Country: Iran

Trump’s Executive Actions on Middle East Undermine US Interests and His Own Promises

(Washington, D.C.) – In response to President Donald Trump’s executive actions on Tuesday to deny U.S. funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA); again withdraw the United States from the UN Human Rights Council; and reinstate “maximum pressure” policies on Iran, the Center for International Policy’s Vice President for Government Affairs Dylan Williams issued the following statement:

“While overshadowed by his appalling comments proposing that the United States undertake ethnic cleansing in Gaza, the cruel and destabilizing actions on Middle East policy taken yesterday by President Trump also risk reigniting large-scale conflict in the region and hamstringing his chances of achieving the major diplomatic deals he has spoken about seeking. While these steps to deny Palestinian civilians critical humanitarian aid, undermine human rights and impoverish the Iranian people may be intended as a gift basket to visiting Israeli Prime Minister and wanted war criminal Benjamin Netanyahu, they are in fact a series of self-defeating moves that undermine U.S. interests in the Middle East and around the world.

“Trump’s move to extend the U.S. defunding of UNRWA without offering any plan or resources for replacing its critical functions is as harmful to Middle East stability as it is inhumane. It is unconscionable to deny civilians who have suffered the horrors of months of siege, displacement and bombardment in Gaza and ongoing violence and deprivation in the West Bank basic supplies and services. Governments throughout the region, including those that are key U.S. and Israeli security partners, will further struggle to meet the needs of Palestinian refugees in their territory, opening the door to rising tensions and unrest.

“Relatedly, once again withdrawing the United States from the UN Human Rights Council sends a clear signal of unaccountability for violations of international law to every dictator, warlord and rights abuser in the world. At a moment when protecting civilian rights and respect for the rule of law are rightly being touted as red lines in places like Lebanon and Syria, the United States is acting to delegitimize the work of those tasked by the international community to uphold those rules. It advances the assault by far-right autocrats against multilateral institutions and norms, further undermining an international system that the Global South already regards as profoundly inconsistent and unsustainable.

“Likewise, Trump’s return to the failed ‘maximum pressure’ policy with Iran – apparently against his own reservations – embraces the foolhardy anti-diplomacy, pro-war positions of former advisors like John Bolton and Mike Pompeo, whose approach blew up any chance Trump had of getting a new anti-nuclear deal with Iran. Thanks to U.S. sanctions and belligerent moves after Trump’s breach of the Iran deal in his first term, as well as the Biden Administration’s decision to add to those sanctions and not take advantage of an early diplomatic window for restoring the agreement, Iran is now closer to being able to obtain nuclear weapons than ever before. Trump seemed to understand that he was given bad advice in his first administration, but is now making the same mistake again, despite promising his supporters he prioritizes avoiding wars of choice. Unfortunately, millions in the region – including thousands of American soldiers and other personnel – may end up paying the price for that mistake.”

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The Illusion of Opportunity in Attacking Iran

Sina Toossi is a senior nonresident fellow at the Center for International Policy.

In the wake of a fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, the Middle East stands at a critical juncture. The recent agreement, brokered with the involvement of both the outgoing and incoming US administrations, has halted hostilities for now, but its durability remains uncertain. Amid this tenuous peace, Israeli leaders, emboldened by President-elect Donald Trump’s historically supportive stance, reportedly see a prime opportunity to push for direct war against Iran—a goal Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pursued for decades.

Exacerbating these tensions is the possibility of Trump doubling down on his “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran, which dismantled the Obama-era nuclear deal and inflicted crippling sanctions on Iran’s economy. Reports from The Wall Street Journal reveal Trump is even weighing military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Yet, in his inaugural address, Trump remarked, “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win, but also by the wars that we end, and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into.” This juxtaposition highlights a critical decision between diplomatic de-escalation and military action

Trump would be wise to pursue diplomacy. Granting Netanyahu the U.S.’s backing for such a conflict would further destabilize the region, heighten already white-hot anti-American sentiment, and derail Trump’s broader agenda. For Iran hawks, these shifting circumstances may seem like the ideal moment to act, but such enthusiasm dangerously ignores the lessons of Israel’s recent wars and the complexities of the region’s current security landscape. If Israel failed to decisively defeat a smaller non-state adversary like Hezbollah, how could it expect success against a well-fortified state like Iran? A preemptive strike would almost certainly provoke massive retaliation, fail to topple the Islamic Republic, and risk igniting a far-reaching, devastating conflict.

Instead of courting disaster, U.S. and Israeli policymakers should seize the moment to pursue diplomacy. Renewed negotiations and a verifiable nuclear agreement could deliver real security while steering the region away from catastrophic war.

Hezbollah’s Survival as a Cautionary Tale

Advocates of a strike on Iran often overlook a critical lesson from Israel’s recent conflict with Hezbollah: even with a relentless military campaign, Israel failed to decisively neutralize a much smaller non-state adversary. Over months of intense fighting in Lebanon, Israel launched an extensive air assault and a punishing ground invasion aimed at crippling Hezbollah’s arsenal. While Hezbollah suffered significant losses, including the assassination of its leader Hassan Nasrallah and senior commanders, its ability to strike Israel was not eliminated. Throughout the bombardment, the group continued firing rockets, missiles, and drones deep into Israeli territory. Major population centers, including Tel Aviv, were hit just days before the ceasefire, causing casualties, widespread displacement, and severe economic and psychological insecurity.  

This experience offers two key lessons for policymakers. First, Israeli military superiority is not the absolute guarantee of success it is often assumed to be. Second, if Israel struggled to decisively defeat Hezbollah, a non-state militia, it is unrealistic to expect a knockout blow against a fortified state like Iran. Iran’s defense systems, nuclear facilities, and missile and drone stockpiles are far more robust and dispersed. Recent history underscores that a swift, clean military solution is less a viable strategy and more a dangerous illusion.

Iran’s Retaliatory Capabilities and the Costs of Escalation

Critics of diplomacy also often underestimate Iran’s ability to defend itself and respond effectively to an attack—a miscalculation fraught with danger. Over the past year, the back-and-forth strikes between Iran and Israel have vividly demonstrated Tehran’s growing military capabilities and its capacity for retaliation. For instance, on October 1, Iran launched a coordinated missile and drone attack on Israel, bypassing advanced Israeli air defenses and inflicting both material damage and insecurity. In response, Israel struck back on October 27, targeting Iran’s Russian-made S-300 air defense systems, ballistic missile production facilities, and solid fuel manufacturing infrastructure for long-range missiles.

Hawks portray the Israeli strike as a decisive blow, leaving Iran vulnerable to a low-cost U.S. or Israeli attack. Yet even Israeli officials disagree. The Nagel Committee in Israel recently confirmed that the country does not have the capability to launch a decisive attack on Iran’s military and nuclear facilities without U.S. support. Former IDF spokesperson and air defense commander Ran Kochav reinforced this reality, cautioning, “I would cautiously say they [Iran] still have strength left; it’s not as if this morning they have no air defense system at all and are completely exposed.” Retired Major General Yaakov Amidror warned an attack without U.S. coordination would risk severe retaliation requiring American intervention.

Despite Israel’s recent attack, many of Iran’s air defenses remain intact, bolstered by advanced systems reverse-engineered from Russian, Chinese, and U.S. technology. In recent military drills, Tehran has showcased its readiness, simulating responses to airstrikes and unveiling new underground “missile cities” alongside advanced drones and missiles. These moves send a clear signal: Iran is prepared to retaliate forcefully against any attack.

A large-scale assault on Iran’s nuclear facilities would all but guarantee a massive retaliatory campaign—one that could escalate beyond Israel’s borders to U.S. forces and partners in the region. At best, military strikes might set Iran’s nuclear timeline back by a few years. But at worst, such an action would ignite a far-reaching conflict that compromises energy security, endangers U.S. personnel, undermines regional stability, and strains diplomatic ties with allies who have no appetite for another protracted conflict in the Middle East.

Why a Foreign Attack Won’t Topple the Islamic Republic

A persistent idea among hawkish policymakers is that a foreign military strike could trigger the collapse of the Islamic Republic. But this belief overlooks a powerful force within Iran: nationalism. History shows that foreign aggression tends to unite Iranians against the invader, fostering a sense of shared solidarity that could bolster, rather than weaken, the ruling theocracy.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has long attempted to stoke dissent within Iran, even addressing Iranians directly multiple times in recent months to portray himself as some sort of savior against their repressive government. However, the aftermath of Israel’s October strike on Iran reveals the futility of this strategy. Instead of sparking mass opposition to the government, the attack plunged ordinary Iranians into fear and uncertainty. Civil society leaders and groups, pro-democracy activists, and political prisoners alike issued stark warnings: war would derail prospects for democratic change, not hasten them. 

The reaction from everyday Iranians was equally telling. Many took to the streets—not in protest against the regime, but to mourn the soldiers killed in the assault. These moments of collective grief underscored a broader truth: foreign attacks are broadly seen as assaults on the nation itself, not just its government.

Far from weakening the Islamic Republic, a military campaign is likely to strengthen its hold, at least in the short term, and deepen the challenges faced by those fighting for a freer and more democratic Iran. The lesson for policymakers? Toppling the regime from the outside isn’t just wishful thinking—it’s counterproductive.

A Better Path Forward: Diplomacy and a Deal  

With the risks clear, the pressing question remains: How can policymakers prevent Iran’s nuclear program from advancing while avoiding a devastating regional war? The answer lies in reinvigorated diplomacy.  

The 2015 nuclear deal provided a proven framework for freezing and even rolling back key elements of Iran’s nuclear program. Next October, the UN sanctions “snapback” mechanism—a crucial part of that deal—expires, and if triggered by France, Germany, and the UK, it would automatically reinstate sanctions. Iran has warned that such a move would force it out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), destroying remaining safeguards and leaving diplomacy in tatters.

This looming deadline demands urgent action. If the Europeans trigger snapback, the reimposition of UN sanctions and Iran leaving the NPT would dramatically increase tensions and make future negotiations infinitely harder. Policymakers must prevent this domino effect by re-engaging diplomatically now.

Diplomacy offers tangible, achievable benefits that make it the most viable path forward. A revived or updated nuclear deal can reimpose verifiable restrictions and intrusive inspections on Iran’s nuclear program, significantly hindering any covert pursuit of a nuclear weapon. It also creates critical channels of communication that can help address broader regional flashpoints, reducing the risks of miscalculation and violent escalation. Furthermore, by incorporating economic incentives, diplomacy has the potential to empower civil society within Iran over time, avoiding the backlash and rally-around-the-flag effects that often result from military action or coercive measures.

Policymakers in the U.S. and Europe have a narrow but critical window to prioritize negotiations. Restoring or updating a nuclear deal—while leveraging the pressure of sanctions and Iran’s own economic vulnerabilities—offers the best path to curbing Tehran’s nuclear ambitions without plunging the region into chaos.

The Danger of Viewing Iran as Enemy Number One

Sina Toossi is a senior non-resident fellow at the Center for International Policy

In a recent “60 Minutes Overtime” interview, Vice President Kamala Harris called Iran the United States’ “greatest adversary.” Her comments, no doubt influenced by the toxic political climate and the ongoing conflict between Israel, Hamas, and Hezbollah, were likely shaped by the recent Iranian missile attack on Israel. While Harris may have been responding to the immediate crisis, her statement invites a deeper examination of U.S. policy toward Iran. It underscores the urgent need for a more forward-thinking approach—one that draws on lessons from past mistakes and focuses on resolving the real, yet peacefully addressable, challenges Iran presents in the Middle East while safeguarding U.S. interests.

In approaching Iran and the broader Middle East tinderbox, Harris has the advantage of relying on her experienced national security advisor, Phil Gordon. Gordon has long focused on the region and helped negotiate the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This agreement successfully blocked Iran’s pathways to developing a nuclear bomb through diplomacy, offering a rare example of de-escalation since the 1979 Iranian revolution and the ensuing U.S.-Iran hostilities.

Unfortunately, the diplomatic success of the JCPOA was short-lived. The agreement was implemented in January 2016, but that same year, Donald Trump was elected President after campaigning on a promise to dismantle it. True to his word, he withdrew the U.S. from the deal in 2018 and launched a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. As a result, Iran never saw meaningful economic benefits from the JCPOA, and tensions began to escalate rapidly.

No Great Powers, No Great Satans

Since Trump set the U.S. on this confrontational path, we’ve seen a dangerous cycle of escalations between Iran, the U.S., and Israel, with each action met by a counteraction, driving the region deeper into instability. This tit-for-tat dynamic has steadily intensified tensions, leading to the precarious situation we now face, where the threat of all-out war looms larger than ever.

As Gordon warned in a 2018 article criticizing Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, “It starts with exiting the nuclear deal without a plan, and it could end with a messy, violent, and unnecessary conflict.” He echoed this concern in a May 2019 piece, noting, “Predictably, Iran has responded not by caving to U.S. demands (let alone collapsing) but with a pressure campaign of its own.” Gordon also explored the dangers of U.S. interventions in his 2020 book, Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East, which highlights the self-defeating nature of America’s regime change interventions abroad.

Gordon’s work underscores that while Iran does present challenges to U.S. interests, framing it as America’s greatest adversary ignores broader strategic realities and risks exacerbating the very tensions a Harris administration would aim to reduce. Reflexive hostility toward Iran has often blinded Washington to the high costs of such an approach. The notion of Iran being the U.S.’s “greatest adversary”—ahead of powers like China, Russia, or existential threats like climate change—threatens to perpetuate this cycle, driving the U.S. further down a path of conflict that undermines both its national security and stability in the Middle East and beyond.

A Moment for Military Realism

It’s important to recognize that Iran is far weaker in terms of conventional military strength than the U.S. and its key regional allies, Israel and the Arab Gulf states. Iran’s military spending and capabilities are dwarfed by these powers. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the U.S. and its Middle Eastern allies outspend Iran on defense by more than 50 to 1. Iran’s military is largely made up of outdated equipment, and its air force and navy are no match for the advanced capabilities of Israel or the U.S. Furthermore, with a population only a quarter the size of the U.S. and an economy just 2% of America’s, Iran simply lacks the resources to be a meaningful strategic competitor to the United States.

Yet Washington’s fixation on Iran has led to exaggerated threat assessments. Trump’s hyperfocus on Iran was especially driven by “political incentives and intensified lobbying by Israel and Saudi Arabia,” according to Daniel Benjamin, former Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U.S. State Department, and Steven Simon, who served on the National Security Council in the Clinton and Obama administrations.

Benjamin and Simon emphasized that this hostility comes at a high cost for the U.S., increasing the risk of armed conflict, alienating allies, and undermining regional stability. According to them, the U.S. has a compelling interest in finding a “modus vivendi” with Iran, much like it did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, by creating incentives for Iranian cooperation. Writing in 2019, they urged the “next administration to, at long last, give sustained engagement a try.”

Unfortunately, the Biden administration’s early signals to Tehran only deepened mistrust. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, along with other officials like Avril Haines and Jen Psaki, insisted that Iran fully comply with the JCPOA before the U.S. would return to its sanctions relief obligations under the deal, while also demanding additional concessions on regional issues and Iran’s missile program. This approach reinforced Tehran’s perception that the U.S. remained an unreliable partner, further undermining the chances for renewed diplomacy.

Unreliable Partners Make Bad Negotiators

For decades, Iran has experienced disappointment in negotiations with the U.S., with former President Hassan Rouhani’s JCPOA arguably the most egregious example of a moderate Iranian leader undermined by U.S. backtracking. The subsequent years would bear out that the Biden administration’s early belief that Trump’s “maximum pressure” provided leverage was a major miscalculation, missing the opportunity to revive the JCPOA under Rouhani’s government and instead pushing for unrealistic concessions.

By the time nuclear talks resumed in April 2021, Israel sabotaged negotiations with an attack on Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility, prompting Tehran to increase uranium enrichment to 60%. Iran, wary of U.S. intentions, demanded guarantees of sanctions relief before agreeing to scale back its nuclear program. By June 2021, with the hardline government taking power in Iran, trust further eroded, leading to 15 months of stalled negotiations, with Tehran’s skepticism of U.S. commitment at the heart of the impasse.

However, the situation has since shifted dramatically again, offering a new opening for diplomacy. Kamala Harris, if elected, will have a significant opportunity to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough with Iran. The death of conservative Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi last April triggered a major shift in Iranian politics, culminating in the election of Masoud Pezeshkian, a heart surgeon and former parliamentarian, as Iran’s first reformist president since 2005. Pezeshkian ran on a platform emphasizing diplomacy emphasizing diplomacy to resolve Iran’s foreign tensions and has consistently advocated for the revival of a nuclear agreement to lift sanctions. In a notable move, he reinstated much of Iran’s original nuclear negotiating team, including former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif as Vice President for Strategic Affairs.

Pezeshkian’s outreach faced an immediate test when, on the day of his inauguration, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran. Despite expectations of swift retaliation, Iran showed restraint for two months, allowing Pezeshkian to attend the UN General Assembly, where he emphasized Iran’s desire for de-escalation and called for the U.S. to seize the opportunity for broader diplomacy. However, the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and the lack of progress on a Israel-Hamas ceasefire led Iran to launch a large missile attack on Israel.

Re-Engaging With Iran During The Lame Duck

If Kamala Harris wins the presidency, the lame-duck period and her remaining tenure as vice president will be crucial for setting the stage for broader diplomatic de-escalation with Iran. During this transition, Harris should work with the Biden team to prioritize immediately reducing tensions. A key step would be restoring the informal de-escalatory informal de-escalatory agreement reached in August 2023, which saw Iran freeze its nuclear program’s expansion, release dual-national American prisoners, and restrain its regional allies from attacking U.S. interests in exchange for access to frozen Iranian funds in South Korean banks, which were transferred to Qatar for humanitarian purchases.

This agreement was pivotal because it sought to cap Iran’s nuclear progress, particularly its accumulation of 60% enriched uranium, while also connecting nuclear restrictions to regional security concerns for the first time. Although the deal unraveled after the October 7 Hamas attack, it provides a blueprint for Harris and the Biden team to revive. By offering Iran access to the funds still frozen in Qatar, in exchange for halting its nuclear expansion and committing to regional de-escalation, Harris can lay the foundation for broader diplomacy. Crucially, this should be linked to securing a Gaza ceasefire, which would help reduce tensions in Lebanon and Yemen as well.

Establishing this groundwork would position Harris to engage in serious negotiations with Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, early in her presidency. A new nuclear deal, built on the JCPOA framework, could eliminate the threat of Iran’s nuclear weaponization and stand as a major foreign policy achievement for her administration.

Now, the U.S. and Iran stand at a critical crossroads. The stakes have never been higher, with the specter of total war in the Middle East—along with its far-reaching ramifications, particularly for the global economy—looming large. In this moment, Harris must send the right signals to steer the situation back from the brink. If elected, she must learn from past U.S. failures with Iran, revitalize a diplomatic approach grounded in mutual compromise, and focus on securing core U.S. security interests in dealing with a middling power like Iran.

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Fact checking Trump’s claims about Iran in the debate

In Tuesday’s debate, Donald Trump again claimed that that Iran was “broke” under him and made $300 billion under Biden. In an interview with National Public Radio’s (NPR) Jackie Northam, CIP senior non-resident fellow Sina Toossi debunked these false claims.

SINA TOOSSI: He imposed what he – his administration called the so-called maximum pressure campaign, very stringent economic sanctions.

NORTHAM: That’s Sina Toossi, an Iran specialist at the Center for International Policy. He says Trump’s economic sanctions had an impact.

TOOSSI: Trump’s economic sanctions on Iran hurt the Iranian economy and hurt various key economic indicators affecting Iran’s population and its overall health of the economy.

NORTHAM: Not quite broke as Trump claims, but foreign reserves plummeted, inflation went up, and the middle class shrank.

The Killing of a Hamas Leader Is Part of a Larger War

The assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, presumably by Israel, is the latest deliberate provocation in a series of deliberate provocations to keep the conflict going. Yet every provocation risks wider regional conflagration, and so long as US policy continues to shield Israel from the consequences of its actions, instead of pushing it to the negotiating table, the situation becomes more precarious.

Most crucially, the United States has plenty of existing leverage over the actions of Israel that the Biden administration could pursue, most immediately by adhering to, instead of sidestepping, US legal limits on arms sales to the country.

There’s another way, Matt Duss and Nancy Okail write for The New York Times:

At the time of this writing, a ground war in Lebanon and devastating, sustained missile barrages may still be staved off, but to do so will require deft, immediate diplomacy and actionable changes on the pipeline of arms to Israel. That will necessitate more action than we have seen in the last 10 months, leading us to worry that the conflagration may occur as much as the Americans would like to wish it away.

The time is late, but it is essential now for President Biden to finally apply real pressure to stop this war, by halting the supply of offensive arms, facilitating the return of hostages to Israel and enabling the provision of desperately needed humanitarian aid into Gaza. The United States must state loudly and clearly that the country will no longer support this war. And then show that it means it.

Read the full piece.

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It’s in America’s Interest for Biden to Pursue Diplomacy with Iran – Yes, Right Now

With reform-oriented Masoud Pezeshkian coming to power in Iran, a region on hair-trigger as the Israel/Hamas conflict rages on, and a shifting balance of power in US domestic politics and security needs, now is the time to return to diplomacy with Iran, argues CIP Vice President for Government Affairs Dylan Williams in a new commentary in The Hill. He writes:

Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal remains one of the worst foreign policy blunders in American history, but it’s one we now have a new opportunity to fix.

President Joe Biden should not miss this chance to conclude his presidency with a major security win while assisting Vice President Kamala Harris in setting a popularly supported course for a more peaceful and stable Middle East.

The 2015 multilateral Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) blocked each of Iran’s paths to a nuclear weapon, and its slow collapse in the wake of Trump’s unilateral abandonment has resulted in across-the-board losses for both U.S. and regional security. It not only triggered an entirely predictable (and predicted) expansion of Iran’s uranium enrichment activities but it also bolstered the political fortunes of Iranian hardliners who had warned the United States would not stick to the deal.

While there are clear hurdles to finding a worthwhile agreement in Biden’s remaining time in office, including the nuclear program’s advances following the U.S. withdrawal from the deal, progress is possible, Williams argues:

There remain key elements of the original deal — particularly those relating to unprecedented and permanent inspection and monitoring to prevent weaponization — that would be a major security win to restore.

Perhaps the biggest obstacle, however, would be Iran’s and the rest of the world’s certainty that a deal reached — or progress in negotiations made — under President Biden would be again repudiated by Trump were he to return to office.

While the U.S. presidential election will not be decided based on whether a deal is achieved with Iran, the pursuit and near-finalization of one in the coming months would help motivate and sharpen the choice facing American voters, particularly among independents and Democrats who favored the JCPOA by strong majorities or supermajorities.

Read the full commentary  here.

Iran’s Election Surprise: A Reformist Victory Amid Turmoil

In a dramatic turn of events, Masoud Pezeshkian’s election as Iran’s new president has set the stage for potential change in a nation grappling with deep-seated discontent and geopolitical turmoil. His victory in a snap presidential election, just 50 days after a helicopter crash that claimed the lives of conservative president Ebrahim Raisi, the foreign minister, a governor, and five others, carries significant implications for Iran, the region, and US-Iran relations. This election comes at a critical juncture, with ongoing conflicts such as the Gaza war, the looming threat of its expansion to Lebanon, continued US sanctions on Iran, a rapidly growing Iranian nuclear program, and shifting geopolitical winds challenging the US-dominated global order.

Pezeshkian’s victory is particularly noteworthy given Iran’s political system, which does not hold free or fair elections and is heavily influenced by unelected institutions and theocratic bodies. The Islamic Republic, born from the 1979 revolution that overthrew the US-backed Shah, has been characterized by a persistent power struggle between its republican factions, which advocate for greater political inclusion and reform, and its religiously fundamentalist and ideological factions, which prioritize theocratic governance and strict adherence to revolutionary principles. This internal tension has shaped Iran’s domestic and foreign policies, creating an often contentious political environment.

This election highlighted the enduring clash within the Islamic Republic’s political landscape, and was set against a backdrop of widespread discontent among Iranians. Many citizens are profoundly disillusioned or actively opposed to a political system that has imposed severe economic hardships, social and political restrictions, including pervasive internet censorship, and the enforcement of traditional religious norms like mandatory hijab, in an increasingly secular society. The political environment has also become more insular in recent years, with reformist and moderate figures who once played significant roles becoming largely marginalized.

Pezeshkian’s victory is significant on multiple levels. His approval to run by the Guardian Council—a 12-member body of clerics and jurists that vets candidates—marked the first time in years that a prominent reformist was allowed to seek the presidency. Pezeshkian, a five-term parliamentarian and former health minister in the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami, has represented Tabriz in northwestern Iran, near the Turkish border, where his core constituency includes Iranian Azeris and Kurds, reflecting his own ethnic heritage.

Speculation abounds regarding the motivations behind the Guardian Council, and by extension the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in allowing Pezeshkian to run. It was likely an attempt to increase voter turnout, which had dropped to historic lows in uncompetitive elections since 2021. The Guardian Council approved six candidates, with Pezeshkian being the only reformist, and his main competitors being hardline conservatives.
 

His approval to run by the Guardian Council—a 12-member body of clerics and jurists that vets candidates—marked the first time in years that a prominent reformist was allowed to seek the presidency.

The election’s outcome, however, likely deviated from the Guardian Council’s expectations. The first round saw a new historic low turnout of 39.93%, a reflection of the electorate’s deep-seated apathy and disillusionment. However, amid intense rivalry among conservatives, Pezeshkian emerged as the frontrunner, with Saeed Jalili, a staunch hardliner, advancing to the second round. This result shocked the Iranian political landscape, as historically, lower turnout has typically benefited conservative candidates.

In the second round, Pezeshkian, representing the republican wing of the Islamic Republic, faced off against Jalili, who advocated for autarky and a return to the 1979 revolutionary ideology. The results delivered another surprise: turnout increased to 49.68%.

A critical aspect of this election was the electorate’s strategic behavior. Two key groups emerged: those who actively voted for Pezeshkian in both rounds and those who abstained strategically in the first round but participated in the second. The former rejected Jalili’s ideology, while the latter, through calculated abstention, significantly influenced the outcome and sent an undeniable message to the authorities. By abstaining initially, they sent a message of discontent, and the subsequent participation of part of this constituency ensured Pezeshkian’s victory while maintaining their protest voice and signaling ongoing dissatisfaction.
 

By abstaining initially, [second-round voters] sent a message of discontent, and the subsequent participation of part of this constituency ensured Pezeshkian’s victory while maintaining their protest voice and signaling ongoing dissatisfaction.

Looking ahead, Pezeshkian faces numerous challenges. He ran on a platform calling for an end to mandatory hijab enforcement, easing social restrictions, opening up the political arena, and pursuing constructive international relations, including with the West. During debates, he emphasized the debilitating impact of sanctions and the need for negotiations to lift them. He defended the 2015 nuclear deal, abandoned by the Trump administration, which reimposed US sanctions and decimated the political capital of centrist former president Hassan Rouhani. He also criticized hardliners for actions that he said immensely harmed the country, such as attacks on the Saudi and British embassies.

Hardliners and unelected institutions in Iran will undoubtedly try to obstruct Pezeshkian’s reformist efforts. Their influence, coupled with continued policies of sanctions and regime change from hawkish forces in the US, Israel, and Europe, presents significant challenges. Yet, the Iranian electorate has made its stance unmistakably clear: it rejects extremism and desires a better quality of life, both domestically and through constructive international engagement. Pezeshkian’s platform, centered on economic revitalization and improving diplomatic relations, resonates deeply with the aspirations of many Iranians. This election signals a major moment in Iran, reflecting a collective yearning for progressive change and a break from the past.

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