that he is any better. Indeed, Biden’s China policy is Trump’s China policy. Worse, Trump’s implied theory of war prevention appears to be a form of extortion. Cultivating personal relationships with dictators, he insists, is the way to prevent World War III. That means that Trump puts himself in the position of telling the public, “Look, you want me to be friends with Xi and Putin and Kim. That’s how I’m preventing Armageddon.”

اقتراح لإنشاء مجلس إعادة إعمار غزة

مدير مؤسسة بال ثينك للدراسات الاستراتيجية عمر شعبان

منذ اندلاع الحرب في غزة، استمر الجدل حول إدارة القطاع بعد الحرب دون الوصول إلى خطة ملموسة وشاملة. يحتاج الناس الذين بقوا في غزة إلى تدخل فوري للتخفيف من معاناتهم وتسريع عودة الحياة الى قطاع غزة. إن الدمار شبه الكامل للقطاع، والخسائر الشخصية الهائلة في الأرواح، وعدم المساءلة عن أفعال إسرائيل، وغياب أفق سياسي لإنهاء أكثر من نصف قرن من الاحتلال الذي سبق 7 أكتوبر، يخلق أرضًا خصبة لأولئك الذين يسعون لإشعال المزيد من العنف والتطرف. من الضروري وجود خطة شاملة لإدارة القطاع في فترة ما بعد الحرب مباشرة لضمان الاستقرار الكافي لإعادة بناء القطاع ومنع عودة القتال.

هذا الاقتراح لإدارة غزة بعد الحرب مباشرة يستند إلى مجموعة من الافتراضات: أن للشعب الفلسطيني الحق في العيش حياة طبيعية بكرامة وأمان، وأنه لا يمكن ولا ينبغي لهم الانتظار لفترة طويلة من التشاور قبل تحقيق هذه الحقوق؛ أن إسرائيل ومعها العديد من دول العالم لن تقبل بأن يكون لحماس أي دور سياسي أو حاكم في اليوم التالي، ومن ناحية ثانية بما أن حماس لم تعط مباركتها للحكومة الفلسطينية المعينة حديثًا العمل بشكل كامل في غزة؛ ، فمن المحتمل ألا تسمح لها بالعمل بحرية في غزة.

بالإضافة إلى ذلك، سيكون من غير الواقعي وخطير جدًا محاولة استعادة السلامة العامة أو إطلاق أي عملية إعادة إعمار دون التنسيق والتعاون الكافي مع الموظفين المتبقين من السلطة الفعلية في غزة، أي حماس، التي كانت الهيئة الحاكمة في غزة منذ عام 2007.
ستتطلب إعادة إعمار غزة إشراك موظفي الخدمة المدنية للسلطة الفعلية السابقة جنبا ألى جنب موظفي السلطة الفلسطينية في قطاع غزة . موظفي السلطة الفلسطينية ليسوا كافيين والبعض منهم غادروا قطاع غزة او تقاعدوا والكثير منهم لم يمارس عمله منذ 2007. هناك 5000 موظف بلدي في غزة، لا ينتمي أي منهم للسلطة الفلسطينية . قبل 7 أكتوبر، شمل قطاع العمل الحكومي في قطاع غزة حوالي 24000 موظف في الخدمة المدنية، خاصة في قطاعي التعليم والصحة إضافة لــ 18000 شرطي. عندما تم انتخاب حماس في عام 2007، تم فصل الكثير من موظفي السلطة الفلسطينية في غزة –وإستمر الكثير منهم في مواصلة عملهم تحت إدارة حكم حركة حماس خاصي في قطاعي الصحة و التعليم. يقدر عددهم بحوالي 25000، منهم 15000 موظف مدني و10000 من أفراد الأمن. بعضهم بحاجة إلى إعادة التدريب والتوجيه. لذلك، يعد إشراك موظفي الخدمة المدنية للسلطة الفعلية السابقة أمرًا ضروريًا لبدء عملية الإدارة المدنية مع عودة موظفي السلطة الفلسطينية الذي بقوا في منازلهم دون عمل. تفترض هذه الخطة دمج موظفي السلطة الفلسطينية للعمل في القطاع الحكومي مع موظفي حكومة غزة . ليس من الخيارات عدم إشراكهم جميعا لتعزيز النظام العام وتحقيق النتائج. في ضوء هذه الحقائق، تتكون هذه الخطة من أربعة عناصر متكاملة:

العنصر الأول: إنشاء مجلس إعادة إعمار غزة. سيتألف المجلس من 15 إلى 20 شخصًا، سيكونون في الغالب من موظفي السلطة الفلسطينية الذين يعيشون في غزة، والذين يتم دفع رواتبهم من السلطة الفلسطينية في رام الله. سيقوم هذا المجلس بتنسيق عمله مع المنظمات الدولية التي ستعمل على إعادة إعمار قطاع غزة. يجب التأكيد على أن هذه اللجنة ستكون بمثابة فرع غزة للحكومة الفلسطينية، وستنسق عملها بشكل كامل مع الحكومة الفلسطينية. يجب السماح لأعضائها بالسفر الروتيني واليسير إلى رام الله والعودة منها، والاجتماع مع رئيس السلطة الفلسطينية ورئيس الوزراء. يجب أن تعلن هذه اللجنة أيضًا أنها ستعمل مع موظفي الخدمة المدنية للسلطة الفعلية. هذا ضروري لكسب تعاون ودعم القوى السياسية و المجتمعية في قطاع غزة. يجب على مجلس إعادة إعمار غزة أن يعلن بوضوح أن ولايته لا تحمل أي مسؤوليات سياسية، وأنه هيئة مؤقتة ليس لاكثر من عامين وتكون مسؤوليته محصورة في تخطيط وإطلاق وإدارة عملية التعافي المبكر والإعمار. يجب على المجلس تنسيق عمله وتمويله وخطته مع المجتمع المحلي و الدولي، يتوجب إنشاء موقع إلكتروني للإعلان عن عمله للجمهور والمانحين بشكل منتظم. يجب أن يضمن هذا المجلس فصل أموال الإعمار عن أي أغراض أخرى من خلال تخصيص حساب بنكي مستقل بإشراف محلي دولي . يجب أيضًا إشراك الشتات الفلسطيني في هذا الجهد، حيث يمتلك الكثيرون المعرفة الفنية الأساسية والموارد اللازمة لتحفيز الاستثمار في مستقبل غزة.

يجب أن تشمل المناصب في المجلس ممثيلن من قطاع غزة للقطاعات التالية-

- - قطاع غزة للقطاعات التالية-:
  العنصر الثاني: إنشاء قوة شرطة محلية لإنفاذ القانون و الحفاظ على الأمن و السلم الأهلي. ستكون القوة مكونة من 5000 شخص، منهم 2500 من قوات الأمن التابعة للسلطة الفلسطينية الذين استمروا في العيش في غزة، و2500 من الموظفين المتبقين من السلطة الفعلية في غزة. سيتم تعيين رئيس للشرطة من مصر أو رام الله. و سيتم دعوة 20-25 من كبار محترفي الشرطة من مصر والأردن والمغرب للمجيء إلى غزة للإشراف على وتدريب وتوجيه قوة الشرطة المشكلة حديثًا. سيكون لرئيس قوة الشرطة مقعد في مجلس إعادة إعمار غزة.
  العنصر الثالث: مراقبة وإدارة معابر غزة. يجب دعوة الاتحاد الأوروبي والولايات المتحدة للتعاون مع إدارة المعابر في السلطة الفلسطينية لتحمل المسؤولية عن مراقبة والإشراف على تدفق المواد و بالتنسيق مع الحكومة الاسرائيلية ، إلى جانب موظفين محليين من مختلف وزارات السلطة الفلسطينية في غزة. سيتطلب ذلك أيضًا التنسيق مع رام الله. يستوجب ذلك رفع الحصار على دخول المواد الخام و المعدات اللازمة. يجب فتح معبر رفح بشكل دائم للسماح بعودة العديد من الأشخاص المؤهلين والفنيين الذين غادروا غزة خلال الحرب. لا يمكن أن تكون هناك عملية إعادة إعمار في غزة بدونهم.
  
  العنصر الرابع والمهم بشكل خاص: تعزيز المجتمع المدني في غزة. يجب إنشاء صندوق خاص من قبل الدول المانحة لمساعدة المجتمع المدني في غزة على إعادة بناء مكاتبهم وممتلكاتهم ومعداتهم والبنية التحتية الأخرى. يجب أن يدعم هذا الصندوق برامج معالجة الاثار النفسية والاجتماعية التي سببتها الحرب وتعزيز ثقافة التسامح والصمود ونبذ العنف والتعايش والسلم الاهلي وبناء النسيج الاجتماعي ، ويكمل عمل المجلس. يشمل ذلك مساعدة الجامعات في غزة التي دمرت بفعل الحرب على إعادة بناء برامجها.
  هناك بالطبع عدة شروط ضرورية لتنفيذ هذا الاقتراح بنجاح. أولاً، يجب أن توافق الولايات المتحدة، السلطة الفلسطينية، إسرائيل، والاتحاد الأوروبي والدول العربية ذات العلاقة خاصة مصر على الخطة – ويجب أن يتوافر للمجلس الدعم و المساندة من كل القوى السياسية في قطاع غزة. ثانيًا، يجب على المجلس أن يعلن أنه هيئة فنية إدارية مؤقتة، لا يحل محل أي هيئة حاكمة أخرى، وليس لديه أي أجندة سياسية تتجاوز إعادة إعمار غزة. أخيرًا، يجب على المجتمع الدولي، وبشكل رئيسي الولايات المتحدة، الاتحاد الأوروبي والدول العربية الرئيسية، تقديم تعهدات مالية كبيرة لمشاريع إعادة الإعمار ودعم الميزانية المخصصة للأنشطة التي ينسقها المجلس. هذه هي خطة عريضة تتطلب خطط تفصيلية يتم إعدادها من قبل المجلس بالتنسيق مع خطط السلطة الفلسطينية والمنظمات التمويل الدولي. يتوجب تعزيز مشاركة شركات القطاع الخاص المحلية والمتضرريين من الحرب وقطاع الحكم البلدي في عملية التخطيط و التنفيذ و الرقابة بقدر الامكان كي تتوفر الحماية و المساندة المجتمعية لعملية إعادة الاعمار.
  
  يتم تنظيم مؤتمر دولي لإعادة الاعمار تشارك فيه الدول الغنية و المؤسسات الدولية لرصد التمويل اللازم لبدء عملية إعادة الاعمار بشكل كبير بحيث يعطي الامل لمواطني قطاع غزة الذي عانوا ويلات الحرب بمستقبل افضل. يجب تشجيع العشرات من اصحاب الكفاءة والخبرة من فلسطيني الشتات خاصة الذين غادروا قطاع غزة بسبب الحرب على العودة للمساهمة في عملية إعادة الاعمار.
  
  التحديات السياسية لتنفيذ هذا الاقتراح كبيرة، ولكن يجب على القادة إظهار الرؤية والشجاعة اللازمة لمواجهتها والتغلب عليها إذا أردنا تجنب تكرار هذا الكابوس.

To read this post in English, click here.

A Proposal for a Gaza Reconstruction Council

Omar Shaban is CIP’s inaugural Leahy Fellow for Human Rights and Security. He is also the founder of PalThink for Strategic Studies, an independent Gaza-based think tank with no political affiliation.

When the war on Gaza ends, the survivors will need immediate help and a government to administer that aid. Yet the debate on the post-war administration of the territory has continued throughout the invasion without reaching a concrete and comprehensive plan. The people who remain in Gaza will require immediate intervention to alleviate their suffering. The near-total devastation of the territory, enormous personal losses of loved ones, and the absence of a political horizon for ending the more than half a century of occupation that preceded October 7th create fertile ground for those seeking to foment more violence and extremism. A comprehensive plan for administration of the territory in the near-term aftermath of the war is necessary to ensure sufficient stability to rebuild the territory and prevent a relapse of fighting.

Terms for Reconstruction

This proposal for the immediate post-war administration of Gaza is built on a set of assumptions: That the Palestinian people have the right to live in dignity, safety, and normalcy, and that they cannot and should not wait for a long process of consultation before these rights are honored; that Israel will not accept Hamas having any political or governing role the day after, and will likely make it difficult for the newly appointed Palestinian Authority (PA) government to operate fully in Gaza; as Hamas did not give its blessing to the recently appointed Palestinian Authority (PA) government, it likely wouldn’t allow it to work in Gaza freely.

Additionally, it would be unrealistic and very risky to attempt to restore public safety or launch any reconstruction process without the adequate coordination and cooperation with the residual personnel of the Gaza de-facto authority, i.e. Hamas, which has been the governing body in Gaza since 2007.

The reconstruction of Gaza will require engaging civil servants of the previous de-facto-authority. Non-Hamas PA employees in Gaza are not enough. There are 5,000 municipal employees in Gaza, none of whom are PA employees. Before October 7, this sector included approximately 24,000 civil public servants (in the education and health sectors) and 18,000 policemen. When Hamas was elected in 2007, all PA employees in Gaza –estimated to number around 25,000, of which 15,000 are civil public servants and 10,000 are security personnel– were dismissed. Many of them have been furloughed since 2007, and are thus in need of re-training and orientation. Therefore, engaging the public servants of the previous de-facto authority is absolutely necessary to get the process of civil administration started. It is not an option not to engage them to enhance public order and to reach results.

In light of those realities, this plan consists of four integrated elements: a Gaza Reconstruction Council, a police force for domestic security, monitoring and management of the Gaza crossings, and strengthening Gaza’s civil society.

The Gaza Reconstruction Council

The first would be to create a Gaza Reconstruction Council. Ranging from 12 to 15 persons, it will be composed mainly of the PA employees who live in Gaza, who will be paid by the PA in Ramallah and were previously granted permits by Israel to exit Gaza (i.e. who are previously vetted). This body will coordinate its work with the international organizations who will be working on the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. It must be emphasized that this committee is the Gaza branch for the PA government, and it will fully coordinate its work with the PA government. Its members must be allowed to routinely and easily travel to and from Ramallah, meeting with the PA president and Prime Minister. This committee must also announce that it will be working with the public servants of the de facto authority. This is vital to gain Hamas’ cooperation and support. The Gaza Reconstruction Council should announce clearly, its mandate has no political responsibilities, it is a temporary body whose responsibility is confined to launching and administrating the early recovery and reconstruction process. The council must coordinate its work, finance, and plan with the community; it must set up a website to declare its work to the public and to the donors on a regular basis. This council must ensure the separation of reconstruction funds. The Palestinian diaspora should also be involved in this effort, as many possess key technical knowledge and resources needed to mobilize and invest in Gaza’s future funds.

Positions in the regional council should include the: Head of the water authority, Head of the energy authority, Head of contracting syndicate, Head of businessman association, Chief of police, and 2-3 members of civil society.

In addition, the regional council should have representatives of: Ministry of health, Ministry of social affairs, Ministry of local government, Ministry of agriculture, and the Ministry of housing and public works.

As well as observer-liaisons from international organizations, including: UNRWA, World Food Programme, World Health Organization, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Palestine NGOs.

Domestic and Border Security

The second element is to create a police force for domestic security. A force of 5,000 persons will be composed of 2,500 from PA security forces who have continued to live in Gaza, and 2,500 from residual employees from the Gaza de-facto authority. Responsibility for this force will be given to a head of police from Egypt or Ramallah. 20-23 senior police professionals from Egypt, Jordan and Morocco will be invited to come into Gaza to supervise, train, and orient the newly formed police force. The head of the police force will have a seat on the Gaza Reconstruction Council.

The third element is the monitoring and management of the Gaza crossings. The European Union (EU) and USA in cooperating with the PA crossing department should be invited to be responsible for monitoring and supervising the in-flow of material, along with local staff from different PA ministries from Gaza. This will also require coordination with Ramallah. At a minimum, Rafah crossing must be opened permanently to allow many of the qualified and technical people who exited Gaza during the war to return. There can be no reconstruction process in Gaza without them.

Civil Society

A fourth and particularly important element involves strengthening Gaza’s civil society. A special fund must be created by donor countries to help civil society in Gaza rebuild their offices, assets, equipment, and other infrastructure. This fund should support programs for tolerance, resilience, and non-violence, and complement the work of the council. This includes helping Gaza universities destroyed by the war to rebuild their programs.

There are obviously several conditions necessary for the successful implementation of this proposal. First, the United States, PA, Israel and EU must agree to the plan – and there must be a reasonable level of confidence that Hamas will not actively thwart it. Second, the council must announce it is a temporary body, it doesn’t replace any other governing body, and it doesn’t have any political agenda beyond the reconstruction of Gaza. Finally, the international community, mainly the US, EU and key Arab states must make and follow through on major financial pledges for reconstruction and budgetary support for activities coordinated by the council.

The political challenges to implementing this proposal are considerable, but leaders must show vision and courage necessary to confront and overcome them if we are to avoid repeating this nightmare.

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Country: Israel & Occupied Palestinian Territories