The funeral of Ayatollah Khamenei is the Islamic Republic’s biggest political ritual since the funeral of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 and one of the most consequential political events in the Islamic Republic’s history. Coming after the U.S.-Israel war on Iran, it marks both the end of one era and the beginning of another.
Every aspect of the funeral has been carefully choreographed. Its scale, symbolism, religious rituals, foreign attendance, and even the route of the procession communicate different messages to different audiences. Like other major state ceremonies in the Islamic Republic, the funeral serves not only to honor the dead but also to shape the political landscape for the living.
Domestically, the central message is continuity. The country’s Supreme Leader was killed in the U.S.-Israel war on Iran, yet the Islamic Republic seeks to demonstrate that its institutions remain intact, succession has taken place, and the state continues to function despite the gravest external challenge it has faced in decades. The funeral projects order rather than uncertainty, stability rather than crisis.
It is also a demonstration of resilience. By portraying Ayatollah Khamenei as a martyr who died during a foreign aggression, the leadership is framing the U.S.-Israel war on Iran as one of national resistance rather than mere survival. The message to supporters is that sacrifice has strengthened, not weakened, the Islamic Republic.
Religious Symbolism
Religiously, the funeral draws on the powerful symbolism of Shi’a mourning, reinforcing the close relationship between political authority and religious legitimacy. Its timing added another powerful layer of symbolism. Islamic tradition generally calls for burying the deceased as soon as possible, but the U.S.-Israel war on Iran delayed the funeral by weeks, allowing the leadership to transform it into a much larger political and religious event.
Held during Muharram, the holiest month of mourning in the Shi’a calendar, the ceremonies deliberately drew on themes of sacrifice, injustice, victimhood, and martyrdom that lie at the heart of Shi’a religious memory. Those themes were reinforced by the highly publicized presence of Ayatollah Khamenei’s family, including his young grandchild, connecting the family’s personal loss to the broader national narrative of war, resistance, and sacrifice.
Regional and Global Signals
Regionally and internationally, the funeral also carried different messages. To supporters and allies, it reassured them that the Islamic Republic remained intact despite the war and the loss of its highest leader. To rivals, it signaled that Iran had absorbed a devastating blow without political collapse. To the United States and Israel, it sought to demonstrate that military pressure had not dismantled the Iranian state or fractured its governing institutions.
The attendance list itself offered a snapshot of Iran’s postwar geopolitical position. The presence of friendly governments and members of what Tehran calls the “Axis of Resistance” underscored the partnerships Iran considers strategically important after the war. Equally telling were the absences. Few European governments sent senior representatives, reflecting Tehran’s view that Europe had aligned politically with the United States and Israel during the conflict. Some Persian Gulf Arab states also kept their representation limited, illustrating the limits of regional rapprochement after a direct war. Attendance — and equally, absence — became a visible marker of Iran’s postwar diplomatic alignments.
The funeral’s regional dimension extended beyond diplomacy. The decision to take Ayatollah Khamenei’s funeral procession to Iraq before his burial linked Iran’s political leadership to the holy Shi’a cities of Najaf and Karbala, reinforcing both his religious stature and Iran’s enduring influence across the wider Shi’a world.
“The Islamic Republic’s unifying theme is that the U.S.-Israeli regime change war has failed. Domestically, they enjoy broad popular support and national unity. Militarily, they remain strong. Politically, they will continue to resist Western aggression, the MOU with Trump notwithstanding,” Nader Hashemi, Professor of Political Science at Georgetown University told CIP.
Perhaps the most striking image, however, was someone who never appeared. Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, remained out of public view throughout the ceremonies. Security concerns following the war, together with reported injuries sustained in the strike that killed Ayatollah Khamenei, and years of careful image management, likely contributed to his absence. Unlike Ayatollah Khomeini or Ayatollah Khamenei before him, he assumes leadership without decades of public visibility or a well-established political persona.
His absence highlights one of the defining challenges of the postwar transition: protecting the country’s highest authority while gradually building his public legitimacy. That balancing act may become one of the first major tests of the post-Ayatollah Khamenei era.
War, Society, and Domestic Politics
The funeral also offered a window into how the U.S.-Israel war on Iran has reshaped Iranian society and politics, at least for now.
One of the war’s most immediate consequences has been a rally-around-the-flag effect. External military attack tends to strengthen national cohesion, and Iran has been no exception. For supporters of the Islamic Republic, the war reinforced long-held beliefs that the country faces an existential external threat and that resistance remains necessary. The funeral became an extension of that narrative, honoring not only Ayatollah Khamenei but also those killed in the war and presenting their deaths as sacrifices made in defense of the nation.
The impact, however, extends beyond the Islamic Republic’s traditional support base. Many Iranians who oppose the political system also opposed the U.S.-Israel war, viewing it as an attack on Iran rather than simply on its leadership. For them, nationalism and patriotism do not necessarily translate into support for the Islamic Republic. Rather, they reflect a broader attachment to Iran’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national dignity. A large funeral crowd, therefore, should not automatically be interpreted as broader political support for the state. It may equally reflect grief, religious conviction, patriotism, or rejection of foreign military intervention.
The war has also temporarily reshaped Iran’s domestic political landscape. External conflict naturally pushes internal divisions into the background as national security becomes the overriding concern. Political space has narrowed, security has tightened, and organized dissent has largely been pushed off the streets.
That should not be mistaken for the disappearance of public grievances. The economic hardships, political frustrations, social demands, and calls for greater freedoms that fueled repeated waves of protest over the past decade remain unresolved. They have not disappeared; they have simply become less visible during wartime. Once the immediate security environment recedes, many of those demands are likely to resurface.
The funeral therefore should not be read as evidence that Iran’s internal political debates have ended. Rather, it reflects a temporary shift in national priorities. History shows that societies under external attack often postpone internal confrontation until the immediate threat has passed, and Iran is unlikely to be an exception.
A Transition and an Uncertain Future
The funeral also marks the beginning of a new political chapter. Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei inherits a country transformed by war, a region undergoing rapid geopolitical change, and a political system entering its first leadership transition in more than three decades. His leadership will be judged not only by how he preserves continuity but also by how he addresses the political, economic, and social challenges that long predate the war.
In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, the funeral appears to have achieved its principal objectives. It projected continuity after the loss of the country’s highest authority, reassured supporters, signaled resilience to adversaries, and reminded allies that Iran remains a central regional actor despite the U.S.-Israel war on Iran.
Whether those messages endure will depend less on the symbolism of the funeral than on what follows. As wartime emotions recede, Iran’s leadership will once again confront familiar challenges: rebuilding the economy, addressing public demands, navigating relations with the United States, maintaining regional deterrence, and establishing the authority of a new Supreme Leader.
The funeral closes one chapter in the history of the Islamic Republic. Whether the next chapter is defined by continuity, adaptation, or deeper transformation will depend not on the symbolism of the funeral, but on the choices the leadership makes after the mourning ends.
June 15, 2026–In response to reports that the United States and Iran have reached a ceasefire agreement to be signed by the end of the week, the Center for International Policy’s Executive Vice President Matt Duss issued the following statement:
“With news of a ceasefire agreement to end the disastrous and unnecessary US-Israeli war on Iran, the tragic failure of Donald Trump’s Iran policy has now played out exactly as antiwar critics warned it would.
“Trump said that his war on Iran would be quick, decisive and force the regime to totally capitulate or collapse. We warned it would become a quagmire that would fail to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program, ignite a regional conflict that could threaten the global economy, further strengthen the Iranian regime’s hold on power and cost thousands of lives–including American servicemembers. We were right.
“This diplomatic agreement is critically needed to bring the disaster to an end, and must be fully and swiftly implemented. Nonetheless, the United States will be left in a weakened strategic position – not because of the contents of this agreement, but because of the utter failure of the reckless approach taken by Trump at the urging of pro-war groups in Washington, and a racist, corrupt Israeli Prime Minister.
“US lawmakers from both parties should support the agreement to end this historic and completely avoidable foreign policy disaster. Just as importantly, both Congress and the White House must end the definitively failed approach of ever-increasing sanctions and belligerence toward Iran, and seek to build on this new opening for diplomacy to address the full range of issues–as well as potential opportunities–in the US-Iran relationship.”
The two-week uneasy ceasefire between the United States, Israel and Iran was set to end Tuesday April 21, and holds tenuously as of publication. In the media reports of talks about talks and of concessions float, while Iranians inside and outside the country are taking it day by day. A video blogger from Tehran posts images of the city, saying “We breathe and gulp down the air, like a drowning man who surfaces briefly, knowing he will be subsumed again soon…We live the lives we never lived, knowing we may never live them.”
As the uneasy truce continues, commentators and analysts the world over focus on ‘who won’? As if the month of missiles and bombs barreling into homes and hospitals was a high-stakes football match, destined to have a winner and loser.
Wars are never so simple. They are fought on many fronts: the operational and strategic, the narrative and societal. On most levels, this war has surprised the world.
Keeping Score
Operationally, the Trump administration expected its shock and awe assassinations of key Iranian figures on the first day of the war to wrap things up quickly. Instead, the killing of the 100 children in the schoolyard in Minab grabbed the headlines. Within days, the Iranian forces managed to extract a toll against US military and naval assets accumulated in the Persian Gulf. Reports of the US aircraft carrier the Gerald Ford limping to port with sewage problems and a purported fire in the laundry room spread widely, while commentators claimed that Iranian drones damaged the behemoth. Iranian media claimed that missile attacks forced the retreat of the USS Abraham Lincoln from a position 350 km off the coast of Iran to a 1100 km position. Tactically the Iranians deployed a decentralized security system yielding better resilience, despite the 30,000 missiles and bombs that the US and Israel dropped on the country in the first 25 days. The Iranian regime also revealed a sophisticated array of missiles with accurate targeting capacity. It is textbook asymmetrical warfare. Iran, by far the weaker military power, ‘wins’ with every punch and bruise landed while every hit or retreat the US and Israel take is a loss.
Strategically, the Iranian regime gained the upper hand at least for now. Knowing it could not dominate the nuclear-armed US and Israel militarily, Iran opted to target the US’s weakest spot – the global economy – and trust in the status quo of a world dominated by the US. By controlling the Straits of Hormuz, Iran pinched the world, and the world cried out in economic pain.
Meanwhile the US has shot many an own goal geostrategically. Its European allies, already offended by Trump’s derision regarding their contributions to NATO, his grasp at Greenland, and his tariffs, were wary of being dragged into another deadly and endless war in the Middle East. The Nordics spoke out first, followed by Spain, France, Italy and Austria. Even the British Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, overly amenable to appeasing the US, found himself struggling to avoid speaking against Trump, while still trying to protect his ‘special relationship’. Russia has benefitted, now no longer the only one of the UN Security Council Permanent Five members waging an illegal aggressive war on another UN member state – a clear breach of the UN Charter. China has quietly ascended, diplomatically rising above the fray and benefitting economically. Its ships have clear passage through the Straits of Hormuz, with the Yuen as a currency of choice for those seeking to get ships through the Iranian-controlled waters.
As for the narrative of war, Iran has shocked the world with its sophistication and humor. The West, wrapped up in its own perception of the Iranian leadership as the Mad Mullahs and Ayatollah Khamenei as the be all and end all, was ill-prepared for the reality. In any other dictatorship – or even democracy, the assassination of the long-standing leader and other senior political and military figures would topple the government. In Iran though Khamenei’s death was a moment in time. The system had anticipated it, absorbed it and carried on. The ‘crazy ayatollahs’, it turns out, are not crazy. But they played into the image as it disarmed their adversaries.
As the war and peace negotiations unfold, the Iranian state has been represented by experienced diplomatic and military strategists who know that as the weaker military entity, they need to understand their more powerful adversaries in depth. The late Ali Larijani, the senior figure directing policy, had a PhD in Western Philosophy. He, like others, knew he was on the assassination list, and yet did not go underground. Foreign minister Abbas Araqchi and Speaker Mohammad Baquer Qalibaf may be loathed and revered in equal measure domestically, but on the world stage they have demonstrated resolve– especially in comparison to their European and American counterparts. Even the robotic sounding spokesman for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) built a following with his ability to communicate in Farsi, Arabic, English and Hebrew. Iranian President Pezeshkian, a surgeon by profession, has been performing surgery. He sent a four-page letter directly to the American people referencing the French philosopher, Alexis de Tocqueville, of whom he wrote “I am sure most Americans have read”.
Meanwhile the American President’s message was: “Open the Fuckin’ Strait, you crazy bastards, or you’ll be living in Hell”. As adversaries go, and given his rantings against the Iranian civilization, and the Pope, Donald Trump has proven to be the best enemy any country could wish for.
On social media too, Iranians set new standards for propaganda, fact and narratives. The Legomen videos, produced at a fast clip with over 2 billion views, are a source of entertainment and information for many. The Iranian embassies’ humorous trolling of the US has changed many observers’ perceptions of the Iranian state. According to the New York Times, they have invented ‘slopaganda’ – a new form of state messaging, blending propaganda with trolling to appeal to GenZ audiences globally.
If we are treating war as a horrific game, in these realms the score is 3-Nil to Iran.
Uneven Terrain
It is in the domain of real life that such scorekeeping becomes untenable. Hidden from view is the societal dimensions and impact on the people and nation. If Americans experienced the war at all in the past month, at most, it was as a price increase at the gas pump, or as videos showing fighting across the globe.. The college students went on their annual Spring Break pilgrimage to Florida. Neither Harvard nor MIT, the Statue of Liberty nor the Golden Gate bridge, Dulles Airport nor Reagan National were affected. No iconic national stadium was hit, no schools were destroyed, no hospitals bombed. The National Health Institute, the country’s premier center for medical research, was unscathed. In towns and cities where steel mills still work, petro chemical plants operate or nuclear power plants hum day and night, there was no fear of chemicals or radiation spewing in the air and water, no distribution of iodine tablets in case of radiation leaks, no children evacuated from hospitals in anticipation of strikes against the electricity and water grids.
Day labourers and salaried people continued their lives, never worrying about their day’s pay suffering from the conflict. As usual in America, many gambled on the war, making money, losing money with every day that passed. The Pentagon’s always opaque and never audited accounting system obscures the monetary cost of war, but the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington based think tank, estimated $11.6 billion for the first 6 days of the war. Others have tallied the month-long cost at $25-35 billion dollars. The administration’s demand for $200 billion from Congress however, indicates serious longer term and hidden costs. Yet, America the nation, Americans as people, have barely noticed. The war is another foreign policy folly, a ‘bad idea’ as J.D Vance said, but nothing seen or felt at home. In the nation’s capital, the Cherry Blossom Season brought in the crowds. As Tehran was being carpet bombed, restaurants in Georgetown were packed with locals and out of towners.
In Iran a different story unfolded. Behind the bravado of the embassy tweets and LEGOmen videos, the harsh reality of war “in real life” is unmissable. The bombed-out rubble of apartment buildings, the carcasses of national institutions like the Pasteur Institute for Health – Iran’s NIH, Sharif University – the MIT of Iran – heritage sites like the Chehel Sotoon Palace in Esfahan, and Tehran’s Rafia-Nia synagogue and the mangled ruins of steel, gas, and petrochemical plants reveal the true burden of the war.
Tehran’s army of street sweepers are out every day in their signature orange jumpsuits, wielding their brooms of twig and twain, clearing dust and rubble. Alongside them the volunteers of the Red Crescent society, Iran’s branch of the international federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC), continue to assist civilians. The state, as reported by the Wall Street Journal, is providing reparations where it can, to those who lost their homes. But it is a drop in the bucket.
Ordinary Iranians, men and women, the elderly and the children – born and unborn- carry the true effects of this war on their bodies and in their damaged lungs and traumatized souls. Over 3000 lost their lives, tens of thousands were injured. Families are traumatized. Parents of the children of the Minab Elementary school that the US targeted with tomahawk missiles reportedly sleep in the graveyards alongside their dead children, unable to leave them alone in the dark. Estimates of the unemployed range between 100,000 to 300,000, all in an economy already impoverished by the toxic mix of international sanctions and domestic corruption and mismanagement.
As a civilization, we lost iconic national sites that held so many memories of our lives long gone.
The bombs destroyed 30 hospitals and 600 schools. Industrial facilities, the engine of the nation, are gone, no longer providing jobs and insurance for thousands of workers. The soil, air and water near the bombed-out oil depots and petro-chemical plants will likely be polluted for decades to come. On Gheshm Island, where water desalination plants were hit, the fragile UNESCO biodiversity site is likely damaged forever too.
Aftermaths and Upheavals
In January, Israel and Reza Pahlavi, the deposed Shah’s son, weaponized Iranians’ aspirations for freedom and dignity as a justification for war, even though most Iranians never had a say in the matter. But Iranians and Iran the nation are the wars’ greatest losers.
Politically too, the fall out is detrimental for Iranians. The regime that is so reviled has revitalized its public image and its hold on power. Thanks to the US-Israel assassinations, Khamenei-the-father has ascended to martyrdom and Khamenei-the-son has risen to leadership – a position he craved but would never have attained without this war.
Despite the war, the Iranian state pursued its domestic political opponents. Women’s Rights activist Nasrin Sotoudeh was re-arrested. Calls for the release of political prisoners go unheeded. The judiciary, led by Mohsen Ejai, feared and loathed in equal measure, continues to invoke the death penalty.
When the dust settles, Iranians will face two grim outcomes. If the regime does not survive, the Iranian state will be decimated, and the country’s territorial integrity will be lost. A nation of 93 million torn apart will have implications for the region and the world. Even a small fraction of the population flowing out as refugees to Turkey and across the Mediterranean will cause an already overburdened humanitarian crisis to break.
If the regime does survive, it will be bloodied, bruised and still paranoid, about foreign infiltration. It will be an ugly reckoning as the state will likely exact a heavy price from dissident and oppositional voices, accusing them of being agents of the US or Israel. Already there is talk of expropriating the Iranian homes of diaspora who advocated for war.
This is not the end of the Iranian story, though.
The regime will also be left to face the people. This public is a formidable force, whose struggle for change and liberation dates back over a century and will continue. Iranians are aspirational by DNA. They want a better life and work hard to achieve it. They look outwards to the West for liberties and the East for economic opportunities. Though they face a state that has wielded its monopoly on violence both physically and structurally, they do not bow. As a civilization the Iranian identity is also rooted in pluralism and independence. Iranians are intolerant of bullies — be they external or internal. In the face of overpowering physical might and violence, their greatest talent is in changing the language and rules of the game.
The public demonstrated this on April 9th. When the US threatened to bomb away the “Iranian civilization”, the Tar musician, Ali Ghamsari, sat alone on the hillside in front of Tehran’s electricity plant, playing music to ward away the spirits of violence. In Dezful women and children stood along a bridge dating back to 255 AD, holding hands to protect it. Around the country, Iranians converged around power plants and bridges. Threaten us and we will stand, was their response to the might of the US military.
It is the same spirit that fueled the Women, Life, Freedom movement in 2022. Then the brute force was the regime itself, and the nonviolent spirit of the protesters – mothers and daughters, with their brothers and fathers standing alongside them – eroded its power. Like water on rock.
The women’s victory against the mandatory hijab was not simply a social issue. It was a blow to the ideological identity of the state, because the hijab was the most visible and physical symbol and tool of its repression and attempted control of women.
The WLF movement is not yet completed, with the other two demands of that powerful trifecta – Life and Freedom – still in motion.
The demand for ‘Life’ is foundational. It is the ability to live with dignity, to work and have a livelihood, to afford a family and a life. The sanctions regime combined with the corruption it exacerbated and the mismanagement that is inherent in this system of governance, has mired people in an economic bog of inflation and joblessness. The war and the damage have caused significant regression. But the silver lining – if this ceasefire evolves into a peace deal – could be the revocation of sanctions, breathing new life into the economy.
As for freedom, the war paused this too. But just as women’s rights have been won culturally in every home, the legal changes needed to give Iranians greater social and political freedoms will come. In other countries the laws exist providing rights and protections that are often unacceptable to wide swathes of society and culture. In Iran, the reverse is true. The sheer force of social change has overridden the anachronistic theocratic laws that govern people’s lives. The age of marriage may be 13 by Sharia law, but the civic code requires national identity cards for marriage – that are issued at 15 years of age, while the average age of marriage among Iranian women is 25. In typical practical asymmetrical Iranian fashion, the strategy for change has not been to confront – it has been to override, undermine and erode the obstacles.
For decades, proponents of regime change in Iran pursued a narrative akin to a Hollywood political action thriller with caricature heroes and villains, espionage and warfare. But the story of Iran is a slow paced, nuanced human drama where right and wrong, good and evil coexist, merging and changing, challenging our perception with every turn. The enduring character is the Iranian soul, rooted in this ancient land, whose drive is to evolve and survive to absorb the good and the bad but never give up its inner essence. Centuries ago the Arabs brought Islam but Iran emerged with Shi’ism. The Moguls came as barbarians but transformed into lovers of Persian architecture and poetry. The Islamic Republic came but it too is being challenged-slowly and inside out. But if we follow the people’s lead, the change will come. Then, Iran, the nation and the civilization can claim victory.
For now, that dream is caught in the lungs of those who hold their breath from this day to the next, in equal measures of hope and dread.
What next?
Below are three recommendations to policy makers:
Peace: Militarized regime change is a failed policy. The ceasefire needs to be sustained and expanded to a comprehensive agreement including the removal of sanctions to enable ordinary Iranians to secure their livelihoods. Spoilers on both sides will try to scuttle – with arguments of “let’s finish the job”, but this is a recipe for endless war and devastation regionally and globally. The US and the wider international community has a once in a generation opportunity for a grand bargain to bring peace and security for Iran, Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon. It is a matter of political will, vision and courage.
Life: Given the depth of mistrust, there needs to be a recalibration of relations with the Iranian state to build confidence: politically security-wise and economically. There should be a coalition-based approach to engage Iran to reintegrate into world AND address domestic human rights issues such as: freeing political prisoners, suspending death penalty, stopping the seizure of assets and businesses and supporting recovery and restoration – especially for the unemployed, health and education institutions,, heritage sites, civilian manufacturing, housing and heritage sites which have been destroyed.
Freedom: Iran needs a national dialogue, truth and reconciliation process for a transformed future. Countless Iranians of every generation, across social strata are traumatized and fearful. This causes and enables societal polarization that the extremists will exploit. But if this trend is reversed, the space for transformation opens to envision an Iran for all Iranians. The depth of state violence needs to be addressed to enable accountability, reparations, memorialization and transformation of laws to guarantee equality and freedom. An inclusive process – comprising differing political forces, regional, ethnic, generational and equal representation from men and women is needed to collectively envision the future. It must be homegrown but Iranians could benefit from the experience of others, notably South Africa, Colombia, Yemen and elsewhere.
Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, MBE, is the British-Iranian Founder and CEO of the International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN). She has 30 years of global experience as peace strategist, is an architect of UN SR Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and was the first Gender and Inclusion Expert on the UN’s Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisors.
April 7, 2026 – Center for International Policy President & CEO Nancy Okail issued the following statement in response to President Trump’s escalating threats against the Iranian people:
“President Trump’s genocidal threats against Iran, including that “a whole civilization may die tonight,” shows he has lost control of an illegal and unnecessary war that he recklessly started. His pledge to launch a major assault specifically targeting civilian infrastructure across Iran is an announcement of an intent to commit wholesale war crimes.
“Partner countries, cabinet officials and Congress must do everything in their power to prevent this slaughter and further civilian deaths, regional escalation and global economic turmoil.
“U.S. allies who have not already done so should immediately prohibit the U.S. military from using their territory, including their airspace, in connection with further attacks on Iran. Trump administration officials, as well as commanders in the U.S. Armed Forces, should uphold their oaths by refusing to carry out unlawful orders issued by the president or others on his behalf.
“Congress should immediately reconvene to pass a War Powers Resolution disengaging U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities against Iran. Lawmakers should also make clear that they will not support any supplemental appropriation whatsoever to fund this unauthorized war.
“It should also be made clear that there must be accountability for those who started this illegal war of choice and committed war crimes in its prosecution. The failure to hold decisionmakers accountable for the U.S. invasion of Iraq and enabling Israel’s genocide in Gaza has led to this extremely dangerous moment in which a lawless president is threatening an entire people with destruction. Upholding the rule of law and basic decency requires that this illegal war end and those responsible for it face justice.”
David Cortright is a visiting scholar at Cornell University’s Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies and professor emeritus at Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.
The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Iran Deal (JCPOA) was an historic agreement that established significant constraints on Iran’s nuclear program. The core bargain involved the acceptance of nuclear restrictions and transparency measures by Iran in return for the lifting of nonproliferation sanctions imposed by the US and UN Security Council. It was the result of several years of intensive negotiations with Iran led by the US, with the involvement of with the involvement of Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China and the European Union. Iran made significant concessions in accepting the agreement and complied fully with its terms.
In 2013 Iran accepted and complied with an interim agreement, the Joint Plan of Action prefiguring the final accord, which required Tehran to restrict its uranium program and accept an enlarged International Atomic Energy Agency inspection regime. Iran complied with the interim agreement, building trust and laying the foundations for the final, more extensive joint comprehensive agreement.1
The JCPOA blocked Iran’s pathway to developing nuclear weapons and provided unprecedented monitoring and verification systems for assuring implementation. According to a 2017 public statement by dozens of former arms control officials and weapons inspectors, the JCPOA2
dramatically reduced the risk posed by Iran’s nuclear program and mandated unprecedented Iran Deal and transparency measures that make it very likely that any possible future effort by Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, even a clandestine program, would be detected promptly. By blocking Iran’s potential pathways to nuclear weapons, the JCPOA has also decreased the likelihood of destabilizing nuclear competition in the region.
Details of the agreement
Under the terms of the JCPOA Iran dismantled more than 13,000 centrifuges and placed them in monitored storage. It shipped more than 11 tons of low-enriched uranium, 98% of its stockpile, out of the country.
Iran also did the following:
Dismantled most of its centrifuges and reduced the number of operating centrifuges to 5,060 IR-1 machines for a ten-year period.
Agreed to cap the level of uranium enrichment for 15 years at 3.67 percent uranium-235, the threshold for medical use and far below the 90% level required for nuclear fission.
For 15 years, confined enrichment to the Natanz site.
Ceased the production of additional IR-1 centrifuges for a decade
Maintained a lowered stockpile of uranium of all types equivalent to 300 kilograms.3
Iran’s potential pathway to a plutonium bomb was shut down. The core of its heavy-water reactor at Arak was removed and disabled. The facility was reconfigured with Russian and Chinese assistance so that it could not produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.4 Plutonium production fell ten-fold. Iran agreed to refrain from research or work on reprocessing spent fuel to extract plutonium for potential weapons for at least 15 years.
The JCPOA provided guarantees that Iran would not be able to have a nuclear weapon for at least a period of 15 years. To verify these terms, Iran accepted “accept the kind of inspections that no other country in the world has ever accepted”the kind of inspections that no other country in the world has had to experience, as Ali Vaez, the Iran project director at the International Crisis Group, stated.5
Verification
In signing the JCPOA Iran agreed to the most comprehensive and intrusive IAEA weapons inspection system ever negotiated.6 In all previous nuclear weapons inspections, the focus had been on fissile material, to verify that nuclear materials were being used only for peaceful purposes and could not be diverted to bomb production. The JCPOA went beyond this approach to look at potential bomb-making equipment. As Ali Vaez put it, inspectors examined “every nut and bolt” that could be used for centrifuges or other machinery involved in Iran’s nuclear production.
The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol established with the JCPOA created procedures granting IAEA full access to Iranian nuclear sites and other sites where undeclared activities were indicated. Under the terms of the agreement, scheduled to last 15 years, the IAEA had the right to access any site in Iran, including prompt entry to suspicious sites, in some cases within 24 hours.7 The agreement “undoubtedly placed Iran’s nuclear program under broader and stricter safeguards than existed before the accord,” wrote Olli Heinonen.8 The nuclear material monitoring mechanisms of the agreement were “robust.”
When Iran confirmed its acceptance of these terms, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2231 (July 2015) lifting sanctions.9 The resolution created the legal framework for member states to engage in economic trade, investment, banking, and travel with Iran. The termination of sanctions was the quid pro quo that motivated Iran to accept these strict limitations to its nuclear program.
Compliance
The record shows that Iran complied with the terms of the JCPOA.10 In testimony before the US Congress, officials from the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the US intelligence community stated that Iran was abiding by the agreement. In April 2018, the State Department’s official report on the agreement said Iran is “transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing the JCPOA” and reported no material breach of the agreement.11
The IAEA issued more than a dozen reports on Iranian compliance from 2016 through 2018 and found no evidence of substantive Iranian violations of the agreement.12 The reports described consistent Iranian fulfillment of its obligations under the agreement. Typical was the IAEA report of June 6, 2018,13 issued soon after the announcement of US withdrawal from the agreement. The report made clear that, contrary to claims by the Trump administration, Iranian officials were still implementing their obligations. Its findings included the following:
Iran’s stockpile of low enriched uranium at that time was 123.9 kg, below the 300 kg limit set by the accord.
The number of installed IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz remained below the 5,060 limit set by the agreement.
Iran enriched uranium only to 3.67 percent uranium-235, the limit set by the deal.
The stockpile of heavy water of 120.3 metric tons was below the negotiated 130 metric ton limit.
IAEA monitoring extended to all nuclear facilities, research and development activities, and all associated mining, milling and industrial production facilities. It is significant that the IAEA was able to measure stockpiles to the nearest 100 grams and enrichment levels to 3 figures. This was an indication of accuracy and added intelligence value of enhanced IAEA inspections and reporting.14
Official validation
Many senior U.S. government officials and nuclear experts recognized the intelligence and security benefits of the JCPOA and urged the White House to continue to comply with the agreement. Former Republican Senator Daniel Coats, the Director of National Intelligence, stated in the directorate’s May 2017 Worldwide Threat Assessment that the JCPOA has “enhanced the transparency of Iran’s nuclear activities” and “extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about a year.”15 Prior to commencing negotiations with Iran in 2013, that timeline would have been 2-3 months.
In October, 2017, Defense Secretary James Mattis confirmed that Iran was complying with the nuclear accord. When asked by then Rep. Ruben Gallego of the House Armed Services Committee if Iran was compliant, Mattis replied, “I believe fundamentally they are.”16 In September 2017, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Iran was complying with the JCPOA and that withdrawal would have “unfortunate” ripple effects.17 Former Secretary of State Colin Powell described the JCPOA as “a pretty good deal” with a “very rigorous verification regime.”18 These and other security concerns were brushed aside in the decision to withdraw from the accord.
Positive assessments of Iranian compliance also came from the governments of Britain, France, and Germany. Conservative British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson said breaking the agreement would be a “mistake.” Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak said that Iran “kept the letter of the agreement quite systematically.”19
In October 2017, President Trump charged that Iran “has committed multiple violations” of the agreement and was preventing IAEA inspectors from doing their job. The website FactCheck.Org thoroughly debunked the claims. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano issued a statement that “the IAEA has had access to all locations it needed to visit. … As I have reported to the Board of Governors, the nuclear-related commitments undertaken by Iran under the JCPOA are being implemented.”20
Rejection
Evidence and informed opinion notwithstanding, on May 8, 2017 the White House officially reneged on the Iran deal and announced US withdrawal from the JCPOA.21 U.S. sanctions were reimposed and intensified. It was a day of infamy in the history of nuclear nonproliferation.
Iran continued to comply with the JCPOA into 2019, but in the face of continuing sanctions and hostility from Washington, Tehran abandoned its policies of nuclear restraint and began enriching uranium to higher levels. The country produced substantial amounts of higher enriched uranium, bringing their stockpile closer to levels that could be further enriched for the production of nuclear weapons. While IAEA inspectors remained in Iran, they issued alarming reports of Iran’s expanding enrichment program. A May 2025 BBC report cited an IAEA assessment that Iran possessed over 400kg of uranium enriched to 60% purity – far above the level used for civilian purposes. This was a nearly 50% increase in three months.22
These were dangerous developments that increased tensions in the region. They provided the justification Israel and the United States used to attack Iranian nuclear production sites during the 12-day war of June 2025.23 Following the 12-day war, the Iranian government halted its cooperation with the IAEA and suspended verification visits at sites illegally bombed in June in violation of IAEA Safeguards agreements.24 Tehran allowed IAEA inspectors back for site visits at the civilian Tehran Research Reactor.25
Although Trump said the June 2025 attacks obliterated Tehran’s nuclear capacities, the US joined Israel on February 28 2026 in renewed strikes against Iran’s nuclear capabilities, launching a devastating war that continues as of this writing.
10 United States Congress. 2018, June 6. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, U.S. House of Representatives. Protecting America from a bad deal: Ending US participation in the nuclear agreement with Iran. Testimony of James Walsh. https://oversight.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/Walsh-Iran-testimony-6.6.18-fin.pdf.
12 International Crisis Group, The Iran Deal at Two: A Status Report, Report No. 181/Midde East & North Africa, 18 January, 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/iran/181-iran-nuclear-deal-two-status-report; see also Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)”, GOV/INF/2016/1, 16 January 2016; GOV/2016/8, 26 February 2016; GOV/2016/23, 27 May 2016; GOV/2016/46, 8 September 2016; GOV/2016/55, 9 November 2016; GOV/2017/10, 24 February 2017; GOV/2017/24, 2 June 2017; GOV/2017/35, 31 August 2017; and GOV/2017/48, 13 November 2017. Also see “Secretary-General report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)”, S/2016/589, 12 July 2016; S/2016/1136, 30 December 2016; S/2017/515, 20 June 2017; S/2017/2010, 8 December 2017.
19 All quotes from Walsh, United States Congress. 2018, June 6. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, U.S. House of Representatives. Protecting America from a bad deal: Ending US participation in the nuclear agreement with Iran. Testimony of James Walsh. https://oversight.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/Walsh-Iran-testimony-6.6.18-fin.pdf.
Trump’s most consistent stated objective for launching his war against Iran is to prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons. It is an end that many supporters of the war believe can only be achieved through force. Negotiations and diplomatic agreements were tried in the past, they argue, and failed.
Trump never wanted diplomacy to have a chance. He made that abundantly clear during his first term when in 2018 he reneged on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. That agreement was effectively blocking Iran’s path to the development of nuclear weapons when the White House pulled the plug. (A documented account of the JCPOA is provided here as an historical annex.)
The administration’s disregard for diplomacy was evident in the weeks preceding the February 28 start of war. Discussions were underway, with significant Iranian concessions on the table. Mediators and close observers of the talks believed progress was being made, but the US and Israel proceeded with military action. A similar pattern played out in June 2025 with the U.S. – Iran talks preceding the 12-day war. These negotiations were cut short when Israel launched military strikes on Iran and Iran retaliated.
Last resort?
That negotiations were taking place up to days before the launch of the war undermines any claim that Trump’s war of choice was a last resort to avert future harm. The harm that the war was intended to prevent, Iran’s possible future development and use of a nuclear weapon, was not imminent, nor was stopping it only possible through the use of military force. Ethical principles on the use of force hold that military action against an adversary is permissible only as a last resort, if other viable means of countering aggressive threats have been tried and found wanting.
Most successes in nonproliferation policy are the result of diplomatic bargaining and the deft use of threats, sanctions and incentives to induce cooperation from potential proliferating states. These means were working before Trump walked the United States out of the JCPOA, and they have been effective means to halt a nuclear program on other cases. Diplomacy should be thoroughly explored before any consideration of the use of force. This is especially true in the Iran case where diplomacy has been effective in the past, and active discussions were underway prior to the attack.
If the threat from an adversary is imminent and the risk of attack is grave, diplomatic options may not be feasible or morally appropriate. If the adversary shows no interest in negotiated solutions, that may also reduce the utility of diplomacy in achieving the desired outcome. Neither of these conditions applied in this case.
No imminent threat of nuclear weapons existed in Iran. Tehran increased the level of uranium enrichment in recent years and has a stockpile of near weapons grade enriched uranium, but it was not currently enriching and had made no conscious effort to create a nuclear weapon. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi stated on March 2 that his agency did not see a “structured program to manufacture nuclear weapons.” The 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US intelligence community stated “We continue to assess Iran is not building a nuclear weapon.” The recently released 2026 threats report omits that sentence, but it does not include an assessment that Iran made the decision to weaponize.
A potential breakthrough?
Twice in the last year the United States started military action in the midst of negotiations that might have placed tighter limits on Iran’s nuclear program. US military threats in each instance prompted backlash among certain factions in Tehran but they also quickened Iranian diplomatic activity and in the recent round prompted concessions to avoid war.
The Geneva talks prior to February 28 were significant in showing Iran’s apparent willingness to curtail its nuclear program. Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi told reporters after the last round of talks on February 26 that the parties made “good progress” in reaching agreement. Araghchi reported that technical teams would meet the following Monday in Vienna to work out the details. “It was one of our best negotiating sessions,” he added. The mediator of the talks, Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi, also reported hopefully, by declaring that the United States and Iran made “substantial progress” toward a nuclear deal. IAEA Director Rossi was less optimistic in his assessment but said there was a possibility of an agreement and confirmed that technical talks were scheduled.
Indications from press statements and interviews at the time suggest that Iran offered significant concessions that went beyond anything they had proposed previously, in some respects surpassing the limits established in the 2015 JCPOA. On offer was a plan for substantially curtailing uranium under international inspection.
Negotiators offered a three-to-five year pause of uranium enrichment and a pledge not to accumulate enriched uranium gas. They agreed that no stockpiles of highly enriched uranium would be built up in the future.
They agreed to blend down highly enriched uranium under the supervision of the IAEA, irreversibly reducing their 440kg stockpile of 60% uranium to lower levels.
They accepted comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight.
Al Busaidi summarized the Iranian package this way: “zero accumulation, zero stockpiling, and full verification.” Iran’s proposals were presented in a seven-page memo and accompanying annex, which Araghchi showed to US envoy Steve Witkoff but did not allow him to keep.
The British security adviser and experienced mediator, Jonathan Powell, was present in Geneva at the talks. British officials who were briefed on the Iranian offer said they were impressed that Iran was prepared to make the proposed deal permanent, unlike the JCPOA, with no cut-off dates or sunset clauses.
In addition, Iranian diplomats dangled the option of a “commercial bonanza” if the US signed an agreement, no doubt appealing to Trump’s penchant for trade deals. Deputy foreign minister Hamid Ghanbari told Iranian businesspeople that the US would be given the chance to participate in a future civil nuclear program in Iran, as well as joint interests in oil and gas, investments in mining, and even the purchase of civilian aircraft.
It is impossible to know how serious Iranian officials were in offering these proposals. They were negotiating with a figurative gun to their heads and multiple US Aircraft Carrier Groups in a threatening position, and were likely desperate to continue negotiations that would avoid war. No doubt there were nonstarters among their proposals, but they included an important gem: the offer to halt and curtail enrichment. The Omanis believed this proposal was a breakthrough that meant agreement was within reach.
The Iranians were willing to give President Trump more than they gave President Obama in the JCPOA, said Ali Vaez. If Trump wanted a better deal than what Obama achieved, it was available.
The failure of the White House to follow up these Iranian diplomatic offers was a colossal act of diplomatic incompetence. It was a sign of the Trump administration’s willful disregard for negotiating a peaceful resolution of the crisis.
As reports of the talks were being circulated, Israeli and US bombing began, shattering whatever prospects existed for a diplomatic solution. The US-Israeli attack seemed intended to derail negotiations at a potentially crucial moment. The strikes that were targeted at sites in Iran were exploding at the bargaining table in Geneva.
Amateur hour
Trump’s disdain for diplomacy was evident in his choice of envoy Steve Witkoff and his son-in-law Jared Kushner as US negotiators. Tehran sent its Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, an experienced diplomatic player. Washington sent the clowns, uninformed and inexperienced minions with no knowledge or interest in the matters at hand.
When the latest round of talks began in Oman in early February, Witkoff committed the faux pas of inviting Admiral Brad Cooper, the head of US Central Command, to join him in full uniform. Witkoff’s explanation was that “he just happened to be in the neighborhood”. The admiral was politely asked to leave by the Omani hosts.
In media appearances during the talks Witkoff made it clear that he did not have the technical expertise or diplomatic experience for effective diplomacy. His statements were riddled with errors and showed that he was out of his depth technically.
At one point, Witkoff expressed surprise that Iran was producing centrifuges, which it has done for decades. He and Kushner wrongly described the use of 20% enriched uranium at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) as a bomb threat. The facility, well known to nuclear scientists and nonproliferation experts, was built by the United States and has been used for civilian research for nearly six decades.
The ignorance of Witkoff and Kushner and their mischaracterizations of Iran’s positions and programs likely influenced Trump’s assessment that talks were not progressing and that Iran was not negotiating seriously. A Gulf diplomat who was close to the talks said the Americans acted as if they were “Israeli assets that had conspired to force the US president into entering a war.”
The end?
The consequences of this war for the future of diplomacy are dire. Trump has poisoned the well once again, this time at the cost of more than a thousand Iranian lives and the deaths of the regime’s top leaders. It’s unlikely that the surviving leaders will rush to return to the bargaining table with Washington or accept a climb-down in their security objectives without countervailing US concessions.
US and Israeli assaults have reduced Tehran’s strategic options to survival and revenge. This may stir an impulse to play the remaining ultimate card. The tragic irony is that a war supposedly to prevent Iran from building a bomb may increase the propensity to do just that.
David Cortright is a visiting scholar at Cornell University’s Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies and professor emeritus at Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.
In September 2023, the Middle East Institute in Washington DC held a conference – in partnership with the European Council on Foreign Relations – on the topic of the Oslo Accords. The conference commemorated 30 years since Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization Yasir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the Accords on the White House lawn.
The consensus at the conference, however, was somber. It seemed to most participants and speakers that the Oslo Accords had largely failed, entrenching a one-state reality predicated on Palestinian subjugation. In a discussion of possible solutions, a co-panelist at one point argued that the Palestinians would have to wait 50+ years and democratize the Israeli system slowly, as African-Americans once did in the context of the Jim Crow south. I disagreed; based on the palpable anger and frustration among Palestinians at their deteriorating conditions, and some of the trends I saw in public opinion polls, I argued that the Palestinians would be unlikely to wait and pursue such a strategy.
Two weeks later, Hamas attacked Israel on October 7th. The mass violence that many analysts, including myself, had warned about was unfolding. Since then, the Gaza Strip has been entirely destroyed, with 90% of Gazans displaced, likely over 10% of the population killed, and much of the infrastructure decimated. The UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as well as many other human rights organizations around the world including in Israel, have characterized the Israeli war on Gaza as genocide.
If we are to move forward in a fruitful direction from this horror, any future attempt at an enduring peace must be informed by how the failures of past peace processes led to the tragedies of the present.
Why Oslo Failed
The last two years are proof that the Oslo Accords did indeed fail to prevent violence, improve living conditions, or move towards a two-state resolution to the conflict. There are three main reasons why the Oslo effort failed to this extent.
First, the PLO and Israel were not evenly matched prior to the peace process negotiations. One party was a nuclear-armed state with advanced military capacity; the other a national liberation movement on its last leg, having been driven out of Jordan and Lebanon and reeling from dwindling support. And, most importantly, the asymmetry in their positions was not corrected for in the peace process. The PLO recognized the state of Israel and thus accepted the loss of much of historic Palestine, whereas Israel only had to recognize the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people (a fact already internationally recognized by the UN and other relevant parties).
Thus, as Daniel Kurtzer, the former US Ambassador to Israel, has stated since: “The Oslo agreement was full of holes. The mutual recognition was asymmetrical, and that was to hurt the Palestinian negotiating position for years to come.”
Secondly, because the main mediator in this process was the United States, this asymmetry was exacerbated further. As many involved in the negotiations have since confirmed, the US took the position of “acting as Israel’s lawyer,” thus introducing severe bias in the process of mediation and negotiation.
Thirdly, the Oslo process was predicated on shrinking the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a full discussion of self-determination for all Palestinians with the right of return for refugees down into a diminished discussion of possible statehood in remnants of the occupied Palestinian territories. This was in tension with the fact that the Palestinian liberation movement included the aspirations of all Palestinians – including those who were citizens of Israel, who resided in Jerusalem, and who were scattered in diaspora communities across the globe. Oslo reduced this aspiration, and these constituencies, who were previously represented (albeit imperfectly) in the PLO, were no longer parties to the process.
Oslo’s Impact on Palestinian Politics
The Oslo Accords also led to the creation of the Palestinian Authority, which in principle continued to be subordinate to the PLO as a representative body. In reality, the PA sidelined the PLO’s role entirely and became the main relevant actor in Palestinian politics. Moreover, the structure of the Oslo Accords led to the entrenchment of the Palestinian Authority, especially following the second Palestinian uprising from late 2000 to early 2005. In order to ensure that the security threats and “collapse of order” unleashed by the years-long uprising never could happen again, the US helped to expand the PA’s security sector, reducing their role in the occupied territories as a “subcontractor of occupation” while preventing democratic accountability. As a result, Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been unable to impact their leadership or policy direction since 2007, and political elites have increasingly diverged from the will of the people. Most recently, the international community has supported Mahmoud Abbas in his effort to change election laws in order to prevent opposition, Hamas included, from ever winning office again. Thus every part of the Palestinian political landscape is now afflicted with a crisis of legitimacy.
Polling shows this legitimacy crisis clearly. The Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas has remained president since he was first elected in 2005, supported by the US intent on remaking the Middle East region in the aftermath of 9/11. Since then, he has overstayed his term limits. Today more than 80% of Palestinians want him to resign, according to the latest poll. Furthermore, the approval rate for the Palestinian Authority as a whole is 21%. The Hamas government in Gaza does not fare better. In a poll conducted Oct 6, 2023, only 28% of Palestinians in Gaza chose Hamas as their preferred party.
Why the Palestinian Public Matters
These dynamics should be relevant to policymakers around the world involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and negotiations between the two parties. The reasons are two-fold. First, given the international (and specifically American) role in the construction of the Oslo framework and its maintenance at the expense of Palestinian self-determination, many Palestinians blame this state of affairs on international actors and see this as proof that their aspirations are not taken seriously by the international community. American policy for the past three administrations at least would justify this impression, as both President Trump and President Biden pursued Arab-Israeli normalization deals and left the Palestinian issue to fester.
Secondly, the legitimacy crisis is not an issue confined to internal Palestinian politics but impacts the resolution of the conflict. Palestinian political leadership that is seen as illegitimate will not have the mandate to enter into negotiations with Israel, or compromise on any aspect of the conflict. For this reason there is not a great deal of support for any peace plan – whether two-states or one-state. Although 45% of Palestinians say they support a 2-state solution, 56% believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion and 61% believe that the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are “slim or non-existent.” It is clear from these numbers that no political leadership, Palestinian or international, has been able to articulate a doable and serious vision of future peace.
Palestinians are outraged at the genocide in Gaza that has been allowed to unfold, the mass displacement and ethnic cleansing of parts of the West Bank, and the deteriorating conditions of their everyday life even prior to the latest war, which the international community ignored. And the only Palestinian political leadership that is deemed acceptable by international actors is one that is illegitimate at home and among much of the diaspora, and that has not and cannot articulate a political vision for a just resolution to the conflict.
Lessons from Comparative Examples
There is only one way forward from this stagnate state of affairs: taking Palestinian agency and self-determination seriously. To do so, the international community and all relevant actors to this conflict must apply the lessons of prior peace negotiations, not just in Israel/Palestine but around the world. These lessons are: public input, inclusion, and accountability.
In the case of Northern Ireland, all parties to the conflict were included in the peace process. This included armed groups on both sides of the Protestant-Catholic divide. Most importantly, the peace process took public input into account, ensuring not one but two referendums to garner buy-in and legitimacy for the peace process. Both the people of Northern Ireland and the people of the Republic of Ireland voted to approve the Good Friday Agreement. This public input was crucial in moving the process forward, and ultimately ended the sectarian conflict since 1998.
In scenarios of severe violence and genocide, the international community must also ensure accountability for war crimes. The case of Yugoslavia, and the subsequent conflict in Bosnia & Herzegovina, demonstrates the importance of accountability – as well as what happens when accountability is not guaranteed by the peace process. The Serbian leadership responsible for war crimes following Yugoslavia’s breakdown were held accountable, taken to the Hague to answer for their role in the conflict. The international community in that instance demonstrated a commitment to upholding international law and punishing violations of the Geneva Conventions.
However, in Bosnia & Herzegovina, political groups that launched a genocide against Bosniak Muslims were largely rewarded in the peace process, given a semi-autonomous region within the new state. This region, Republica Srbska, continues to destabilize the country and threatens to upend the fragile peace.
The Way Forward
To ensure a successful and sustainable peace process in the case of Israel-Palestine, the international community cannot afford to ignore these lessons. The Palestinian people must have a say in the process – that means ensuring the leadership that represents them is democratically elected, and that means taking seriously their approval of the final contours of an agreement. Moreover, all parties to the conflict must be included to ensure the legitimacy of the process, including armed groups. The inclusion of armed groups in the Northern Ireland case indeed ensured their disarmament, and avoided the emergence of spoilers that threatened the progress of the negotiations. A similar logic can be applied in this case. Palestinian civil society actors have already articulated what this might look like; the Palestinian National Initiative for instance has generated proposals for the democratic renewal of the PLO. The international community must engage with these initiatives seriously.
Thirdly, given the severity of the violence in Gaza, and the almost complete annihilation of life in the Gaza Strip, the international community must ensure the peace process holds the perpetrators accountable. The UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory found Israeli leaders Prime Minister Netanyahu, President Isaac Herzog, and former defense minister Yoav Gallant directly responsible for genocide. One cannot imagine a peace process having any legitimacy without addressing violations of international law and war crimes of this magnitude. Initiatives such as The Hind Rajab Foundation have pursued legal action against “perpetrators, accomplices, and inciters of violence against Palestinians.” Similar attempts to hold war criminals accountable were used in the Syrian case after the civil war, with activists utilizing universal jurisdiction, in particular in European court systems, to pursue Assad-regime criminals around the world. There should be formal support for accountability by governments, rather than rely on civil society actors to fill this gap alone.
Finally, in the Israel-Palestine case, we can also deduce two additional recommendations. First, given that the power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians is so severe, mediation of the peace process must ensure that this power imbalance is accounted for. In previous attempts at Israeli-Palestinian peace, the US did not act as an unbiased mediator – instead heavily weighting the outcome in Israel’s favor time and time again. We now have irrefutable proof that this dynamic only destroyed the possibility of peace, and increased the level of suffering and violence since. In any future process, the US cannot control the process alone.
Secondly, it is important to address all parties to the conflict, and communities that have been ignored in previous iterations of the peace process. As previously mentioned, this includes Palestinians in the diaspora, Palestinian citizens of Israel, and Palestinians in Jerusalem. Inclusion of these communities not only goes farther in legitimizing the process and addressing the full scope of Palestinian aspirations, but also has the added benefit of engaging with communities with different perspectives on, and relationships to, Israeli society.
Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, especially younger generations, have only ever understood Israeli society through the context of violent occupation. Formally including these communities in the peace process thus also has the potential of generating new policy solutions and forcing changes within the Israeli regime as well.
Dana El Kurd is associate professor of political science at the University of Richmond and senior non-resident fellow at the Arab Center Washington. El Kurd is a researcher of Arab and Palestinian politics, with a focus on authoritarianism and US intervention.
Abdelhalim Abdelrahman is a Palestinian-American political analyst, host of the Uncharted Territory Podcast and a Marcellus Policy Fellow alum at the John Quincy Adams Society advocating for a restrained U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East centered around American laws and respect for Palestinian human rights.
Following the October 7th, 2023 attacks, Israel embarked on a series of military operations that human rights organizations, legal experts, and U.N. special rapporteurs recognize as constituting a number of war crimes and other violations of international law, including the crime of genocide. The involvement of US citizens as Israel Defense Forces (IDF) personnel in Gaza–and possibly in other roles in the territory–has raised questions of whether Americans may have committed war crimes in Gaza.
The Guardian published a report in September 2025 on Daniel Rabb, a U.S.–Israeli citizen from Chicago operating as a sniper in Gaza. Raab is part of the Paratrooper Unit 202, a sniper division of the IDF, for which Raab’s parents helped fundraise over $300,000. Raab, reports the Guardian, says he shot Salem Doghmosh “simply because he tried to retrieve the body of his beloved older brother Mohammed.” This goes against International Humanitarian Law regarding the recovery of the dead. The Guardian story also quotes Asa Kasher, co-author of the Israeli Defense Forces’ ethics code, stating that “if you see someone recovering a body or helping a wounded person, that’s a rescue operation, it should be respected. Someone like that should not be shot.”
Accusations that Americans committed war crimes in Gaza have not been limited to those US citizens who served in the IDF. While allowing a trickle of aid into Gaza, Israel’s government prevented the United Nations from delivering aid for much of 2025, instead disbursing lifesaving supplies through the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), created with the involvement of the U.S. Department of State and Israel. However, the United Nations estimated that, by August 1, 2025, over 850 Palestinians in Gaza had been killed near GHF distribution sites, largely from fire by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).
On May 27, 2025, the New York Times reported that the opening of aid distribution sites by the GHF was marred by chaos and gunfire near some of the sites. On June 2, CNN reported that hundreds of Palestinians had received gunshot wounds outside an aid site run by GHF. On July 2nd, the Associated Press reported that two US contractors speaking on condition of anonymity claimed that fellow GHF contractors had “regularly lobbed stun grenades and pepper spray in the direction of the Palestinians.” AP reported that one of the contractors “said bullets were fired in all directions — in the air, into the ground and at times toward the Palestinians, recalling at least one instance where he thought someone had been hit.” Videos provided by one of the contractors “include conversation between English-speaking men discussing how to disperse crowds and encouraging each other after bursts of gunfire,” according to the AP report.
In July 2025, Democracy Now interviewed U.S. Army Veteran Anthony Aguilar about his experience in Gaza with UG Solutions, the security subcontractor working with the GHF. He told Democracy Now that the aid distribution sites had “become death traps.” He also said “[w]e are using indiscriminate force, targeting civilians, escalation of force that goes far beyond the measures of appropriate, against an unarmed, starving population.”
In August, CBS Newsinterviewed another individual claiming to be a GHF whistleblower under the alias “Mike,” who also asserted that American subcontractors and the IDF deliberately targeted Palestinian civilians near aid sites. The GHF vigorously denies the claims that its contractors fired on any Palestinian civilians.
Under the 1996 War Crimes Act, Congress and the Department of State have the authority to investigate and charge citizens and dual nationals who facilitate war crimes. While federal level action is unlikely under the Trump administration, members of Congress, civil society, and groups leading strategic litigation should press to use U.S. law to hold both the Israeli government and individual perpetrators accountable.
The War Crimes Act
Although the United States’ engagement with international war crimes prosecution is complex, under statutory law, U.S. nationals can be held domestically accountable for war crimes. The War Crimes Act, passed in 1996 by unanimous consent in the Senate and voice vote in the House, criminalizes a range of conduct constituting “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions, when committed by U.S. nationals or members of the U.S. armed forces. The scope of the WCA is significant: conduct committed overseas is not exempt from prosecution under U.S. law if the perpetrator is an American national.
Conduct by U.S. citizens and dual nationals in Gaza, like firing on civilians, could constitute a “grave breach” under the Geneva Conventions. This offers a legal basis for the Department of Justice to open WCA investigations against Americans credibly alleged to have committed war crimes.
The DOJ should immediately create a War Crimes Task Force, which would actively investigate credible allegations of war crimes committed by U.S citizens in Gaza. This task force should have expertise in international humanitarian law, open-source forensics, and conflict-zone investigations. This step would make clear that American citizenship is not a means to evade responsibility, and would allow the U.S. government to enforce the War Crimes Act to help prevent future impunity. Such an effort would also likely clear the path for a long-overdue accounting of war crimes committed by people serving in the US military, such as the 151 cases uncovered by The New Yorker and the Pulitzer Center in 2024.
Disarming Dangerous ‘Allies’
While the War Crimes Act allows for charges to be brought against perpetrators, the State Department and Department of Defense are obliged under the Leahy Laws to prevent continued military aid to foreign military units “where there is credible information implicating that unit in the commission of gross violations of human rights”. There is potential for overlap: if an American is serving in a foreign military unit committing abuses, they could be charged under the War Crimes Act, and their unit should be flagged for rigorous vetting under the Leahy Laws, though the crimes need not overlap for either measure to be useful.
The Leahy Laws offer another tool to prevent the use of American weapons in human rights abuses. Initially passed in 1997, and expanded/reaffirmed since, the Leahy Laws prohibit U.S. security assistance to any foreign security force unit “about which” credible information exists of gross violations of human rights, including but not limited to torture, extrajudicial killing, and enforced disappearance. The Leahy laws prevent specific military aid from continuing to be provided to units found in violation, but the laws do not at present ensure such units are barred from receiving assistance given to the foreign country’s military as a whole, after which the distribution of that aid makes it non-traceable, and can leave it in the hands of specific units that violate human rights. Patrick Leahy, the former Senator whose name the Leahy laws bear, argued in spring 2024 that the laws should be applied to Israel. “Unlike for most countries,” he wrote, “U.S. weapons, ammunition and other aid are provided to Israeli security forces in bulk rather than to specific units. The secretary of state is therefore required to regularly inform Israel of any security force unit ineligible for U.S. aid because of having committed a gross violation of human rights, and the Israeli government is obligated to comply with that prohibition.”
To date, the Leahy Laws have been used to impede funding to suspect units in Colombia, Pakistan, Egypt, Ukraine, and elsewhere, but as Leahy himself noted, since “the Leahy law was passed, not a single Israeli security force unit has been deemed ineligible for U.S. aid, despite repeated, credible reports of gross violations of human rights and a pattern of failing to appropriately punish Israeli soldiers and police who violate the rights of Palestinians.”
Congress and State should end that double standard. Accountability and integrity under US law demands that the Leahy conditions should be upheld in every instance, even and especially when friends and allies commit war crimes.
Daniel Raab’s Israeli Sniper Unit 202 should be subject to rigorous Leahy Law vetting, reasserting that U.S. military assistance—training, intelligence, equipment, etc.— can and will be withdrawn on credible allegations of unlawful attacks. Other units responsible for war crimes, like the targeting of civilians, should be identified in the open source or news reporting and similarly be made ineligible for U.S support under the Leahy Laws.
Policy Recommendations
Congress must do its job to ensure oversight and transparency. It should require the State Department to make regular public reports on investigations of U.S. nationals under the War Crimes Act, as well as the results of Leahy vetting. Congress can and should hold oversight hearings to demand the executive branch take action (or explain its inaction) when such violations come to light. The U.S. government should coordinate with U.N. fact-finding missions, NGOs, and international prosecutors and share evidence it has that can be used to corroborate allegations. It should be absolutely clear, through public messaging by the State Department, that U.S. nationals are not exempt from accountability mechanisms for violations committed anywhere.
As the second anniversary of October 7 passes, and the tenuous terms of a ceasefire are once again agreed to, the genocide in Gaza remains a humanitarian and legal crisis. American citizens and nationals have been directly implicated in the violence, raising profound questions of accountability. Washington possesses legal tools, like the War Crimes Act, and legally mandated procedural obligations, like arms withholding under Leahy Laws—but has lacked the political and moral courage to utilize them. Enforcing these statutes, such as conditioning aid, arms embargoes and enhancing transparency, are essential steps toward upholding international law, deterring future violations, and ensuring that American citizenship is never misused as a shield for war crimes.
The United States cannot credibly demand accountability for atrocities in other conflicts (e.g Russian war crimes in Ukraine) while it simultaneously shields Americans who may be complicit in war crimes in Gaza
If serving in a foreign military is a free pass to immunity, then citizenship, and by extension the law, loses meaning. The U.S. must not create that precedent. The threat, however small, of prosecution or conditioned assistance will have a deterrent effect: knowing that one’s military actions may later have legal and reputational consequences will push compliance with IHL.
While the present administration may disregard the harm done to national reputation as undermining U.S. strategic interest, unaddressed accusations of grave human rights violations by U.S. citizens abroad carries real diplomatic risk for Washington. Ignoring it erodes trust with allies and partners that expect and demand the U.S. to uphold its own laws.
Editor’s note: This piece has been updated for clarity and to include the GHF’s denial of claims by cited sources.
September 29, 2025 — Following President Trump’s meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu at the White House, and the Trump administration’s release of a “21-point plan” to end the conflict in Gaza, Matt Duss, Executive Vice-President at the Center for International Policy, released the following statement:
“The world desperately needs an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, whose people have endured unspeakable horror over these past two years. Unfortunately, the 21-point plan released by the Trump administration today, while thankfully walking back from Trump’s previous goal of expelling Gaza’s people, contains numerous opportunities for Netanyahu to renege on his commitments, as he has repeatedly done in the past. It is not clear who has agreed to which terms of Trump’s plan, or whether Trump himself understands what is in it. Trump and Netanyahu’s remarks today were a litany of lies about the last 30 years, not a promising foundation for peace.
“Despite his claim of being close to a deal, Trump’s statement that Israel will have ‘full US backing’ to “‘finish the job’ in Gaza if his plan is not agreed to stood out most clearly. This would be more of what we have seen not only the last nine months, but the last two years, as the United States has unconditionally armed and subsidized a genocide in Gaza.”
“The path to a desperately needed peace remains the same as it has for nearly two years: using leverage and pressure on Israel to achieve a ceasefire that stops its atrocities, frees all hostages, ends the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and supports a real path to Palestinian liberation, without which the region will not know real security.”
