The funeral of Ayatollah Khamenei is the Islamic Republic’s biggest political ritual since the funeral of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 and one of the most consequential political events in the Islamic Republic’s history. Coming after the U.S.-Israel war on Iran, it marks both the end of one era and the beginning of another.
Every aspect of the funeral has been carefully choreographed. Its scale, symbolism, religious rituals, foreign attendance, and even the route of the procession communicate different messages to different audiences. Like other major state ceremonies in the Islamic Republic, the funeral serves not only to honor the dead but also to shape the political landscape for the living.
Domestically, the central message is continuity. The country’s Supreme Leader was killed in the U.S.-Israel war on Iran, yet the Islamic Republic seeks to demonstrate that its institutions remain intact, succession has taken place, and the state continues to function despite the gravest external challenge it has faced in decades. The funeral projects order rather than uncertainty, stability rather than crisis.
It is also a demonstration of resilience. By portraying Ayatollah Khamenei as a martyr who died during a foreign aggression, the leadership is framing the U.S.-Israel war on Iran as one of national resistance rather than mere survival. The message to supporters is that sacrifice has strengthened, not weakened, the Islamic Republic.
Religious Symbolism
Religiously, the funeral draws on the powerful symbolism of Shi’a mourning, reinforcing the close relationship between political authority and religious legitimacy. Its timing added another powerful layer of symbolism. Islamic tradition generally calls for burying the deceased as soon as possible, but the U.S.-Israel war on Iran delayed the funeral by weeks, allowing the leadership to transform it into a much larger political and religious event.
Held during Muharram, the holiest month of mourning in the Shi’a calendar, the ceremonies deliberately drew on themes of sacrifice, injustice, victimhood, and martyrdom that lie at the heart of Shi’a religious memory. Those themes were reinforced by the highly publicized presence of Ayatollah Khamenei’s family, including his young grandchild, connecting the family’s personal loss to the broader national narrative of war, resistance, and sacrifice.
Regional and Global Signals
Regionally and internationally, the funeral also carried different messages. To supporters and allies, it reassured them that the Islamic Republic remained intact despite the war and the loss of its highest leader. To rivals, it signaled that Iran had absorbed a devastating blow without political collapse. To the United States and Israel, it sought to demonstrate that military pressure had not dismantled the Iranian state or fractured its governing institutions.
The attendance list itself offered a snapshot of Iran’s postwar geopolitical position. The presence of friendly governments and members of what Tehran calls the “Axis of Resistance” underscored the partnerships Iran considers strategically important after the war. Equally telling were the absences. Few European governments sent senior representatives, reflecting Tehran’s view that Europe had aligned politically with the United States and Israel during the conflict. Some Persian Gulf Arab states also kept their representation limited, illustrating the limits of regional rapprochement after a direct war. Attendance — and equally, absence — became a visible marker of Iran’s postwar diplomatic alignments.
The funeral’s regional dimension extended beyond diplomacy. The decision to take Ayatollah Khamenei’s funeral procession to Iraq before his burial linked Iran’s political leadership to the holy Shi’a cities of Najaf and Karbala, reinforcing both his religious stature and Iran’s enduring influence across the wider Shi’a world.
“The Islamic Republic’s unifying theme is that the U.S.-Israeli regime change war has failed. Domestically, they enjoy broad popular support and national unity. Militarily, they remain strong. Politically, they will continue to resist Western aggression, the MOU with Trump notwithstanding,” Nader Hashemi, Professor of Political Science at Georgetown University told CIP.
Perhaps the most striking image, however, was someone who never appeared. Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, remained out of public view throughout the ceremonies. Security concerns following the war, together with reported injuries sustained in the strike that killed Ayatollah Khamenei, and years of careful image management, likely contributed to his absence. Unlike Ayatollah Khomeini or Ayatollah Khamenei before him, he assumes leadership without decades of public visibility or a well-established political persona.
His absence highlights one of the defining challenges of the postwar transition: protecting the country’s highest authority while gradually building his public legitimacy. That balancing act may become one of the first major tests of the post-Ayatollah Khamenei era.
War, Society, and Domestic Politics
The funeral also offered a window into how the U.S.-Israel war on Iran has reshaped Iranian society and politics, at least for now.
One of the war’s most immediate consequences has been a rally-around-the-flag effect. External military attack tends to strengthen national cohesion, and Iran has been no exception. For supporters of the Islamic Republic, the war reinforced long-held beliefs that the country faces an existential external threat and that resistance remains necessary. The funeral became an extension of that narrative, honoring not only Ayatollah Khamenei but also those killed in the war and presenting their deaths as sacrifices made in defense of the nation.
The impact, however, extends beyond the Islamic Republic’s traditional support base. Many Iranians who oppose the political system also opposed the U.S.-Israel war, viewing it as an attack on Iran rather than simply on its leadership. For them, nationalism and patriotism do not necessarily translate into support for the Islamic Republic. Rather, they reflect a broader attachment to Iran’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national dignity. A large funeral crowd, therefore, should not automatically be interpreted as broader political support for the state. It may equally reflect grief, religious conviction, patriotism, or rejection of foreign military intervention.
The war has also temporarily reshaped Iran’s domestic political landscape. External conflict naturally pushes internal divisions into the background as national security becomes the overriding concern. Political space has narrowed, security has tightened, and organized dissent has largely been pushed off the streets.
That should not be mistaken for the disappearance of public grievances. The economic hardships, political frustrations, social demands, and calls for greater freedoms that fueled repeated waves of protest over the past decade remain unresolved. They have not disappeared; they have simply become less visible during wartime. Once the immediate security environment recedes, many of those demands are likely to resurface.
The funeral therefore should not be read as evidence that Iran’s internal political debates have ended. Rather, it reflects a temporary shift in national priorities. History shows that societies under external attack often postpone internal confrontation until the immediate threat has passed, and Iran is unlikely to be an exception.
A Transition and an Uncertain Future
The funeral also marks the beginning of a new political chapter. Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei inherits a country transformed by war, a region undergoing rapid geopolitical change, and a political system entering its first leadership transition in more than three decades. His leadership will be judged not only by how he preserves continuity but also by how he addresses the political, economic, and social challenges that long predate the war.
In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, the funeral appears to have achieved its principal objectives. It projected continuity after the loss of the country’s highest authority, reassured supporters, signaled resilience to adversaries, and reminded allies that Iran remains a central regional actor despite the U.S.-Israel war on Iran.
Whether those messages endure will depend less on the symbolism of the funeral than on what follows. As wartime emotions recede, Iran’s leadership will once again confront familiar challenges: rebuilding the economy, addressing public demands, navigating relations with the United States, maintaining regional deterrence, and establishing the authority of a new Supreme Leader.
The funeral closes one chapter in the history of the Islamic Republic. Whether the next chapter is defined by continuity, adaptation, or deeper transformation will depend not on the symbolism of the funeral, but on the choices the leadership makes after the mourning ends.
June 15, 2026–In response to reports that the United States and Iran have reached a ceasefire agreement to be signed by the end of the week, the Center for International Policy’s Executive Vice President Matt Duss issued the following statement:
“With news of a ceasefire agreement to end the disastrous and unnecessary US-Israeli war on Iran, the tragic failure of Donald Trump’s Iran policy has now played out exactly as antiwar critics warned it would.
“Trump said that his war on Iran would be quick, decisive and force the regime to totally capitulate or collapse. We warned it would become a quagmire that would fail to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program, ignite a regional conflict that could threaten the global economy, further strengthen the Iranian regime’s hold on power and cost thousands of lives–including American servicemembers. We were right.
“This diplomatic agreement is critically needed to bring the disaster to an end, and must be fully and swiftly implemented. Nonetheless, the United States will be left in a weakened strategic position – not because of the contents of this agreement, but because of the utter failure of the reckless approach taken by Trump at the urging of pro-war groups in Washington, and a racist, corrupt Israeli Prime Minister.
“US lawmakers from both parties should support the agreement to end this historic and completely avoidable foreign policy disaster. Just as importantly, both Congress and the White House must end the definitively failed approach of ever-increasing sanctions and belligerence toward Iran, and seek to build on this new opening for diplomacy to address the full range of issues–as well as potential opportunities–in the US-Iran relationship.”
The two-week uneasy ceasefire between the United States, Israel and Iran was set to end Tuesday April 21, and holds tenuously as of publication. In the media reports of talks about talks and of concessions float, while Iranians inside and outside the country are taking it day by day. A video blogger from Tehran posts images of the city, saying “We breathe and gulp down the air, like a drowning man who surfaces briefly, knowing he will be subsumed again soon…We live the lives we never lived, knowing we may never live them.”
As the uneasy truce continues, commentators and analysts the world over focus on ‘who won’? As if the month of missiles and bombs barreling into homes and hospitals was a high-stakes football match, destined to have a winner and loser.
Wars are never so simple. They are fought on many fronts: the operational and strategic, the narrative and societal. On most levels, this war has surprised the world.
Keeping Score
Operationally, the Trump administration expected its shock and awe assassinations of key Iranian figures on the first day of the war to wrap things up quickly. Instead, the killing of the 100 children in the schoolyard in Minab grabbed the headlines. Within days, the Iranian forces managed to extract a toll against US military and naval assets accumulated in the Persian Gulf. Reports of the US aircraft carrier the Gerald Ford limping to port with sewage problems and a purported fire in the laundry room spread widely, while commentators claimed that Iranian drones damaged the behemoth. Iranian media claimed that missile attacks forced the retreat of the USS Abraham Lincoln from a position 350 km off the coast of Iran to a 1100 km position. Tactically the Iranians deployed a decentralized security system yielding better resilience, despite the 30,000 missiles and bombs that the US and Israel dropped on the country in the first 25 days. The Iranian regime also revealed a sophisticated array of missiles with accurate targeting capacity. It is textbook asymmetrical warfare. Iran, by far the weaker military power, ‘wins’ with every punch and bruise landed while every hit or retreat the US and Israel take is a loss.
Strategically, the Iranian regime gained the upper hand at least for now. Knowing it could not dominate the nuclear-armed US and Israel militarily, Iran opted to target the US’s weakest spot – the global economy – and trust in the status quo of a world dominated by the US. By controlling the Straits of Hormuz, Iran pinched the world, and the world cried out in economic pain.
Meanwhile the US has shot many an own goal geostrategically. Its European allies, already offended by Trump’s derision regarding their contributions to NATO, his grasp at Greenland, and his tariffs, were wary of being dragged into another deadly and endless war in the Middle East. The Nordics spoke out first, followed by Spain, France, Italy and Austria. Even the British Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, overly amenable to appeasing the US, found himself struggling to avoid speaking against Trump, while still trying to protect his ‘special relationship’. Russia has benefitted, now no longer the only one of the UN Security Council Permanent Five members waging an illegal aggressive war on another UN member state – a clear breach of the UN Charter. China has quietly ascended, diplomatically rising above the fray and benefitting economically. Its ships have clear passage through the Straits of Hormuz, with the Yuen as a currency of choice for those seeking to get ships through the Iranian-controlled waters.
As for the narrative of war, Iran has shocked the world with its sophistication and humor. The West, wrapped up in its own perception of the Iranian leadership as the Mad Mullahs and Ayatollah Khamenei as the be all and end all, was ill-prepared for the reality. In any other dictatorship – or even democracy, the assassination of the long-standing leader and other senior political and military figures would topple the government. In Iran though Khamenei’s death was a moment in time. The system had anticipated it, absorbed it and carried on. The ‘crazy ayatollahs’, it turns out, are not crazy. But they played into the image as it disarmed their adversaries.
As the war and peace negotiations unfold, the Iranian state has been represented by experienced diplomatic and military strategists who know that as the weaker military entity, they need to understand their more powerful adversaries in depth. The late Ali Larijani, the senior figure directing policy, had a PhD in Western Philosophy. He, like others, knew he was on the assassination list, and yet did not go underground. Foreign minister Abbas Araqchi and Speaker Mohammad Baquer Qalibaf may be loathed and revered in equal measure domestically, but on the world stage they have demonstrated resolve– especially in comparison to their European and American counterparts. Even the robotic sounding spokesman for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) built a following with his ability to communicate in Farsi, Arabic, English and Hebrew. Iranian President Pezeshkian, a surgeon by profession, has been performing surgery. He sent a four-page letter directly to the American people referencing the French philosopher, Alexis de Tocqueville, of whom he wrote “I am sure most Americans have read”.
Meanwhile the American President’s message was: “Open the Fuckin’ Strait, you crazy bastards, or you’ll be living in Hell”. As adversaries go, and given his rantings against the Iranian civilization, and the Pope, Donald Trump has proven to be the best enemy any country could wish for.
On social media too, Iranians set new standards for propaganda, fact and narratives. The Legomen videos, produced at a fast clip with over 2 billion views, are a source of entertainment and information for many. The Iranian embassies’ humorous trolling of the US has changed many observers’ perceptions of the Iranian state. According to the New York Times, they have invented ‘slopaganda’ – a new form of state messaging, blending propaganda with trolling to appeal to GenZ audiences globally.
If we are treating war as a horrific game, in these realms the score is 3-Nil to Iran.
Uneven Terrain
It is in the domain of real life that such scorekeeping becomes untenable. Hidden from view is the societal dimensions and impact on the people and nation. If Americans experienced the war at all in the past month, at most, it was as a price increase at the gas pump, or as videos showing fighting across the globe.. The college students went on their annual Spring Break pilgrimage to Florida. Neither Harvard nor MIT, the Statue of Liberty nor the Golden Gate bridge, Dulles Airport nor Reagan National were affected. No iconic national stadium was hit, no schools were destroyed, no hospitals bombed. The National Health Institute, the country’s premier center for medical research, was unscathed. In towns and cities where steel mills still work, petro chemical plants operate or nuclear power plants hum day and night, there was no fear of chemicals or radiation spewing in the air and water, no distribution of iodine tablets in case of radiation leaks, no children evacuated from hospitals in anticipation of strikes against the electricity and water grids.
Day labourers and salaried people continued their lives, never worrying about their day’s pay suffering from the conflict. As usual in America, many gambled on the war, making money, losing money with every day that passed. The Pentagon’s always opaque and never audited accounting system obscures the monetary cost of war, but the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington based think tank, estimated $11.6 billion for the first 6 days of the war. Others have tallied the month-long cost at $25-35 billion dollars. The administration’s demand for $200 billion from Congress however, indicates serious longer term and hidden costs. Yet, America the nation, Americans as people, have barely noticed. The war is another foreign policy folly, a ‘bad idea’ as J.D Vance said, but nothing seen or felt at home. In the nation’s capital, the Cherry Blossom Season brought in the crowds. As Tehran was being carpet bombed, restaurants in Georgetown were packed with locals and out of towners.
In Iran a different story unfolded. Behind the bravado of the embassy tweets and LEGOmen videos, the harsh reality of war “in real life” is unmissable. The bombed-out rubble of apartment buildings, the carcasses of national institutions like the Pasteur Institute for Health – Iran’s NIH, Sharif University – the MIT of Iran – heritage sites like the Chehel Sotoon Palace in Esfahan, and Tehran’s Rafia-Nia synagogue and the mangled ruins of steel, gas, and petrochemical plants reveal the true burden of the war.
Tehran’s army of street sweepers are out every day in their signature orange jumpsuits, wielding their brooms of twig and twain, clearing dust and rubble. Alongside them the volunteers of the Red Crescent society, Iran’s branch of the international federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC), continue to assist civilians. The state, as reported by the Wall Street Journal, is providing reparations where it can, to those who lost their homes. But it is a drop in the bucket.
Ordinary Iranians, men and women, the elderly and the children – born and unborn- carry the true effects of this war on their bodies and in their damaged lungs and traumatized souls. Over 3000 lost their lives, tens of thousands were injured. Families are traumatized. Parents of the children of the Minab Elementary school that the US targeted with tomahawk missiles reportedly sleep in the graveyards alongside their dead children, unable to leave them alone in the dark. Estimates of the unemployed range between 100,000 to 300,000, all in an economy already impoverished by the toxic mix of international sanctions and domestic corruption and mismanagement.
As a civilization, we lost iconic national sites that held so many memories of our lives long gone.
The bombs destroyed 30 hospitals and 600 schools. Industrial facilities, the engine of the nation, are gone, no longer providing jobs and insurance for thousands of workers. The soil, air and water near the bombed-out oil depots and petro-chemical plants will likely be polluted for decades to come. On Gheshm Island, where water desalination plants were hit, the fragile UNESCO biodiversity site is likely damaged forever too.
Aftermaths and Upheavals
In January, Israel and Reza Pahlavi, the deposed Shah’s son, weaponized Iranians’ aspirations for freedom and dignity as a justification for war, even though most Iranians never had a say in the matter. But Iranians and Iran the nation are the wars’ greatest losers.
Politically too, the fall out is detrimental for Iranians. The regime that is so reviled has revitalized its public image and its hold on power. Thanks to the US-Israel assassinations, Khamenei-the-father has ascended to martyrdom and Khamenei-the-son has risen to leadership – a position he craved but would never have attained without this war.
Despite the war, the Iranian state pursued its domestic political opponents. Women’s Rights activist Nasrin Sotoudeh was re-arrested. Calls for the release of political prisoners go unheeded. The judiciary, led by Mohsen Ejai, feared and loathed in equal measure, continues to invoke the death penalty.
When the dust settles, Iranians will face two grim outcomes. If the regime does not survive, the Iranian state will be decimated, and the country’s territorial integrity will be lost. A nation of 93 million torn apart will have implications for the region and the world. Even a small fraction of the population flowing out as refugees to Turkey and across the Mediterranean will cause an already overburdened humanitarian crisis to break.
If the regime does survive, it will be bloodied, bruised and still paranoid, about foreign infiltration. It will be an ugly reckoning as the state will likely exact a heavy price from dissident and oppositional voices, accusing them of being agents of the US or Israel. Already there is talk of expropriating the Iranian homes of diaspora who advocated for war.
This is not the end of the Iranian story, though.
The regime will also be left to face the people. This public is a formidable force, whose struggle for change and liberation dates back over a century and will continue. Iranians are aspirational by DNA. They want a better life and work hard to achieve it. They look outwards to the West for liberties and the East for economic opportunities. Though they face a state that has wielded its monopoly on violence both physically and structurally, they do not bow. As a civilization the Iranian identity is also rooted in pluralism and independence. Iranians are intolerant of bullies — be they external or internal. In the face of overpowering physical might and violence, their greatest talent is in changing the language and rules of the game.
The public demonstrated this on April 9th. When the US threatened to bomb away the “Iranian civilization”, the Tar musician, Ali Ghamsari, sat alone on the hillside in front of Tehran’s electricity plant, playing music to ward away the spirits of violence. In Dezful women and children stood along a bridge dating back to 255 AD, holding hands to protect it. Around the country, Iranians converged around power plants and bridges. Threaten us and we will stand, was their response to the might of the US military.
It is the same spirit that fueled the Women, Life, Freedom movement in 2022. Then the brute force was the regime itself, and the nonviolent spirit of the protesters – mothers and daughters, with their brothers and fathers standing alongside them – eroded its power. Like water on rock.
The women’s victory against the mandatory hijab was not simply a social issue. It was a blow to the ideological identity of the state, because the hijab was the most visible and physical symbol and tool of its repression and attempted control of women.
The WLF movement is not yet completed, with the other two demands of that powerful trifecta – Life and Freedom – still in motion.
The demand for ‘Life’ is foundational. It is the ability to live with dignity, to work and have a livelihood, to afford a family and a life. The sanctions regime combined with the corruption it exacerbated and the mismanagement that is inherent in this system of governance, has mired people in an economic bog of inflation and joblessness. The war and the damage have caused significant regression. But the silver lining – if this ceasefire evolves into a peace deal – could be the revocation of sanctions, breathing new life into the economy.
As for freedom, the war paused this too. But just as women’s rights have been won culturally in every home, the legal changes needed to give Iranians greater social and political freedoms will come. In other countries the laws exist providing rights and protections that are often unacceptable to wide swathes of society and culture. In Iran, the reverse is true. The sheer force of social change has overridden the anachronistic theocratic laws that govern people’s lives. The age of marriage may be 13 by Sharia law, but the civic code requires national identity cards for marriage – that are issued at 15 years of age, while the average age of marriage among Iranian women is 25. In typical practical asymmetrical Iranian fashion, the strategy for change has not been to confront – it has been to override, undermine and erode the obstacles.
For decades, proponents of regime change in Iran pursued a narrative akin to a Hollywood political action thriller with caricature heroes and villains, espionage and warfare. But the story of Iran is a slow paced, nuanced human drama where right and wrong, good and evil coexist, merging and changing, challenging our perception with every turn. The enduring character is the Iranian soul, rooted in this ancient land, whose drive is to evolve and survive to absorb the good and the bad but never give up its inner essence. Centuries ago the Arabs brought Islam but Iran emerged with Shi’ism. The Moguls came as barbarians but transformed into lovers of Persian architecture and poetry. The Islamic Republic came but it too is being challenged-slowly and inside out. But if we follow the people’s lead, the change will come. Then, Iran, the nation and the civilization can claim victory.
For now, that dream is caught in the lungs of those who hold their breath from this day to the next, in equal measures of hope and dread.
What next?
Below are three recommendations to policy makers:
Peace: Militarized regime change is a failed policy. The ceasefire needs to be sustained and expanded to a comprehensive agreement including the removal of sanctions to enable ordinary Iranians to secure their livelihoods. Spoilers on both sides will try to scuttle – with arguments of “let’s finish the job”, but this is a recipe for endless war and devastation regionally and globally. The US and the wider international community has a once in a generation opportunity for a grand bargain to bring peace and security for Iran, Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon. It is a matter of political will, vision and courage.
Life: Given the depth of mistrust, there needs to be a recalibration of relations with the Iranian state to build confidence: politically security-wise and economically. There should be a coalition-based approach to engage Iran to reintegrate into world AND address domestic human rights issues such as: freeing political prisoners, suspending death penalty, stopping the seizure of assets and businesses and supporting recovery and restoration – especially for the unemployed, health and education institutions,, heritage sites, civilian manufacturing, housing and heritage sites which have been destroyed.
Freedom: Iran needs a national dialogue, truth and reconciliation process for a transformed future. Countless Iranians of every generation, across social strata are traumatized and fearful. This causes and enables societal polarization that the extremists will exploit. But if this trend is reversed, the space for transformation opens to envision an Iran for all Iranians. The depth of state violence needs to be addressed to enable accountability, reparations, memorialization and transformation of laws to guarantee equality and freedom. An inclusive process – comprising differing political forces, regional, ethnic, generational and equal representation from men and women is needed to collectively envision the future. It must be homegrown but Iranians could benefit from the experience of others, notably South Africa, Colombia, Yemen and elsewhere.
Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, MBE, is the British-Iranian Founder and CEO of the International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN). She has 30 years of global experience as peace strategist, is an architect of UN SR Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and was the first Gender and Inclusion Expert on the UN’s Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisors.
April 7, 2026 – Center for International Policy President & CEO Nancy Okail issued the following statement in response to President Trump’s escalating threats against the Iranian people:
“President Trump’s genocidal threats against Iran, including that “a whole civilization may die tonight,” shows he has lost control of an illegal and unnecessary war that he recklessly started. His pledge to launch a major assault specifically targeting civilian infrastructure across Iran is an announcement of an intent to commit wholesale war crimes.
“Partner countries, cabinet officials and Congress must do everything in their power to prevent this slaughter and further civilian deaths, regional escalation and global economic turmoil.
“U.S. allies who have not already done so should immediately prohibit the U.S. military from using their territory, including their airspace, in connection with further attacks on Iran. Trump administration officials, as well as commanders in the U.S. Armed Forces, should uphold their oaths by refusing to carry out unlawful orders issued by the president or others on his behalf.
“Congress should immediately reconvene to pass a War Powers Resolution disengaging U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities against Iran. Lawmakers should also make clear that they will not support any supplemental appropriation whatsoever to fund this unauthorized war.
“It should also be made clear that there must be accountability for those who started this illegal war of choice and committed war crimes in its prosecution. The failure to hold decisionmakers accountable for the U.S. invasion of Iraq and enabling Israel’s genocide in Gaza has led to this extremely dangerous moment in which a lawless president is threatening an entire people with destruction. Upholding the rule of law and basic decency requires that this illegal war end and those responsible for it face justice.”
David Cortright is a visiting scholar at Cornell University’s Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies and professor emeritus at Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.
The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Iran Deal (JCPOA) was an historic agreement that established significant constraints on Iran’s nuclear program. The core bargain involved the acceptance of nuclear restrictions and transparency measures by Iran in return for the lifting of nonproliferation sanctions imposed by the US and UN Security Council. It was the result of several years of intensive negotiations with Iran led by the US, with the involvement of with the involvement of Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China and the European Union. Iran made significant concessions in accepting the agreement and complied fully with its terms.
In 2013 Iran accepted and complied with an interim agreement, the Joint Plan of Action prefiguring the final accord, which required Tehran to restrict its uranium program and accept an enlarged International Atomic Energy Agency inspection regime. Iran complied with the interim agreement, building trust and laying the foundations for the final, more extensive joint comprehensive agreement.1
The JCPOA blocked Iran’s pathway to developing nuclear weapons and provided unprecedented monitoring and verification systems for assuring implementation. According to a 2017 public statement by dozens of former arms control officials and weapons inspectors, the JCPOA2
dramatically reduced the risk posed by Iran’s nuclear program and mandated unprecedented Iran Deal and transparency measures that make it very likely that any possible future effort by Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, even a clandestine program, would be detected promptly. By blocking Iran’s potential pathways to nuclear weapons, the JCPOA has also decreased the likelihood of destabilizing nuclear competition in the region.
Details of the agreement
Under the terms of the JCPOA Iran dismantled more than 13,000 centrifuges and placed them in monitored storage. It shipped more than 11 tons of low-enriched uranium, 98% of its stockpile, out of the country.
Iran also did the following:
Dismantled most of its centrifuges and reduced the number of operating centrifuges to 5,060 IR-1 machines for a ten-year period.
Agreed to cap the level of uranium enrichment for 15 years at 3.67 percent uranium-235, the threshold for medical use and far below the 90% level required for nuclear fission.
For 15 years, confined enrichment to the Natanz site.
Ceased the production of additional IR-1 centrifuges for a decade
Maintained a lowered stockpile of uranium of all types equivalent to 300 kilograms.3
Iran’s potential pathway to a plutonium bomb was shut down. The core of its heavy-water reactor at Arak was removed and disabled. The facility was reconfigured with Russian and Chinese assistance so that it could not produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.4 Plutonium production fell ten-fold. Iran agreed to refrain from research or work on reprocessing spent fuel to extract plutonium for potential weapons for at least 15 years.
The JCPOA provided guarantees that Iran would not be able to have a nuclear weapon for at least a period of 15 years. To verify these terms, Iran accepted “accept the kind of inspections that no other country in the world has ever accepted”the kind of inspections that no other country in the world has had to experience, as Ali Vaez, the Iran project director at the International Crisis Group, stated.5
Verification
In signing the JCPOA Iran agreed to the most comprehensive and intrusive IAEA weapons inspection system ever negotiated.6 In all previous nuclear weapons inspections, the focus had been on fissile material, to verify that nuclear materials were being used only for peaceful purposes and could not be diverted to bomb production. The JCPOA went beyond this approach to look at potential bomb-making equipment. As Ali Vaez put it, inspectors examined “every nut and bolt” that could be used for centrifuges or other machinery involved in Iran’s nuclear production.
The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol established with the JCPOA created procedures granting IAEA full access to Iranian nuclear sites and other sites where undeclared activities were indicated. Under the terms of the agreement, scheduled to last 15 years, the IAEA had the right to access any site in Iran, including prompt entry to suspicious sites, in some cases within 24 hours.7 The agreement “undoubtedly placed Iran’s nuclear program under broader and stricter safeguards than existed before the accord,” wrote Olli Heinonen.8 The nuclear material monitoring mechanisms of the agreement were “robust.”
When Iran confirmed its acceptance of these terms, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2231 (July 2015) lifting sanctions.9 The resolution created the legal framework for member states to engage in economic trade, investment, banking, and travel with Iran. The termination of sanctions was the quid pro quo that motivated Iran to accept these strict limitations to its nuclear program.
Compliance
The record shows that Iran complied with the terms of the JCPOA.10 In testimony before the US Congress, officials from the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the US intelligence community stated that Iran was abiding by the agreement. In April 2018, the State Department’s official report on the agreement said Iran is “transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing the JCPOA” and reported no material breach of the agreement.11
The IAEA issued more than a dozen reports on Iranian compliance from 2016 through 2018 and found no evidence of substantive Iranian violations of the agreement.12 The reports described consistent Iranian fulfillment of its obligations under the agreement. Typical was the IAEA report of June 6, 2018,13 issued soon after the announcement of US withdrawal from the agreement. The report made clear that, contrary to claims by the Trump administration, Iranian officials were still implementing their obligations. Its findings included the following:
Iran’s stockpile of low enriched uranium at that time was 123.9 kg, below the 300 kg limit set by the accord.
The number of installed IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz remained below the 5,060 limit set by the agreement.
Iran enriched uranium only to 3.67 percent uranium-235, the limit set by the deal.
The stockpile of heavy water of 120.3 metric tons was below the negotiated 130 metric ton limit.
IAEA monitoring extended to all nuclear facilities, research and development activities, and all associated mining, milling and industrial production facilities. It is significant that the IAEA was able to measure stockpiles to the nearest 100 grams and enrichment levels to 3 figures. This was an indication of accuracy and added intelligence value of enhanced IAEA inspections and reporting.14
Official validation
Many senior U.S. government officials and nuclear experts recognized the intelligence and security benefits of the JCPOA and urged the White House to continue to comply with the agreement. Former Republican Senator Daniel Coats, the Director of National Intelligence, stated in the directorate’s May 2017 Worldwide Threat Assessment that the JCPOA has “enhanced the transparency of Iran’s nuclear activities” and “extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about a year.”15 Prior to commencing negotiations with Iran in 2013, that timeline would have been 2-3 months.
In October, 2017, Defense Secretary James Mattis confirmed that Iran was complying with the nuclear accord. When asked by then Rep. Ruben Gallego of the House Armed Services Committee if Iran was compliant, Mattis replied, “I believe fundamentally they are.”16 In September 2017, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Iran was complying with the JCPOA and that withdrawal would have “unfortunate” ripple effects.17 Former Secretary of State Colin Powell described the JCPOA as “a pretty good deal” with a “very rigorous verification regime.”18 These and other security concerns were brushed aside in the decision to withdraw from the accord.
Positive assessments of Iranian compliance also came from the governments of Britain, France, and Germany. Conservative British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson said breaking the agreement would be a “mistake.” Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak said that Iran “kept the letter of the agreement quite systematically.”19
In October 2017, President Trump charged that Iran “has committed multiple violations” of the agreement and was preventing IAEA inspectors from doing their job. The website FactCheck.Org thoroughly debunked the claims. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano issued a statement that “the IAEA has had access to all locations it needed to visit. … As I have reported to the Board of Governors, the nuclear-related commitments undertaken by Iran under the JCPOA are being implemented.”20
Rejection
Evidence and informed opinion notwithstanding, on May 8, 2017 the White House officially reneged on the Iran deal and announced US withdrawal from the JCPOA.21 U.S. sanctions were reimposed and intensified. It was a day of infamy in the history of nuclear nonproliferation.
Iran continued to comply with the JCPOA into 2019, but in the face of continuing sanctions and hostility from Washington, Tehran abandoned its policies of nuclear restraint and began enriching uranium to higher levels. The country produced substantial amounts of higher enriched uranium, bringing their stockpile closer to levels that could be further enriched for the production of nuclear weapons. While IAEA inspectors remained in Iran, they issued alarming reports of Iran’s expanding enrichment program. A May 2025 BBC report cited an IAEA assessment that Iran possessed over 400kg of uranium enriched to 60% purity – far above the level used for civilian purposes. This was a nearly 50% increase in three months.22
These were dangerous developments that increased tensions in the region. They provided the justification Israel and the United States used to attack Iranian nuclear production sites during the 12-day war of June 2025.23 Following the 12-day war, the Iranian government halted its cooperation with the IAEA and suspended verification visits at sites illegally bombed in June in violation of IAEA Safeguards agreements.24 Tehran allowed IAEA inspectors back for site visits at the civilian Tehran Research Reactor.25
Although Trump said the June 2025 attacks obliterated Tehran’s nuclear capacities, the US joined Israel on February 28 2026 in renewed strikes against Iran’s nuclear capabilities, launching a devastating war that continues as of this writing.
10 United States Congress. 2018, June 6. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, U.S. House of Representatives. Protecting America from a bad deal: Ending US participation in the nuclear agreement with Iran. Testimony of James Walsh. https://oversight.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/Walsh-Iran-testimony-6.6.18-fin.pdf.
12 International Crisis Group, The Iran Deal at Two: A Status Report, Report No. 181/Midde East & North Africa, 18 January, 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/iran/181-iran-nuclear-deal-two-status-report; see also Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)”, GOV/INF/2016/1, 16 January 2016; GOV/2016/8, 26 February 2016; GOV/2016/23, 27 May 2016; GOV/2016/46, 8 September 2016; GOV/2016/55, 9 November 2016; GOV/2017/10, 24 February 2017; GOV/2017/24, 2 June 2017; GOV/2017/35, 31 August 2017; and GOV/2017/48, 13 November 2017. Also see “Secretary-General report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)”, S/2016/589, 12 July 2016; S/2016/1136, 30 December 2016; S/2017/515, 20 June 2017; S/2017/2010, 8 December 2017.
19 All quotes from Walsh, United States Congress. 2018, June 6. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, U.S. House of Representatives. Protecting America from a bad deal: Ending US participation in the nuclear agreement with Iran. Testimony of James Walsh. https://oversight.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/Walsh-Iran-testimony-6.6.18-fin.pdf.
Trump’s most consistent stated objective for launching his war against Iran is to prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons. It is an end that many supporters of the war believe can only be achieved through force. Negotiations and diplomatic agreements were tried in the past, they argue, and failed.
Trump never wanted diplomacy to have a chance. He made that abundantly clear during his first term when in 2018 he reneged on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. That agreement was effectively blocking Iran’s path to the development of nuclear weapons when the White House pulled the plug. (A documented account of the JCPOA is provided here as an historical annex.)
The administration’s disregard for diplomacy was evident in the weeks preceding the February 28 start of war. Discussions were underway, with significant Iranian concessions on the table. Mediators and close observers of the talks believed progress was being made, but the US and Israel proceeded with military action. A similar pattern played out in June 2025 with the U.S. – Iran talks preceding the 12-day war. These negotiations were cut short when Israel launched military strikes on Iran and Iran retaliated.
Last resort?
That negotiations were taking place up to days before the launch of the war undermines any claim that Trump’s war of choice was a last resort to avert future harm. The harm that the war was intended to prevent, Iran’s possible future development and use of a nuclear weapon, was not imminent, nor was stopping it only possible through the use of military force. Ethical principles on the use of force hold that military action against an adversary is permissible only as a last resort, if other viable means of countering aggressive threats have been tried and found wanting.
Most successes in nonproliferation policy are the result of diplomatic bargaining and the deft use of threats, sanctions and incentives to induce cooperation from potential proliferating states. These means were working before Trump walked the United States out of the JCPOA, and they have been effective means to halt a nuclear program on other cases. Diplomacy should be thoroughly explored before any consideration of the use of force. This is especially true in the Iran case where diplomacy has been effective in the past, and active discussions were underway prior to the attack.
If the threat from an adversary is imminent and the risk of attack is grave, diplomatic options may not be feasible or morally appropriate. If the adversary shows no interest in negotiated solutions, that may also reduce the utility of diplomacy in achieving the desired outcome. Neither of these conditions applied in this case.
No imminent threat of nuclear weapons existed in Iran. Tehran increased the level of uranium enrichment in recent years and has a stockpile of near weapons grade enriched uranium, but it was not currently enriching and had made no conscious effort to create a nuclear weapon. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi stated on March 2 that his agency did not see a “structured program to manufacture nuclear weapons.” The 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US intelligence community stated “We continue to assess Iran is not building a nuclear weapon.” The recently released 2026 threats report omits that sentence, but it does not include an assessment that Iran made the decision to weaponize.
A potential breakthrough?
Twice in the last year the United States started military action in the midst of negotiations that might have placed tighter limits on Iran’s nuclear program. US military threats in each instance prompted backlash among certain factions in Tehran but they also quickened Iranian diplomatic activity and in the recent round prompted concessions to avoid war.
The Geneva talks prior to February 28 were significant in showing Iran’s apparent willingness to curtail its nuclear program. Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi told reporters after the last round of talks on February 26 that the parties made “good progress” in reaching agreement. Araghchi reported that technical teams would meet the following Monday in Vienna to work out the details. “It was one of our best negotiating sessions,” he added. The mediator of the talks, Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi, also reported hopefully, by declaring that the United States and Iran made “substantial progress” toward a nuclear deal. IAEA Director Rossi was less optimistic in his assessment but said there was a possibility of an agreement and confirmed that technical talks were scheduled.
Indications from press statements and interviews at the time suggest that Iran offered significant concessions that went beyond anything they had proposed previously, in some respects surpassing the limits established in the 2015 JCPOA. On offer was a plan for substantially curtailing uranium under international inspection.
Negotiators offered a three-to-five year pause of uranium enrichment and a pledge not to accumulate enriched uranium gas. They agreed that no stockpiles of highly enriched uranium would be built up in the future.
They agreed to blend down highly enriched uranium under the supervision of the IAEA, irreversibly reducing their 440kg stockpile of 60% uranium to lower levels.
They accepted comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight.
Al Busaidi summarized the Iranian package this way: “zero accumulation, zero stockpiling, and full verification.” Iran’s proposals were presented in a seven-page memo and accompanying annex, which Araghchi showed to US envoy Steve Witkoff but did not allow him to keep.
The British security adviser and experienced mediator, Jonathan Powell, was present in Geneva at the talks. British officials who were briefed on the Iranian offer said they were impressed that Iran was prepared to make the proposed deal permanent, unlike the JCPOA, with no cut-off dates or sunset clauses.
In addition, Iranian diplomats dangled the option of a “commercial bonanza” if the US signed an agreement, no doubt appealing to Trump’s penchant for trade deals. Deputy foreign minister Hamid Ghanbari told Iranian businesspeople that the US would be given the chance to participate in a future civil nuclear program in Iran, as well as joint interests in oil and gas, investments in mining, and even the purchase of civilian aircraft.
It is impossible to know how serious Iranian officials were in offering these proposals. They were negotiating with a figurative gun to their heads and multiple US Aircraft Carrier Groups in a threatening position, and were likely desperate to continue negotiations that would avoid war. No doubt there were nonstarters among their proposals, but they included an important gem: the offer to halt and curtail enrichment. The Omanis believed this proposal was a breakthrough that meant agreement was within reach.
The Iranians were willing to give President Trump more than they gave President Obama in the JCPOA, said Ali Vaez. If Trump wanted a better deal than what Obama achieved, it was available.
The failure of the White House to follow up these Iranian diplomatic offers was a colossal act of diplomatic incompetence. It was a sign of the Trump administration’s willful disregard for negotiating a peaceful resolution of the crisis.
As reports of the talks were being circulated, Israeli and US bombing began, shattering whatever prospects existed for a diplomatic solution. The US-Israeli attack seemed intended to derail negotiations at a potentially crucial moment. The strikes that were targeted at sites in Iran were exploding at the bargaining table in Geneva.
Amateur hour
Trump’s disdain for diplomacy was evident in his choice of envoy Steve Witkoff and his son-in-law Jared Kushner as US negotiators. Tehran sent its Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, an experienced diplomatic player. Washington sent the clowns, uninformed and inexperienced minions with no knowledge or interest in the matters at hand.
When the latest round of talks began in Oman in early February, Witkoff committed the faux pas of inviting Admiral Brad Cooper, the head of US Central Command, to join him in full uniform. Witkoff’s explanation was that “he just happened to be in the neighborhood”. The admiral was politely asked to leave by the Omani hosts.
In media appearances during the talks Witkoff made it clear that he did not have the technical expertise or diplomatic experience for effective diplomacy. His statements were riddled with errors and showed that he was out of his depth technically.
At one point, Witkoff expressed surprise that Iran was producing centrifuges, which it has done for decades. He and Kushner wrongly described the use of 20% enriched uranium at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) as a bomb threat. The facility, well known to nuclear scientists and nonproliferation experts, was built by the United States and has been used for civilian research for nearly six decades.
The ignorance of Witkoff and Kushner and their mischaracterizations of Iran’s positions and programs likely influenced Trump’s assessment that talks were not progressing and that Iran was not negotiating seriously. A Gulf diplomat who was close to the talks said the Americans acted as if they were “Israeli assets that had conspired to force the US president into entering a war.”
The end?
The consequences of this war for the future of diplomacy are dire. Trump has poisoned the well once again, this time at the cost of more than a thousand Iranian lives and the deaths of the regime’s top leaders. It’s unlikely that the surviving leaders will rush to return to the bargaining table with Washington or accept a climb-down in their security objectives without countervailing US concessions.
US and Israeli assaults have reduced Tehran’s strategic options to survival and revenge. This may stir an impulse to play the remaining ultimate card. The tragic irony is that a war supposedly to prevent Iran from building a bomb may increase the propensity to do just that.
David Cortright is a visiting scholar at Cornell University’s Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies and professor emeritus at Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.
Senior Non-Resident Fellow Sina Toossi writes on the evolving trajectory of U.S.–Iran relations after the 2025 conflict, outlining four paths that could shape the region’s future.
What comes after a war that “shattered long-held assumptions”? Is the United States pursuing containment, negotiation, or something closer to regime change? In this analysis, Toossi maps out four plausible scenarios, from sustained escalation and fragile diplomacy to a potential nuclear breakout or a long-term strategy of endurance.
“Escalation offers the illusion of control while courting disaster.”
Each path carries its own risks: a cycle of confrontation that could spiral into regional war, negotiations that hinge on politically difficult compromises, or a shift toward strategic patience as Iran deepens ties with China and Russia. But as this piece argues, the real question lies beneath these scenarios, what outcome U.S. policy is actually designed to produce, and whether that vision is sustainable.
President and CEO, Nancy Okail, explains how accepting false narratives about U.S. strikes on Iran will not prevent war, but instead normalizes unauthorized military action and erodes accountability.
When Donald Trump authorized strikes on nuclear sites in Iran, the justification was immediate: strategic necessity, decisive success. But as this piece underscores, “quietly accepting the president’s false narrative will not prevent more war—it normalizes it.”
Five weeks after denouncing interventionism in Riyadh, Trump repeated the very pattern he criticized—joining a long line of presidents who have used selective intelligence and bypassed meaningful oversight. Claims that Iran’s capabilities were “obliterated” remain contested, while the risk of nuclear escalation may have increased.
“This hypocrisy is not incidental—it is structural.” The danger is not just unilateral action, but public and political complicity in accepting distorted narratives. If left unchecked, this dynamic erodes accountability and legitimizes deception as a tool of war.
Senior Non-Resident Fellow Sina Toossi new opinion piece explains why U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran will not end its nuclear program or trigger regime change, and may instead deepen regional instability
Following joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, the narrative has centered on strength and deterrence. But as Toossi argues, this approach reflects a deeper strategic failure.
“Iran is not a problem that can be bombed into submission.”
Despite significant damage, Iran’s nuclear infrastructure remains intact, its leadership unified, and public sentiment increasingly shaped by a “rally-around-the-flag” effect. Rather than forcing collapse, military escalation risks accelerating nuclear ambitions and entrenching resistance.
Toossi makes the case that decades of coercion have failed—and that without a shift toward diplomacy, the cycle of escalation will only continue.
(Washington, D.C.) – In response to President Donald Trump’s executive actions on Tuesday to deny U.S. funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA); again withdraw the United States from the UN Human Rights Council; and reinstate “maximum pressure” policies on Iran, the Center for International Policy’s Vice President for Government Affairs Dylan Williams issued the following statement:
“While overshadowed by his appalling comments proposing that the United States undertake ethnic cleansing in Gaza, the cruel and destabilizing actions on Middle East policy taken yesterday by President Trump also risk reigniting large-scale conflict in the region and hamstringing his chances of achieving the major diplomatic deals he has spoken about seeking. While these steps to deny Palestinian civilians critical humanitarian aid, undermine human rights and impoverish the Iranian people may be intended as a gift basket to visiting Israeli Prime Minister and wanted war criminal Benjamin Netanyahu, they are in fact a series of self-defeating moves that undermine U.S. interests in the Middle East and around the world.
“Trump’s move to extend the U.S. defunding of UNRWA without offering any plan or resources for replacing its critical functions is as harmful to Middle East stability as it is inhumane. It is unconscionable to deny civilians who have suffered the horrors of months of siege, displacement and bombardment in Gaza and ongoing violence and deprivation in the West Bank basic supplies and services. Governments throughout the region, including those that are key U.S. and Israeli security partners, will further struggle to meet the needs of Palestinian refugees in their territory, opening the door to rising tensions and unrest.
“Relatedly, once again withdrawing the United States from the UN Human Rights Council sends a clear signal of unaccountability for violations of international law to every dictator, warlord and rights abuser in the world. At a moment when protecting civilian rights and respect for the rule of law are rightly being touted as red lines in places like Lebanon and Syria, the United States is acting to delegitimize the work of those tasked by the international community to uphold those rules. It advances the assault by far-right autocrats against multilateral institutions and norms, further undermining an international system that the Global South already regards as profoundly inconsistent and unsustainable.
“Likewise, Trump’s return to the failed ‘maximum pressure’ policy with Iran – apparently against his own reservations – embraces the foolhardy anti-diplomacy, pro-war positions of former advisors like John Bolton and Mike Pompeo, whose approach blew up any chance Trump had of getting a new anti-nuclear deal with Iran. Thanks to U.S. sanctions and belligerent moves after Trump’s breach of the Iran deal in his first term, as well as the Biden Administration’s decision to add to those sanctions and not take advantage of an early diplomatic window for restoring the agreement, Iran is now closer to being able to obtain nuclear weapons than ever before. Trump seemed to understand that he was given bad advice in his first administration, but is now making the same mistake again, despite promising his supporters he prioritizes avoiding wars of choice. Unfortunately, millions in the region – including thousands of American soldiers and other personnel – may end up paying the price for that mistake.”
